From the Dublin University Magazine. LEAVES FROM THE LIFE OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND.-PART II. WHETHER Talleyrand's magnificent project | stood. He destroyed the holy Roman em pire, which had existed since Charlemagne, and he created the confederation of the Rhine, at the head of which he placed himself. He enlarged the secondary states of Germany, and erected several of them into kingdoms, creating, as he imagined, permanent, natural, and useful allies for his empire. Having three years before destroyed. the ecclesiastical sovereignties of Germany, he now destroyed the feudal sovereignties of its noblesse. He reduced the power of Austria, depriving her of her Italian territory without indemnifying her upon the Danube. He humiliated, but did not subdue her. Such, in fact, were the results of the victory of Austerlitz, which, it must be admitted, stand in disadvantageous contrast with those which Talleyrand claimed as its possible fruits. The key to Napoleon's policy was the enfeeblement of great states; its effect was the creation of powerful malcontents. He created a swarm of opponents, with whom he was condemned to maintain a perpetual struggle without the possibility of destroying them. His peaces were truces, and can be regarded only as the successive halts of the grand army in its unparalleled career of conquest. of a Territorial Settlement of Europe were really practicable at the time it was proposed, opinions are not agreed. It is, however, hard to say what was not practicable by Napoleon on the morrow of Austerlitz. Talleyrand, following the footsteps of the conqueror, never ceased to urge his favorite theory. He wrote it from Strasburg, reproduced it from the Schoenbrunn, and finally exhausted all his arts of persuasion in urging it in the personal conferences with Napoleon at Brunn, amidst the dead and the dying, on the very field which the preceding eve had witnessed the rout and confusion of the hosts of Austria and Russia, headed by the two emperors. M. Thiers, while he does not deny the merit of the project, casts doubts on its practicability. M. Mignet maintains that at such a moment anything was possible- that the project was practicable-and that, had it been carried into effect, the course of European events would have been far different from that which has actually ensued. Austria would have been enlarged by the accession of a vast territory, precisely in that direction where the augmentation of her power was most necessary for the well-being of Europe. Instead of being, as now, com- Another of the grand European projects posed of jarring and discordant elements, by which the public career of Talleyrand was having no natural coherence, and only kept signalized, was the establishment at Franktogether by the sword, she would have been fort-on-the-Maine of a permanent congress, rendered homogeneous throughout her en- with the philanthropic object of maintaining tire territory. Instead of leaving her in- perpetual peace. This congress, at which each terested to obstruct progress, and to main- state of Europe was to be represented by tain the old regime, she would have been a resident ambassador, was to consist of stimulated to concur in the general advance- three colleges, the first composed of reprement of civilization. The project, accord-sentatives of the four great powers, France, ing to Mignet, would have supplied the foundation of a lasting peace, by the combinations it would have created, and the interests it would have satisfied. It was not, however, approved of by Napoleon He proceeded, as he had always done, neither destroying the conquered, nor gaining them over. He weakened, without paralysing them. He left them strength enough to be formidable, and supplied them no motive for any cordial alliance with him. The genius of Napoleon was greater for destruction than for creation. Much of what he pulled down can never be re-erected little of what he created has Austria, Russia, and Prussia. England was excluded from this congress; its promoter regarding her, or affecting to regard her, as an exceptional power, the policy and interest of which must always be irreconcilable with those of the Continent. This, it must be confessed, was a curious exclusion to be proposed by one, the favorite object of whose political life was to bring about a close and permanent union of France and England against the world. England with her navy, and France with her army, if cordially allied, might, according to Talleyrand, dictate to the rest of the globe. The apparent inconsistency may, however, be understood, when it is remem- | I should live to see myself at length abanbered that the European congress was pro-doned by it. Talleyrand has never apjected at the time when Napoleon, in the peared to me to be either eloquent or perzenith of his glory, regarded England as his implacable and unrelenting enemy, against which every expedient of policy must be directed. The second college of Talleyrand's projected congress was to consist of the representatives of states of the second order; and in like manner the third was to be composed of the ministers of powers of the third order. Thus composed, this high diplomatic body was to be authorized to decide finally and without appeal, by a sort of arbitration, and as an international court of honor, all differences which might arise between the states represented in it, and also to regulate the military contingents of each power. Every decision come to by the first college, provided it were unanimous, was to be final without the intervention of the other two. But in case of a dissent in the first college, then the second and third were to be successively consulted. This scheme was never attempted to be realized, but from it Napoleon took the idea of the Confederation of the Rhine. Talleyrand would have wished him to have availed himself of his vast powers to establish something more permanent in its