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as much and as definite information of the cows attached as the use of twenty-one would have done. The same reasoning is applicable to the other live stock then on the farm. To identify the property described in either case, extrinsic evidence, or evidence outside of the return, would have to be resorted to, namely: evidence to show the particular cows that made up the twenty-one cows, or all the cows then on the farm, and named in the return. While the return stating that the officer attached all the personal property of the kind named in a town has been held too indefinite to create a valid attachment - Paul v. Burton, 32 Vt. 148; Rogers v. Fairfield, 36 id. 641-it has not, so far as we are informed, ever been held in this State or elsewhere that a description in a return or conveyance was inoperative because of indefiniteness which described the property as all the property of the particular kind named in the possession of a particular person on a designated farm in a town.

In Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 306, it is held that a mortgage of all the goods, etc., in and about a certain building, is valid as to all articles that can be identified. The same is held in Harding v. Coburn, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 333; and in Burditt v. Hunt, 25 Me. 419. We think the description of the live stock in the plaintiff's return sufficient to comply with the rule enunciated in Bucklin v. Crampton, supra, that when read with reference to the situation and condition of John Campbell's property in the possession of G. M. Campbell as his lessee on the farm leased, it was sufficient to inform John Campbell or any reasonable prudent person who might have occasion to deal with him in regard to any of the same that it was under attachment by the plaintiff.

We also think that the thirteen yearling heifers which came in, and the horse power, threshers and saws were, by the contract, included in the lease. The lessee was entitled to their possession and use during the term of the lease. The plaintiff would have been a trespasser if he had undertaken to remove them from the lessee's possession. The property other than the live stock in the lessee's possession is described. by number as well as kind. It is not seriously contended that the return insufficiently describes this, and yet it could be identified only by evidence extrinsic to the return.

III. It is further contended that the plaintiff lost the lien created by his attachment by his failure to take possession of the property immediately upon the expiration of the lease to G. M. Campbell. On the facts found, the lease expired on the first or second day of October, 1879. When the attachment was made the plaintiff asked G. M. Campbell, in the presence of John Campbell, what property was included in the lease and when the lease expired; G. M. Campbell replied, that all the property on the farm was included in the lease, and that the lease expired October 3, 1879. The statute-R. L., §§ 1189, 1190, 1191-authorizing an attachment and sale of the interest of the lessor in property leased, while in the lessee's possession, is silent in regard to the duty of the officer, or what is necessary to be done by him to preserve the attachment if the lease or bailment should expire before the sale. It is claimed by the defendants that the officer must take

possession of the property the moment the lease expires, or the lien created by the attachment is lost. There seems to be force in the contention under the decisions in this State, that if the property pending the attachment is released from the operation of the lease and returns to the possession of the lessor, it becomes subject to attachment by other creditors of the lessor, and to sale to bona fide purchasers. But how the law should be held on the supposed state of facts we have no occasion to inquire nor decide. The property has not returned to the possession of the lessor and there been attached by other creditors of the lessor, or been purchased by bona fide purchasers. On the 18th day of July, 1879, John Campbell assigned all his property to the defendants for the benefit of all his creditors. The defendants, early on the morning of October 3, 1879, took possession of all the property attached, removed it from the farm, and have converted most of it into money. The plaintiff appeared at the farm October 3, 1879, after the defendants had taken possession of the property and removed it, and demanded the property of the lessee, and subsequently and before bringing this suit of the defendants.

If it was the duty of the plaintiff to ascertain the time when the lease expired and take possession of the property attached at the expiration of the lease to preserve the lien created by the attachment in the hands of the lessee, we think all that can be required of the officer is the exercise of reasonable and prudent inquiry to ascertain the time when the lease expires, and reasonable diligence to take possession of the property at the expiration of the lease. This the plaintiff did. The lease was unwritten. He inquired of the lessee in the presence of the lessor. He was present to take possession of the property on the very day on which he was informed the lease expired. Any stricter rule would be open to the practice of frequent and gross frauds on the attaching officer and creditor. It may well be questioned whether, under the law, when an attachment was made of property in the hands of a bailee, pledgee or lessee, such bailee, pledgee or lessee can lawfully deliver the property so attached on the termination of the bailment, pledge or lease to the owner, whether by the attachment the law has not impounded it in his hands, and whether he is not under a legal duty, at least, to notify the officer of its termination and call upon him to take possession. But on the facts of this case there is another satisfactory answer to this contention. The defendants are neither attaching creditors nor bona fide purchasers of the property. Stickney v. Crane, 35 Vt. 89. They occupy against the plaintiff in that respect no better position than their assignor, John Campbell. Against him, the plaintiff's attachment of the property continued valid, whether made by a legally authenticated copy of the writ, with his return delivered to G. M. Campbell as lessee, or by like copy and return lodged in the town clerk's office, although he did not take actual possession of the personal property so attached. No. 70, Acts 1878; Blodgett v. Adams, 24 Vt. 23. Such attachments being legal, when made, created a legal lien on the property attached which continued in force against the defendant, without more being done by the officer, until thirty days after final judgment in the suit on which the attach

