generally; but if the objection is meant to extend to regular forces, or to men who ftep forward voluntarily to co-operate. with the regular forces, from a zeal to repel an enemy, I cannot admit the objection has any weight. I believe there is nothing that can add confidence to the people, and enable them to feel a fecurity under their own Government, except being poffeffed of the means of co-operating for the general defence of the country. It is this that calls forth into action men's love for their country, and it is on this bafis that the provisions of the Bill are founded; and therefore if the objection is made on the ground of any danger arising from trusting the people fo coming forward in defence of the country with arms, it is an objection to one of the most leading principles in the Bill, for I must lay this down as an argument which cannot be refuted; if men are defirous of bearing a part in defence of the country, under whatever clafs or defcription they may fall, their exertions cannot be effectual, unlefs they act in unifon with each other, and with regularity. It is by fo doing they form all a part of that great fyftem of defence which will render this country totally invincible and impregnable.

"When I say this, I defire not to be ranked among those who affert, that country is perfectly fafe from the danger of trufting arms indifcriminately. I cannot fuppofe that there are not men in this country whom it would be improper to truft with arms, on the appearance of the enemy, or who, on fuch a day, would not be proper objects of our care and vigilance, I would not, on this occafion, fay any thing that may prevent unanimity; but I may be allowed to fay there are, I will not call them large, but certainly confiderable bodies of men, who are not inimical to the government of this country; but there are men, who, to forward their own views, are defirous of introducing reform through the medium of their connection with the enemies of this country. There are confiderable bodies of men in this country, who are engaged in traitorous correfpondence with the enemy, in order to aid their own views. I have no doubt of the fact. I know it with certainty. It is not my defign to throw out fufpicions; I know that Parliamentary Reform is captivating to the ears; but God forbid that all who entertain feelings different from the generality of the people of this country fhould be included among the objects of my fufpicions; they are applicable only to those who wish to introduce a reform, by the aid of a French Revolution. I muft fay, that many perfons, affociated under the name of Parliamentary Reformers, are defirous of effecting it by the very means I have juft now ftated, and the French have thought it material to their caufe, to hold out in one ge

neral

neral lump, to all Parliamentary Reformers, their offers of affiftance. I believe they are mistaken in their notions as to all who wish for Parliamentary Reform; but permit me to obferve, that Gentlemen will do right to inquire well, to examine well, to inform themfelves well, as to the views, characters and fentiments of those with whom they are connected in the fame caufe. If they will do this, they will find that this is not a moment to diflurb the country or to forward the views of the enemy, by holding out any measures of reform, however congenial to their own views. I wish to state, that under the deJutive name of Parliamentary Reformers, there are existing in this country men affociated by every tie, endeavouring by infamous and diabolical means to promote the defigns of the enemy. I will not fay more, but I am perfuaded the zeal of the country is fuch, as to render the prefent measure a proper one. The people know they are contending for their exiftence; and I trust that those who think the friendship of the French a fecurity for the peace of the country, will reflect on the fate of thofe countries to which they have extended their friendship. I will not refer to what has paffed in Flanders and Holland, the circumstances with refpect to thofe countries are obliterated by the more recent conduct of the French: wherever they have appeared, under the name of friendship, they have foon affumed the character of conquerors. Venice, Genoa, Naples, and Rome, are proofs of what is to be expected from the friendship of France, and every country that follows fuch examples will equally fall facrifices to their fraternal embrace. But above all, there is a recent circumftance, which it is impoflible to pass over on a day fuch as this, when I am endeavouring to call forth the zeal, the fpirit and the valour of the country. It is impoffible for the House not to fee I refer to the inhumanity exercifed to that ill ufed nation of he roes, of virtuous heroes, the Swifs Cantons. We all know that with robbers hands, without any provocation, they have attacked that virtuous people, who have ftudiously avoided every way by which offence could be given, who have ftrug gled to preferve a pure neutrality amidst the convulfions of Eu rope; yet, because they were neutral, because they gave no provocation, they have provoked the hatred of the French, who now, under the walls of Berne, think themfeles at liberty to drink ruin to Great Britain, who are boafting that every battle gained in Switzerland is an advantage over Great Britain; with fuch an enemy as we have to contend, we have no doubt left as to their object. They have told us it is the deftruction of our commerce, of our navy, of our revenue, of every thing which entitles us to hold up ourselves as that

proud

proud independent people whieh have fo long characterized the annals of Great Britain. I do not think it neceffary to add any thing further; I have faid thus much in order to explain the reafons for bringing forward the meafure, which is meant as an incentive to call forth the energy of the country, and to place its fecurity beyond the reach of doubt, and therefore I move that leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable his Majefty more effectually to provide for the defence and fecurity of the realm, and to indemnify perfons who might fuffer in their property by fuch measures as fhould be thought neceffary."

