war.

This, my Lords, was at one time true, and at another falfe, juft as it happened to fuit the occafional views of Minifters. Your Lordships know what were the doctrines which were laid down by a great man, now deceased, whofe talents I admired, whofe virtues I revered, and whofe memory I refpect. I mean Mr. Burke. That great man maintained that, without the reftoration of a monarchy of fome form or other in France, there was no fecurity for Europe. My Lords, it is to the confusion of thofe two doctrines we are to attribute all the errors and all the calamities of the war; for, while Mr. Burke urged the neceffity of overturning the Republic, Minifters thought that a proper pretext and a fit opportunity to attack France; and thus unhappily contrived to enlift every man in France, whether republican or loyalift, against them, and to irritate and inflame them against this country. By this confufion of principle, by the duplicity of their conduct, and by the obvious treachery of their views, did the allies enlift not only the interefts but the natural vanity of France against them, fo that every individual in that country felt it to be his principle and his duty to refift an infamous combination of princes, who commenced the war by fwindling, and ended it in blunders and difgrace. With views fuch as thefe the war commenced; England being at that time, as has been ftated, in a condition of unexampled profperity. Now, that all the objects which Government had in view, whether those so ably enforced by Mr. Burke on one hand, or the indefinite views of the Miniffer on the other, have completely failed, cannot be denied; neither can it be overlooked that France, at the commencement of the conteft, had every imaginable difficulty to encounter. Have I not then a right to say that this country, fourthing as it was, found it impoffible to check the progrefs of France, crippled and depreffed; and is it not fair to prefume that fuch mifcarriages, fo uniformly happening to every plant of Minifters, can only be owing to their total want of talents and capacity as ftatefmen. They fet out with a very confident promife that the war would be fhort in duration; it has turned out otherwife, and it is natural enough for them to plead, and may be candid for us to admit, that fo far they were in error; but if a long feries of action is found to be but one long feries of error-if in a period of fix years changing from principle to principle, and fhifting from expedient to expedient, they are found not to have been even once right, am I not juftified in faying that they have neither talents, vigour, or capacity, and ought to be difmiffed in order to give place to men better qualified to govern the country in the arduous and dangerous conteft in which we are involved by their folly, and, wickedness.

But,

But, fays a Noble Lord, this would be ingratitude." This would be to difmifs men who have rendered great fervice to the country, and raised its finances to a ftate of unprecedented affluence and profperity.' But fhall fuch a paltry evafion be deemed a juftification of their having again deftroyed the finances of the country? Let Minifters reftore the finances even to the fituation in which they ftood at the period previous to their boafted fervices! Not only have they undone what they themselves did, but all that had been done before their times. Are we to allow this in juftification of their misconduct? Are we, out of gratitude for a fmall benefit fuppofed to be done in time of peace, to overlook the moft unjuftifiable mifconduct of Ministers, and devote the country to them and ruin in time of war?

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My Lords, it is impoffible but you must remember that, at the beginning of every feffion, the Minifter has faid to ParJiament, There is your expences for this year:' and that invariably and conftantly the fum has been doubled before the end of the feffion. This is called, an unforeseen accident.* Subfidies were unexpectedly found to be neceffary, and the ordinary mode of fupply was departed from. Thofe were as unlucky and as wrong as all other parts of the Minister's politics, and here too they plead error; but can they fay that they were not cautioned against thofe fubfidies? were there no men, eminent for virtue and talents, who predicted at the time that the fubfidized powers would defert the alliance, and that the treasures of the nation would be fquandered in vain? I will not dwell upon the desertion of Pruffia, because it is now fo long known, and indeed was from the beginning fo obvious, that it must be familiar to your Lordships; but Auftria was fubfidized, and Sardinia was fubfidized, to carry on the war. Holland did not defire our interference, and all, as they began, fo they continued to carry on the war merely because this country perfuaded them to carry it on. But happy would it have been for this country if Minifters, inftead of fubfidizing thofe powers to carry on the war, had allowed, or even fubfidized them to make peace; it may have been juftifiable in them to fubfidize Pruffia to make peace, but it is most unfortunate that Auftria was not perfuaded to make peace before Belgium was loft. When Sardinia, in return for our fubfidy, made a peace with France, it was, an unforeseen accident.' A Noble Marquis (Lanfdowne) in words which I had not the pleafure to hear, but which, if truly reported, in my opinion, equalled any that have ever been uttered in this House for wisdom and prefcience, once faid, that the allies, by their conduct in the war, would eftablish a military Republic in the

heart

heart of Europe-and fo it turned out. Was that an unforefeen accident-No, not unforeseen. Admitting that it could be termed unfortunate, and that all the mifconduct of the war could be confidered as no worse than unfortunate, it does not alter the grounds of my Noble Friend's motion, for if the meafures of any particular fet of men happen to be unfortunate, it is good and fufficient grounds for difmiffing them, fince very good or very bad fortune have a very impreffive effect on the minds of men.

