The Texas statute excludes railways as common carriers, and this is held to exclude also the operation of street railways. The industrial accident board held that a company operating a street railway and also an electric light plant would be under the act as regards the latter if the electricity was furnished for other purposes than the operation of the road. Labor being interchangeable to a certain extent, it would be a question of fact in each case whether a claimant was injured while working for the electric light plant as such or was in the service of the railway company. The statute of this State also has a provision exempting employers of not more than five employees. It was held that a mercantile partnership operating stores in two different places in one city, each store having five employees, might become a subscriber under the act on the basis of its aggregate force of employees, since it was a single employer, though operating separate establishments.

Decisions are at hand from a few jurisdictions passing upon the question of the status of working stockholders or partners, etc. One of the compensation commissioners of Connecticut declared that if it had been desired to exclude officers of corporations from benefits as employees specific language would have been employed, so that one who was engaged in the company's service, although he was stockholder, director, and treasurer, was held entitled to compensation. The compensation commissioner of New York likewise allowed benefits to the president of an employing corporation who was injured while working in its shops as a mechanic; and the supreme court of the State, appellate division, though denying a claim on the ground that the employment was not covered by the act, held that a shareholder and vice president of a corporation was an employee within the meaning of the compensation act where he worked alongside the regular workmen, though he was general foreman. (Beckman v. J. W. Oelerich & Son, 160 N. Y. Supp. 791.)

The industrial accident board of Massachusetts, on the other hand, denied the benefits of the act of that State to a partner who received $30 a week from the firm and claimed that it was wages. The public service commission of West Virginia also disallowed the claim of an employee who was bookkeeper and secretary of the company, on the ground that he was an officer of the corporation and not an employee within the meaning of the act of that State. The law of Texas was construed by the industrial accident board of that State to cover sons, wives, and daughters of merchants working in the store and paid a salary or wages.

The question of the status of employees engaged otherwise than on a fixed salary was ruled upon by the compensation commission of New York, the instant case being that of a traveling salesman employed on a commission basis. It was held that such employees

should be included in the pay roll upon which premiums are based, though it is permissible to exclude such salesmen who are continuously employed outside of the State. Similar were the rulings of the industrial accident board of Texas as to salesmen taking orders on commission and pieceworkers in factories; so also as to a porter working in a hotel, dependent entirely upon tips for his income, the same board ruling that he was rendering service for the company even though his payment came from such tips.

Public employees. The status of employees in public service was passed upon in a number of cases coming under notice. The law of New York as enacted defined employments as trades, etc., carried on by the employer "for pecuniary gain," and under this provision the attorney general of the State in 1914 made a ruling, under which the commission has since acted, by which the claims of a number of employees of municipalities were rejected on the ground that no municipality could be engaged in business for pecuniary gain. The view of nonliability was taken by the supreme court of the State, appellate division, in the case of a worker on a State road (Allen v. State, 160 N. Y. Supp. 85), though it was said that the State has power to engage in business for profit, of which this was not an instance. Where there is profit, therefore, as may occur in municipal docks, lighting and water plants, and the like, compensation would seem to be payable, though it is clear that the phrasing of the law excluded the greater portion of municipal employees from its benefits. An amendment of 1916 makes the law applicable to work carried on by the State or a municipality, regardless of the question of profit, and the attorney general of the State has ruled that all such agencies must insure their employees coming within the classes covered by the act, though self-insurance is permitted.

In Connecticut a woman supervising pupils in a State school for imbeciles was held to be an employee of the State within the act, the law covering all employers who use "the services of another for pay." Another class of employment was under consideration by the Supreme Court of Michigan (Wood v. City of Detroit, 155 N. W. 592) in which the injured person was an employee of the public lighting commission of the city. The State accident board had made an award over the city's contention that the act was void as applied to municipalities, and this award was sustained by the court. The method of disposing of the question of constitutionality has already been noted (p. 180).

The constitutionality of the Montana law was challenged by a county of that State, the claim being made that inasmuch as counties were not originally subject to the operation of the liability statutes they could not be brought under the compensation law. The supreme court of the State dismissed this contention, stating that the present

law was not a substitute for the liability statutes, but rested on fundamentally different grounds, and that counties were subject to its operations. (Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Board, 155 Pac. 268.)

The University of Illinois claimed that it was not covered by the act of that State, that it had not elected to come under the act, and that it was not engaged in a hazardous occupation. A claim was allowed on account of the death by accident of an elevator operator in the institution, the industrial board ruling that the institution was within the act compulsorily, and that on account of the various enterprises connected with it it was a hazardous employer of labor. The Agricultural College of Michigan also contested the claim of a carpenter who did repair work about the buildings of the institution, in the course of which he fell, sustaining a fractured leg. The claim was contested on the ground that the employee was a casual one, and also that the college was not subject to legislative control, so that it was not under the law. The industrial accident board of the State held that the proviso excluding casual employees does not apply to employees of the State or municipal corporations, and also that the college is subject to general laws regarding liability, an award in behalf of the claimant being affirmed.

