it. Certainly no consul, upon proper demand, could rightfully refuse to issue to a steerage passenger the inspection card provided for by the quarantine regulations when such passenger had complied with all necessary conditions.

Very respectfully,

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

P. C. KNOX.

FALSE LABELING OF DAIRY AND FOOD PRODUCTS.

The act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 632), prohibiting the introduction into any State or Territory of any dairy or food product which shall have been falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory where grown, applies not only to domestic articles, but also to those imported from foreign countries which are labeled as being of domestic origin. The Department of Agriculture and the Treasury Department have no jurisdiction or power under the act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat., 1157), to prevent or punish the false labeling or branding of dairy or food products after they have passed the custom-house and are delivered to the owner or consignee.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 18, 1903.

SIR: In your note of June 2, 1903, you transmit to me an excerpt from the appropriation act of March 3, 1903 (32) Stat., 1157, 1158), authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate the adulteration of foods, drugs, and liquors, and forbidding the Secretary of the Treasury to deliver to the consignee any such goods imported from a foreign country which the Secretary of Agriculture has “reported to him to have been inspected and analyzed and found to be dangerous to health, or which are forbidden to be sold, or restricted in sale in the countries in which they are made, or from which they are imported, or which shall be falsely labeled in any respect in regard to the place of manufacture, or the contents of the package," and a copy of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 632), in regard to the introduction into any State or Territory or the District of Columbia of any dairy or food products which shall have been falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown; and you ask my opinion, in

substance, whether, under the provisions referred to, you have jurisdiction or power to prevent the false labeling or branding of such articles imported from foreign countries, after they have passed the custom-house and are delivered to the consignees; and whether the act last referred to above applies to such articles imported from foreign countries, or applies only to articles of domestic production.

In reply to your questions, I have the honor to say that, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1903, to which you refer, the jurisdiction and power of your Department, and that of the Treasury Department, in respect of the matter here considered, end with the delivery of the imported article from the custom-house to the owner or consignee, and this provision of the act confers no power to prevent or punish the false labeling or branding of such imported articles after such delivery to the owner or consignee. The whole power there conferred in this respect is to examine such imported articles before such delivery, and to refuse delivery if found to come within the ban of the act. Whatever power there may be to prevent or punish the false labeling or branding of such imported goods after such delivery must be looked for elsewhere.

If the evils of false labeling of such imported articles have reached a magnitude requiring Congressional legislation, it would seem almost, or quite, as important to prevent such false labeling after the articles have passed the customhouse as before; and it would seem that Congress, while having the matter directly in hand, has omitted what would have been very appropriate legislation. But this omission can not be supplied by those called upon to interpret or to administer the law.

But I think the act of July 1, 1902, may be resorted to for partial relief from the evil to which you refer. The first section provides:

"That no person * %

State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia from any other State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or sell in the District of Columbia or in any Territory any dairy or food products which shall be falsely labeled or branded as to the State or

Territory in which they are made, produced or grown, or cause or procure the same to be done by others."

The second section provides the penalty for violation of the act.

The prohibition is of the introduction into any State or Territory or the District of Columbia from any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and the sale in said District or any Territory of dairy or food products. which are "falsely branded or labeled as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown."

It is important to notice that the prohibition extends to falsely labeled articles introduced or brought from another State or Territory, and is not confined to articles which are made, produced, or grown in some other State or Territory of the United States. If dairy or food products, which are falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory of their origin, are introduced or brought into one State or Territory or the District of Columbia from another State or Territory or the District of Columbia, or are sold in any Territory or said District, this is clearly within the prohibition of the act, no matter whether such articles were of domestic or foreign origin. I repeat, the section does not confine or purport to confine its prohibition to the introduction of falsely labeled articles made, grown, or produced in this country, but extends it to all such articles introduced from another State or Territory which are falsely labeled "as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown."

But, as I have stated above, the act can give only partial relief; for it is plain from the context that the words "State or Territory" refer to a State or Territory of the United States, and can not be extended to include the wider signification of foreign country. Thus, if articles of foreign origin are imported into New York, for example, and thence introduced into another State or Territory with a label or brand falsely stating their origin as to another foreign country, the case would not fall within the provisions of the statute. On the other hand, it is certain that if foreign articles imported into New York are introduced into another State or Territory with a label or brand showing

them to be of New York make or growth, such articles would be falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown," and such introduction would be within both the letter and the spirit and purpose of the act.

In this respect Congress can interfere only with interstate trade. It can prevent the use of false labels of dairy or food products only when they become objects of commerce between different States or Territories. Hence, the prohibition is confined to articles introduced from one State or Territory into another. But this does not imply, nor is there anything to imply, that the prohibition is confined also to articles made, produced, or grown in the State or Territory from which they are introduced, or to articles of domestic origin. It is the use of false labels on dairy and food products in interstate commerce which is prohibited. And if it is interstate commerce, it is quite unimportant whether the articles falsely labeled were of domestic or foreign origin. If an imported article of foreign origin is labeled as of domestic origin, the article is "falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which it is made, produced, or grown;" and if such article, thus falsely labeled, is introduced from one State or Territory into another, or the District of Columbia, it is a violation of the act. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether the false label or brand be placed on the article before or after leaving the custom-house in a case of foreign importation.

If it were required, a familiar rule of construction might be invoked in support of this interpretation. Statutes should be construed in aid of their manifest purpose and object. And when it is considered that the sole purpose of this act is to prevent the use of false labels or brands of dairy or food products, when articles of interstate commerce, it is manifest that a construction which limits the prohibition to domestic articles would defeat, rather than aid the purpose of the act. Indeed, the greater and more prevalent evil in this respect is not in falsely stating a particular State or Territory as the origin of a domestic article, but is the labeling of a foreign article as the product of some

particular State or Territory, or vice versa.

This is the

more serious and prevalent evil, and, in my opinion, is as certainly forbidden by the act referred to as is the labeling of an article of one State or Territory as being the product of another.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the act of July 1, 1902, applies not only to domestic articles, but also to those imported from foreign countries which are labeled as being of domestic origin.

Respectfully,

The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

P. C. KNOX.

CRUISER GALVESTON-RELEASE FROM POSSESSION OF STATE COURT.

The Attorney-General defers answering the question as to the right of the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President, to employ the military forces of the Government to obtain possession of the cruiser Galveston, in course of construction under contract with the Wm. R. Trigg Company, of Richmond, Va., which company has gone into the hands of a receiver appointed by the chancery court of Virginia, for the reason that a method of procedure in such cases is provided for by section 3753, Revised Statutes, and occasion for the exercise of this power is not likely to arise if the stipulation authorized by that section is filed.

No instrumentality of the Government may be taken into custody and held under any adverse authority whatever. This applies as well to an instrumentality in process of creation as to one already completed. The United States is entitled to the undisputed possession and control of its property and of property in which it is interested to the extent of that interest, and this possession and control are exempt from the process of every court.

The word "stipulation," as used in section 3753, Revised Statutes, denotes an undertaking in the nature of bail, and is analogous to the “stipulation for value" under present admiralty practice, the measure of the Government's obligation being limited in section 3754, Revised Statutes, to "the value of the interest of the United States in the property in question."

The discretion of courts relative to such "stipulation" is practically limited to a consideration of the bond or equivalent engagement and the sufficiency of the sureties where security is required, the release of the property following as matter of right.