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fuch a government as is capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity:-with fuch a government, whether republican or not, we will treat. They told us in their arguments, that they had given up indemnity; but they faid, will you call upon us to treat with fuch a government? Where now, my Lords, was the lofty language which talked of restoring the French monarchy? Where were the fupporters of the declaration ifiued by a Noble Lord oppofite to me at Toulon? Where were the men who faid, that there was no middle line between anarchy and monarchy? They were all foftened; they were foftened, because they found that they could not maintain their principles without lofing their fituations. They then fhewed, that, however lofty their language had been in the hour of profperity, it should ever fall as their profpects fell, and that their conceffions fhould be in a pro rata proportion to their difficulties. Such was the fituation in which we were placed in the third year of the war. A debt of forty-feven millions had been incurred, and a permanent annual charge upon the country of 2,250,000l. With this the feflion clofed. The opening of the next prefented a different aspect of affairs. The allies had been fuccefsful. Yet, however elated Minifters might be at thefe fucceffes, ftill they did not think them fufficient to warrant the refumption of their old strain of argument; but, in answer to thofe who ftill endeavoured for peace, they told us that the state of things in France must lead to a crifis, the iffue of which no one could forefee, but that great events might arife, which would be important for the interefts of Europe. If the crifis terminated favourably, they would be ready to meet any propofition that might be made for peace. It was then endeavoured, by the advocates for peace, to be proved, that it would be better to attempt to come to a conclufion, and Parliament were urged to declare, that the then Government of France was capable of maintaining the accuftomed relations of amity and peace. No fuccefs, however, was derived from that propofition. Minifters renewed their former objections, and the affignats of France afforded ample matter of fpeculation on the ruin of the finances. It was faid, that France was abfolutely fo exhaufted, that another campaign would not even be endured. I remember, my Lords, full well, that, upon that occafion, I moved an amendment. I faid I would not enter into the involved question; and that all I had to obferve was, that in proportion as the prophecies of Minifters were more decisive, the energies of France became greater. Some compliments were paid me; it was faid, that I was perfectly competent to argue the question, but that I declined it from a conviction that fo little could be faid. The event has proved, whether I

was

was right or wrong. But failing conftantly in our attempts to make Parliament declare that France was capable of maintaining the relations of amity and peace, we learnt, with great furprife, in less than fix weeks, that the crifis had ended favourably, and that Minifters declared themselves ready to meet any offers of negotiation. Now, furely, my Lords, thofe who were fo anxious for a fixed form of Government in France, might, I fhould have thought, have taken more than fix weeks to decide upon the new Government, and whether it had fufficient stability or not. But thinking, as we did, that you might have treated with any Government that had exifted fince the commencement of the war, we had of course no objection to this offer of treating. We could not however help fufpecting, that Minif ters had no fincere defire for peace, but were anxious to concede a little, not to us certainly, but to those who were wavering between peace and war. This ftate of affairs produced a meffage from Mr. Wickham, an answer to it, and a note commenting upon both. Upon that note I have had occafion to remark before, and I have always faid, and it is not my own opinion alone, but the opinion of all with whom I have converfed, that that proceeding was the most unlikely means that were ever adopted by any nation to fecure a peace. You would have thought, at leaft, that fome civility might have been used to the power with whom you profeffed a wish to treat. Upon the anfwer given by M. Barthelemy, his Majefty's Minifters publithed a note. But finding that was not quite fufficient to delude the people, they brought forward another negotiation with a little more ftate trick in it. Look at the circumstances and conduct of the first negotiation of Lord Malmesbury. I fhall not go at length into a topic fo often difcuffed. If Minifters, contrary to every appearance, were fincere upon that occafion, muft they not have been the most incapable adminiftration that ever exifted, to adopt the courfe which they purfued. There was nothing concilating in its beginning or in its progress; every ground of fufpicion was given to the enemy against the fincerity of Minifters. A Minifter was fent with power to conclude and not to treat, and to treat for the Emperor without authority. Upon this fubject it has been vainly attempted to obtain documents which develope the true state of fome very important points of negotiation. If thefe documents are refufed, then I am entitled to conclude that they contain nothing to juftify Minifters in the demand of Belgium as a fine qua non; that Minifters had no authority from the Emperor to urge fuch a condition. Notwithstanding the original pretences from which the war was faid to be undertaken, to give protection to the oppreffed, to check the career of mad ambition, and to de

fend

fend property, what were the terms on which we proposed to conclude a peace? All the great powers were to be benefited at the expence of the fmaller. While Poland was allowed to be divided without a remonftrance, new fchemes of partition were devised by those who pretended to have interfered for the protection of the weak, and for the intereft of all. France was to have retained fome of her conquests. The Emperor was to have received compenfation for his loffes, and the Dutch fettlements in the Eaft were to be the portion of Great Britain. Upon this occafion Belgium, as a fine qua non, was not to remain with France. Upon this point, Lord Malmesbury's firft negotiation was broken off; while many thought that confidering the importance of peace to this country, Minifters ought to have made that ceffion as the means of obtaining peace. How much more neceffary would it have appeared to give up Belgium, had our financial fituation then been afcertained; had it been known that the Bank was in danger of ftopping payment; and what can be thought of thofe, who, warned of the danger, ftill perfevered in the meafures by which its folidity was fhaken? The fine qua non of Belgium, however, was infifted upon, and, after many millions were fquandered in support of our pretenfions, it was at laft found neceffary that they fhould be dropped.

