Com

medicine was to purge the system. plainant took a dose of this medicine on the morning of the third of December, before supper and continued this treatment, taking it before each meal until the following evening. The consequence of taking this medicine was to debilitate the system, and this resulted in a very weak physical condition. This condition obtained until Thursday, when complainant was lying upon the bed, and had had a short nap up to about 8 o'clock. Thereupon he called his wife to bring him the Nashville Banner, and asked her to turn on the light at the head of the bed so that he might read the paper. Complainant then reached for the paper and raised it above his head, and the light was turned on, when he found he had lost the sight of his left eye. On raising his hands he felt some change had come over his left eye. On consulting a physician he was informed that the loss of his left eye was due to the fact that in his weakened condition resulting from the purging of the 'black draught,' that he raised his hand suddenly to get the paper and that his blood pressure was strong and rushed to his head, causing a blood rupture of the retina-that is causing a little clot of blood to rest on the nerve of the eye or in the retina, thereby destroying his sight. Complainant charges that the loss of his left eye resulted wholly from accidental means."

The demurrer which the chancellor sustained raises the point that the injury or disability suffered was caused by sickness or disease and not through accidental means, re sulting directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes

[1] The general rule is that an injury is not produced by accidental means, within the meaning of this policy, where the injury is the natural result of an act or acts in which the insured intentionally engages. A person may do certain acts the result of which produces unforeseen consequences resulting in what is termed an accident; yet it does not come within the terms of this contract. The policy does not insure against an injury that may be caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary movement, executed exactly as was intended.

Therefore, to determine the matter, we look, not to the result merely, but to the means producing the result. It is not sufficient that the injury be unusual and unexpected, but the cause itself must have been unexpected and accidental. In re Scarr, (1905) 1 K. B. 367, 2 B. R. C. 385, 82 L. T. N. S. 128, 21 Times L. R. 173, 1 Ann. Cas. 787; Cledera v. Scottish Ac

cident Ins. Co. (1892) 19 R. 355, 29 Scott L. R. 303; Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1914) 219 Mass. 147, 106 N. E. 607, L. R. A. 1915B, 872; Feder v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa, 538, 78 N. W. 252, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212; Shanberg v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (C. C.) 143 Fed. 651, affirmed in 158 Fed. 1, 85 C. C. A. 343, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206; Lehman v. Great West. Acc. Ass'n, 155 Iowa, 737, 133 N. W. 752, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563; Smouse v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 118 Iowa, 436, 92 N. W. 53; McCarthy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 8 Biss. 362, Fed. Cas. No. 8,682; Niskern v. United Brotherhood, 93 App. Div. 364, 87 N. Y. Supp. 640; Hastings v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (C. C.) 190 Fed. 258; Cobb v. Preferred Mut. Acc Ass'n, 96 Ga. 818, 22 S. E. 976; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Selden, 78 Fed. 285, 24 C. C. A. 92; Southard v. Railway Passenger, etc., Co., 34 Conn. 576, Fed. Cas. No. 13,182.

Attention is especially directed to the very excellent notes on the subject in 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563 and 1 Ann. Cas. 787. These notes illustrate the subject by statements of the facts.

In the foregoing cases no liability was found, because the injury was not produced by accidental means.

In Cobb v. Preferred Mut. Acc. Ass'n, supra, the plaintiff was in a feeble condition, and in carrying his baggage a short distance it was found that his eye was affected, finally resulting in blindness. The plaintiff had not fallen nor received any shock, blow, or jar, and there was nothing unusual in the manner of carrying the baggage or his movement while so doing. It was considered that the means producing the injury were not accidental.

In Feder v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n, supra, a rupture of an artery occurred while the insured was reaching in an ordinary way over a chair to close some window shutters, and he did not fall or lose his balance. Everything was done as was intended. It was held the rupture was not sustained through accidental means.

