partment would have no jurisdiction to | of all this, we are told that they may be entransfer them, and its attempted convey- forced against citizens, and that Congress ance of them would be inoperative and void, no matter with what seeming regularity the forms of law may have been observed. The action of the Department would in that event be like that of any other special tribunal not having jurisdiction of a case which it had assumed to decide."

It would be an affectation to attempt to cite all the authorities in which this doctrine is announced. In Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 31 L. ed. 844, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1228, decided in 1887, Mr. Justice Miller cites more than a dozen cases as directly in point. Since then the doctrine has been again and again restated.

so intended. Banishment of a citizen not merely removes him from the limits of his native land, but puts him beyond the reach of any of the protecting clauses of the Constitution. In other words, it strips him of all the rights which are given to a citizen. I cannot believe that Congress intended to provide that a citizen, simply because he belongs to an obnoxious race, can be deprived of all the liberty and protection which the Constitution guarantees, and if it did so intend, I do not believe that it has the power to do so.

Mr. Justice Peckham concurred in the foregoing dissent.

Mr. Justice Day also dissented.

Take also the matter of imports. The Secretary of the Treasury is charged with the collection of the duties on them, but has it ever been held or even suggested that a ruling of the customhouse officers, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, is a final determination that the article so passed up- EX PARTE: IN RE GERTRUDE GLAS

on was subject to duty, and precluded the courts from inquiring as to that fact? Certainly this court has wasted a great deal of time determining whether a given article was subject to duty or not if the decision of the customhouse officers, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, was a final decision of the question.

(198 U. S. 171)

ER, Administratrix, Petitioner.

Mandamus-power of Supreme Court grant when without appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of the United States eannct grant a writ of mandamus to compel the judges of a Federal circuit court to take jurisdiction of an action alleged to be pending in that court, where the cause was not of such a character that a final judgment therein could be directly reviewed, under the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 547), in the Supreme Court.

But it is said that the exclusion acts speak of Chinese persons, and that such term includes citizens as well as aliens, and, therefore, Congress has given power to the immigration officers to banish citizens of the United States if they happen to be of Chinese descent. But obviously the statutes refer to citizens of China, and not to citizens of the United States. The treaty of 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 1210), in execution of which most of these statutes were passed, Submitted April 20, 1905. Decided May 8, speaks, on the one hand, of Chinese subjects in the United States, and, on the other, of

[No. 16, Original.]

1905.

citizens of the United States in China. The ORIGINAL petition for mandamus to re

treaty declared the rights and burdens of
Chinese citizens in the United States, as
well as the rights and burdens of citizens of
the United States in China. The treaty
then, placing Chinese subjects over against
American citizens, must have had in mind
The legislation
citizenship, and not race.
carrying that treaty into effect must be in-
terpreted in the light of that fact. The
statutes of the United States expressly lim-
it the finality of the determination of the
immigration officers to the case of aliens.
It has been conceded by the government
that these statutes do not apply to citizens,
and this court made a most important deci-
sion based upon that concession. The rules
of the Department declare that the statutes
do not apply to citizens, and yet, in the face

quire the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District

of New York to take jurisdiction of a suit alleged to be pending and undetermined in that court.

that court. Denied.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Richard A. Irving and Lewis E. Carr, Jr., for petitioner.

Mr. Alvin Cushing Cass for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a petition by Gertrude Glaser, as administratrix, for mandamus, requiring the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of New York to take jurisdiction and proceed against An

thony P. Langer in a certain suit alleged by | error in cases such as this case, if pending petitioner to be pending and undetermined in the circuit court.

Rule discharged. Petition denied.

(198 U. S. 173) GEORGE SCHLOSSER, Plff. in Err.,

v.