General Tarleton did not rife to oppofe the motion, nor should he attempt to follow the Honourable Gentleman into a difcuffion of all the points agitated in his very able fpeech. He was ftill lefs prepared to throw out infinuations in general, and loofe terms against men for holding particular fentiments of forms of Government. Whatever might be the danger apprehended by Minifters, he believed there did not exift in the country any body of men excufively attached to France. But he faw it with pain, that the country had been brought, he. would not fay by whom, into a perilous, but not a calamitous fituation: he would not call it calamitous, because the country abounded in military refources, which, if rightly managed, would enable it to refift any enemy. In his opinion, however, the best way of providing for our defence would be to examine the parts most vulnerable, and there put ourselves in a fituation to appal the enemy. If the people wished to preferve their independence, if the Houfe wifhed to be the reprefentatives of an independent nation, fuch must be the plan of defence. He would not appal the fpirit of the people, at a crifis big with danger, and loudly demanding the greatest una nimity and exertion. As to the fpecific measure before the Houfe, he would not oppofe it, but he would state some obfervations. The enemy were making great naval preparations; but from the time requifite for their completion, England and Ireland did not appear to him in any danger, at leaft, for fome months. Formerly the enemy had fent an army to Ireland; but it did not follow that they could do it again with the fame facility; we had benefited by the medi tated attack; the country was put into a state of defence, and proper measures taken to prevent its repetition. Where then, he would afk, was this country open to danger? Why, in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, it was vulnerable in the caftern coaft, which was not far diftant from the capital.. That was the part where they could make their attack with any chance of fuccefs, God forbid they should do so, but if they fhould, their march would be as rapid as possible; No. 20. 4 U

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they knew there were no fortified towns to be left behind them; they would not incumber themfelves with heavy baggage and provifions, which, by retarding their movements, would afford time to render their efforts ineffectual. Did Buonaparte do fo when he was marching forward to Vienna? No. Should they land 160 or 170 miles from the metropolis, it would be a march of feven or eight days to reach it; but the nearest march to the metropolis would not be one of more than three or four days. He would advife, therefore, that fo many troops fhould not be left in the fouthern, the northern, and western extremities of the kingdom, and that the best of our troops, both infantry and cavalry, fhould be drawn to the neighbourhood of London, where our force fhould be concentrated, leaving detachments to protect the principal commercial towns, fuch as Newcastle, Liveroool, and Briftol. Befides this, other precautions were neceffary. A regiment, he admitted, drawn out in St. James's Park, looked well, and feemed able to act with the utmost celerity; but look at it marching from cantonment to cantonment, and fee how flow and encumbered its motion. To enable our army then to cope with the French, it must be difembarraffed of much of its prefent encumbrances. Look to the conftitution of the French army. A captain in the French army carried his own baggage; he did not mean to reduce an English officer to that fituation. But expedition was the foul of enterprize, and certainly alterations thould be made in thofe particulars which rendered us unable to act with as much expedition as our encmies. Thefe then were the obfervations to which he alluded.

With refpect to the driving off the cattle in cafe of invafion, he faid, he had seen as much of that service as any officer in the army; he had been employed upon that fervice by Lord Cornwallis, in America, and if it did not fucceed in fo thin a country as that, it could not be expected to be more fuccessful in fo populous a country as England. Befides, the evils men muft endure in fuch circumftances would be intolerable, Having faid this, he trufted credit would be given to him when he declared he wifhed every thing for the good of the country. "I cannot," faid the General, give military leffons to Buonaparte, but I have hopes, after the war is ended, and I with it may be ended honourably, I fhall hear from Buonaparte himself a defcription of his battles, and that we shall have the pleasure of talking together over our campaigns; but, in saying this, I cannot be mifunderstood, as I mean nothing more than perfonal refpect for a man of acknowledged valour, who has excited the admiration of every mind; and it is in the nature of a foldier's life to wish to talk over his stories with men who

have fhared its toils. Every man who hears me will, I trust, not imagine that while I can admire talent, and venerate a brave man, I would court that general for a command or office. No, I am convinced he would not permit me to talk to him, if I had not done my duty to my country. And here I would beg leave to remark, that if you do not expect military merit and prowess in an enemy, you cannot fight him to advantage thus, if you do not look on Buonaparte as the greateft man of modern times, you cannot fight him to advantage." He had thrown out thefe general obfervations from a sense of his duty to the House and the country, but would not oppofe the measure.

General Delancey obferved, that as the Honourable General who had juft fat down, had called upon military men in the Houfe to give their opinions upon the prefent measure, he would endeavour to fhew in what way he conceived the plan fuggefted by that Gentleman would be improper. He had not been in the habit of addreffing himfelf to the House, and therefore he requefted their indulgence. The Honourable General had stated that no adequate preparations had been made to defend the country against a foreign enemy, and that no proper difpofition had been made of the army, if the enemy fhould come. But he would point out what difpofitions ought to be made; and he had ftated his opinion. The plan of defence which the Honourable General feemed to think ought to be adopted, was to concenter all the force near the metropolis, and fo leave the extremities of the country unprotected. This was the general tenor of his fuggeftion. So different, however, was his opinion, that he was perfectly fatisfied every thing had been done which could be done; and that fuch were the difpofitions that had already been made, that if the enemy should invade the country, they would meet with refiftance which they did not expect. Of the prefent plan, his opinion was, that it ought to be adopted, and immediately. The Honourable General had fpoken of Buonaparte. He acknowledged that he had done wonders; but he would find that if he brought his army here, he would meet with a reliftance which could only proceed from a free people.

General Tarleton, in explanation, ftated, that General Delancey had miftaken what he had faid. He did not say that all the troops fhould be drawn to the metropolis; he had exprefsly faid, that detachments fhould be left to guard the great towns, fuch as Newcastle, Briftol, &c.

General Delancey replied, that he had merely endeavoured to recollect and to ftate what appeared to him to be the general tenor and scope of the Honourable Gentleman's argu4 U 2

ments.

Sir