"My Lords, I fhall now trouble you with a few observations on the very important fubject of Ireland. A Noble Lord, in anfwer to my Noble Friend's propofal for conciliation, has asked if any one will put his hand to his heart, and fay that conciliation would produce the effect of tranquillizing that Country? I afk, will any one put his hand to his heart, and fay that coercion will produce it? Can any one point out a fingle inftance of fuch an effect having been produced by fuch means in fuch circumstances? Has the war with France, or has that with America, both of which infpired their advocates with the most fanguine and prefumptuous hopes, given reafon to put any confidence in coercion? My Lords, I can put my hand to my heart, and fay, that I am perfuaded his Majesty's prefent Minifters cannot tranquillize that country even by conciliation. How can they conciliate whofe conceffions are always known to be the conceffions of weakness and of fear; who refufe to fupplication what they grant to menace; who, not only in the cafe of France, but even in that of the mutinies at Portsmouth, and of the grants to Ireland, never conceded that which they had not before refufed; and who never granted even to the Irish (the few fragments of whofe nautical hiftory left us to prove to be the most generous people upon earth) any thing without ftruggle and reluctance. And thus, My Lords, the Rulers of France argue of our Minifter: and hence arifes their reluctance to make peace till they can exact from the fear and feeblenefs of Adminiftration that which they would defpair of obtaining from any other fet of men. When they obferve in the political tactics here the nature of our Minifter, and his jealoufy of the people, they naturally fay, why does he afk for peace? Is it for the fake of peace in its true fpirit? No; no fuch thing.-Is it because he thinks peace wife, or prudent, or just? No; no fuch thing; but because he finds, as he has held it out, that the people are adverfe to the war, and demand a peace with a clamour which can only be appeafed by holding out the pretext of negotiation; and fpeculating in this manner on the conduct of Minifters, the Directory withhold that peace which, if any other men No. 18. **

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were

were our Minifters, they would feel it to be their interest to grant to us. As to our negotiations, the first propofal made by Minifters was, when Jourdan was at the head of a victorious army; but that ended because the restoration of Belgium was made a fine qua non. In this cafe, the weaknefs of Minifters appeared; for they ought to have duly confidered, first, the probability of regaining that country; and next, whether the fum of money that might be expended in regaining it, would not be more than Belgium in the hands of Auftria would be worth to us. It is well known that in Vienna Belgium is looked upon as an incumbrance; to urge Auftria to fight for it, therefore, and to pay a fubfidy for that purpose, I rely upon it, was actual infanity. To pay fubfidies for the purpofe of maintaining Belgium as a fine qua non, is a proof of either fuch incapacity or fuch infincerity as ought not to be pardoned. The British Minifter, who was fo dignified that he would hold no terms or intercourfe with the murderers of the King of France, was found fending a plenipotentiary over to crouch to one of the worst of thofe very murderers-and the enemy, very fagacioufly inferred from thence, that, waiting longer, they would have more ample conceffions; for the Malus Animus is no more dead among the Rulers of France, than among our Minifters.

"My Lords, Minifters give out that they ftay in office to keep out others who would be worfe than themselves. This I conceive to be extremely arrogant; for is it not infulting the nation at large to fuggeft that there are in it only two men fit for the once. For my part, my Lords, I am fure there are many; and I pledge myself to fupport any fet of men who will make the attainment of peace their object. As for reform, I prevent the fame

pledge myself to purfue it, as neceffary to fyftem from taking place here, which produced the French Revolution, as well as that in America. To difmifs Minifters is therefore neceffary; and I for my part will fupport in or out of this Houfe fuch Minifters fupplying their place as will take measures to conciliate Ireland, not by offering them terms, but by giving them what they defire; for it is not for us to determine for them what may be in our opinions a wife Go-` vernment. Every country has a right to be governed in that way that makes them happy.

The Marquis of Downfhire faid, he could lay his hand upon his heart and declare that, in his opinion, conciliation, as explained by the Noble Duke, and others, could never fave Ireland. If it was meant that the King of Great Britain should no longer be acknowledged in Ireland, and that that country fhould be a province to France, that indeed might be obtained

by

by conciliation. He would declare further, that it was the general with of that country to stand or fall by this. But he was afhamed to fay that there were fome perfons in that country fo bafe as to wish to fee it made a province to France. He came to the Houfe thinking it was impoffible for any Noble Lord to introduce into this debate the fubject of Ireland; after fo plain and ample a statement that had been made upon the fubject, not only in that Houfe, but alfo in Ireland, by his Majefty's Minifters. Every fyllable that a Noble Earl had ftated upon that meafure had been contradicted by the statement of plain facts. It appeared that the doubts of that Noble Lord refpecting the existence of a plot were fully anfwered; that there were even in his own house, people engaged in making arms.-There were indeed two fets of people i Ireland: the one of them faid they wanted the emancipation of the Catholics; the other faid they wanted Parliamentary Reform-in which they were not fincere; they made ufe of thefe pretexts to catch the vulgar, and to deceive the ignorant. He was forry that a Noble Lord of fo much authority in that country and in this made ufe of that doctrine in his argument, becaufe that was certainly a mifconception, as applied to the people of Ireland.

Much had been faid upon the subject of coercion. He was ready to confefs he was not afraid of the effect of coercion, although he liked conceffion when well applied. And upon that fubject he muft obferve that every conceffion was made by our Sovereign that could be fafely made towards Ireland ever fince he knew it. Ireland had a trade as free as could be fafely made fo, with due regard to the other parts of his Majesty's dominions. Every Catholic was free who chose to be fo; that was to fay, they were made as free as the fafety of the State would admit. Were the Catholics to have an equal fhare in the Government with the Proteftants, the Government would foon be loft. He was more forry than he could exprefs at being obliged to fay that coercion was abfolutely neceflary in Ireland; but he hoped it would ftop the progrefs of the difaffected there, and indeed their efforts were becoming daily more and more feeble, as the people they had deluded by their artifice were every day opening their eyes. By this coercion, and by being admonifhed, they were returning to their duty; many of them had acknowledged their errors, many more were about to follow their example, and many had given proof of their allegiance, by entering into the army; and he trufted they would foon all be ashamed of having been deluded fo long by thofe who had nothing in view but to facrifice their country to the ambition of its enemies, but he muft obferve ftill further, that thefe 5 P 2 difaffected