EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE (Continued).

"but not from receiving," as his right to receive patronage without direct or indirect solicitation is not in issue, but this phrase in the judgment is harmless. (Id.)

7. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-ACTIONS IN STATE COURTS— DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES COURTS CONTROLLING.-In actions brought in the state courts under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, approved April 22, 1908, the decisions of the supreme court of the United States are controlling in the construction of the act. (Smithson v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 148.)

8. STATE ACT PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS DURING CERTAIN HOURS-STATUTE ENACTED FOR SAFETY OF EMPLOYEES-ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION.-In an action brought in the state court under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a minor while in the employ of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, it is error to instruct the jury that the act of the legislature of the state of California providing that no minor under the age of eighteen years shall be employed or permitted to work between the hours of 10 o'clock in the evening and 5 o'clock in the morning (Stats. 1911, p. 910), is a statute enacted for the safety of employees, as those words are used in section 3 of the federal act. (Id.)

9. STATE ACT NOT EFFECTIVE AS POLICE REGULATION.-Such act of the legislature, notwithstanding it is in no wise in conflict with the federal act, cannot be employed with and as a supplement to the federal act as a state police regulation, for the legislation of Congress upon the matter is exclusive. (Id.)

10. INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-VIOLATION OF "ANY STATUTE" CONTRIBUTING TO INJURY-FREEDOM FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE CONSTRUCTION OF ACT-STATE STATUTES EXCLUDED.-The phrase "any statute," as that language is employed in section 3 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, providing that in any action brought against any common carrier under it an employee "shall not be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee," means another federal statute, and does not include the statutes of a state. (Id.)

11. INJURY TO ENGINE HELPER-LACK OF SIGNAL TO MOVE ON TURNTABLE-TRIAL ON ISSUE-INSUFFICIENCY OF DENIAL APPEAL OB. JECTION NOT REVIEWABLE.-In an action against a railroad corporation to recover damages for personal injuries received by an employee, whose duty it was to assist in running engines into the roundhouse after they had finished their trips, where the answer did not deny the allegation that no signal was given by plaintiff for the engine which caused the injury to move upon the turntable, but the denial was taken by both parties upon the trial as an accepted fact,

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE (Continued).

and issues joined without objection, neither party will be permitted for the first time on appeal to claim that such issue was not joined. (Id.)

See Contract, 3-8; Interstate Commerce; Negligence, 8, 9, 12-16, 18-25; Workmen's Compensation Act.

EQUITY. See Injunction; Specific Performance.

ESCROW. See Deed, 1.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

1. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT WAIVER BY WIDOW OF RIGHT TO FAMILY ALLOWANCE.-An antenuptial agreement, whereby the husband agreed to give his wife proper support during their married life and, in the event of his prior death, to cause to be paid her a specified sum per month during her life, and she agreed that the same should be "in lieu of any and all claims against his property or estate, whether community or any other property or interest of his," precludes her from demanding a family allowance from his estate. (Estate of Cutting, 104.)

2. MEANING OF WORD "CLAIMS."-The word "claims," as used in such agreement, is not to be construed as meaning only those demands which might have been enforced against the deceased husband in his lifetime, and which must be presented in due form of law to the executor or administrator of his estate. (Id.)

3. UNRECORDED MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.-Such agreement, considered as a marriage settlement, lost nothing of its binding force, as between the parties thereto, because it was unrecorded. (Id.)

4. PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION TO ONE OF SEVERAL RESIDUARY LEGATEESCASH ON HAND.-A partial distribution to one of several residuary legatees of a portion of the cash in the hands of the executor, in part payment of such legatee's residuary interest, was properly decreed in this estate, it appearing that the remaining cash on hand was sufficient to pay the pecuniary legacies and the expenses of administration, and that it would be necessary to sell all the property of the estate and to make a final distribution of the residue in cash. (Estate of Huntoon, 282.)

5. VALUATION OF PROPERTY-INVENTORY PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.-On the proceeding for final distribution, the valuation in the inventory is prima facie evidence of the value of the property of the estate. (Id.)

6. ACCOUNTING BY REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED ADMINISTRATOR.— Under section 1639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon the death

to the parties and the amount of the assessment, and that the decision in this case shall be the same as in No. 6802. The same judgment is therefore given.

The judgment is reversed.

Rehearing denied.

[S. F. No. 6817. In Bank.-January 8, 1917.]

A. M. SIMPSON, Respondent, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Appellant.

SAN FRANCISCO TUNNEL UNDER STREET ASSESSMENT DISTRICT.Judgment reversed on the authority of Hayne v. San Francisco, ante, p. 185

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. J. M. Seawell, Judge.

The facts are similar to those stated in the opinion in Hayne v. San Francisco, ante, p. 185.

Percy V. Long, City Attorney, and George Lull, Assistant City Attorney, for Appellant.

J. A. Cooper, for Respondent.

THE COURT.-This appeal involves the same tunnel assessment that was under consideration in Hayne et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, ante, p. 185, this day decided. The parties have stipulated that the facts are the same, except as to the parties and the amount of the assessment, and that the decision in this case shall be the same as in No. 6802. The same judgment is therefore given.

The judgment is reversed.

Rehearing denied.

[Sac. No. 2556. In Bank.-March 17, 1917.]

EUNICE J. PROPER, Respondent, v. RECLAMATION DISTRICT No. 1500, et al., Appellants.

RECLAMATION DISTRICT-NAVIGABLE WATERS-POLICE POWER.—Judgment reversed on the authority of Gray v. Reclamation District, ante, p. 622.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sutter County. Emmet Seawell, Judge presiding.

The facts are similar to those stated in the opinion in Gray v. Reclamation District, ante, p. 622.

A. C. & H. L. Huston, and Devlin & Devlin, for Appellants.

A. H. Hewitt, for Respondent.

Sullivan & Sullivan and Theo. J. Roche, Amici Curiae.

THE COURT.-This case in all its essentials identical with that of Gray et al. v. Reclamation District No. 1500 et al., ante, p. 622, this day decided. Upon the authority of that case the judgment herein appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded.