NOTICE.

SINCE 1776, when the thirteen colonies of North America proclaimed their Declaration of Independence and defined the principles of modern democracy, we have beheld the decay or transformation of feudalism almost everywhere in Europe.

In view of such a state of things, the historian and the statesman, without yielding to the promptings of the heart, or to the flights of the imagination, should calmly observe and classify facts and strive to deduce therefrom the laws that regulate the political progress of nations.

If, then, we inquire what forms of government democratic nations may substitute for those of the past, we are naturally led to study the organization of the American republic. In pursuing such researches, the most suitable order to follow is that invariably adopted by the Federal Constitution, as well as the constitutions of the thirty-seven States of the Union. Attention should be given first to the national sovereignty and the supreme power of the people; and then to the organization of the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches of the government.

It has appeared to me, however, that such a work, for which much material has been slowly gathered, might properly be divided into four almost entirely distinct parts, and each of them be treated in a separate publication. Acting upon that impression, I have not hesitated to issue in the first place this monograph on The Executive Power.

The question which it is proposed to examine in the book now submitted to the public is this: How have a democratic people succeeded in organizing an executive power which was, up to a certain point, to take the place elsewhere occupied by

historic royalty, or by that constitutional monarchy of which England has produced the model?

Inasmuch as the knowledge I have acquired of the Constitution of the United States has been principally gained in the course of an intimate association with some eminent men, I desire to mention Senator Charles Sumner, Mr. Caleb Cushing and Senator Schurz as those to whom I am the most indebted.

The literary world of Europe will soon be in possession of the complete works of Mr. Sumner. It will then be able to appreciate the vast learning of this statesman, to understand his superior nature, and to catch at least the faint echo of those austere and eloquent utterances, which I have never heard without being reminded of what the cotemporaries of our Royer-Collard have told us of him.

After Mr. Sumner, I have named that jurisconsult who has never separated the cultivation of letters from the study of law, and whose attention has been alternately directed to the most diverse branches of human knowledge; after having filled the highest political positions to which an American may aspire, he has retired from the arena of political parties, reserving to himself only the right of judging their acts.

Finally, I have spoken of Senator Schurz, a German, naturalized in the United States; he has applied to the study of the institutions of the country, to which he has forever promised allegiance, the rigorous methods of European criticism, and thus imparted those enlarged views and that political philosophy which give to his speeches and writings a lasting value.

I take the liberty to place, under the protection of these distinguished men, the work of which I offer now to the public the first portion.1

WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 18, 1873.

1 The works to which I refer are always quoted, so as to be as accessible as possible to the European reader. Thus, for example, when I have found the decisions of the Supreme Court reprinted in books which could be easily procured, I have cited the latter in preference to the reports of that tribunal.

INTRODUCTION.

THE organization of the Executive Power in a republic offers the greatest difficulties. It should have vigor and capacity to meet the necessities of the government without proving an obstacle to the development of the liberties of the country.

There would seem to be, at first, almost a contradiction between propositions so dissimilar, and yet, if they cannot be harmonized, the republic will either be lost in anarchy or replaced by military despotism.

From the moment when the American people decided that they would thenceforth live under democratic and republican institutions, questions regarding the constitution of the Executive Power were naturally presented for their consideration. The most opposite opinions on the subject were at once expressed, traces of which will be found in the debates which took place in the Constitutional Convention of Philadelphia.1

Alexander Hamilton's plan provided for the vesting of the supreme executive authority in a Governor, to be chosen by electoral colleges, and to serve during good behavior, his authorities and functions to be as follows: To have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed; to have the direction of war, when authorized or begun; to

1 The convention of 1787 deliberated with closed doors. James Madison, one of its members, drew up a summary of these debates, which has been published under the title of "The Madison Papers."