Yu-Hsien, Governor of the province of Shansi, in his previous post as Governor of Shantung, developed the Boxer organization, and was the first to bring it to effectiveness. He is personally responsible for all the terrible evils in Shantung, and for the massacre of the missionaries in Shansi.

Jung-Lu and Tung have already been mentioned as Generals holding high commands.

Kang, popularly known as "Lord High Extortioner," was sent through the central and southern provinces last winter to squeeze out more funds for Imperial wastefulness to squander, and was in everything a dutiful henchman of his imperial and evil-minded mistress.

With the exception of General Tung, those just named are Manchus, who had contrived to absorb almost all the highest places in the Empire, to the exclusion of the Chinese.

The Empress Dowager herself left the palace where she had so long exercised a despotism as absolute as in this age of the world any mortal can enjoy, in the early morning hours of August 15, in great haste and fear, disguised as a common woman, with an ordinary cart for her use, and an insignificant procession, so that for two days it was not ascertained for certain that she had left at all. The

ravaged the country in advance of the Imperial refugees, so that it was difficult for them to get enough to support life, and many of the attendants are reported to have deserted and returned to Peking for this reason.

On the morning of the 28th of August, two weeks after the occupation of Peking, small detachments of the eight military forces concerned, marching in the order of the numbers of troops embarked in the campaign, made a formal entry into the Forbidden City and were there reviewed by the senior General in command, after which the British field artillery fired a salute of one and twenty guns, to indicate that the occupation in force of the innermost shrine of Chinese exclusiveness was now completely accomplished. Thus was added the last touch to the punishment of Peking.

What is it that the Manchu nobles and the Empress Dowager have achieved in their effort to exterminate the Ocean Men, and to drive Western civilization out of the Celestial Empire? Disaster, humiliation, and abject defeat such as in modern days is rare, not to say unexampled.

In a tempest of insane passion they have exiled themselves, put an end to Manchu domination, and lost the Decree of Heaven by which alone they have claimed to rule. "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad."

Night of eeriest wonders seen
Is the eve of Hallowe'en-
Then things befall too dear to doubt,
For all the Fairy World is out—
And, in the dusk or moonlight clear,
Miracles once more appear.
Kobold, elfin, pixy, sprite,
Flock to celebrate this night;

Pranks they play with nuts and yarn-
And, from the garden, field, and barn,
Masked they come, keen tricks to try,
With fortune-telling riotry.

Now youths and maidens by the fire
Watch the flames rise and expire;
Chestnuts put upon the coals
To see what augury controls

Their love or, where the apples float
In a tub, the omens note.

We, too, who may not wander more
On Youth's iridescent shore,
Still beside the fireplace sit
Amidst Love's coquetry and wit,
And dream of our lost, joyous teens,
Over uncounted Hallowe'ens.

T

HE relation of public service companies to city governments is a subject on which much is pretty well known that cannot be definitely stated. Some of the relations between public service corporations and city governments are open and public; all of them ought to be; but it is naturally believed that relations of a subterranean and illegitimate character are often established between representatives of the city and representatives of these companies, by means of which oppressive powers and privileges are granted to the companies and the public is made the prey of their rapacity. Some of these transactions have been exposed and punished by the courts; they are not matter of suspicion, but of record. It is not disputed that New York Aldermen received about twenty thousand dollars apiece for voting for the Broadway surface franchise; that was proved in court, and some of the bribed Aldermen went to prison. Mayor Pingree, of Detroit, has stated over his own signature that the Citizens' Street Railway Company of that city offered seventy-five thousand dollars for his influence in securing legislation which they desired. Ex-Mayor Black, of Columbus, has publicly declared that twenty-five thousand dollars' worth of stock was once promised him for his support of a certain measure. Mr. Bemis quotes a street-railway financier who told him that when he offered to build extensive railway lines in Chicago with a three-cent fare, he was informed by members of the City Council that items of that nature were unimportant; that the essential thing would be the payment of $25,000 to the Aldermen as a retaining fee, so to speak, with $250,000 more when the franchise was secured. This sum, if reports are to be trusted, was but a fraction of what the existing street-railway company expended in the Legislature in Illinois, and was ready to expend in the

1 An address delivered at the Municipal Reform Association.

Chicago Council, for legislation in its interests. In the Legislature the bribe was effectual; it failed in the Council only because a well-organized and resolute lynching-bee appeared to be imminent. The Philadelphia Gas Works were leased to the present company at a certain figure when another company, believed to be responsible, was offering to take the same contract and pay the city a bonus of ten millions of dollars for it. It is not to be supposed that these capitalists were offering the city of Philadelphia ten millions of dollars for nothing, and the action of the Council in this case is naturally supposed to have been dictated by other than public reasons.

I have mentioned but a few of many instances in which corrupt relations are believed to have existed between city governments and public service companies. The whole melancholy story does not need to be told. It is a shameful recordone that no American citizen can contemplate without a sinking of the heart. "The recent history of American municipalities," says Mr. L. S. Rowe, "has shown that the inability of our city gov ernments to maintain control over private corporations performing quasi-public functions constitutes the greatest danger to American local institutions. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that these corporations have succeeded in intrenching themselves as the real power behind the constituted authorities in all matters affecting their interests."

