and for no other purpose; and that wire in coils, not cut into lengths and without the loop at the end, is never used for baling hay. We now know from the present very full record which appears to be exhaustive on the subject, that the imported articles are bale ties and not baling wire, and that the former, which are used for baling hay, are made out of the latter, which is merely the component wire material of the ties. Those facts make applicable to this importation our decision in Gerrard Wire Tying Machines Co. v. United States, T. D. 39341, G. A. 8583, 42 Treas. Dec. 256. There, as here, the merchandise consisted of bundles of bale ties which were assessed with duty at the rate of 15 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 114 of the Tariff Act of 1913 as manufactures of wire. It was claimed that the importation was properly entitled to free entry under paragraph 645 of said act as "wire commonly used for baling hay or other commodities." We there said: we are satisfied that the merchandise is not wire material, but rather consists of articles made of wire. The following testimony of the single witness who appeared for the importer inevitably leads to that conclusion: Q. What do you call this thing?-A. That is known commercially as hay-bale ties. Q. So the distinguishing name is tie?—A. Ties; yes, sir. * * Q. And what kind of people do you sell them to?-A. The scrap-paper people, the people who bale excelsior, hay, and various scrap materials. Q. You make it out of a kind of wire that comes in rolls?-A. In coils. * Q. Without being cut into lengths, or having the loop put upon them like Exhibit 1? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the name that is commonly applied to them?-A. That is its commercial trade name; ties, hay-bale ties. In view of the facts established by the uncontradicted testimony of the importer's witness, we hold the classification of the present merchandise to be governed by the well-settled rule of customs law, so aptly expressed by Judge Lacombe in United States v. Meier (136 Fed. 764; T. D. 25973), thatwhere an article has been advanced through one or more processes into a completed commercial article, known and recognized in trade by a specific and distinctive name other than the name of the material, and is put into a completed shape designed and adapted for a particular use, it is deemed to be a manufacture. Here, the proof shows that there is in the trade and commerce of this country a wire which comes in rolls or coils and which is commonly used for baling commodities. An order for such wire would scarcely be met by a delivery of the present ties, even though the latter may be likewise used for baling purposes. In tariff adjudication a distinction has always been made between materials and articles made therefrom. In United States v. Bache (7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 445; T. D. 37011) the court said: We think it is clear that the board lost sight of the distinction between window glass as a material, whether or not subjected to any of the various treatments mentioned in paragraph 90, and such material made into a finished article such as these glass signs * ** The recited facts show beyond question that the original material has been made into something, a thing that is, as imported, ready for use In and by paragraph 645 Congress accorded free entry merely to the material wire which is commonly used for baling commodities, without extending the provision to include articles, such as these ties, made from said wire. Where it was the legislative purpose to provide for both materials and articles made therefrom, suitable language is invariably employed to express that intention. The tariff act abounds with such enumerations. Where it was the intention to provide for material cut to lengths, language indicative of that purpose has been employed. Take, for example, paragraph 509, which provides free entry forHoop or band iron, or hoop or band steel, cut to lengths, or wholly or partly manufactured into hoops or ties, coated or not coated with paint or any other preparation, with or without buckles or fastenings, for baling cotton or any other commodity. No such language is contained in paragraph 645. It merely provides free entry for certain kinds of wire in the form of material, but makes no mention of articles made therefrom. We therefore hold as matter of law that these baling ties are not covered by the provisions of paragraph 645, and that they are accordingly relegated for tariff classification to the general provision in paragraph 114 for manufactures of wire not specially provided for, as classified by the collector. That the present importation is governed by the last above-cited decision finds support in the congressional history in the premises. It appears that in said paragraph 645 of the Tariff Act of 1913 