in point of fact, neither Parliament nor the world knew what the determination of the Government really was. Warfare was talked of, but no one knew with whom we were at war. Nay, no one could say whether we were at war or not. But if public rumour were true, we were at war, and, if so, why were the Government afraid to state the fact? Another point of complaint was, that no information on the Eastern question had been afforded to the public, so that the inhabitants of other and unconstitutional countries were in a better position to form an opinion of the state of affairs than the people of constitutional England. It was impossible to avoid coming to the conclusion that all this uncertainty was owing to the difference of opinion on the Eastern question which prevailed in the Cabinet; the result of which division was, that every step taken in the matter bore evidence of a compromise between the conflicting parties. The character of England had sunk immeasurably among continental nations through the conduct of the Government in this affair. The went round, that we were afraid. Though he had asked questions very sparingly last session, from a wish not to embarrass the Government, he had said enough to show that the opinions he had then formed, and the anticipations he had then expressed, had been justified by the course of events, and that Russia, which from the very first had shown the "cloven foot," had only continued the same line of falsehood and duplicity. The only way to deal with Russians,

" sneer

as he had found from personal experience, was to put to them a plain straightforward question, and to insist on a straightforward answer. Had the Government done this, much of the present complication might have been avoided. In this respect, as compared with England, the conduct of the French Government was worthy of the highest praise, and he only hoped that the relations now existing between the two nations would be maintained with uninterrupted cordiality. He then passed in review the various phases of the negotiations entered into by the great Powers with respect to the Turkish and Russian quarrel, and denounced in no measured terms the late propositions which had been imposed on Turkey, and particularly the clause which insisted on the renewal of the treaties—a clause in itself sufficient to give the Emperor of Russia all that he had asked for at the commencement of the dispute.

In conclusion he stated that he was as ready as any one in that House to support the Government, and to rescue them from the scrape into which they had got themselves; but he could not as an honourable man withhold his opinion, thinking as he did it was our want of energy which had deceived the Emperor of Russia, and had, as it were, decoyed him into the war in which there was too much reason to fear we were soon to be involved.

The Earl of Clarendon defended the concealment system, on the plea that as Ministers were responsible to Parliament they were not called upon to publish their acts before the Legislature met, in imitation of those Go

vernments who had no Parliament to which they owned responsibility. Revelations also might, on certain contingencies, have been inconvenient and damaging to the cause of peace. He denied that the Administration had shown cowardice. What they had done was under an intimate conviction of the value of peace, which they considered worth any sacrifice except that of the national honour or the faith of treaties. This position he illustrated by a minute detail of the proceedings and negotiations on either side, pointing always to the dexterity with which at every turn Russia had contrived to hold forth such prospects of a peaceful solution as warranted the British Government in carrying on the negotiations without committing the country to the terrible hazards of war. They had exhausted, he said, every honourable means to bring about a pacific solution by negotiation; and the result was, the Emperor of Russia had been placed completely in the wrong. He urged that the delay in pushing forward active measures had been serviceable to the Turks, who had thus obtained much valuable and necessary time to complete their warlike preparations, and after expressing his unequivocal testimony to the straightforward, manly, and entirely honourable conduct of the French Government throughout the whole of the transactions, he concluded by declaring his conviction that the efforts which had been made by the Government in the cause of peace, would in the event of war enable them to appeal with greater force and justice to the energetic aid of the British people in a just and

righteous cause, in which was involved the future tranquillity of Europe.

The Earl of Malmesbury forbore to comment upon the state of foreign affairs, and their serious entanglements in Russia and Turkey, until the official papers had appeared, and the subject came fully on for discussion. He, however, recapitulated and censured the secret and mysterious manner in which Ministers had conducted the negotiations. Some of the consequences he pointed out, such as despatches appearing surreptitiously in the papers, and information respecting the movements of the British Ministry reaching this country by reflection from the foreign journals. These results, he contended, were disrespectful to the House and prejudicial to the public service. Another injurious consequence followed indirectly from the same source. Ministerial secrecy prevented the expression of public opinion in England, and thus stopped one of the most powerful influences that might have induced the Czar to adopt a pacific course. But the Ministry had misled the Czar at an earlier period. By depreciating the efforts made to consolidate the French alliance during Lord Derby's Administration, and by their speeches at the commencement of their own, several of the present Ministers had given Russia reasonable cause to believe that England and France could never act cordially together, and thus induced the Emperor to venture upon attacking Turkey. He proceeded to examine the various stages of the dispute on all sides, eulogising the intre

pidity displayed by Turkey, and showing abundant cause for ascribing heavy blame to the English Government, "not for endeavouring to avert war, but for vacillating in their conduct, and not taking the right steps at the proper moment."

Earl Grey thought that the course pursued by the Government stood greatly in need of explanation and vindication; but so far as he was yet acquainted with the facts, he was not satisfied that we ought to have interfered at all in the dispute between Russia and Turkey. If, however, as he feared, war was inevitable, it should be carried on with vigour and unanimity; and he trusted to find the defect in the naval and military services which long peace might have fostered, promptly removed, and young and intelligent officers appointed to the principal commands. He thought the question of reform by no means pressed for immediate solution, and recommended the Government to postpone it to a more appropriate season.

The Earl of Derby, after briefly alluding to the "most awful crisis" in which the country was now placed, adverted to the topics in the Queen's Speech, and noticed some omissions in it. He concurred in desiring some reforms in the universities, but doubted whether a Commission was the fitting machinery for obtaining the requisite information, and pointed out the directions in which improvement should be sought. On the subject of popular education, he regretted to find no promise made and no notice taken in the Speech of the Sovereign. It also omitted all mention of the negotiation still pending between

England and the United States, and the treaties effected through Lord Malmesbury's efforts, by which the River Plate, and its vast adjacent district, had been opened to the commerce of the world. Adverting to the Turkish question, he abstained from opening the whole controversy, but remarked upon the indefinite and indescribable condition in which the conduct of the Government had placed the country at the pending juncture.