The same doctrine is announced in other cases, but a recovery had because the injury was sustained through accidental means. These cases are Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S. W. 49, 74 Am. St. Rep. 112; Atlanta Acc. Ass'n v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 30 S. E. 939, 42 L. R. A. 188; McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 Atl. 13, 6 Am. St. Rep. 190; Reynolds v. Equitable Acc. Ass'n, 59 Hun, 13, 1 N. Y. Supp. 738; Pervangher v. Casualty, etc., Co., 85 Miss.

31, 37 South. 461; Bailey v. Interstate Casualty Co., 8 App. Div. 127, 40 N. Y. Supp. 513; Rodey v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 3 N. M. (Gild.) 543, 9 Pac. 348; Taylor v. Gen. Acc. Corp., 208 Pa. 439, 57 Atl. 830; Stout v. Pac. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. 471, 62 Pac. 732; Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 60.

The following authorities are in conflict with those above cited: North American L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 Am. Rep. 212; Horsefall v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1028, 63 L. R. A. 425, 98 Am. St. Rep. 846; Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 126 Mo. App. 325, 103 S. W. 557; Rose v. Commercial Mut. Acc. Co., 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 394; Patterson v. Ocean Acc. & Guaranty Co., 25 App. D. C. 46.

[2] Now, looking to the particular facts here alleged, we find the cause alleged to have produced the injury was a natural and ordinary movement. Complainant was lying quietly on the bed, and called to his wife to bring him the Nashville Banner, that he might read it. He then reached for the paper and raised it above his head, and the light was turned on, when he found he had lost the sight of his left eye. He was informed by his physician that the loss of the eye was due to the fact that in his weakened condition, resulting from the purgative he had taken, he raised his hand suddenly to get the paper, and that his blood pressure was strong and rushed to his head, causing a blood rupture of the retina, thereby destroying his sight. The weakened condition | due to the purgative was not accidental, nor was the excessive blood pressure; both being physical conditions produced from natural causes. The movement of the hand suddenly to get the paper was executed exactly as intended. It was a simple and ordinary movement. The rushing of the blood with excessive pressure, rupturing the retina, was therefore caused by natural means. While the result was not foreseen, the causes producing that result were not accidental. It is well in line with the cases above cited sustaining the majority rule, which we adopt. This rule affords a reasonable interpretation of the contract.

The position here taken is not in conflict, as we view it, with the opinion of our court in Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 6 Pick. (90 Tenn.) 256, 16 S. W. 723, 25 Am. St. Rep. 685, when the facts of the case are properly considered.

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the next point, raised by demurrer, namely, that if the injury may be said to have resulted

through accidental means, yet it did not so result "directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes." The learned chancellor sustained the demurrer in this respect also, and there is strong authority for his position. But, inasmuch as the foregoing is decisive of the case and the question of proximate cause and what contributing facts would be too remote to be considered as entering into the accidental means producing the injury must depend upon the facts of each case, discussion on that point is omitted.

Affirmed.

NOTE.-Accident Resulting from Involuntary Movement. Many cases support the ruling in the instant cases, one of the most prominent being that of Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147, 106 N. E. 607, L. R. A. 1915 B, 872, which was very like the instant case, except that in the Smith case the act having an unexpected effect was more deliberate in its nature, than in the instant case. The movement in the instant case was of an involuntary nature and yet it resulted in loss. In the Smith case there was the deliberate injection of a douche in the nasal organ and the court speaks of the deceased taking the douche "not accidentally in any sense of that word, but purposely, with full knowledge of its character and in the very way in which he intended to take it." In the instant case it is said: "The movement of the hand suddenly to get the paper was executed exactly as intended. It was a simple and ordinary movement." Perhaps it was the latter, but is that a test? If in making the movement he had struck his hand against a knife, or a revolving saw or a needle, would not the injury resulting have been an accident? If he had carefully have moved his hand against these external things, it would not have been an accident.

