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daughter of a deceased workman and his widow and children by a second marriage. It was held by the supreme court of the State that the daughter was entirely orphaned and a dependent to share equally with the widow, even though the latter had also dependent children of the deceased dependent on her, the widow and the orphaned daughter representing a case in which "there is more than one person wholly dependent," between whom the law provides that the death benefit should be equally divided.

In another case (In re Murphy, 113 N. E. 283) the deceased workman had lived with a dependent mother, who was an invalid, whose sole support he was. A sister was the housekeeper for the family, there being other members who were, however, self-supporting. Before the final determination of the mother's claim she died and an administrator intervened and secured an award in behalf of the next of kin of the deceased mother. The superior court affirmed this award, but it was reversed by the supreme court on the ground that the mother was the sole next of kin dependent on the deceased workman under the act, the family being not his but his mother's and the determination as to dependence being made necessarily at the time of the injury. In a quite similar case an unmarried son assumed the care of his aged parents and invited his sister to become the housekeeper of the family, not on a wage basis, but with a promise of support. It was held that the sister was a dependent on the brother, but since she had some property of her own the dependence was said to be partial only, and consideration was not to be given to any sum that she might inherit from her brother. (Kenney v. Boston, 111 N. E. 47.)

The same court construed the law of that State in a case in which a wife was living apart from her husband for alleged justifiable cause, ruling that under the circumstances the question of dependence would be subject to proof and not conclusively presumed. It was said that such cause may not be sufficient to warrant divorce, but it must be continuing, and if not in existence at the time of the fatality it will not suffice even though once valid. (In re Newman, 111 N. E. 359.) An award was refused in the case of a nonresident wife to whom the deceased had sent $161 in the course of eight years, there being insufficient evidence as to the wife's circumstances and means of support. It was said that there must be proof of actual dependence and a knowledge of the facts as to the separation of the parties before an award can be made. (In re Fierro, 111 N. E. 957.) That the intent of the parties will be considered was ruled by the accident board of this State in a case where a wife and children had been left in Syria, but with the definite purpose in mind of a future reunion of the family, an award for the wife's total dependency being made. That such intention must be definite would be concluded from

the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in a case (Finn v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 155 N. W. 721) in which a wife had left her husband following some friction and resumed teaching, contemplating a reunion as possible some time in the future, the court holding that such indefinite prospect did not bring the case within the act.

In the foregoing case, of course, the wife was earning, but that this of itself would not be a bar to a claim was the ruling of the industrial commissioner of Iowa in applying the law of that State to the case of a claimant widow who was herself a wage earner. It is pointed out that there must be a legal marriage and not a willful desertion without fault of the husband, and that under the provisions of the act of the State it is immaterial that she herself earns and was helping to support herself at the time of the injury.

The Ohio commission awarded benefits in the case of a wife and child deserted and left without support for several months through no fault of her own; in the case of a bigamous wife, ignorant of the fact of the first marriage of the deceased (lawful wife deserted for 18 years ruled not a dependent and was not a claimant); and in the case of a common-law wife and child with whom the deceased had lived and whom he supported. The West Virginia commission struck a middle course in the case of a man who had deserted his legal wife and had lived with another woman for 14 years, denying compensation both to the deserted wife and to the common-law wife making claim, but allowing compensation for the benefit of the three young children of the latter. In another case the same law was considered to warrant compensation to the children of the deceased, the widow's claim being denied, where she had deserted her husband two months prior to his death, taking her children with her, and going to live with another man, who supported the family.

An insane woman supported entirely by the State for several years was held not entitled to be considered as a beneficiary under the Michigan law (Roberts v. Whaley, 158 N. W. 209), but the attorney general of Minnesota held that a man confined in jail was nevertheless entitled to compensation, and the department of labor of the same State awarded compensation to a child in confinement in a reformatory institution.

The question of dependence of parents on their children involves no particular principle peculiar to compensation laws, but a few rulings have been noted. In a case before the Supreme Court of New Jersey (Reardon v. P. & R. R. Co., 88 Atl. 970), the employer contested an award under the law of the State for the death of an unmarried workman. The court held, however, that since the father had been dependent on his son's earnings an award in his behalf was valid. A compensation commissioner of Connecticut awarded benefits to a nonresident alien mother in a case in which the son had been

in the habit, while in France, of giving his earnings to his parents, and while in this country had given the money to his father for the support of the family. The industrial accident board of Massachusetts made an award on the claim of the mother where it was shown that the son had contributed to the support of herself and a large family, making contributions in an amount which was found to be more than double the actual cost of the board received by him. Where the father and son worked together, both losing their lives in the same accident, and the son's earnings had gone largely to the family support, the mother was held to be a partial dependent of the son; it was also held that the young man's sister, though 19 years of age and competent to make her own living, was in fact supported by the family and was dependent so as to justify an award in her behalf on account of her brother's death. So, also, under the law of New Jersey an award was made on behalf of a sister who received substantial benefits from her adult brother's earnings, which he had turned over to the father, the question being one of dependence as a fact, and not of minority or incapacity to work (Conners v. Electric Co., 97 Atl. 792); of course such a ruling depends on the terms of the act.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts made an award as for entire dependency, i. e., based on the full wages of a minor son, where all his earnings had been turned into the family fund, the father and other children also working. (In re Murphy, 105 N. E. 635.) In another case (Grove v. Royal Indemnity Co., 111 N. E. 702) this court affirmed an award of the State board where a young man had turned over part of his wages to his mother, receiving his board as a member of the family, the father also working. The mother was declared to be a dependent upon the son to the full amount of the wages turned over to her, without deducting therefrom the value of the board received by him, the benefits under the compensation law differing from the judgments allowed under Lord Campbell's Act, in that it is not on the amount of injury done to the dependent but on the amount of the decedent's wages that awards are to be based.

