was now supported by a considerable body of infantry, but the ships soon retired out of the range of the Russian guns.

The flag of the Tiger was forwarded to St. Petersburg, to be kept as a trophy. Captain Gifford died of his wounds on the 1st of June, nineteen days after the surrender of his ship. After a short captivity, the majority of the crew were exchanged for an equal number of Russian prisoners; but Lieutenant Royer, the first lieutenant, was ordered to St. Petersburg, to await the orders of the Emperor, who at once gave him his liberty.

The blockade of Sebastopol by the allied fleets was thought to be so strict that no Russian vessel could possibly evade it; yet the contrary was proved by the steam-frigate Waldimir. This ship made her way without molestation to the very mouth of the Bosphorus, to within the distance of a few miles from Constantinople. From that point she proceeded to the Asiatic coast of the Black Sea, and there sank several Turkish vessels laden with corn. She next went to Heraclea, and there captured two vessels laden with coal. She had expected to surprise the English steamer Cyclops, which, having landed her guns, would have fallen an easy prey had she chanced to have been in the roads; but she was fortunately detained at Constan

tinople. The Waldimir was a paddle-wheel steamer, which could not make any progress without the usual noise made by that class of vessels; and this renders it the more extraordinary that she should have succeeded in baffling the vigilance of the allied fleet. She was painted for the occasion like an Austrian, and showed her name as Fernando Primo; and thus she eluded twenty-four sail of the line and a great number of steam-frigates, and took her prizes safely in tow, and carried them into Sebastopol.

We cannot vouch for the correctness of the numbers, but it is stated that at the end of July or beginning of August, the Sultan had 120,000 men on the line of the Danube, or a little in advance of it; and that they were thus distributed: 10,000 in Wallachia, at Giurgevo and Bucharest; 50,000 at the camp of Rustchuk; 30,000 at Rasgradt; and 30,000 at Schumla. There were also more troops in the fortified places on the Danube. But disease scarcely spared the Mussulmans more than the Christians; their commissariat was in a most wretched condition, and their medical staff as bad as could be. Outside of each of their encampments there was a cemetery of new-made graves. Every day saw it increasing in its mournful dimensions.

present treaty; and the fifth, that during its existence, the contracting parties should not conclude with any other country an alliance at variance with its bases. The sixth merely stipulated for the speedy ratification of the treaty.

On the same day there was signed an "additional article" to the treaty, which was as follows:

"Their Majesties cannot disguise to themselves that a prolonged occupation of the Sultan's territories on the Lower Danube by the Russian troops will put in peril the political, moral, and material interests of the whole Germanic Confederation, and this the more in proportion as Russia shall extend her military operations against Turkey. The Courts of Austria and Prussia unite in the desire to avoid as much as possible any participation in the war which has broken out between Russia, on the one side, and France, England, and Turkey, on the other, and at the same time to aid in the re-establishment of a general peace. The two Courts regard, above all, as a powerful element of pacification the explanations recently given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg at Berlin, in which Russia appears to consider the primitive cause of her occupation of the Principalities as set aside by the concessions recently made, and in many points accomplished, in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and the two Courts would profoundly deplore that these elements of pacification should not receive an ulterior realisation. They, therefore, hope that the answers expected from St. Petersburg will offer the neces

sary guarantees of a prompt withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Turkish territory. In case these hopes should be disappointed, the Plenipotentiaries above named are agreed as to the special engagement designated by Art. II. of the treaty."

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There was also an "article unique." 'Austria, on her side, will address to the Imperial Court of Russia overtures having for their object to obtain from his Majesty the Emperor of Russia the orders necessary to suspend any forward movement of his army on the Ottoman territory, and also to obtain from his Majesty complete guarantees for the early evacuation of the Danubian Principalities. On its side, the Prussian Government will energetically back these propositions.

"If, contrary to all hopes, the answers of the Court of Russia should be of a nature not to give a complete security on the subject of the two points above mentioned, then, in the view of arriving at the result, one of the contracting parties will adopt measures in virtue of the stipulations of Art. II. of the treaty this day concluded, which states that any attack against the territory of either of the two contracting parties shall be repelled by the other by all the military means at its disposal.

"Nevertheless, and in every case, an offensive action of the two contracting parties shall be determined upon only by the incorporation of the Principalities, or by the passage of the Balkans, by Russia.

"The present arrangement will be submitted to the ratification of

the two Sovereigns simultaneously with the treaty."