Take the case of National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Singleton, Ala., 69 So. 80, and the company was held liable, where insured, in shaving himself, cut his lip, whereby it became infected and the infection spread to his entire face and neck and he died as a result of the infection. The court said: "If death did so result from the cutting of the lip of insured while shaving, whether he was shaving himself or being shaven by another, we hold that the death would be within the terms of the policy which provides against 'bodily injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means.' There was no evidence whatever to show that the insured or any other person intentionally cut the gash." So in the instant case there is no evidence to show that insured intended to cause a rush of blood to his head, thus rupturing the retina. Was not this rush of blood as immediately connected with the sudden act by insured as was the lip-cutting in the Singleton case? The only difference, I see, is that one was a visible injury and the other not.

Take the case of New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson, Ohio, 110 N. E. 475, wherein it was held there was no accident, where deceased

died from dilatation of the heart brought on from taking a plunge in a cold bath. The court said, however, that: "The insured did nothing but that which he intended to do. He planned for and deliberately entered on the project, and so far as it appears, it was carried out precisely as intended. *** A case is cited where recovery was had by reason of a ruptured blood vessel occasioned by the mere lifting one's self naturally out of a chair. It is felt by this court, that in such a case, as in the case at bar, such a conclusion would be unduly pressing the construction of the language universally employed in naked accident policies." Yet the court does not say it disagrees with the case cited and there were not present in such a case the deliberate intent that existed in the case before it.

So also take the case of Feder v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso., 107 Iowa 538, 78 N. W. 252, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212, and the theory of voluntary acts deliberately performed is stated, and the case itself was of such a deliberate act as of one reaching over a chair to close window shutters. There was no sudden involuntary movement in this kind of performance. As the instant case says: "Everything was done as was intended." There was no spontaneity about the act at all. The like observation is pertinent in respect of Cobb v. Preferred Mut. Acc. Assn., 96 Ga. 818, 22 S. E. 976, cited and referred to in the instant case.

And a leading case on this subject, U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121, 33 L. ed. 60, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, shows an injury from leaping from a train and the court said: "It must be presumed not only that the deceased intended to alight safely, but thought that he would."

The question of movement being voluntary or involuntary was considered in Smouse v. Traveling Men's Assn., 118 Iowa 36, and the following was said: "An examination of the testimony reveals nothing to sustain a finding that the acts and exertions put forth by assured in removing his nightshirt or in disentangling himself there from were of an involuntary character. An involuntary movement is one which is made against the will, or independent of the will, as in the process of breathing or in the circulation of the blood or as seen in a body in convulsions. The most shown in the present case is that Mr. Smouse, on being suddenly awakened from sleep, appeared dazed and confused; but he evidently comprehended the call of his wife to dress quickly, which he was endeavoring to do." It was not necessary for the court to rule that involuntary movements are always within the limits it defined, and it is easy to see the court does not so think. The question here is whether a sudden movement of the kind in the instant case is necessarily a voluntary movement. It seems to me there was room for a jury question. The point I make is that there may be a difference between the cases relied on by the instant case, where deliberate purpose was present, and the case that was before the court. There seemed here room to doubt whether deceased did do what he intended to do in the way he intended.

C.

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

MEETING OF THE CONNECTICUT BAR ASSOCIATION.-The eighth annual meeting of the State Bar Association of Connecticut was held January 31, 1916, in the Supreme Court Building, Hartford, Conn.

President Charles Phelps, of Rockville, presided and made the principal address dealing mainly with recent state legislation.

Judge Simeon E. Baldwin reviewed the legal results of the recent Pan-American Scientific Congress, and Mr. Henry D. Estabrook, of New York, spoke on the Constitution. During the course of his remarks, in speaking of the Supreme Court as the greatest of tribunals, Mr. Estabrook is reported to have said that "the nine judges who constitute the Supreme Court are chosen for their abilitiessometimes." This facetious anti-climax provoked a titter which the public press construed as a reflection on the recent appointment of Mr. Brandeis. The remark was unfortunate for the simple reason that if there are any valid objections to Mr. Brandeis as a candidate for Supreme Justice the objection does not and cannot have reference to his intellectual capacity or legal acumen in which respects he seems to equal if not to overtower some of the men who have heretofore sat upon the bench.

BOOK REVIEW.