"If fincere in the next attempt, furely it was not greatly in the fpirit of conciliation, or with probability of fuccefs, that the Noble Lord who had failed in the first miffion fhould again be chofen as the negotiator. I do not queftion the talents of the Noble Lord, but I cannot help thinking that the circumftances of his former negotiation placed him in a fituation of prejudice, which no other perfon would have had to encounter. Without going into the circumftances of this negotiation, I fhall only remind you of the efforts which were made laft feffion to prevail upon you to refort to attain that peace which the prefent Minifters had in vain endeavoured to obtain. The haughty demeanour which they had obferved, the irritating conduct they had purfued, difqualified them for acting the part of conciliation with any credit for fincerity, or any chance of fuc cefs. The infolence which they had difplayed in profperity was not followed by firmnefs in adverfity; and their concef fions, though never calculated to procure peace, betrayed them to the enemy as weak and wavering Statefmen, from whom every conceffion might ultimately be obtained. When fuch was the character of Ministers, and fuch the light in which they were viewed by the enemy, how could it be expected that peace would be the refult of their hollow negotiations?

At the end of five years of war, then, let me call the atten

ence.

tion of the Houfe to the fituation in which we stood at the conteft, and that which we now hold. We began the war in conjunction with the greatest confederacy ever known in Europe, and we are now without a fingle Ally but Portugal! It was then faid what would be our fituation, obliged to wage war alone with France, at peace with the other nations of Europe. How favourable a fituation this, my Lords, to that in which we now ftand? We should have entered upon the conteft with ample refources, and, in the worst event, we should have feen at fome years diftance that calamity we now experi Notwithstanding all the expence which the war has heaped upon us, we fee not a fingle effort exerted in vigorous attack. We are reduced to a state of inert felf-defence. What hope of fuccefs have we in protracted war?-What prospect have we of its termination? What profpect have we to cheer our gloom or to compenfate for our facrifices? Our exertions, my Lords, under the aufpices of the prefent Minifters, are as hopeless as they are incalculable. I know, my Lords, that the fubject of finance is irkfome to you. But let me intreat you to confider the magnitude of the debt under which this country now labours. The annual charge entailed upon this country, in the courfe of a few years war, is equal to the amount of the debt at the time when the prefent Miniflers came into power. Without mentioning the different corps of Supplementary Cavalry, &c. which had been raised at a great expence to the country, the permanent debt of the nation was doubled in the fhort fpace of five years. Can you think, then, that no blame can attach to the men who have fquandered fo profufely the refources of the nation without fruit or advantage? Do you think that the review of what we were and what we are now,-what we have spent, and what we have gained, or rather loft, affords no proof of the incapacity of the prefent Minifters; and that under their aufpices you can have any hope that your affairs will be conducted with ability and fuccefs?

"While we contemplate from without a fituation of affairs fo afflicting, there is nothing in our internal ftate to afford us any confolation. We began to war in circumstances of the greatest profperity, and with the ftrongest alliance. We have perfevered in it till we have been deferted by the whole of that alliance, except Portugal. We are reduced to a state of defence, and what hopes of fuccefs have we? Have you any? Will you point out to the country what they are? No, you have none to hold out-you have neither hope of fuccefs nor of termination of the conteft. To this fituation, deferted by Our allies, embarraffed in our finances, we are reduced:

No. 18.

5 N

We

are

are burthened with a debt more enormous than any that was ever incurred in any war. Look, my Lords, at the amount of it-it is a dry and unpleafing tafk, I know, at all times; but for God's fake fee what you have expended for the destruction of Jacobinism in France; which now is at its greatest height. Again, however, muft we have recourfe to borrowing, and we shall have impofed upon the country, for the profecution of this war, an annual charge exceeding all the intereft of the National Debt to the time when the prefent Chancellor of the Exchequer came into office. When the accounts of the American War were all wound up, the interest of the debt was nine millions and a half. In five years however we have laid more burthen than any preceding Minifters, without taking into the calculation the money raifed by Supplementary Cavalry, Infantry, &c. Can you think of this without imagining that any blame is imputable to the prefent Minifters? If you are determined to think fo, you have at least fufficient proof that they have done miferably ill, and that all hope of retrieving the country muft confift in felecting other men. What, my Lords, is our prefent domeftic fituation? To fhew all the mifchiefs and mifery of it, I fhall perhaps commence at the period that preceded the war. Your Lordships will recollect, that thefe men had the government of the country during a long period of profperous peace. What is our fituation now? Are we not living under laws hoftile to the Conftitution? (A cry of hear, bear.) Is not that our present fituation? Are we not precluded from the benefits of that system which it was our pride to boast of, and on which we refted our firmest hopes? But there is another topic which this review fuggefts, on which I know not how to fpeak. Confider, my Lords, the fituation of Ireland at the prefent moment. It has been faid that you ought not to interfere in the affairs of Ireland? do not the Minifters of this country, by the fyftem which they purfue, alienate from you the affections of the Sifter Kingdom. My Lords, were I to enter into a detail of the atrocities which have been committed in Ireland, the picture would appal the ftouteft heart. It could be proved that the moft fhocking atrocities have been perpetrated; but indeed what could be expected if men, kept in ftrict difcipline, were all at once allowed to give loofe to their fury and their paffions. To the military, then, I do not impute the blame, but to thofe by whom their exceffes have been permitted and encouraged. Certain it is that two diftinct and oppofite orders have been iffued for regulating the conduct of the military; one by which they were allowed to act without the authority of the civil power; and the other by which they are restrained

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