the Congress placed on the free list "wire commonly used for baling hay or other commodities" and in paragraph 114 of that act made dutiable "all other wire not specially provided for in this section and articles made wholly or in chief value of any wire or wires not provided for in this section." In the Tariff Act of 1922 Congress transferred "wire commonly used for baling hay and other commodities" from the free list to the dutiable list, and under paragraph 317 made said wire dutiable at one-half of 1 cent per pound. Likewise, the Congress rearranged the provisions of paragraph 114 of the Tariff Act of 1913, deleted the provisions for manufactures of wire not specially provided for, and placed all such manufactures in the general provision for manufactures of metal in what finally became paragraph 399 of the Tariff Act of 1922. The foregoing is obvious from a reading of pages 550 and 551 of the Summary of Tariff Information, 1921, concerning paragraph 393, H. R. 7456, which became paragraph 399 of the Tariff Act of 1922. By virtue of this change and regrouping there is found no provision for manufactures of wire not specially provided for in the Tariff Act of 1922. The original paragraph 114 of the Tariff Act of 1913 became in part paragraph 317 of the Tariff Act of 1922 and was thus limited to material and not articles or manufactures of the materials therein mentioned unless specifically named. The Tariff Act of 1930 re-enacted substantially the same provisions as those contained in the Tariff Act of 1922 and bearing the same paragraph numbers. In the hearing before the Committee on Finance on H. R. 2667, Tariff Adjustment, 1929, Vol. 3, Schedule 3, page 65, Mr. George E. Dix, representing the Steel Union Co. (Inc.), and Sheet Piling (Inc.), testified at page 70: Mr. Dix. In connection with bale ties, paragraph 317, the last two lines of this paragraph read: All wire commonly used for baling hay or other commodities, one-half of 1 cent per pound. Under the ruling of the customs department it is impossible to import a wire for baling hay, for the simple reason that there is nothing in the nature of the wire itself or the manner in which it is supplied to identify ordinary wire for use in baling purposes, and, therefore, this portion of the paragraph is ineffective. We would respectfully request the committee to change the paragraph to read: All wire commonly used for baling hay or other commodities and all wire bale ties, one-half of 1 cent per pound. A bale tie consists of a straight length of the wire with a loop twisted at one end; but under ruling of the appraisers this is classified by them under paragraph 399 of the tariff as "articles or wares not specially provided for if composed wholly or in chief value of iron or steel, 40 per cent ad valorem." It was evidently the intention of the previous Congress to allow baling wire and bale ties which are made of wire, which are used principally by the farmers, to enjoy a reasonable duty of one-half of 1 cent per pound, instead of the 40 percent ad valorem required by the paragraph for articles not specially provided for. Senator KING. You want to add those words Mr. Dix. "Bale ties." Senator KING. To bear a tariff rate of one-half of 1 cent per pound. The Senate Committee on Finance, however, did not accept such recommendation, although it made an amendment to paragraph 317 as passed by the House. That amendment did not provide for bale ties but rather for wire fencing and wire netting of the kind chiefly used for poultry fencing. (See bill in various stages, Report No. 37, Calendar No. 42, December 4, 1929; also report of Senator Smoot from the Committee on Finance, Report 37, September 4, 1929.) This amendment was finally deleted from paragraph 317 by the Senate and paragraph 317 remained in substantially the same words as originally reported to the House by the Ways and Means Committee. From the foregoing it is indisputable that the Congress knew of merchandise designated as bale ties which was used for baling hay and other commodities. But it did not see fit to include the same in paragraph 317, as requested at the hearings before the legislative committees. On the facts and the law the decision of the collector is affirmed and all claims of the plaintiffs are overruled. Judgment will be rendered accordingly. (T. D. 48078) Aluminum containers for watch materials-Hollow ware NEWALL MANUFACTURING Co. v. UNITED STATES Certain aluminum containers for watch materials, some square and others oblong in shape, are properly dutiable at the rate of 11 cents per pound and 55 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 339, Tariff Act of 1922, as hollow ware composed wholly or in chief value of aluminum, rather than at but 40 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 339 as manufactures of aluminum not specially provided for. Newall Manufacturing Co. v. United States, Abstract 11973, 57 Treas. Dec. 1237, cited and followed. See also G. E. Meissner v. United States, T. D. 41269, G. A. 9072, 48 Treas. Dec. 592, and Frank P. Dow Co., Inc. v. United States, 21 C. C. P. A. 282, T. D. 46816. United States Customs Court, Second Division Protests 362851-G, etc., against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of Chicago [Judgment for defendant.] (Decided December 26, 1935) Tompkins & Tompkins (J. Stuart Tompkins and Allerton deC. Tompkins of counsel) for the plaintiff. Joseph R. