Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

must have been decided, in order to induce the judgment. Let us inquire, then, whether it appears on the face of this record, that the validity of a statute of Ohio, 'on the ground of its repugnancy to the constitution or laws of the United States' was drawn in question in this case.” Id., p. 341.

Pursuing that essential inquiry, the Court found that the question decided by the state court was one of the construction of the statute and not of its validity.

In Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149, the Supreme Court of Ohio certified that the validity of statutes of the State had been drawn in question as being in violation of the Federal Constitution and that the court had held the statutes to be valid. The certificate in that case was found to be vague and indefinite but the Court also restated the above-quoted ruling of Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executors, supra. While in Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36, the certificate was made by the presiding judge of the state court and not by the court itself, we took occasion to say:

"We will add, if this court should entertain jurisdiction upon a certificate alone in the absence of any evidence of the question in the record, then the Supreme Court of the State can give the jurisdiction in every case where the question is made by counsel in the argument. The office of the certificate, as it respects the Federal question, is to make more certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record, but it is incompetent to originate the question within the true construction of the 25th section (of the Judiciary Act].” Id., p. 39.

This statement was quoted with approval in Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433, 439.

The case of Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327, affords another illustration of the rule. The judgment was rendered in the Court of Appeals of New York and an entry was made in its record that on the argument of the

appeal it was claimed by the appellant that the Act of Congress of 1836, known as the Patent Act, governed the effect of the several transfers relating to the letters patent appearing in the case, and that the court had decided against the claims urged under that act. This Court observed that, until the certificate of the Court of Appeals, it nowhere appeared in the record that any question was raised as to the effect of the patent laws upon the title under consideration. And the Court said (id., pp. 329, 330):

“We have often decided that it is not enough to give us jurisdiction over the judgments of the State courts for the record to show that a Federal question was argued or presented to that court for decision. It must appear that its decision was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it. Commercial National Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executors, 5 How. 341; Lawler et al. v. Walker et al., 14 id. 154; R. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 180; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 id. 38.

“The same cases also establish the further rule, that 'the office of the certificate, as it respects the Federal question, is to make more specific and certain that which is too general and indefinite in the record, but is incompetent to originate the question'."

The Court found that the record did not present the federal question to which the certificate referred and the case was accordingly dismissed.

The rule was succinctly stated in Rector v. City. Deposit Bank Co., 200 U. S. 405, 412, as follows:

"It is elementary that the certificate of a court of last resort of a State may not import a Federal question into a record where otherwise such question does not arise, it is equally elementary that such a certificate may serve to elucidate the determination whether a Federal question exists."

a

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

Thus the true function of a certificate or statement of a state court, by way of amendment of, or addition to, the record, is to aid in the understanding of the record, to clarify it by defining the federal question with reasonable precision and by showing how the question was raised and decided, so that this Court upon the record as thus clarified may be able to see that the federal question was properly raised and was necessarily determined. Our decisions in cases where certificates have been found useful should be read in the light of that fundamental consideration. In Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 223, as explained in Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk & Ocean View Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 596, 599, there was "a record disclosure of the existence of the Federal question,” which was also certified. In the latter case it was assumed that the certificate, made by order of the state court, operated to show that some federal question was decided, but on examining the record this Court found the question to be unsubstantial and denied rehearing, the case having previously been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id., p. 603. The record in Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 182, showed that the federal question had been raised and the certificate aided in disclosing that the question was not treated as having been raised too late under the local procedure, a point upon which the state court was the judge. Applying the rule, in Rector v. City Deposit Bank Co., supra, the Court concluded that as the suit was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by the act of Congress the certificate made "clear the effect, if it were otherwise doubtful, that rights under the bankrupt law were relied upon and passed upon below.” See, also, Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 243, 244. It was in the light of these decisions that the question was presented in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 360–362. The writ of error had been dismissed

for want of jurisdiction (269 U. S. 530) and a motion for rehearing was granted. Id., p. 538. The Court of Appeal of the State, as an addition to the record, entered an order stating that the question whether the California Criminal Syndicalism Act and its application were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was considered and passed upon by the court. While this Court said that the record did not show that the defendant had raised or the state court had decided a federal question except as it appeared from that order, the record did disclose facts indicating the presence of the federal question which the order of the state court said was actually presented and decided, and accordingly jurisdiction was entertained. And it has been in recognition of the established principle governing the exercise of our jurisdiction, and not as a departure from it, that we have said that opportunity might be afforded upon seasonable application to obtain a certificate from the state court where it appeared that an appropriate certificate might lead to a better understanding of the record. See Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, supra; International Steel Co. v. Surety Co., 297 U. S. 657, 662.

In some of the cases cited above, we found from our examination of the record that, notwithstanding the certificate, the decision of the state court rested upon an adequate non-federal ground and hence we were without jurisdiction. See Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham's Executors, supra; Brown v. Atwell, supra; Powell v. Brunswick County, supra. A similar result follows where, even assuming that the state court has formally determined a federal question, it does not appear

. to have been a substantial one. See Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk & Ocean View Ry. Co., supra. In other cases an examination of the record has left the Court in doubt as to what has actually been determined. That is the situation in the present case.

Opinion of the Court.

300 U.S.

The appellee points to the provision of § 1078 of the Civil Practice Act of New York (enacted long before the so-called moratorium acts) that, after final judgment for the plaintiff in a foreclosure action, no other action shall be maintained to recover any part of the mortgage debt without leave of the court in which the former action was brought. In the instant case the amended complaint does not allege that such leave was obtained. We are also advised of decisions by the state court, prior to the one here sought to be reviewed, construing Chapter 794 of the Laws of New York of 1933 (S$ 1083–a and 1083-b of the Civil Practice Act) to which the amended remittitur refers. That act (§ 1083-a) forbids a judgment for any residue of the debt, remaining unsatisfied after sale of the mortgaged property, except as therein provided. Provision is made for an application by the creditor in the foreclosure action for leave to enter a deficiency judgment, and thereupon the court is to determine the fair and reasonable market value of the mortgaged premises and is to make an order directing the entry of a deficiency judgment, which is to be for an amount equal to that remaining due less the market value as determined or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher; and if no motion for a deficiency judgment is thus made, the proceeds of the foreclosure sale are to be regarded as full satisfaction of the mortgage debt "and no right to recover any deficiency in any action or proceeding shall exist." Section 1083-b provides that in actions, other than foreclosure actions, to recover for an indebtedness secured solely by a mortgage on real property and originating simultaneously, with such mortgage and secured thereby, against any one "directly or indirectly or contingently liable therefor," the party against whom the money judgment is demanded shall be entitled to set off the reasonable market value of the mortgaged property less prior liens.