Alto County, Iowa.

in that court, wherein Gertrude Glaser, as administratrix, is plaintiff, and Anthony P. Langer is defendant, and to strike from the records of the court a certain order made on the 14th day of November, 1904, entitled: "In the Matter of the Application of Gertrude Glaser, Administratrix, etc., to com- W. L. HEMPHILL, Richard Ryan, and Palo pel the filing of an answer, or other relief, in an action alleged to be pending between Gertrude Glaser, as Administratrix, etc., of Isador Glaser, deceased, Plaintiff, and Anthony P. Langer, Defendant,' whereby petitioner's application to compel the filing of said answer was denied, on the ground that no such action was pending, and to make such disposition of said suit as ought to have been made had said order not been made and entered therein

Error to state court-final judgment.

A judgment of the highest state court reversing the decree of the trial court in an equity cause, and remanding the cause for further proceedings in harmony with its opinion, is not final in such a sense as will sustain a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, although equity causes are heard on appeal de novo in the state court, and the successful party is entitled to a decree in that court if he moves for it, where no such decree was applied for or rendered, and, under the state practice, newly discovered evidence may be introduced in the court below, and the pleadings amended after the cause is remanded.

[No. 175.]

The petition alleged the commencement in the circuit court of a common-law action by petitioner, as administratrix, against Langer, to recover damages for negligence causing the death of petitioner's husband, and rested the jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The circumstances in respect of a mistake, by reason of which no summons was issued, though service of copy Argued March 13, 14, 1905. Decided May was made, are set forth in detail, and the fact alleged of notice of appearance and answer, and the assertion by defendant's attorney that this was in ignorance of the defect in the summons.

Leave to file the petition was granted, and this having been done, a rule was entered thereon, to which the judge presiding in the circuit court, and before whom all the proceedings referred to in the petition were had, and by whom the decision was made, made due return submitting his action in the premises, and certifying that his reasons for denying the motion were set forth in the order, which is given at length. It appears therefrom that the motion was denied "upon the sole ground that no action of Gertrude Glaser, as administratrix of tne goods, chattels, and credits of Isador Glaser, deceased, plaintiff, against Anthony P. Langer, defendant, is nor ever has been pending in this court.'

In cases over which we possess neither original nor appellate jurisdiction, we cannot grant mandamus. Rev. Stat. § 716, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 580; Re Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 482, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512. 49 L. ed..

Of course there is no pretense of original jurisdiction here, and since the passage of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 547), we have no jurisdiction to review the judgments or decrees of the district and circuit courts directly by appeal or writ of

IN

8, 1905.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa to review a judgment reversing the decree of the District Court of Palo Alto County, in that state, in an equity cause, and remanding the cause for further proceedings in harmony with its opinion. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See same case below, 118 Iowa, 452, 90 N. W. 842.

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: The case is thus stated by the supreme court of Iowa, to which it had been carried by appeal from the district court of Palo Alto county:

"This is an action in equity to quiet title to a tract of some 290 acres of land in the south half of section 30, township 97, range 34, in Palo Alto county. Plaintiff is the admitted owner of lots 2 and 3, forming a part of said tract, and containing about 99. acres. acres. According to the original government survey, made in 1857, this land was. adjacent to a lake, which was meandered, and the meander lines were run along the north side of the said two lots. The remainder of the land claimed lies between this meander line and the alleged shore of the lake, and is the subject of the controversy. The half section in question-that is, such part of it as lies beyond the original meander line was resurveyed by the government in the year 1898, and platted into.

Rep. 49. It was there ruled that the face of the judgment is the test of its finality, and that this court cannot be called on to inquire whether, when a cause is sent back, the defeated party might or might not make a better case.

five lots, of which lots 11, 14, and 16 are | this court. Haseltine v. Central Nat. Bank, claimed by defendant Hemphill, and lots 12 183 U. S. 130, 46 L. ed. 117, 22 Sup. Ct. and 13 by defendant Ryan. These claims are founded upon conveyances from Palo Alto county, under a patent issued to the state, under the swamp land grant of 1850, and which is based upon the resurvey of 1898. Schlosser insists that the meander line is not his boundary, it not marking the edge of the lake, but that he is entitled to claim up to the east and west half-section line of said section. There was a decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal." 118 Iowa, 452, 90 N. W. 842.