ment was made. Hence the plaintiff's attachment of the calves, which were not included in the lease as agreed upon by the parties thereto by a copy of the writ in the town clerk's office, was valid against these defendants. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider whether John Campbell and his assignees are estopped by the statement of G. M. Campbell that the. calves were included in the lease, and that the lease expired October 3, 1879. The execution on the judgment in favor of the attaching creditor was seasonably taken out and placed in the plaintiff's hands for collection, and the property attached duly demanded and charged thereon. This perfected the right of the plaintiff to recover the value of the property thus legally attached and charged in execution against John Campbell.

The hay and grain raised on the farm by the lessee under the lease was not in existence when the attachment was made, and therefore could not be attached. Although by the terms of the lease the hay cut by the lessee, in 1879, was substituted for the hay on the premises when the lease was agreed upon, which latter was legally attached by the plaintiff, it was not attached and the plaintiff never acquired any right to it, and cannot recover for its conversion, nor for the conversion of John Campbell's half of the corn and oats raised on the farm that season. IV. The only remaining question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of John Campbell's reversionary interest in the property attached at the date of the attachment, or the value of the property attached when converted by the defendants. We think he is entitled to recover the value of the property when converted. It is true, by the provisions of the statute, only the interest of the lessor in property leased can be attached and sold. But when before the sale the property is discharged from the lease, that interest is the entire value of the property. It is the value of his interest in the property at the time of the sale and not at the time of its attachment, which the creditor is entitled to take and apply in satisfaction or toward the satisfaction of the judgment.

The result is the pro forma judgment of the county court is reversed and judgment rendered for the plaintiff to recover of the defendants the sum of $1,260.77, with interest from October 5, 1879, and his costs.

NEWELL V. TOWN OF WHITTINGHAM.

January 23, 1886.

TAXATION OATH OF TAX PAYER.

The plaintiff interlined the oath attached to his inventory required by the tax law of 1880, with the words "to my best knowledge and belief." The listers refused to accept it and proceeded under the section of the statute R. L., § 326 -which directs them, in case of a willful omission to make, swear to and deliver a legal inventory, to ascertain the amount of the taxpayer's taxable property, appraise the same, and double the sum so obtained as a basis for the delinquent's list. Held, that the action of the listers was lawful; that it was the duty of the plaintiff to take the oath as formulated in the statute; and that his refusal was willful, though conscientious. Ross, J., dissenting.

Assumpsit. Plea, general issue with notice. Trial by jury, March term, 1884, Windham county, RowELL, J., presiding. The court pro

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forma directed a verdict for the defendant, that the question might be settled by the supreme court. But in doing this the court stated: "We think there is no ground for saying that Mr. Newell acted in this matter otherwise than in the utmost good faith and honesty, and that he really and honestly entertained the doubts and scruples that he said he did.”

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The words, "To my best knowledge and belief," were inserted in the oath just after the words "taxable property." The required oath was: "I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the above is a full, true and correct list and description of al! my taxable property, both real and personal, and all property which should be set in the list to me, and that I have set down only such debts as I am unconditionally bound to pay, to the amount of the deduction claimed, that my answers to these interrogatories are correct, and that I have not conveyed or disposed of any property or estate in any manner, or created any fictitious debt for the purpose of evading the provisions of law, or affecting the value and amount of my taxable estate, so help me God."

The collector sold the plaintiff's property to satisfy the tax, and this action was brought to recover for the same. The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court, and in the dissenting opinion of Judge Ross.