"We are left to mere conjecture as to whether, at the moment that I am speaking, we are at peace or at war. For I presume that, if I were to hint that we are actually at war, not only would such a conclusion be repudiated by Her Majesty's Government, but they would state that the Government mean to persevere in their efforts to preserve peace; yet I would suggest a little modification in this, and say that, before peace is preserved, it had better be restored. (A laugh.) It is intimated to us, however, that a state of warfare has ensued from the failure of all our negotiations. A state of warfare with whom? Are we engaged in that warfare? Are we belligerents? Are we partisans? Are we carrying on war openly and boldly, or are we carrying on that which is tantamount to war, but a war carried on in a pettifogging manner, and, I might almost say, in a manner discreditable to this great country? I know not; but I hope that, when the papers shall have been submitted to our consideration, we shall at least know what is the precise occupation in which our fleet is engaged at present; that we shall know precisely under what orders it has been sent, and that those

orders have been given in the most distinct, and positive, and formal manner by Her Majesty's Government here to the admiral in command of the squadron. I shall rejoice to see what is the exact state of affairs; but at the present moment I confess it is involved in obscurity. We are not at war-we are cherishing hopes of peace, and labouring to restore it when interrupted; but, at the same time, Her Majesty's Government are sending a civil message to one of the belligerent parties, that if their vessels leave the port in which it is presumed they are lying, we shall consider it an act of hostility, and insist on confining them to their quarters. On the other hand, are we applying the same condition to the other belligerent? are we confining the Turkish fleet under a compulsory armistice? Or are we confining the Russian fleet in its own harbour, whilst we are convoying the Turkish fleet, laden with ammunition and with troops, to enable Turkey more effectually to carry on war? I am not saying that, if we are doing all this, we are acting in a manner discreditable to the country, by giving a moral and physical assistance to Turkey, but I say that by giving the convoy of our fleet for the transport of ammunition and of troops, whatever you may call it, we are virtually engaged in war, but at the same time with all the dangers and the risks, unaccompanied by the dignity or moral effect, of an open declaration of war." ("Hear, hear!")

not a policy of conquest, but of aggression. It has never proceeded by storm, but by sap and mine. The first process has been invariably that of fomenting discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the subjects of subordinate states then proffering mediation-then offering assistance to the weaker party-then declaring the independence of that party-then placing that independence under the protection of Russia; and finally, from protection, proceeding to the incorporation, one by one, of those states into the gigantic body of the Russian empire. (Hear, hear!) I say nothing of Poland, or of Livonia, but I speak of Mingrelia, Imiritia, and the countries of the Caspian, even as far as the boundary of the Araxes; and, again, the Crimea itself. But this has been the one course which Russia has invariably pursued; although she has pursued this steady course for 150 years, she has from time to time desisted from her schemes where she has found that they met with opposition, and has never carried any one of those schemes into effect where she has been certain to meet the opposition of this country." ("Hear, hear!")

He then gave a pithy recapitulation of Russian policy.

ject he would not hesitate to sacrifice all party feelings and prejudices. He contended that no time could be less opportune than the present for the consideration of questions of Parlia mentary reform, though the great evils of bribery and intimidation could not be too soon or too summarily dealt with. Turning from public affairs, he called attention to the extraordinary circumstances of Lord Palmerston's retirement from office, and his yet more extraordinary return to it; and in conclusion, he protested his desire to render his best assistance in rescuing the country from its difficult position, with honour to her arms and cha

racter.

Lord Aberdeen, repeating in the strongest terms all that he had ever said to express his horror and detestation of war, defended himself from the odious imputation that he had been "the instrument and tool of Russia" in the late negotiation, whereas no man in public life had ever taken a more active part against the Russian Government. The same charge was made with respect to Austria, with which, since he had been accredited as Ambassador to it forty years ago, he had had no more concern than with Japan. He maintained, in reply to those who would have preferred a more vigorous course, that nothing would have been gained by a game of brag, and that, if we had menaced Russia in the spring of last year, we should only have provoked an immediate march upon Constantinople, which the Turks were then wholly unprepared to resist. He had, too, been accused of indifference to

the French alliance. he who had, through his long life, uniformly maintained the necessity of such an alliance-the author of the entente cordiale! It was consolatory, after such calumnies, to see that on the other side, and with at least as much reason, Count Nesselrode was accused of being a traitor to his country, and as bought by English gold.

After explaining, with regard to the Palmerston resignation, that the Home Secretary had believed the details of a certain measure settled, and therefore resigned, but finding that it was still susceptible of modification, subsequently resumed his functions, Lord Aberdeen denied the right of the Opposition to demand any explanation on the subject. The performance of the public duties of the office had never been interrupted. Had Lord Palmerston left office, he would have been bound to give a Parliamentary explanation; but where a mere misunderstanding took place, whether in the Cabinet or elsewhere, which was reconcilable, he maintained that no explanation was necessary. then diverged into the subject of the charges brought against Prince Albert, and pronounced the following vindication:

He

"I will for a moment advert to this odious charge, as having assumed a sort of character of consistency which calls on me to treat it more seriously than anything so despicable ought to be treated. (Hear, hear!) I will just recall to your Lordshipswhat you have seen in the course of the last few weeks-the persevering manner in which these scandalous and groundless impu