.

attorney the burden is on the accuser to prove moral turpitude. The requirement on his admission is to prevent the accrediting of untrustworthy persons as fit to receive the confidence attending upon the relation of attorney and client. The inquiry may extend to his general character as well as to particular acts. It is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding. The court may receive any evidence which tends to show his character for honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The fact that the order admitting Wells to practice has already been made does not convert this into a proceeding in disbarment. The charge is that he obtained that order by means of a fraudulent concealment of his real character. The allegations as to his character are necessary in order to show that if there shall be a bona fide inquiry regarding it, the court would be authorized to reject him because of the facts alleged. If the court should conclude that the fraudulent means were sufficiently established to justify a revocation of the order, it would then be its duty to inquire again into his moral character, and that inquiry would have the same scope, and be subject to the same rules, as if it had been made upon his original application.

From this it would follow that the court would not be confined to acts which have occurred since the enactment of the aforesaid amendment of 1911 to section 287, but may consider any acts or conduct occurring at any time, provided they have a legal tendency to prove his present character.

We now come to the consideration of the sufficiency of the allegations relating to the moral character of the respondent. It is alleged, in effect, though not in the best form or manner, that in the year 1903 he obtained a loan of $550 upon the security of a note executed by his wife and himself, and upon the representation by him that his wife owned twenty-five. acres of land free and clear of encumbrances, whereas in truth it was then encumbered by a homestead declaration duly made and recorded by her; that in the year 1914, while acting as adviser and assistant to the attorney for certain defendants in a criminal case in Orange County superior court, he advised and urged certain witnesses that they could testify

that they did not remember material facts within their knowledge, without danger to themselves, and thereby induced them to so testify. In a matter of this kind the form of the averments relating to the character of the applicant need not be closely scrutinized. If the case reaches the stage of inquiry on that subject, the court may inquire as to any facts bearing on the subject which are brought to its attention in any manner, whether by pleading or otherwise. In addition there are, of course, the facts above recited touching the manner in which he has sought to gain admission, which, if true, have a bearing upon his character.

While this conduct may not show great depravity of character, we think it must be admitted that it indicates in the respondent a want of that sincerity and integrity which the law demands of those who are to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. One who obtains credit by concealing material facts from the creditor and who, while endeavoring to practice in the superior court by indirection before he is admitted as an attorney, endeavors to induce witnesses to conceal the truth and to evade the giving of an honest answer, is not a person of that high character which the state intends shall be possessed by those who practice as attorneys in the courts.

With regard to the part of the case relating to the fraudulent means by which, as it is alleged, he gained admission and evaded meeting the objections, little need be said except to state some additional facts. It appears that he did not change his residence to Nevada, but went into that state solely for the purpose of there obtaining admission to practice and securing a license from that state. Under the rules of the supreme court made for the government of the district courts of appeal, persons who desire admission upon examination. must apply to the district court of appeal of the district in which they reside. Wells resided, and apparently still resides, in Orange County, which is within the second district. The court of that district had made a rule that applications for admission upon examination should be filed ten days. before the date fixed for such examination. It was also an established practice there for the clerk to send a copy of the application to the president of the bar association of the county in which the applicant resided. Upon his two previous applications for examination in that court this course

had been followed and, as above stated, upon being confronted with the objections now made, he had, on each occasion, withdrawn his application. It is alleged that he realized that he would be unable to secure admission upon examination, under these circumstances, and that with intent to evade the requirements above mentioned, to conceal the existence of the objections to his admission and then by indirection obtain admission, he went to the state of Nevada and secured admission there in October, 1915, and that in further pursuit of his intent to evade our laws and regulations he did not apply to the second district court of appeal for admission upon his certificate from Nevada, but presented the same and asked for admission in the third district court of appeal, where the facts were unknown to the court, and thereby procured the order sought to be vacated. If the allegations are true they tend to show that he was conscious of the fact that he could not gain admission in any forum where he would be met by evidence regarding his character, and that to avoid this necessity and evade the efforts of the bar association to prevent his admission he resorted to the circuitous method above detailed, took advantage of the lack of knowledge by the justices of the third district concerning his case, and thus procured the order, notwithstanding his unworthiness. His conduct in this respect not only constituted a fraud upon the court, but it affords additional proof that he is not a fit person for admission to the bar. The courts should be vigilant, not lax, to investigate such charges as are here made in regard to the character of an applicant for admission to the bar.