duration and more universal in its object. In all the projects and speculations of Talleyrand, traces are discoverable of the best parts of the theories of the last century, although his purposes were so constantly defeated, and even made subservient to ends of which he disapproved, by the overruling power of the events with which he was surrounded. The minister of a sovereign sprung from arms and aggrandized by victory, he loved not war. His aversion to it was not only a matter of temperament and philosophical repugnance, but even of calculation. War, as a system, appeared to him calculated only to create perpetual causes for its own reproduction, while, on the contrary, his unceasing solicitude was to elicit from every victory consequences which would obliterate all future causes of collision. Napoleon himself has done Talleyrand the justice to admit the tenacity of purpose, with which he incessantly endeavored to moderate his military propensities. "He never ceased," Napoleon used to say, "repeating to me that I was mistaken respecting the energy of the nation, that it would not continue to second me, and that suasive. He used to revolve continually round the same idea.” This was true, and the idea round which Talleyrand revolved was an European peace, the alliance of the great powers, the enlightenment of mankind, the advance of civilization and the arts, and the diffusion of knowledge. Although this fatigued Napoleon, he did not the less appreciate the counsels of so sage an admirer, and he never departed for a campaign without bringing in his rear, besides his legion of surgeons, his foreign minister, also skilled in the art of arresting the course of the destroyer. After having concluded the peace of Presburg, and presided over those which terminated in the elevation of Louis Napoleon to the throne of Holland, and Joseph to that of Naples, and conducted the diplomatic measures which established the Confederation of the Rhine, Talleyrand, now become Prince of Beneventum, was called on to inflict on Prussia the penalty for its impolitic revolt against the imperial power. When the victory of Austerlitz placed Austria at the feet of Napoleon, the latter left Talleyrand at the village of Bruun, on the very field of the battle, to conduct the negotiations with the agents of Austria, while he went himself to Vienna with M. Haugwitz, to arrange the preliminaries of a treaty with Prussia. Talleyrand opened the negotiations with the announcement of the purposes of France to deprive Austria of her dominions in Italy and Switzerland, with the professed object of removing all future causes of rivalry and war between the two empires. These sacrifices were, of course, resisted by the most lively remonstrances on the part of the Austrian negotiators, who expressed, however, their willingness to surrender Venice and a part of the Italian territory, but insisted that Salsburg, the Tyrol, and other territories, should be conferred upon one of the archdukes, and thus indirectly retained by Austria. One of the most erroneous propositions advanced by Austria, however, on this occasion, requires especial notice. It will be remembered by every one conversant with the history of this period, that Napoleon was the object of the most unmeasured abuse, for his proposition of giving Hanover to Prussia, and that Prussia was scarcely less censured for her wil lingness to accept the gift. Nevertheless, against all Europe in coalition, would at we now know that Austria, the natural ally best have been a hazardous game. He and friend of England, did, in the course therefore saw the necessity for the same of the negotiations to which we refer, ac- promptitude in diplomacy to which he so tually propose to Napoleon, through Tal- often owed his success in war. leyrand, that the patrimony of the king of England should be conferred on one of the archdukes, in exchange for the sacrifices she was compelled to make on her southern frontiers. Napoleon, therefore, immediately on arriving at the Schoenbrunn, on the 13th December, 1805, sent for M. Haugwitz, and received him in the cabinet of Maria Theresa.* After a burst of indignation at The sagacious French diplomatist listened the underhand proceedings which Prussia to this unprincipled demand with unmixed had taken in regard to France, and giving delight, well aware how potent a means it utterance to menaces of the disasters with might be converted into to embroil Austria which he could overwhelm her, now that he with England, and was too skilful to crush had got Austria and Russia off his hands, at once the hopes of its accomplishment. he elicited from M. Haugwitz an offer of an He accordingly received the proposition alliance, as the price of immediate reconciwith much complacency, and promised to liation. Napoleon did not scruple to offer lay it before the Emperor. Talleyrand Prussia conditions, the acceptance of which had another object in protracting these ne- he knew must seriously compromise her gotiations. He knew that Napoleon was at with the other great powers. As she had the same time negotiating with M. Haug- before betrayed France to the profit of Euwitz a treaty with Prussia at the Schoen- rope, she was now called on to betray Eubrunn, and that Austria would be much rope to the profit of France. Napoleon, more tractable after Prussia was put out of nevertheless, did not hesitate to propose the question by the final settlement, the intelligence of which he hourly expected. He therefore willingly consented to the suspension of the negotiations until Prince Lichtenstein should go to the chateau at which the Emperor Francis was then staying, to obtain fresh instructions and enlarged powers. Talleyrand was to wait at Brunn until his return. this course to the plenipotentiary of Prussia, who, so far from showing any repugnancy, seemed enchanted to be enabled to bring back from Vienna an alliance with France, instead of a declaration of war. This interview