Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB
[blocks in formation]

producing ability of these individual wells and the number of acres containing each of these wells, but in no case shall more than one hundred sixty (160) acres in the East Panhandle Field and not more than Six Hundred Forty (640) acres in the West Panhandle Field, in both sweet and sour zones, be allocated to any one well for the purpose of proration.

"It is ordered, That the total daily allowable production of gas from gas wells in the East and West Pan

of each well shall be regarded as its daily allowable production of such daily volume required for utilization from such common reservoir. ...

"Sec. 14. It shall be the duty of the Commission, after notice and hearing, to ascertain and determine the reasonable market demand for gas from gas wells to be used for light and fuel purposes and for all other lawful purposes to which sweet gas may be put under the terms of this Article and by proper order to restrict the production of gas from all gas wells in said field producing such gas to an amount equal to market demand or to an amount which may be produced without waste as otherwise defined; provided, however, the production of such gas shall in any event be restricted to the amount of the reasonable market demand therefor. In such order the Commission shall allocate, distribute or apportion the total allowable production from such field among the various gas wells affected by the order on a reasonable basis, and as provided in Section 13. ...

"Sec. 16. It shall be unlawful for any person to produce gas from a gas well as herein defined in excess of the daily allowable production in such schedule of allowable production. ...

"Sec. 20. In the event the Commission finds that the owner of any gas well has failed or refused to utilize or sell the allowable production from his well when such owner has been offered a connection or market for such gas at a reasonable price, such well shall be excluded from consideration in allocating the daily allowable production from the reservoir or zone in which same is located until the owner thereof signifies to the Commission his desire to utilize or sell such gas. In all other cases all gas wells shall be taken into account in allocating the allowable production among wells producing the same type of gas."

130607-37

-5

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

50

12

300

49

handle Fields shall be distributed and prorated among the individual wells on the following basis and in the following manner, to-wit: Fifty (50%) per cent of the reasonable market demand of the field shall be allocated on the ratio of the individual well acreage to the sum of the total well acreage in the field; and fifty (50%) per cent of the reasonable market demand of the field shall be allocated on the ratio of the individual well potential to the sum of the total well potentials in the field.”

The order reduces plaintiffs' allowable production to a volume far below their requirements. The plaintiffs and other pipe line owners acquired, at large cost, their markets in distant States and their transportation and marketing facilities. By means of their pipe lines all the sweet gas produced by the plaintiffs (and likewise all produced by other pipe line owners) was, and is, marketed under contracts with distant distributors, chiefly in other States. These markets are not free markets. The plaintiffs necessarily bound themselves to supply the requirements of the distributors; and the distributors bound themselves to take their requirements from the plaintiffs. In order to fulfill their contractual obligations, the plaintiffs developed the capacity of their wells and acquired large reserves to provide for their future needs so that they have no occasion to purchase gas from other wells. By limiting the plaintiffs' allowable production, the order disables them from perform

The Texoma Natural Gas Company (with an affiliate) has, at a cost of about $72,000,000, acquired 200,000 acres of leases in the West Panhandle field known to be capable of producing sweet gas; drilled about 90 wells; erected a compressor plant; constructed a pipe line to its Chicago market; and secured marketing contracts for distribution in other States. Similarly, the Consolidated Gas Utilities Company (with affiliates) has 'expended a smaller sum in acquiring and developing gas reserves in the East Panhandle field and in constructing pipe lines to, and securing contracts for marketing its gas in Kansas.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors][merged small]

Opinion of the Court.

13

ing their contracts unless they purchase, gas from nonpipe-line wells. Such purchases would at least involve the cost of the gas and the loss resulting from failure to make fuller use of their own property.