Both Austria and Prussia communicated to Count Nesselrode separate notes, containing a repetition of the summons which the Court of Vienna sent to St. Petersburg in the month of February. To these notes the Russian Chancellor did not reply until July 29, by which time the army of the Czar was on the point of being driven out from Wallachia and Moldavia. To Austria Count Nesselrode said

"The occupation of the Principalities did not prevent the opening and progress of the negotiations. It was not that occupation which occasioned the abandonment of the Vienna note, the rejection of the propositions made at Olmütz with the concurrence and approbation of Austria, nor the complete change in all the anterior bases of the negotiations; and, if all the attempts at conciliation have proved abortive since then, the Austrian Cabinet cannot deny that this result arose from incidents and motives of a more complicated character, respecting which we would rather he silent now, in order to avoid unpleasant recriminations. We replied by silence to the summons of France and England, because it was couched in an offensive form, and was preceded by open provocation, and was destitute of all conditions of reciprocity; and, if the war consequently ensued, it would only be just to impute the cause less to the nature of our answer than to the tone and the terms which provoked it. Be this as it may, if, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, the prolonged occupation of the Prin

cipalities was the motive of the war, it ought to be a consequence that when the occupation ceased the war would cease from that fact itself, seeing that hostilities would be suspended.

"Is the Cabinet of Vienna in a position to give us the assurance of it? It cannot escape its attention that, from the first moment when the Porte declared war against us, and particularly since the arena of that war, transported beyond Turkey, on our seas and upon our coasts, has been extended without limit, the occupation of the Principalities, whatever may have been its original character, has become for us only amilitary position, the maintenance or abandonment of which is entirely a matter connected with strategical considerations. It is, therefore, quite clear that, before voluntarily giving up, in deference to Austria, the only point where, by assuming the offensive, we should have any chance of restoring in our favour the balance against us, we ought, at least, to be made acquainted with the securities which Austria has to offer us.

For, if the hostilities continue, if the Powers, released from all apprehension in Turkey, should be free either to pursue us on the evacuated territory, or to employ all their disposable forces in invading our European or Asiatic dominions, with a view to impose upon us conditions which could not be accepted, it is evident that the demand made by Austria was that we should weaken ourselves morally and materially by a sacrifice wholly useless. To require that Russia should place herself entirely at the mercy of her enemies, who

do not conceal their intention to overthrow or diminish her power, to expose her to all the attacks which they may think right to make against her, particularly by reducing her to the defensive, to take from her, in short, in the name of peace, all the means of obtaining that peace except those which would be ruinous and dishonourable, this would be an act so contrary to all the laws of equity, and to all the principles of military honour, that we feel pleasure in believing that such an idea would not for a moment enter into the imagination of his Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph. In communicating to us the protocol of the 9th of April, the Court of Vienna points out to us particularly the positive engagement she has made with the Western Powers to bring about, by every means in her power, the final evacuation of the Principalities; but in making this engagement Austria cannot interdict to herself the choice of the mode which might appear to her the most proper to fulfil her obligations that of placing Russia in a position to proceed to the evacuation with honour and secu

rity to herself. Even the obligation which she made gives her, on the contrary, the right of insisting that the Powers should not, by their exigencies, throw any obstacles in the way of the success of her efforts. The same may be said of the interests of Austrian and German commerce, which were invoked against the prolongation or extension of our military operations. They authorise the Cabinet of Vienna to use towards the two Powers the same arguments as to us, for, if the

interests of Austria and the whole of Germany should suffer temporarily from our operations on the Danube, they must suffer still more, as well as all neutral States, from the situation brought about by the maritime operations of France and England in the Euxine, the North Sea, and the Baltic.

"Let the Austrian Government, then, after giving mature consideration to these points, give us an explanation upon the subject of the guarantees of safety which it can give to us, and the Emperor, from deference to the wishes and interests of Germany, will be disposed to enter into negotiation as to the precise period for the evacuation. The Cabinet of Vienna may beforehand rest persuaded that his Majesty shares with it the desire to put an end as speedily as possible to the crisis which weighs at this moment upon every European position. Our august master still wishes, as he has always wished, for peace. He has no desire,we have repeated it, and we repeat it once more,—either to prolong indefinitely the occupation of the Principalities, or to establish himself there in a permanent manner, or to incorporate them with his dominions, still less to overthrow the Ottoman Empire. In this respect he has no difficulty in agreeing to the three principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th of April: