gerents. He denied that this change was a corollary of the Declaration of Paris, or that we had by that Declaration sacrificed a powerful instrument of warfare. It was a balance, he said, of disadvantages, whether we would cripple our naval power in time of war, or would submit to a temporary interference with our commercial operations; and he energetically repudiated the insinuation that the United States would take the opportunity of our being involved in a war to revenge themselves for the Alabama, as an unmerited imputation on that Government. After giving some further explanations as to the overture which had been made to the American Government for the revision of the neutrality laws, he went on to argue that this danger to commerce was a strong security for peace. "I will not," he said, "repeat the argument I used four years ago on the subject, of making war a duel between Governments, and separating the people from their Governments. I believe that such a mode of carrying on war would interfere with the national life and the patriotic feeling of countries, and would be far more mischievous to nations than any thing at present contained in international law. We have to consider the matter in this way-Does the present system afford us a valuable means of carrying on war when war is necessary? Shall we or not pay the price of these means-it may be an interference with our commerce, it may be a serious interruption of our trade-or shall we surrender these means and thereby cast away a part of our power in war? I say, if we be engaged in war, let us go on in good earnest; let us avail ourselves of all the usages of fair warfare; above all, let us not impose fetters upon ourselves on that ocean where hitherto we have been supreme. If we look to the interests of peace, have we not been told over and over again that commerce is the great antidote of war; that increasing commerce renders war less likely; that France is growing in prosperity, and, therefore, will be less disposed to make war? And is it not perceived that all those arguments have a direct bearing against the proposition now before the House; because, by that strong, inevitable, invaluable power of commerce, do you not bring a weight to bear against war-do you not bring a check against war in the first instance? Again, do you not introduce an element that tends to the restoration of peace when, in time of war, the strength of a belligerent Power is brought to bear against commerce and against maritime trade, at the same time that it is not brought to bear by the confiscation of land against individual or private interests? In this way commerce works as an antidote to war. That hitherto has been its influence in respect of war. And nothing which has hitherto happened in war leads us to think, whatever may be alleged in piping times of peace-whatever chambers of commerce may say that the commercial interests would not be in times of war ready to bear their share in the risk; that they would not be prepared to look the evil in the face; that, whether by putting their ships in neutral hands, or by other means, they would not

use their best endeavours to assist their country in upholding the national honour, relying on the same material resources which have made her great and have enabled her to rebound from the pressure when war is over. Can any one doubt that this would be the case? To quote the words of the hon. member for Finsbury, 'We hear alarming predictions of ruin if things remain as they are.' I don't believe in the prophecy of ruin if things remain as they are; for we should only be doing what we did without ruin before. There may be a temporary depression of trade; but depend upon it, when the war is over, the power and prosperity of this country will be as they were before, and England will remain as great and as strong as ever. I do not believe in such predictions as those to which I allude; but I believe that even after a war our ships, like the ships of the United States, which were said to be driven from every sea, would live and come back to their own country. The truth is, mercantile men know how to deal with these things, and they do deal with them. It is not the experience of mankind, though predicted over and over again, that final ruin will come from such causes. But though I don't fear final ruin, if things remain as they are, yet if opinion is advancing in the direction of a change such as that now proposed, then opinion in this, as in all other matters, will prevail; and I have no doubt that if it does prevail, it will be proved to be right by prevailing. But the opinion to which I refer must not be confounded with the opinion of those who have certain interests-of those to whom it might be of no small value and importance to induce this country to take steps which would depress the power of our naval element and exalt that of military operations. Our power must depend on the naval element: the power of other nations depends on military operations. If changes of this kind be advanced by nations whose strength lies in military operations, we must inquire the motive which prompts the proposal. Such changes must be recommended by sound public opinion-recommended by the common sense of mankind-before we can adopt them. If, on the other hand, they come to us recommended by the opinion of the Emperor Napoleon I., as quoted by my hon. friend the member for Galway, or the opinion of French theorists, who would abolish all naval rights which are not of paramount value to a great military nation, we must be careful how we confound that with sound public opinion. I have the utmost faith in sound public opinion, and am prepared to bow to it on all occasions; but if public opinion does not recommend the adoption of the proposition of my hon. friend, I will still feel sure that England will not be ruined, and that we shall retain to the last our national prosperity and greatness."

After some further discussion the motion was withdrawn.

The subject of our Relations with the United States, especially with reference to the expiration of the Reciprocity Treaty between the two countries, was brought before the House of Commons by Mr. Watkin, who pressed the Government to afford some infor

mation as to the course which it was intended to pursue. He expressed his regret that the Foreign Department had for many years kept back information on important matters, and now, when it was found that a powerful United States fleet had been sent to the North American fishing grounds, the matter seemed to have become extremely serious. The object of the Reciprocity Treaty, which had been allowed to expire, was to establish an identity of commercial interests between the United States and British North America, and the House had been kept in ignorance of the facts which led to the expiration of the treaty; the only information which the Government had condescended to communicate being the notice of the American Government putting an end to the treaty, and the note by which it was accompanied from Mr. Adams, the United States Minister in London. Thus the House had had its hands tied, and was unable to take any step which might be adopted to induce the American people and their Government to consent to the renewal of the treaty and the continuance of the old friendly relations. He might be told that there was an indisposition on the part of the United States Government to negotiate a renewal of the treaty; but from personal knowledge he could meet such an assertion with a positive denial, and he believed that from the time the Prince of Wales visited America down to the autumn of 1864, there was not a week in which, if proper means had been resorted to, negotiations might not have been opened and carried to a satisfactory conclusion. It was clear, from the fact that a United States squadron had been sent to the fishing grounds, that the relations between the two countries were not in a healthy condition. Under these circumstances, he asked Who was responsible for this state of things, and what was to be done? And he called upon Ministers to tell the House what was the position of our relations with the United States, to give an assurance that some department of the Government was occupied with this important question, and whether there was any prospect of its being brought to a successful issue.