took place the 13th December; the treaty was reduced to writing on the 14th, and formally signed at the Schoenbrunn on the following day. Han This delay, purposely created by Talley- The moment this was accomplished, Narand, was a capital fault on the part of the poleon wrote to Talleyrand that if the Austrian negotiators, for what was then Austrian negotiators did not immediately passing at Vienna, and which they ought to accede to the terms offered, he should come have at least conjectured, if not certainly without further delay to Vienna. The emknown, greatly aggravated the difficulties of barrassment of the Austrian plenipotentiatheir position. The immediate object of ries now became extreme. In resisting the Napoleon was to detach Prussia from the demands and postponing concessions, they Coalition before she had time to recover augmented the exigencies of the conqueror, from the terror with which the catastrophe and really increased the difficulties. of Austerlitz had struck her. Besides the over was disposable when Talleyrand advantages of bringing the Prussian ar- opened the negotiation-it was now approrangement to a conclusion while the Aus-priated. The Tyrol, for the surrender of trian negotiation was still pending, there which Austria claimed it, would now have were other reasons for accelerating the ge- to be given up without an equivalent. In neral settlement of both treaties. The short, it was found that even their increased archdukes were advancing towards Presburg powers did not meet the demands on which at the head of a hundred thousand men. Talleyrand was now ordered to insist; a The Prussian armies were assembled in further reference to the Emperor Francis Saxony and Franconia, and the combined was necessary, and the conference broke up forces of England and Russia were advanc- and was adjourned to Presburg, Brunn ing on Hanover. Whatever might be the having become unhealthy, owing to the confidence of Napoleon against such a com- noxious exhalations proceeding from the bination, it was impolitic to wait for it to enormous number of bodies of men and collect against him. To recommence a war * Thiers, VI., 355. horses in a state of decomposition on the of frankness and cordiality. The necessity field of battle, and the innumerable sick under which the British government felt and wounded who crowded the hospitals. itself placed to insist on including Russia Talleyrand, after a conference with Napo- in the arrangements, soon appeared to conleon at Vienna, finally met the Austrian stitute a formidable obstacle to any favoranegotiators at Presburg, where the treaty ble issue, this being opposed by Napoleon. was concluded, amidst the advanced posts Talleyrand, whose dominant thought was of the two hostile armies, and signed by directed towards the attainment of a duraTalleyrand, as the representative of the ble peace, which he regarded as the highest French empire, on the 26th December. interest of France, spared no exertions or The death of Mr. Pitt, which occurred in persuasions to induce Napoleon to avail a month after this event, effected a great himself of the opportunity offered by the apparent change in the relations of France presence of Mr. Fox in power to continue and England, and the advent of Mr. Fox the negotiation with England. Napoleon and his party to power, offered some ground was not less disposed than his minister to for expecting that a peace was not alto- avail himself of an opportunity of termigether impracticable. An accidental cir-nating the war, as auspicious as it was uncumstance brought about a communication looked for. Circumstances also seemed to between the two governments, well calcu- offer facilities for surmounting the obstacle lated to mitigate feelings of mutual hostility. A miscreant had the ignorance and baseness to obtain access personally to Mr. Fox, and to propose to him to get Napoleon assassinated. Mr. Fox had the wretch delivered into the hands of the police, and immediately wrote a dispatch to Talleyrand, denouncing in suitable terms the proposition which had been made, and placing at his disposition all the means necessary to prosecute the author, if the thing should be regarded as worthy of serious notice. Napoleon, sensible of this proceeding on the part of a hostile government, authorized M. Talleyrand to reply to it, which he did in the following terms: I have placed before his majesty the letter of your excellency. I recognise in this,' said the Emperor, the honor and virtue which have always animated Mr. Fox. Thank him for me, and as sure him that, whether the policy of his sovereign leads to the continuance of war, or the quarrel, so useless to humanity, should be brought to as speedy a conclusion as both nations ought to desire, I shall equally rejoice in the new character which, by this proceeding, the war has already assumed, and which is the presage of what may be expected from a cabinet in which I am glad to recognise the principles of Mr. Fox, who is a man so eminently fitted to perceive what is finest and most truly which had arisen. Information had been received from the French Consul at St. Petersburgh, confirmed by advices from other quarters, that the Emperor Alexander, uneasy at the results of the war, distrustful of the cabinet of St. James's, and especially of the personal predilections of Mr. Fox, desired the re-establishment of peace. In short, the probability of a direct negotiation being opened with Russia was so strong, that it was hoped that the principle of a collective negotiation, on which Mr. Fox had insisted, would be renounced. This Another incident also lent itself to foster the friendly feeling which had already been produced. During these negotiations an exchange of prisoners between France and England was agreed upon. Among the detenus in Paris was Lord Yarmouth, afterwards Marquis of Hertford, who was then, although a Tory, an intimate friend of Mr. Fox, and from his predilections