The plaintiffs do not contest that the State has power to conserve its natural resources for the public, as well as to protect private rights, 18 or that the Legislature has power to confer upon the Railroad Commission authority to make and enforce regulations to that end; or that to limit production to the aggregate reasonable market demand is, as a conservation measure, clearly proper in the interest of the public and of the private persons owning the right to draw from a common reservoir; or that the Commission has authority to issue regulations to that end. The plaintiffs do not deny that the Legislature may confer upon the Railroad Commission also authority to prorate the total allowable production among all the individual wells which draw from the common reservoir, provided the proration is in accordance with their respective market demands and due consideration is given to existing reserves. But they insist that House Bill 266 has not conferred that authority. And as to the order, the plaintiffs assert that, while restrictive in form, it is in fact coercive; that its purpose and effect are not to prevent waste of gas in the common reservoir nor to prorate the opportunities of production as distinguished from marketing; that the limitation of the production of the wells is merely a device to compel the individual plaintiffs, and other pipe line owners, to purchase gas for which they have no need; that the real purpose and

* Section 59 of Article 16 of the Constitution of Texas, which article was proclaimed October 2, 1917, provides, in part:

"The conservation and development of all the natural resources of this State . . . and the preservation and conservation of such natural resources of this State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties, and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as are appropriate thereto. ..."

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

effect of the order are to prorate not production, but distant markets and the facilities for serving them; and that, thus, the order takes their property without warrant in law.

First. Prior to the enactment of House Bill 266,14 the property rights of the plaintiffs were substantially those conferred by the common law of the State. Under it, the owner of land has title to oil and gas in place and, likewise, to the oil and gas which migrate to formations under his land through drainage from other lands.15 Under that rule, he may produce all the oil and gas that will flow out of the well on his land, subject to the exercise by other landowners of the same right of capture through drilling offsetting wells, so as to get their full share.16 This common law rule, declared in an unbroken line of authorities, has been widely applied.17 While a producer who negligently uses explosives in his operations will be liable if he causes physical damage to his

[ocr errors]

15

14 House Bill 266 amends Article 6008 of the Revised Civil Statutes, which is the statute particularly dealing with the production and use of natural gas. That article was amended by Chap. 26 of Acts of 1931, Forty-Second Legislature, First Called Session, p. 46. It was again amended by Chap. 100 of the Acts of 1933, called the "Sour Gas Law," Forty-Third Legislature, Regular Session, p. 222; also by Chap. 88 of the Acts of 1933, Forty-Third Legislature, First Called Session, p. 229, which remained in force until August 1, 1935, when House Bill 266 became effective.

See Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290; Grayburg Oil Co. v. State, 50 S. W. (20) 355.

19 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 231 S. W. 1088 (Tex. Comm. App.); compare Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S. W. 279.

1 Compare, e. g., Hermann v. Thomds, 143 $. W. 195 (Tex. Civ. App.); United North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith, 258 S. W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App.), affirmed, 272 S. W. 124 (Tex. Comm. App.);. Hunt v. State, 48 S. W. (2d) 466 (Tex. Civ. App.); Malone v. Barnett, 87 S. W. (20) 523 (Tex. Civ. App.). See Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S. W. (2d) 935 (Tex. Sup. Ct.).

!

55

Opinion of the Court.

neighbors' gas and oil bearing strata and thus impairs the productivity thereof,18 the common law of the State did not, apparently, afford a remedy against depleting the common supply by wasteful taking or use of oil or gas drawn from the wells on one's own property. But since 1899 the Legislature of the State has prohibited, or curbed, certain practices in the production of gas and oil which it recognized as wasteful.19

Second. The defendants contend that the order assailed is a regulation duly promulgated for the prevention of waste, and the protection of correlative rights of owners in the common pool, and was so applied. It may be assumed that House Bill 266 should be construed as authorizing regulations to prevent waste, and to create and protect correlative rights of owners in a common reservoir of gas to their justly proportionate shares thereof, free of drainage to neighboring lands. It may be assumed, also, that the statute, so construed, is a valid exercise of the State's undoubted power to legislate to those ends; and that it validly delegates to the Railroad Commission authority to promulgate regulations therefor. It is settled that to all administrative regulations purporting to be made under authority legally delegated, there attaches a presumption of the existence of facts justifying the specific exercise. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 185. But, obviously, the proration orders would not be valid if shown to bear no reasonable relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of correlative rights, or if shown to be

а

19

* See Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 298 S. W. 554 (Tex. Comm. App.).

"See Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 49 S. W. (20) 837, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.), reversed and dismissed as moot, 122 Tex. 243; 56 S. W. (2d) 1075 (Tex. Comm. App.); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S. W. (20) 935, 940, 941 (Tex. Sup. Ct.).

« AnteriorContinuar »