Mr. Layard said that if Mr. Watkin's object had been to raise a feeling of hostility on the part of the United States towards this country, and render it impossible to come to a satisfactory arrangement with them, he could not have made a speech more calculated to accomplish that end. Her Majesty's Government were fully alive to the beneficial character, commercially and politically, of the Reciprocity Treaty. It was not their wish, therefore, that it should come to an end; and that it had done so was entirely the act of the Americans themselves. With regard to opening negotiations for a renewal of the treaty, it was altogether out of the power of either Government to do so, the notice to terminate the treaty having originated in the Congress, in whose hands alone the matter rested, and not with the United States Executive. The question, then, was, Could the British Government have brought about such a change of public opinion in the United States as

would have induced Congress to adopt a different policy? and upon that point he was altogether at issue with his hon. friend. Her Majesty's Ministers had repeatedly conveyed to the Government at Washington their readiness to negotiate a renewal of the old treaty, or a modification of its terms, so as to make it more beneficial to both countries than it had hitherto been; and Congress itself had been moved on the subject, but had declined to act. To the last communication, addressed to Mr. Secretary Seward on the 16th of February, he had replied that public sentiment was not favourable to opening the question; and that Congress preferred treating it directly, and not that it should be approached in the form of diplomatic agreement. Subsequently the matter had been submitted to the committee of Congress, and it now awaited their decision. All negotiations being beyond the limits of the United States Executive, and all attempts on the part of Her Majesty's Government to bring about an arrangement by that means having failed, it only remained for them to do all in their power to prevent any evil consequences that might arise from the abrogation of the treaty, and this they had done. The United States, it was true, had sent a squadron to the fishing grounds, but he saw no source of danger in that. Rather it afforded security against the danger of a collision amongst the fishermen on the coast. The English naval officers would cooperate with those of the United States in maintaining order. Her Majesty's Government had received from the United States authorities every assistance with the view of preserving a good understanding on the coast, and proposals had been interchanged by the two Governments which he believed would be acceptable to both.

Mr. White referred to the refusal of the Foreign Secretary to submit the dispute respecting the depredations of the Alabama to arbitration, as accounting for the irritation which had led to Congress giving notice to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty.

Mr. Cardwell, who, on behalf of the Government deprecated this allusion to an unpleasant subject, explained that the cessation of the Reciprocity Treaty did not affect the bonding privileges under which goods were carried free to and from the United States and the British provinces by railway, and that there was no intention on either side to suspend them. So also with the existing arrangements for the navigation of the St. Lawrence and the canals on one side, and Lake Michigan on the other. They would in no way be interfered with. And as to the fisheries, the two Governments were in the most friendly communication on the subject.

Early in the month of May, as the prospects of a great conflict in Germany became imminent, anxiety began to be felt as to the effect which such a war might have upon our national interests, although all idea of intervention on the part of Great Britain was repudiated alike by every party in the State. The movement of public opinion on this question did not fail to find a voice in the

Legislature. And questions were put to the Ministers in both Houses respecting the aspect of Continental affairs.

On the 8th of May the Earl of Cadogan asked whether our Government had made any offers of mediation, either alone or in concert with other Powers, to obtain a pacific settlement between Austria, Prussia, and Italy ?

The Earl of Clarendon referred to the fall in all German securities on every Bourse in Europe, and the paralysis of industry and credit. Within the last fortnight the hope of peace had daily diminished. As the armies of those countries were marching to the same frontier, there was too much reason to fear that a collision, either through design or accident, must take place. With regard to making a tender of our good offices, we could not act alone. By ourselves we could do nothing against a determination that war was the most effective means of carrying out ambitious projects. That that determination would not be enforced we might still continue to hope; but there was no doubt that more than a million of men were now armed and ready for action. And he must say that it was a most saddening reflection in this enlightened age, that Europe should be menaced with a conflict for which there was no casus belli, and which was not only without cause, but without justification.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe said we were on the eve of one of the most expensive and bloody wars ever known. He deeply regretted that a country like this should be condemned to inaction, and not be able to raise her voice against it.

Earl Grey said the present state of Europe was the legitimate result of the rule of conduct we had recently laid down for ourselves, that this country would not, directly or indirectly, interfere in Continental affairs unless her interests or her honour were affected. This was not the policy of great States; and by acting in this manner two years ago with reference to Denmark, a great stain had been left on the honour of England. If we continued to pursue this selfish course, sooner or later we must endanger the peace of Europe.

The Earl of Derby concurred in Lord Grey's opinion.

Earl Russell denied that any such rule of conduct had been proclaimed by him. What he had said was, that if neither the honour nor the interests of this country were concerned, we should do well long to reflect before we entered into a war. As to Denmark, what our Government had done was, to urge Denmark to put herself in the right, and she had declined to do so. Lord Wodehouse was sent out with this express object in view, yet she still refused until it was too late, and the German Powers would no longer abstain from action. All the Government could then do was to remonstrate with Austria and Prussia, and endeavour to induce them to settle the question at issue by negotiation.

In reply to the Earl of Hardwicke, the Earl of Clarendon stated