The supreme court ruled that "where a body of water is meandered, such lines are not boundary lines, and the adjacent owner will usually take title to the actual shore; but where there is no adjacent body of water proper to be meandered, such line becomes a boundary, and the purchaser from the government cannot claim title beyond it;" and held upon the facts that there was no body of water in section 30 necessary to be meandered, and that plaintiff could not claim title beyond the meandered line. The court said, in concluding: "In our opin- | ion the plaintiff has no right to any other than the land patented to his grantor, and the decree of the trial court must therefore be reversed." And entered judgment as follows:

"In this cause, the court being fully advised in the premises, file their written opinion reversing the judgment of the district court.

"It is therefore considered by the court that the judgment of the court below be and it is hereby reversed and set aside, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the opinion of this court, and that a writ of procedendo issue accordingly.

"It is further considered by the court that the appellee pay the costs of this appeal, taxed at $227.70, and that execution issue therefor."

It is true that in Iowa the supreme court hears equity cases on appeal de novo, and the successful party is entitled to a decree in that court, if he moves for it (First Nat. Bank v. Baker, 60 Iowa, 132, 14 N. W. 125), but in the present case no such decree was applied for or rendered. Nor did the supreme court direct the court below to dismiss plaintiff's petition, or in terms direct the specific decree to be entered.

And it has been repeatedly held by that court that when a case triable de novo is remanded for judgment in the court below, the parties may be permitted to introduce material evidence discovered since the since original trial, and may amend the pleadings for the purpose of setting up matters materially affecting the merits, subsequently occurring. Sanxey v. Iowa City Glass Co. 68 Iowa, 542, 27 N. W. 747; Adams County v. Burlington & M. R. Co. 44 Iowa, 335; Shorthill v. Ferguson, 47 Iowa, 284; Jones v. Clark, 31 Iowa, 497. In the latter case, the court below, the district court, refused to permit amendments, holding, "as a matter of law, that when a chancery case has been appealed to the supreme court, and has been there heard upon its merits, and is remanded to the district court, with instructions as set forth in the procedendo in this cause, the district court has no power to grant leave to amend." But the supreme court reversed the district court, and held that that court might, "at any time, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, permit a party to amend any pleadings or proceedings. Rev. § 2977."

Doubtless the conclusions arrived at by This writ of error was thereupon brought. the state supreme court, and expressed in its opinion, furnish the grounds on which Messrs. Charles A. Clark and George the court below must proceed when the case E. Clarke for plaintiff in error.

goes to a decree there, if no change in pleadMessrs. E. B. Evans and H. C. Evans ings or proof takes place, but we cannot for defendants in error.

say what action might nevertheless be taken, and as no decree was entered in the su

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the preme court, and no specific instruction opinion of the court:

By its judgment the supreme court of Iowa reversed the decree of the trial court, and remanded the cause "for further proceedings in harmony with the opinion of this court."

We have heretofore held that a judgment couched in such terms is not final in such a sense as to sustain a writ of error from

was given to the court below, we think the
writ of error cannot be maintained. As-
suming, without deciding, that a Federal
question was so raised as otherwise to have
justified the exercise of our jurisdiction,
we can but repeat what we said in Hasel-
tine's Case:
Case: "The plaintiffs in the case
under consideration could have secured an
immediate review by this court if the court,

DANIEL L. HOLDEN and Lizzie Holden, Lizzie Holden, his wife. They were con

Execution—exemptions—proceeds of life in- ber and the first day of December, 1900,

Submitted April 6, 1905. Decided May 8, was then alive, he or his assigns, if credit

ors, might surrender the policy, and receive its full cash value, or a nonparticipating N WRIT of Certiorari to the United policy, payable to the original beneficiary,

O`States Circuit Court of Appeals for the pri' she was not alive, to the executors,