JONES' BLACKSTONE-TWO VOLUMES. Prof. Wm. Carey Jones, Director of the School of Jurisprudence of the University of California, is the author of an annotated edition of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries, for which he says: "The perennial interest in Blackstone's Commentaries affords ample justification for the periodic publication of new editions." In the present edition there are reproduced the notes in the edition prepared and published in 1890 by Mr. Wm. G. Hammond, then Dean of the St. Louis School, recognized as very valuable and discriminative in their nature.

Prof. Hammond's edition shows that up to 1890 he found nearly 6,500 references in American jurisdictions to Blackstone's Commentaries and since then nearly 2,500 are to be added.

Especially interesting in the present edition is what the notes show about the fellow

servant doctrine from the standpoint of principle and as statute and decision have modified the old rule. Of like interest in the note regarding husband and wife, and marriage and divorce, inclusive, also of alimony. The most radical departure from the old common law theory is that made by enabling acts.

Many other things in modern law are touched upon, as it has been made by statute or evolved in application to modern conditions.

We know of no better way for measuring the progress we have made, sometimes possibly retrogression, than the study of common law principles as shown in the Commentaries and the judicious notes made by editors such as Mr. Jones. Particularly is this so when we consider tenures of real estate as formerly existing and now changed. The abolition of the feudal system of necessity greatly changed all this, but how far the change worked has been the question with our courts and conveyancers.

But above all, this sort of book helps to win the profession back to a study of the principles upon which our jurisprudence is based, and Mr. Jones in his enthusiasm deserves distinct praise in his effort to keep the interest he speaks of from abating in any degree.

The present edition in two volumes, containing the four books of Sir William Blackstone, with tabular views of each book, with the original introduction on the Study of Law, the Nature of Law and Law of England, is presented in very attractive print, on thin-leaved paper, and bound in law buckram, and comes from the well known house of Bancroft-Whitney Company, San Francisco. 1915.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Commodities' Clause; a treatise on the development and enactment of the Commodities' · Clause and its construction when applied to interstate railroads engaged in the coal industry. By Thomas Latimer Kibler, M. A., Ph. D. Professor of Economics. A. and M. College of Texas. Price, $3.00. Washington, D. C., John Byrne & Co., 1916. Review will follow.

Trusts, Pools and Corporations. Edited with an Introduction by William Z. Ripley, Ph. D., Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Economics, Harvard University. Revised edition. 1916. Ginn & Company. Boston. Price, $2.75. Review will follow.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

A settlement worker tells the following story: "In the old days of carpet bag rule, when the colored brother was in great evidence at election times, on one occasion in an election an officer amused himself by mixing a large number of rat poison circulars among the regular ballots. They were the same size as the ballots, but instead of the party insignia bore a picture of a large rat. Many of the citiezns 'voted' the rat poison ticket until at last a field hand, more cautious than the others, took one of the circulars to a pompous old uncle.

"Won't you please tell me, Uncle Isam, what dish here rat stoods for?" he asked.

"The old man took the circular, adjusted his brass rimmed specs and stared at the rodent for a moment. Then he handed back the paper.

"Brudder,' he said, 'is yo' lived all dis time an' nebber heered tell 'bout de Ratification ob de Constitution?"-St. Louis Star.

A tailor who was defendant in a case tried in court seemed much cast down when brought up for trial. "What's the trouble?" whispered his counsel, observing his client's distress as he surveyed the jurymen. "It looks pretty bad for me," said the defendant, "unless some steps are taken to dismiss that jury and get in a new lot. There ain't a man amongst 'em but what owes me money for clothes."

Assistant Circuit Attorney McCullen is telling a funny experience he had several days ago while selecting a jury in a robbery case. He had reached juror No. 11 and when he looked on the list saw the man's name was McCullough. When the juror arose to be questioned McCullen was rather surprised to hear the man reply in a decided German accent.

"If the state proves beyond reasonable doubt this man is guilty, you would not hesitate to bring in a verdict to that effect and send him to the penitentiary, would you?" queried McCullen.