The industrial commissioner of Iowa discriminates between schoolteachers in cities and in the country on the ground that country teachers frequently have to do the work of a janitor, while teachers in the city schools are not required to perform such duties. School janitors and country school-teachers, as well as other employees who perform manual labor for the school districts, were held to be included in the act; but as the law contains no reference to either manual or hazardous employments as conditioning rights under it the grounds for the distinction are not clear.

A Massachusetts statute (ch. 807, Acts of 1913) authorizes cities to vote on the question of accepting the provisions of the State compensation law for "laborers, workmen, and mechanics" employed by them. These words were held by the supreme court of the State (Devney v. City of Boston, 111 N. E. 788), not to apply to a hoseman in the city fire department, such employees being classed as in "the official service" of the city and not in "the labor service," as determined by the civil-service rules laid down by the State civil service commission. It was also said that laborers were persons without particular training, employed at manual labor, while workmen and mechanics broadly embrace those who are skilled users of tools, hosemen coming in neither class.

The status of police officers, under a city charter where appointment is made by a commission and the police are required to take an oath of office, was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the State of

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Michigan (Blynn v. City of Pontiac, 151 N. W. 681), the court holding that the injured man was a public officer and not an employee of the city, reversing an award by the State accident board. The Supreme Court of Connecticut spoke similarly of a sheriff elected to office, and not "working under a contract of service," and therefore not an employee. (Sibley v. State, 96 Atl. 161.) The legal department of the city of Newark, N. J., held that the law of the State did not apply to a patrolman of the city; while the Pennsylvania Compensation Board rules that policemen are protected by its statute, though constables, and elective officers generally, are not. The industrial commission of Ohio also held that a police lieutenant in a city which does not maintain a policeman's pension system is an employee within the meaning of the act of that State, this decision being based on the particular provision of the law on this point. The law of Minnesota excludes city officials elected or appointed for a regular term of office. This was held (State v. District Court of St. Louis Co., 158 N. W. 790) not to debar policemen from a right to recover under the act; and so also of firemen in the city fire department (State v. District Court of St. Louis Co., 158 N. W. 791); and the fact that the fireman was a member of a voluntary relief association supported in part by the city and in part by the members, from which the dependents of the decedent drew benefits, does not affect the right to compensation nor the amount thereof.

The industrial commission of Wisconsin ruled that a prisoner placed at work during the term of his sentence was not an employee of the State, so that no compensation could be allowed for the loss of the right hand of an imprisoned sailor from an injury while employed about a planing machine in a chair factory. A similar ruling was made by the attorney general of Minnesota where a prisoner lost an eye while working for the county.

Children unlawfully employed.-Where a child was employed at an age under the limit fixed by statute, the New Jersey court of errors and appeals held (Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 98 Atl. 306) that, the employment not being lawful, there was no application of the compensation law, and the rights of the child at common law remained unchanged. The Supreme Court of Washington also held that a boy under the lawful age was not an employee within the act. (Hillestad v. Industrial Commission, 141 Pac. 913.) The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on the other hand, held that a minor who was of legal age for employment but was engaged at forbidden hazardous occupations was under the compensation act, and could not sue for damages, since the statute itself gives minors of employable age a right to contract under it. (Foth v. Macomber & Whyte Rope Co., 154 N. W. 369.) In a later case the same court held that a child of employable age but working without a statutory certificate was

not an employee under the compensation act even though his age had been misrepresented and the employment was found by the court to have been in good faith. A compensation award had been paid and release secured, but this was held void, and damages were allowed under the liability act of the State. (Stetz v. Boot & Shoe Co., 156 N. W. 971.) This case is distinguished from the Foth case above on the ground that in that case the minor was legally authorized to engage in the business in which he contracted to work, even though at the time of the injury he was employed at a machine forbidden by law; while in the present case, in the absence of an employment certificate, no employment was lawful. One judge dissented from this finding, while two others took no part in the decision. The effect of these findings is to penalize the unwitting (even though not therefore excusable) violation of an administrative provision, while the penal provisions of the child-labor act were held inapplicable to an obvious violation of it in exposing a child to hazards which were forbidden, even if he was lawfully present in the establishment.

The industrial board of Illinois ruled in practical accord with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the Foth case above, in a case in which a boy of the legal age of employment, 14 years, lost the use of his hand by an injury received in a forbidden hazardous occupation. It was said that a boy under legal age may recover for his wages, and for the purposes of the compensation act such a boy is entitled to compensation in the event of injury.

Extraterritoriality. The question of the application of the laws of the States in cases arising outside their boundaries is answered differently by the authorities of the different States. The industrial commission of California took the view that the language of the statute is not limited as to territorial operation, but follows the contract. The supreme court held this view on its first decision, but later held the contrary. (Anderson v. North Alaska Salmon Co., - Pac..) The industrial commission of Colorado, on the other hand, decides that the contract of employment follows the employee into other States wherever he goes in its performance. Practically the same language was used by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in construing the law of that State. (Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 94 Atl. 372.) This is the position also of the industrial commission of Indiana, of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island (Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 98 Atl. 103), and of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the latter saying that the compensation act is contractual in its nature and the place of the performance of the contract thereunder is no more essential than in the case of life insurance. (Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 94 Atl. 392.)

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