for the Continent in general, and Paris in particular, an ardent partisan of peace. young nobleman, who, during his detention, had moved in the best Parisian society, was well known to Prince Talleyrand, who was an admirer of the English aristocracy. Talleyrand, with his usual tact, seized this opportunity of turning his private intimacies. to the public advantage. He invited Lord Mr. Fox addressed to Talleyrand a note Yarmouth to his hotel, and there, in a conin answer to this, conceived in a frank and versation marked by the most exquisite cordial spirit, in which, without reserve or tact, and apparent frankness, assured him diplomatic finesse, he offered peace on honor- that the Emperor most ardently desired able conditions, and by means, as sure as peace, that he wished to put aside diplothey were prompt. A correspondence en-matic formalities, and to agree frankly on sued between these distinguished men, in conditions mutually honorable and acceptathe course of which each of them joined to ble; that such conditions could present no their public dispatches private letters, full difficulty, inasmuch as it was no longer de grand in affairs.'” sired to dispute with England the posses- grandeur, his approaching decline? These sion of Malta and the Cape; that the ques- are questions which will be variously retion was, therefore, narrowed to a small ceived, and to which satisfactory or conclucompass, especially since Napoleon was sive answers, with our present information, willing to restore Hanover to George III. would be impossible. However this may After receiving these and other confiden- be, his retirement from affairs at such a tial communications from Talleyrand, Lord moment gave occasion to innumerable conYarmouth left Paris, promising to return jectures, and no one believed it to be sinimmediately with the secret of the inten- cerely the result of his own wish. Some tions of Mr. Fox. In fact Lord Yarmouth ascribed it to the strong disapprobation did accordingly return with powers from which Talleyrand entertained for the policy Mr. Fox, and was subsequently joined by pursued by Napoleon respecting Spain. Lord Lauderdale; but notwithstanding the This opinion Talleyrand did not fail to enearnest desire of M. Talleyrand for peace, courage, and turn to account as soon as the the complication of the affairs of the Conti- course of events rendered it popular. Still nent rendered, as is well known, all these exertions abortive. it is difficult to render such a supposition compatible with Talleyrand's own acts. After presiding at these various negotia- The idea of imitating the policy of Louis tions, and assisting in the ceremonies at- XIV. was at least as much that of Talleytending the elevation of Louis Napoleon to rand himself as of Napoleon. Yet there the throne of Holland, and Joseph to that might have been a disagreement as to the of Naples, Talleyrand affixed his name to time and manner of carrying out such a the treaty of Tilsitt, which was concluded policy. Others ascribe his retirement to as the consequence of the victories of Jena, his having opened negotiations for peace Eylau, and Friedland. Prussia and Rus- with England, without the cognisance of the sia were humbled; the Confederation of Emperor; and others again find the cause the Rhine was extended from the south to in the intrigues of Fouché, his personal the north of Germany; in fine, the empire enemy, who labored incessantly to excite had attained the meridian of its splendor, the impatience of the Emperor against his and Napoleon reached the summit of his minister, always representing the latter as glory. At this dazzling epoch, at a mo- assuming to himself too great a share in the ment of unparalleled prosperity of success, management of affairs. M. Talleyrand ceased to direct the diplo- Whatever may have produced this esmacy of the empire. The signature of the trangement, it was one deeply to be deplortreaty of Tilsitt was his last official act. ed by Napoleon. The vast ambition and On the 8th of August, 1807, an imperial great military prowess of Napoleon, and decree announced his retirement from office, the unequalled good sense, moderation, and and named M. Champagny his successor. sang froid of Talleyrand, seemed to be The following day a second decree raised made for each other. The invention, ferhim to the office of Vice Grand Elector, the tility, boldness, and impetuosity of the one third dignity of the empire, with a salary of were happily checked by the coolness, mo£20,000. The office was for life. deration, powers of deliberation, foresight, The retirement of the great diplomatist and caution of the other. Talleyrand knew was nominally his own voluntary act; how how to throw dilatory obstacles in the way far it was really his spontaneous choice will of the Emperor when rage and passion not be certainly known until the publica- transported him and prompted precipitate tion of those autobiographical memoirs, measures, thus giving him the opportunity whose appearance is interdicted until the of recovering his tranquillity, and acting year 1868. with ability and dignity. Thus he used to Was he fatigued with the continual sac- say, with some exaggeration, but much truth rifice of his own judgment, which the aspir- and infinite wit, "The Emperor always ing ambition of his master exacted? Was compromised himself when he was enabled his indolence allured by the perspective of to do anything a quarter of an hour earlier, the magnificent sinecure which awaited him? which I would have induced him to postDid his incomparable clear-sightedness ena-pone to a quarter of an hour later." The ble him to see that Napoleon, balanced on loss of such a counsellor was more than a a summit, trembled and became giddy with misfortune; it was a danger. the height to which he had attained? Did The retirement of Talleyrand from office he. in short, anticinate at this epoch of did not, however, produce any personal |