The German juror with the Irish name looked puzzled and thinking he had not heard clearly, McCullen repeated the question.

"Vell, I don't know," said the prospective juror. "You see, I don't like to get mixed in these things; I would be neutral."

McCullen thinking he had misunderstood the answer, had the man repeat it. "I said I would be neutral," repeated the man.

Judge Fisher then took a hand and propounded the question.

"Vell, judge, I am still neutral," said the man and Judge Fisher ordered him scratched from the venire.

3. Acknowledgment-Presumption.-All presumptions were against the probability of misconduct of a notary public taking the acknowledgment of a purported signer of a deed, or of a forgery which he should have discovered if it existed, and the burden of proving that there was no signature was upon the purported signer.-Hall v. Hall, Mich., 155 N. W. 695.

4. Adverse Possession-Prescription.-Where defendant, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, joined under the allegation that he claimed some interest in the mortgaged premises, had held the land in open, adverse, and continuous possession for more than 20 years last past, he held title thereto, irrespective of the conveyance of other parties.-Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Rivers, S. C., 87 S. E. 438.

5.

Aliens Rights of.-The equal rights of all persons residing within a state to labor therein does not include the equal right of an alien to participate in the common property and privileges peculiar to citizens.-Ex parte Gilletti, Fla., 70 So. 446.

6. Animals-Running at Large. In action for death of horse by falling into defendant's cistern, ordinance prohibiting the running at large of live stock held complete defense, unless defendant was guilty of gross negligence in permitting the cistern to remain open.-Woodruff v. Deshazo, Tex. Civ. App., 181 S. W. 250. 7. Appearance Facts Constituting. The execution and filing of a replevy bond with a surety is no such an appearance by the defendant whose property was attached as will authorize judgment by default against defendant and its surety on the replevy bond.-American Surety Co. of New York v. Stebbins, Law

10. Attorney and

Client-Authority.-With

out express authorization, the acknowledgment of defendant's attorney to plaintiff's attorney that defendant owed plaintiff money for goods sold could not bind the defendant.-Witt v. Carlton Dress Goods Co., N. Y. Sup., 156 N. Y. S. 693. 11. Bankruptcy-Discharge.-A mere order of the District Court, allowing the trustee to amend his specifications of objection to discharge of bankrupt, has not the finality necessary for review. In re Pechin, U. S. C. C. A., 227 Fed. 853.

12. Equity.-A guaranteed creditor suing the executrix of the debtor's guarantor is subject to equities in the executrix's favor, from the creditor's having collected collateral of the debtor hypothecated to it and later transferred to it by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy at a fixed valuation.-Neblett v. Cooper Grocery Co., Tex. Civ. App., 180 S. W. 1162.

13. Banks and Banking-Statutory Construction. The Nebraska Banking Act held to vest the banking board with discretionary power to refuse a charter for a savings bank, where it appears that the bank is to be conducted in the same room, or in a room immediately adjacent to one occupied by a national bank, and the officers and directors of the two are substantially the same.-State v. Morehead, Neb:, 155 N. W. 879.

14. Bills and

Notes-Consideration.-Notes payable in monthly installments and given in payment for the privilege of removing sand from a stream, held not void for want of consideration, though without fault of the seller no sand was removed.-Burner v. Nutter, W. Va., 87 S. E. 359.

15. Boundaries-Acquiescence. Simple acquiescence or failure to object for the statutory period, in case of an adverse holding under a mistake as to the true boundary line, will bind the real owner of the land, though the line is not the true one.-Bossom v. Gillman, Fla., 70 So. 364.

a prosecution

17. Burglary-Evidence.-In for burglary, evidence that the owner saw three men coming from his house was admissible in connection with the finding of the stolen property in the possession of defendant and his codefendants.-People v. Morrell, Cal. App., 153 Pac. 977.

18. Carriers of Goods-Notice of Damage.A provision of an interstate shipment contract of live stock requiring notice of claim for damage before removal of stock and mingling of same with other stock, such notice to be given within one day after delivery of the stock, held valid. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Wynn, Okl., 153 Pac. 1156.