It is not to be assumed that such illicit relations always involve the payment of money by the corporations to the municipal officers. A competent investigator expresses the belief that the amount of money received by Councilmen in the Philadelphia gas steal was not large. “The truth would seem to be," he says, "that the members are not self-acting agents, and therefore, with few exceptions, not in a position to demand a bribe. An assertion was made to me by one of the

members that there is not a man in the Councils who does not sit there at the sufferance of some boss. The different railroads have their political agents. These agents are local bosses in small sections of the city. There are a few men in the Councils known as belonging to the Reading Railroad's political agent, others who belong to the Traction's political agent, or the political agent of some other company who must go to Council from time to time and ask favors. In order to get a bill through Council one must secure the approval, not of the Councilmen, but of these who control them. Unquestionably, it is as bad to bribe the man whom you know to control the Councilman's vote as to bribe the Councilman directly, but it is much harder for others to prove it."

It is quite true that the influence of public service companies upon municipal officials is often indirect. In many instances it is exerted through the agency of the local boss, to whose funds the companies make liberal contributions. Nominations are dictated by him, and when he has paid the election expenses of the candidate he sees no good reason why he should not control the work of his hands. Sometimes, when there is no local boss who can be trusted, the companies, through attorneys or other agents, take an active but somewhat shadowy interest in nominating and electing city officers; it is the common understanding nowadays that elections are carried by money, and impecunious candidates are often gratified by secretly proffered assistance from those who hope to be remembered in their time of need.

But along with these cryptic operations there is much direct and flagrant bribery. And the surprising and appalling thing is that so many of those who occupy high positions in society and in the church are more or less closely connected with this nefarious business. In writing, two years and a half ago, of the lease of the Philadelphia Gas Works, Mr. William Draper Lewis says: "There is an almost universal belief among all classes in the city that bribery has been used to obtain the acceptance by the city government of this lease. This belief is not confined to those who are opposed to the lease, but is shared by many who were strongly in favor of it. The words eminent respect

ability,' had they not been used in an offensive sense, would accurately describe the men connected with the company. The belief that these men used bribery to obtain property shows to what depth of degradation we have come. It is possible for a large part of the community to believe, without direct evidence, that some of the first of their fellow-citizens have acted as rascals." It is possible to believe it, because it is impossible to doubt it. When such men are seen walking off with the stolen goods in their possession, it is difficult to believe that they have had nothing to do with the theft. Mayor Swift, of Chicago, conveyed to the Commercial Club of that city the precise truth: "Who bribes the Common Council? is not the men in the common walks of life. It is you representative citizens, you capitalists, you business men.'

It

Of course the actual negotiations with dishonest officials are not apt to be conducted by the leading stockholders and the influential directors. There is generally a "wicked partner "-general manager, or confidential agent-who attends to the details. Probably the eminently respectable take great pains to know nothing about it. But it is not, after all, a very profound secret; if the "wicked partner did not know that what he did was acceptable to the rest, it would not be done. And very often there is not much concealment; bribery of public officials is openly justified on the ground that "a man must protect his property." "What would you do yourself?" these capitalists demand. "Would you sit still and see your hard earnings and the accumulations of years. confiscated by robbers?"

I think that it is getting to be a prevalent notion that bribery to prevent the spoliation of properties by rascally officials is entirely justifiable, almost meritorious. It is just here that the public conscience needs toning up. I can see, for my part, very little distinction between the coward who is bullied into bribery by the public spoilsman, and the corruptionist who himself takes the initiative. The one lets the bandits make a tool of him, and the other uses the bandits as his tools. Which is the more honorable? On the whole, I have more respect for the aggressive briber.

But what would you do?" these re

spectable people persist. "Must not a man protect his property?" And they cast upon you glances of ill-concealed compassion because you fail to see that nothing else is worth thinking of when property is at stake. What answer shall we give to these who ask this question? Any man who understands what citizenship means would be prompted to say: "I haven't much property to lose; but my life is worth as much to me, I suppose, as any man's property is to him; and I would part with it very quickly before I would consent that any public official should be bribed for my advantage. And a man who would not sacrifice in a minute all his property, rather than have any part or lot in the corruption of his government, is a man whose patriotism is of a very cheap variety." The fact is that the real criminal in this case is always the man who pays the money-and it matters little whether it is solicited or proffered. The man who pays the money to influence legislation whether it be to avert hostile legislation or to secure favorable legislation is the man upon whom rests the blame for the corruption of government. Spare your censure for the venal legislator or councilman; he would have no power to do harm if the men who have the money that he wants did not themselves regard money as worth more than righteous rule and the safety of the State.

It is by no means true, however, that these combinations of capital are always on the defensive against official strikers. They are very often in the field with their money actively seeking to entice and debauch public officials who would be, but for their evil influences, honest and faithful. Young men who are not boodlers, whose life has always been reputable, are corrupted and led astray by temptations addressed to their desire for money. There are those to whom a bribe is no temptation; but the inexperienced and ambitious, whose virtue is not thoroughly grounded, are often successfully assailed by such solicitations. It is getting to be a perilous thing for a man who is not incased in adamantine armor of integrity to occupy responsible municipal office.