Ninth Circuit to review a judgment which revised an order of the District Court for the Northern Division of the District of Washington, in proceedings in bankruptcy, by adjudging that the bankrupt must pay the cash surrender value of certain policies The bankrupts made application to have of life insurance as a condition precedent these policies set aside to them, because, to an exemption of such policies. Judgment it was asserted, they were exempt by the

law of the state of Washington. This was | icies, or that the exemption here claimed is resisted by the trustee upon the ground not embraced within the state law, if such law be valid, lie at the threshold of the case, and must be disposed of before we come to consider the true interpretation of the bankrupt law.

that the policies had a cash surrender value of $2,200, which it was the duty of the bankrupts to pay to the trustee as a condition precedent to the exemption of the policies. The referee sustained the claim of the trustee. His ruling was reversed by the district court. On a petition for revision the circuit court of appeals held that the bankrupts were obliged to pay the cash surrender value as asserted by the trustee. 51 C. C. A. 97, 113 Fed. 141. An appeal was prosecuted to this court, and was dismissed. 191 U. S. 115, 48 L. ed. 116, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45. This writ of certiorari was then allowed. 193 U. S. 672, 48 L. ed. 841, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854.

To decide the contentions involves purely state, and not Federal, considerations. No decision of the supreme court of the state of Washington holding the exemption law to be invalid because repugnant to the state Constitution has been referred to. On the contrary, in Re Heilbron, 14 Wash. 536, 35 L. R. A. 602, 45 Pac. 153, the exemption law in question was considered and upheld by the supreme court of Washington. In that case the court maintained the contention that to cause the provisions of the statute to retrospectively apply to debts which had

Messrs. P. P. Carroll and John E. Car- been contracted prior to the passage of the roll for petitioners.

act would render the act unconstitutional,

Messrs. Frederick Bausman and Hugh both from the point of view of the Federal A. Garland for respondent.

Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion

of the court:

The law of the state of Washington upon which the bankrupts relied to sustain the exemption of the policies was originally enacted in 1895, (Wash. Laws 1895, p. 336), and was re-enacted in 1897. Laws 1897, p. 70. The original act provided "that the proceeds or avails of all life insurance shall be exempt from all liability for any debt," and the amendment of 1897 enlarged this act by making it also applicable to accident insurance.

The circuit court of appeals held that the policies were not exempt, even although embraced by the state exemption, because of the requirements of § 70 of the bankrupt act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 565, chap. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3451]. This was sustained upon the theory that § 6 of the bankrupt act, adopting the exemption laws of the several states, was modified, as to life insurance policies, by a proviso found in § 70a. In addition, in this court it is insisted, on behalf of the trustee, that, even although the construction of the bankrupt act adopted by the circuit court of appeals was a mistaken one, nevertheless the policies were not exempt, first, because the law of Washington making the exemption was in conflict with the Constitution of that state; and, second, because the law, even if valid, did not authorize the exemption of policies of the character of those here involved.

as well as the state Constitution, and therefore that the law must be construed as having only a prospective operation. All the reasoning, however, of the opinion of the court by which the conclusion referred to was reached, assumed, as a matter of course, that the law, if operating prospectively, was not an unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature. And it is also worthy of remark that the amendment including accident insurance was adopted by the legislature of Washington subsequent to the decision in Re Heilbron. Of course, as the question of the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution of Washington upon the grounds now asserted was not presented in that case, the decision cannot be said to beconclusive of the question. But it has its due persuasive force.

Considering the contention, however, asan original question, we think its unsoundness is quite clear. The fallacy which the proposition embodies consists in presupposing that because the Constitution of the state of Washington provides that the legis lature "shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families," thereby a limitation was imposed upon the general power of the legislature to determine the amount and character of property which should be exempt. Two cases are referred to as supporting the contention. How, 59 Minn. 415, 61 N. W. 456; Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 62 Am. St. Rep. 878, 69 N. W. 595. But those cases were based upon constitutional provisions widely different from the one here relied upon. As § 6 of the bankrupt act gives effect to the contrary, in California, where a conthe exemptions allowed by the state law, it stitutional provision obtains identical with follows that the contentions that there was the one we are considering (Cal. Const. art. no valid state law exempting insurance pol-17, § 1), it has been decided that the charac25 S. C.-42.

How v.

To