We do not think it advisable to take up in this court the investigation of these charges. It is proper to say that they are now mere allegations which put the court upon inquiry as to the truth of the matter. The law has devolved that duty upon the district court of appeal. The court that should conduct the investigation in this case, both as to the alleged fraud in obtaining the order and as to the good moral character of the applicant, is the district court of appeal of the third. district, the court which, it is alleged, was improperly led to make the order sought to be revoked.

The motion to strike out the petition is denied and the demurrer to the petition is overruled.

It is ordered that the matter be transferred to the district court of appeal of the third district for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., Melvin, J., Sloss, J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.

ANGELLOTTI, C. J., Dissenting.-I dissent.

My view is that this matter is not one as to which this court has the power of transfer under the provisions of section 4 of article VI of the constitution, that the order purporting to transfer the same to this court after decision by the district court of appeal of the third appellate district is a nullity, and that we have no jurisdiction whatever in the matter. It may properly be added that it seems to me that what is said in the opinion as to the meaning of the word "cause" as used in the provision quoted in the opinion is contrary to our decision in Ex parte Zany, 164 Cal. 724, [130 Pac. 710], wherein it was held after most careful consideration, Mr. Justice Shaw alone dissenting, that no such power of transfer exists as to a habeas corpus proceeding. The opinion herein recognizes that decision as settling the law on that question.

Rehearing denied.

[L. A. No. 4100. In Bank.-March 2, 1917.]

GEORGE CHAFOR et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH (a Municipal Corporation), Appellant.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-MAINTENANCE OF AUDITORIUM-PROPRIETARY CAPACITY-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.-A municipal corporation acts in its private and proprietary, as distinguished from its governmental, capacity, in constructing and maintaining an auditorium in pursuance of the permissive authorization given by the act of 1903 (Stats. 1903, p. 412), and is liable to one lawfully on such premises for personal injuries resulting from its negligence in maintaining the structure, notwithstanding it derived no pecuniary benefit from the use being made of the building at the time of the injury. ID.-ABSENCE OF PECUNIARY GAIN FROM USE OF BUILDING-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.-The fact that the municipality reaps no direct

pecuniary return from the use of the building for a particular purpose, does not make its act in so using it the performance of a governmental function.

ID.-BUILDING ERECTED ON TIDE-LAND.-It is immaterial to the liability of the city that the building was constructed in part upon tide-lands belonging to the state, and that its construction and maintenance of the building under such circumstances was ultra vires.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order refusing a new trial. Paul J. McCormick, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Haas & Dunnigan, Byron C. Hanna, Stephen G. Long, George F. Kapp, Wilbur F. Downs, and George L. Hoodenpyl, for Appellant.

William A. Alderson, for Respondents.

Harry M. Irwin, Waldo M. York, T. E. Gibbon, Valentine & Newby, Kemp, Mitchell & Silberberg, Leo V. Youngworth, Harry A. Hollzer, T. A. Williams, Steely & Jeffers, Amici Curiae, on behalf of Respondents on a prior petition for rehearing.

HENSHAW, J.-This action was brought by the husband and by the minor son of Edith Chafor to recover damages for the death of Edith, occasioned by the negligence of the defendant city. Trial was had before a jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs. Judgment followed the verdict, and from that judgment and from the order of the court denying defendant's motion for a new trial it prosecutes this appeal.

Long Beach is a maritime city. Prior to the accident it had constructed and was maintaining a wharf or pier extending into the ocean. The superstructure of this pier was supported by piles driven into the beach and ocean-bed. Near the outer end of this pier, and a little distance from it, the city had built and was also maintaining a structure known as an auditorium. The approach to the auditorium from the pier, a distance of about forty feet, was by means of a platform. From this platform doors gave entrance on to the main floor of the auditorium. The 24th of May, 1914, was