However, I pretend not, as I said, to any great certainty in this case; and especially, as the sentiments of writers upon this subject have been so much on the say, that they could not perfect the worshipper as to his conscience, i. e. make atonement for all his sins, in such a manner, as that he should have no more conscience of sins (chap. x. 2,) or occasion to look for another expiation without being understood to intimate, that they did not extend to the conscience in any degree, or respect? If it should be said, that the apostle's meaning is, that the legal offerings did (as seems at first sight to be implied) perfect the worshipper in other respects, but not at all as to conscience; would observe, that this cannot be his meaning; because those offerings could not, in any respect, perfect the worshipper, in the sense he uses that word, chap. x. 1, 14. Not to observe, that the apostle's design here seems to be, to represent the different value and excellency of the sacrifice of Christ, and of the legal sacrifices; not in respect of their different influence upon conscience in particular, but of the dif ferent extent of their virtue and efficacy in general. However, I hope, it will still be remembered, that when I intimate, that the legal sacrifices might, in some degree, reach the conscience; my meaning is, not that their virtue was at all worthy to be compared with that of the sacrifice of Christ; but only, that they were a means of freeing the mind of the offerer from his apprehension of those evils, for the removal or prevention of which they were offered and that they did this, or which is the same, procured for him so far the remission of his sins, is, I presume, plain from the whole law, and seems to be intimated (not very obscurely) in the 12th verse of the ninth chapter, where our Lord is said (in contradistinction to the levitical sacrifices, which effected only a other side though I must still own, that it is my opinion (but willing at the same time to be better informed) that if we consider the real and precise meaning of the words, or the sense in which they must necessarily be understood, when applied to any sacrifice whatsoever; we shall see reason to think, that the virtue of the levitical sacrifices did so far extend to the conscience, as to free it, in some degree, from guilt, &c. : temporary redemption) by his own blood, to have entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. Those sacrifices indeed were generally offered for the removal of ceremonial guilt and uncleanness ; and therefore their blood is said, by the apostle, ver. 13, to have sanctified (I suppose, in a more especial manner) to the purifying of the flesh as on the other hand, he intimates, ver. 14, that the blood of Christ (by reason of its greater and more extensive virtue, in freeing the mind or conscience from the guilt of all its sins) purges the conscience from dead works entirely, so as to qualify us to draw near to and to serve the living God: but then, as the legal sacrifices were not always offered for the removal of ceremonial guilt and uncleanness; and as moreover that uncleanness was by the law made and constituted such, as to expose those who contracted it (if not prevented by sacrifice) to penal evils; it seems to me, at present however, to be both consistent with what the writer to the Hebrews has said, and agreeable to the legal constitution to suppose, that its sacrifices extended so far to the conscience, as to free it, in some degree, from guilt. I pass on now to your ninth chapter, for as to your eighth, though you have therein explained two or three passages of scripture (not necessary at present to be considered) in a way, which seems to me not so just; yet, as I have little or nothing to object to the other parts of it, I may save myself the trouble of making, and you, sir, that of reading, any remarks upon it. The business of your ninth chapter is, it would seem, to represent and correct some mistakes, which some Christians have fallen into, about the efficacy of Christ's death. The first you take notice of, (154.) may indeed justly be considered as one; and therefore, I shall say nothing more in relation to it, than that I wish, what you have said to correct it may not be without effect. For hardly any thing is more reasonable, or of more important consequence in religion, than that men should entertain amiable and worthy apprehensions of that Being, who is undoubtedly, considered in himself, the best as well as greatest of beings. But the contents of your next paragraph, in which you set yourself to rectify another supposed mistake, it may not be improper to consider more largely. The notion I suppose you refer to, and which you would shew to be groundless, is this; that our Lord by his death satisfied or made satisfaction to the divine justice.* But this sentiment you have been pleased to represent in a light so different from that, in which it is usually represented by judicious and moderate Christians, that as it is maintained by them, it does not appear to be affected by what you have said in this paragraph. To shew that this is not said without grounds, it will be proper to transcribe and examine a part of it at least. You begin it thus; Nor can it be true, 'that by his sufferings he satisfied justice, 'or the law of God. For it is very certain ' and very evident, that justice and law can no otherwise be satisfied than by the 'just and legal punishment of the offend'er.' To which, referring to the word justice in particular, you subjoin in a note as follows; By justice, in this case, is not meant justice as it is an attribute in * That this is the sentiment you mean to overthrow in this paragraph, is, I think, plain from what you say towards the close of it, viz. The scripture never speaks. (nor, in any consistency, can speak) of Christ's satisfy'ing the divine law or justice. Of which I shall take a more particular notice anon. 6 God, or that branch of his moral recti'tude, which we call righteousness: but justice as stinted and directed by law, commanding duty, and denouncing a penalty in case of transgression. Here 'therefore justice and law come to the same thing; only law is the 'rule, and justice is acting according to, or the exe'cution of, that rule.' That is, if I understand you aright, as law is that, which commands duty and denounces a penalty in case of transgression; so justice is, in such a case, the execution of the law or rule, or the infliction (if I may say so) of the denounced penalty upon the transgressor. Now, if this be your meaning, as it seems to be, nothing can be more certain or evident, than that JUSTICE (understanding the word as you have defined it) can no otherwise be satisfied than by the just and legal punishment of the offender: because this is to assert no more than that the executing, in the case of a transgression, the denounced penalty of the offender, can be done no otherwise than by the just and legal punishment of the offender :* but it * It may, perhaps, sir, seem somewhat strange, that the ingenious Mr. Taylor should give occasion, by any |