Somewhat in contrast with the ruling in the Murphy case above is the decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in a case (Dazy v. Apponaug Co., 89 Atl. 160) in which it appeared that there was no actual dependence on a minor son who had turned in his wages to his father, the facts being that without them the father was able to support his family and put by savings. The only allowance made therefore was for last sickness and funeral expenses. A lower court of Minnesota, on the other hand, declared the partial dependency of a mother on her son where she was earning $60 per month, and he

had given her $97.50 monthly. (Hayden v. Great Northern Power Co.)

The position of the commission of Ohio where a son contributed $7 or $8 per week to the family fund and lived as a member of the family, the father earning $12.50 per week, was the same as that taken by the Massachusetts commission above, holding that the mother was entitled to an award as a partial dependent.

Where the deceased made no contributions and was under no legal obligation to do so in the absence of court proceedings, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the mother was not a dependent. (Pinel v. Rapid Ry. System, 150 N. W. 897.)

In the case of Boyd v. Pratt (130 Pac. 371) the construction of the Washington statute as to the duration of benefit payments where the deceased employee was a minor on whose earnings his mother was dependent was the question before the court. The deceased was 19 years of age, and on the occurrence of his death by accident an order was made providing for payments to his dependent mother until such time as he would have arrived at the age of 21 years. From this order of the industrial insurance department an appeal was taken to the court, where the order of the department was reversed and a new order entered allowing monthly payments as long as dependency should continue. The statute in question provides that dependents shall receive during dependency 50 per cent of the average monthly support received during the preceding 12 months, but not in excess of $20 per month. It also provides that in the case of the death of unmarried minors their parents shall receive $20 per month for each month after the death until the time at which the deceased would have arrived at the age of 21 years. The Supreme Court of Washington construed the latter clause as being based on the parents' right to the earnings of a minor and not involving the question of dependence. Where, however, there was actual dependence, as in the case in hand, the question of minority was not controlling, and the case would come under the general provision relating to dependence. The judgment of the lower court was therefore affirmed.

Going beyond the narrower bounds of relationship was a ruling of the industrial commission of Ohio to the effect that an invalid father and the stepmother and half brothers and sisters were wholly dependent on the earnings of a 19-year old son of the father by a prior marriage; so also in a case passed upon by the Wisconsin commission where the employee had been reared by the claimants but was not their child nor had she been legally adopted. She had, however, regularly turned over a part of her weekly wages for their support, and they were held to be proportionately dependent. An award was made accordingly.

The dependence of children is usually restricted by a provision of the law fixing an age limit, though physical or mental incapacity frequently waives this limitation. The Massachusetts board had before it a case in which the father and mother lived separately, and an 18-year old daughter was unable to work. The mother made a statement that she was not dependent, while the daughter had made a claim on the ground of her total dependence, she having been previously supported by the father, and having no other income; an award was made exclusively for the daughter's benefit on the ground that she was wholly dependent. In a case before the supreme court of this State (In re Herrick, 104 N. E. 432), an adult daughter capable of self-support but living with and caring for her father, both being supported by his earnings, was held a dependent.

The attorney general of Minnesota ruled on a case in which a child by the first marriage of the deceased had not lived with the family for the past five years though she had not been adopted by others and might be returned any time. The fact of separate residence was held not to bar her dependence under the act, since it was only necessary that she be unmarried and under 18, or incapable of self-support over that age. The child was but 10 years old and compensation was directed in her behalf. Quite similar to the Herrick case above was a decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota (State v. District Court of Ramsey Co., 158 N. W. 798), applying the law of Minnesota as amended by chapter 209, Acts of 1915. In this case a widowed daughter was held to be partially dependent on her father where she lived with him and derived part of her support from him, the law providing for such an award without regard to age or inability to earn.

The law of Pennsylvania provides for payments to the widow or dependent widower alone, with additional sums where there is one child, where two children, etc., the phraseology suggesting payments to the head of the family only, if there be one. It was held by a court of common pleas (Irvin v. William M. Frost & Co.) that children are entitled to compensation in their own right no less when there is a parent surviving than where there is none. In the case in hand a posthumous child was held entitled to the award made in its behalf by the State board.

BASIS OF AWARDS.

In practically every law compensation awards are based on the amount of wages received. What shall be considered as the proper wages or earnings comes up for decision in several cases for which reports are available. In a California case passed upon by the State commission the amount of tips or gratuities additional to the salary was held not to be a part of the earnings on which compensa

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