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General (John F. Kavanagh and Richard E. FitzGibbon, special attorneys), for the defendant. Before TILSON, KINCHELOE, and DALLINGER, Judges DALLINGER, Judge: These are suits against the United States, arising at the port of Chicago, brought to recover certain customs duties alleged to have been improperly exacted on particular importations invoiced as "aluminum cups" and entered as "aluminum watch part containers." Duty was levied thereon at the rate of 11 cents per pound and 55 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 339 of the Tariff Act of 1922 as hollow ware composed wholly or in chief value of aluminum. It is claimed that the articles are properly dutiable at but 40 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 399 of said act as aluminum articles not specially provided for. Representative samples of said merchandise are in evidence herein as Exhibits 1 and 2, the former square and the latter oblong in shape. Precisely the same issue was passed upon by this court in Newall Manufacturing Co. v. United States, Abstract 11973, 57 Treas. Dec. 1237, and the record in that case has been incorporated herein. Moreover, the evidence there submitted is here supplemented by the oral testimony of five witnesses for the plaintiff herein. No evidence was offered by the Government. The first witness, F. O. Parker, testified that the present merchandise is used exclusively as containers for watch materials and that he sold it for that purpose to makers of watch materials. On cross examination he admitted it could be used to contain almost anything except liquids. The second witness, E. H. Rennhack, for thirty years a buyer for Sears, Roebuck & Co., has sold articles known as hollow ware, but never so bought or sold articles like those here imported. Such merchandise, in his opinion, would not be known as hollow ware. He regards that term as confined mostly to kitchen ware, frying pans, pan broilers, and similar kitchen or household utensils. Hollow ware, he said, embraced utensils for preparing food, and flat ware comprised knives and forks. In his opinion the imported articles might be deemed specialties rather than utensils. He said they were produced by the stamping process whereas hollow ware was confined to cast articles. In fact he restricted the term to cast-iron kitchen utensils. On cross-examination he testified that the instant merchandise was composed of aluminum and was used as containers. He included kitchen kettles and frying pans in the term "hollow ware", but also said a bathtub might come within that category. The third witness, Clarence H. Woods, vice president of a jewelry importing corporation, testified that articles like those here imported are designed for use as containers of watch materials and he knew of no other purpose therefor; that he never knew them to be sold as hollow ware, a term which he understood was confined to kitchen or table utensils used principally in the household. The fourth witness, George Cless, a buyer of house furnishings composed of aluminum and other materials, testified that the term "hollow ware" as understood in the wholesale trade in the United States was confined to cast cooking utensils usually of cast iron, sometimes of cast aluminum; and that the term did not embrace articles like Exhibits 1 and 2. On cross-examination he testified that the size of the article made no difference; that the term "hollow ware" was confined to cooking utensils only, and that a silver-plated sugar and creamer would not be hollow ware. The fifth witness, Samuel Sanders, formerly a watchmaker, testified that prior to September 21, 1932, he bought household utensils, both hollow and flat ware, in wholesale quantities in the eastern part of the United States; that during said period the term "hollow ware" had a definite, uniform, and general meaning which was different from the common understanding thereof; that anything, regardless of component material, was considered hollow ware if it had something to do with the household and its shape was hollow; and that he had never seen articles like Exhibits 1 and 2 used in the household. It will be seen that the testimony of the witnesses would confine the term "hollow ware" to hollow articles used in the kitchen or |