The greatest danger to American institutions arises from the relation of these public service corporations to city governments. Professor Commons says: "As

the people become aroused to the degradation of their politics and to the need of reform, their attention is concentrated on the chief source of that degradation, the underhanded and often high-handed domination of city officials and machine politics by the corporations whose life is maintained by city franchises." Professor Ely says: "Our terrible corruption in cities dates from the rise of private corporations in control of natural monopolies." "It is a fact," says Mr. Charles Whiting Baker, "that out of the relations between city governments and franchise companies have grown three-quarters of the municipal corruption of the past two decades." That this is the simple truth no careful observer of current events will be likely to deny. The monumental proof of the ascendency which such corporations have gained over the city governments is seen in the enormously inflated capitalization which is almost universal. The steam railroads of this country, according to the last report of the Inter-State Commission, have a gross capitalization-stock and bonds of $59,620 a mile. That the steam railways are heavily over-capitalized is not doubted. But the street railways outside of Massachusetts were stocked and bonded in 1898 for an average of $98,755 per mile-sixty-five per cent. more than the steam railways. In Massachusetts some strenuous efforts have been made to prevent the inflation of capital; the result is that street railways in that State are capitalized for only $45,595 per mile-less than half of the indebtedness in the rest of the country. Yet the number of cars per mile of track is greater in Massachusetts than in the rest of the country, and there is no reason to believe that the equipment or the service in that State is inferior in any respect to that of the cities west of the Hudson. The system in Springfield, Mass., where there are three cars per mile and an admirable service, is capitalized for only $33,000 per mile. The Massachusetts figures show what can be done, with a little resolute determination to prevent oppression; the figures for the rest of the country show what is done when private corporations are left to work their own will. There are few cities in the Central and Western States in which the street railways and the gas and electric lighting companies

are not capitalized for from two to four times the amount for which the plant could be replaced. The indubitable'intention is to compel the people to pay for the service much more than would be required to cover the cost of operation and a good return on the money invested. And the expectation is that the city councils can be induced to give franchises by which this spoliation of the people will be legalized. On no other expectation could such ventures be made. This expectation has, thus far, been almost universally realized. City Councils have generally done substantially what the public service corporations have wished them to do. The charters of such corporations are generally drawn by the attorneys of the corporations; they embody such grants and concessions and securities as the companies desire; the rights and interests of the people are very imperfectly safeguarded. Contrasting German municipal contracts with those in America, Dr. Shaw has pithily said: "In studying these German contracts one is always impressed with a sense of the first-class legal, financial, and technical ability that the public is able to command; while American contracts always impress one with the unlimited astuteness and ability of the gentlemen representing the private corporations."

It is true, and it is a shameful truth. It is the gentlemen representing the private corporations who have had things, hitherto, all their own way in dealing with municipalities; the gentlemen representing the city have frequently got something out of the contract for themselves; the people's interests have been ignored.

For this state of things what is the remedy? Doubtless something might be done by stringent State legislation, if the State legislators were sufficiently intelligent and virtuous. But the same power that controls the city councils knows how to manipulate the legislature. Indeed, the enterprise of controlling the lawmakers of the State is apt to be less thorny and perilous than that of fixing the city council; for the Solons at the State capital are away from home, and easily accessible by well-directed influence; public attention cannot be focused upon their operations so sharply as upon the council; most of the communities for which they are legislating are at a distance from the

capital. The public service companies, however, whose interests would be affected by stringent legislation find it easy to raise ample funds and to secure a skillful lobby for the prevention of such legislation. Those of us who live in State capitals know how powerful are the influences which these great combinations of capital are able to bring to bear upon the legislators. It seems, therefore, rather improbable that we shall be likely soon to get relief from the oppressions of these monopolies through direct State legislation. The Legislature ought, certainly, to do two or three things at once; it ought to enforce the most complete publicity in the accounts of all these companies, prescribing the methods of bookkeeping, and punishing condignly all evasions of them; it ought to limit the capitalization to the cost of the plant and make stock-watering a penitentiary offense; it ought to require every franchise to be submitted to popular vote; and it ought to create a strong State Board with ample powers to supervise the operations of such companies. Such measures of regulation might check some of the worst of the existing abuses.

But, after all, I do not expect that these measures will be found effectual. My own strong conviction is that nothing will reach the case except the public ownership and control of public service monopolies. That may not come for some time yet, and in the meantime we must make the best contracts we can, and enforce them as best we may, but it is well to confront the issue which is before us.

We may reason as we will about the inexpediency and impracticability of municipal ownership; the decisive fact is that it is required by the elementary principles of democratic government. A democratic people cannot permit the existence of private monopoly; for the very essence of monopoly is taxation without representation. "The charge for services which cannot be dispensed with," says John Stuart Mill, “is, in substance, quite as much compulsory taxation as if imposed by law."

The business of these public service. corporations is, in its nature, a monopoly. It cannot be, it never is, for any great length of time, controlled by competition. The services which they furnish are, for many of us, services which cannot bẹ