Our allies consistently tell us that they need offsets because they perceive that the U.S. defense market is not open to them due, at least in part, to protectionist legislation. In particular, they cite congressional reluctance to change Buy America and small business preference legislation. We believe that offsets should be considered as one, among many, practices that distort defense trade, and consequently, negotiating the offset issue by itself does not give the United States a strong bargaining position.

Furthermore, officials from the defense industry have expressed concern about any unilateral action by the U.S. Government that would limit the use of offsets, stating that such action, as Mr. Johnson said earlier, would place U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage in winning overseas defense contracts.

The Department of Defense is prepared to continue to work with other Federal agencies, our allies, and the defense industry to monitor the employment and effect of offsets in international trade, to ensure that U.S. Government policies of action or inaction do not compromise broader U.S. national interests. The DOD will continue to support U.S. industry interests when they are forced to comply with foreign government-mandated offsets, while working to discourage our foreign friends and allies from requiring offsets. However, the Department would be very concerned over any U.S. Government actions that would diminish the competitiveness of the U.S. defense industry or harm the Department's efforts to achieve military interoperability with our allies.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Volkman follows:]

STATEMENT BY

MR. ALFRED VOLKMAN

ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS)

TO THE

SUBCOMMITTEE on CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, and HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE on GOVERNMENT REFORM

JUNE 29, 1999

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to participate in discussions on the subject of offsets in international trade. The Department of Defense is keenly aware of the many issues associated with offsets in defense trade. We are also aware of the many ambiguities associated with offsets and offset issues. I look forward to contributing the DoD perspective to this discussion

As the members of this Subcommittee know very well, there is no national consensus on the subject of offsets. Government agencies have a range of views on the topic and industry opinion on the matter is divided. There is no definitive evidence of the effects of offsets on the US economy. Views on their effects are generally divided between those who accept offsets as an

unavoidable cost of doing business overseas and those who believe that offsets negatively affect the defense industrial base and other US interests. It is difficult to accurately measure the impact of offsets on the overall US economy and on specific industry sectors that are critical to defense.

With the end of the Cold War, military establishments around the world have been decreasing their force structures and spending by significant amounts. The decline in defense spending has served to highlight the linkages between the economics of international trade in armaments and political-military security issues. Naturally, this has lead to a debate on the US policy toward offsets.

The GAO has reported that US defense companies advised them that without offsets most export sales would not be made, and the positive effects on the US economy and defense industrial base derived from our dominant position in defense sales abroad would be lost. In addition, company officials indicated that export sales provide employment for the defense industry and orders for larger production runs, thus reducing unit costs to the US military. They also

noted that many offset deals created new and profitable business opportunities for themselves and other US companies.

Critics charge that offsets have effects that limit or negate the economic and defense industrial base benefits claimed to be associated with defense export sales. Mandated offshore production may directly displace US defense firms that previously performed this work, and offsets that transfer technology and provide marketing assistance give foreign defense firms the capabilities to subsequently produce and market their products, often in direct competition with US defense companies.

However, defense exports involving offsets are small relative to the economy as a whole, making it difficult to measure any effects using national aggregated data. Similarly, the impact of offsets on specific sectors of the US economy cannot be accurately measured. It would be difficult to isolate the effects of offsets from numerous other factors affecting specific industry sectors.

In response to concerns raised about the impact of offsets, the President issued a policy statement in 1990 that reaffirmed DoD's standing policy of not encouraging or participating directly in offset arrangements. This policy statement also recognized that certain offsets are economically inefficient and directed that an interagency team, led by DoD in coordination with the Department of State, consult with foreign nations on limiting adverse effects of offsets in defense procurement.

The Department of Defense fully supports the policies articulated by the Congress and the Administration concerning the need to negotiate with friendly and allied govemments to eliminate the harmful effects of offsets in defense trade. My office has been actively engaged in discussing offsets with key allies during our regular meetings on reciprocal defense procurement activities. We have attempted to address the issue of offsets by implementing reciprocal

memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between the US and several major allies which include provisions to consult on the adverse affects of offsets. Reciprocal defense MOUS seek to facilitate armaments cooperation by allowing US and foreign companies reciprocal access to the governments' defense markets, and calling for reductions in certain barriers, such as buy-national laws and tariffs.

In addition, we have co-sponsored seminars organized by independent organizations such as the National Research Council to better understand and deal with the complex and growing world of offset demands in international trade. More recently, we initiated action to lead an interagency team, including representatives from the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative that met bilaterally with officials from Canada and the Netherlands on the subject of the harmful effects of offset demands in defense trade.

Our Allies constantly tell us that they need offsets because they perceive that the US defense market is not open to them due to protectionist legislation. In particular, they cite Congressional reluctance to change Buy America and small business preference legislation. Offsets should be considered among a range of practices that distort defense trade, and consequently we feel that negotiating the offset issue by itself does not give the US a strong bargaining position. Furthermore, officials from defense industry have expressed concern about any unilateral action by the US government that would limit the use of offsets, stating that such action would place US exporters at a competitive disadvantage in winning overseas defense contracts.

As a consequence of the worldwide decline in defense spending, the entire US defense industry, and in particular the aerospace sector, has undergone a process of consolidation, restructuring, and downsizing over the past decade. The only way in which many nations will be able to maintain a