C. B. & C. F. Eddy and H. N. Hix, for plaintiff. In every essential particular, the oath tendered, was all the act required. The plaintiff had a right to propose the form of the oath which he would take if the same was thus binding upon him. 1 Greenl. Ev. 434; 1 Swift Dig. 739; 1 Stark. Ev. 20. This act, like all others, must have a reasonable construction. The object of the statute is: First, to provide revenue; second, to secure the citizens against injustice. It was not intended to confer upon listers, lawful power to inflict upon a tax payer inequality and injustice for no other reason than that he has been honest and exactly truthful. The case shows that the plaintiff was in honest and conscientious doubt as to whether he had a taxable interest in some wool and cattle, or in what might be due him ultimately in respect to them. It is not a mere formula of words that constitutes the law; its substance, the true rule of action prescribed, must be gathered from the object and spirit of the enactment as well as the mere letter. Holland v. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280. Not every verbal variance, either in the omission or admission of words, will vitiate. Shrewsbury v. Mount Holly, 2 Vt. 220; State v. Bartlett, 11 id. 650; Blodgett v. Holbrook, 39 id. 341; Ayers v. Moulton, 51 id. 115; Charleston v. County Commissioners, 1 Allen, 199; Lanesborough v. County Commissioners, 131 Mass. 424; Tonnelle v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140; Walker v. Cochran, 8 N. H. 166; Leach v. Bradley, 34 Vt. 124; Fairbanks & Co. v. Kittredge, 24 id. 13.

J. Barrett, for defendant. The plaintiff was subject to taxation; hence, if he can recover, it is because the tax was unlawful. If the listers accepted a different inventory than was provided by law they were liable to forfeit $200. 14 of the act of 1880. It could not be unlawful for them to stand on the explicit requirement of the

statute. Unless the statute required the listers to accept the oath, they had no authority to accept it. It is not the lawful function of this court to change the law of 1880 in respect to the oath. The language of the statute being explicit and plain, without ambiguity as to its meaning, there is no subject or occasion for construction.

The current of authority at the present day is in favor of reading statutes according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. Courts cannot correct what they deem either excesses or omissions in legislation. Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. 555; Sedg. Stat. Law, 243. The omission to make and deliver the proper inventory was willful. Smith v. Wilcox, 47 Vt. 537. Again, the authorities are uniform in marking the distinction between ministerial and judicial functions of listers. Day v. Peasley, 54 Vt. 312; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id. 359; Fuller v. Gould, 20 id. 649. The plaintiff's action enforced on the listers to act judicially to construe the statute. The good faith with which the plaintiff omitted to make the prescribed oath does not avoid the consequences visited by the statute. Did the listers do any thing unlawful? They obeyed the statute in every particular. The plaintiff must show the illegality of the tax. 44 Vt. 235; 38 id. 221; 25 id. 20; Cooley Tax. 566; Burr. Tax. 441.

VEAZEY, J. The listers of the defendant town were satisfied with the inventory of the plaintiff as filled out and tendered by him, with the exception of the interlineation in the oath, and for this reason only refused to receive it and administer the oath. The interlineation was in the words, " to my best knowledge and belief." By section 4 of No. 78 of the act of 1880, it was provided as follows: "Said inven

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tories shall also contain the following oath;" then followed the form just as printed in the blank inventory, and in which said interlineation was made by the plaintiff. Section 14 of said act was this: "If a lister accepts the inventory of a person not made out and sworn to as provided in this act. . he shall, for each inventory so received,

forfeit to the town or city where he resides the sum of $200; and any tax payer in such town, in the name of the town, may sue, and recover such penalty for the benefit of such town."

The plaintiff insists that the interlined oath was a substantial if not literal compliance with the requirements of the statute and that is sufficient in the construction of an act of this kind. The test is the legislative intent, to be deduced from the terms of the enactment as a whole. We think it is plain that the intention was to confer upon the listers the right to exact the oath prescribed. This is indicated by the provisions quoted and by others. The listers could not take up the inventories before April 1; and were limited to April 25 to complete, and arrange in alphabetical order and lodge the personal lists of all the tax payers in the clerk's office. $15.

The variation of the form of the oath under a claim that it did not vary the substance or legal effect would present practical difficulties to the listers that could not have been contemplated, in view of the liability and limitation upon them. The plaintiff's claim seems to come

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