This measure was highly preposterous. It was incorrect in the president to confer, it was equally incorrect in the secretary to receive, the appointment. It was the less defensible, from the circumstance, that nearly all the democrats in the United States had, in 1794, utterly disapproved of, and declaimed against, the appointment, by General Washington, of Judge Jay, to negociate a treaty with Great Britain, pending his continuance as a judge. It is moreover obvious, that the absence of one judge cannot produce any material inconvenience; as there are always others to supply his place. But there are high and responsible duties attached to the office of secretary of the treasury, which can never, without very great impropriety, be devolved on a deputy. I pass over all but the transcendant one of remitting fines and forfeitures, too high a power probably to to be trusted to any individual whatever, not excepting even a secretary himself.

NEGOCIATION AT GOTTENBURG.

At a period when it was of immense importance to the United States to close the war as speedily as possible, the president had the alternative of London or Gottenburg as the scene of negociation. We had been unfortunate by land, through treason, incapacity, or some other cause. It was our interest to accelerate it was that of the British to procrastinate the negociations. The chances from delay were much in their favour. War is, moreover, a component part of their system. Ours is calculated for peace. These observations acquired treble force from a reflection on the disaffection of the Eastern portion of the union, and its aversion to the war. Of course, we ought to have shunned every thing that might cause delay. It was therefore most extraordinary and unaccountable that the president should have chosen Gottenburg in preferrence to London, under all the obvious delays resulting from the necessity that would probably arise, or be pretended, to consult the court of St. James's, by the ministers of that court. It appears almost as absurd as it would be to choose the Havanna, or Port Royal, were the negociations to be conducted on this side of the At lantic. This was the more erroneous, from the consideration that the fate of large portions of our territory, and the lives of hundreds of valuable citizens, might depend upon the delay of a single day.

* See the luminous essays on this subject by W. B. Giles, esq. which are replete with the most convincing and unanswerable arguments.

THE OLIVE BRANCH.

R

,59 OF

CALIFORNIA

Shortly after the annunciation of the choice of there was a paragraph published here, extracted from a bon don news-paper, stating that twenty mails were then actually due from that place at London, owing to the continued prevalence of adverse winds. This was an unanswerable proof, if any were necessary, of the impropriety of the choice of Gottenburg.

RECENT NEGLECT OF DUE PREPARATIONS.

Under this head, the president and the heads of departments were still more culpable than under any of the former

ones.

From the period of the downfall of Bonaparte, and the · complete triumph of Great Britain and her allies, it was obvious to the meanest capacity that her powers of annoyance had increased prodigiously. The immense forces raised to aid the coalition against France, were liberated from all employment but against us. And of the disposition of England to continue the war, we had the most convincing indications. The British newspapers were replete with denunciations, of vengeance against us, and with statements of immense preparations for our chastisement. And to crown the whole-to remove all possible doubt on the subject-to deprive us and

rulers of all plea in justification of our torpor, and apathy, and neglect, an address was published from the lords of the admiralty to the navy, stating, as a reason for not discharging so many seamen as the return of peace in Europe might have warranted, that the war existing with this country for the maritime rights of the British Empire, rendered such a measure improper.

London, April 30th. 1814.

"The lords commissioners of the admiralty cannot announce to the fleet the termination of "hostilities without expressing to the petty officers, seamen and royal marines of his majesty's ships, the high sense which their lordships entertain of their gallant and glorious services during the late war. The patience, perseverance, and discipline; the skill, courage, and devotion, with which the seamen and marines have upheld the best interests, and achieved the noblest triumphs of our country, entitle them to the gratitude, not only of their native land, which they have preserved inviolate, but of the other nations of Europe, of whose ultimate deliverance their success maintained the hope and accelerated the accomplishment. Their lordships regret the unjust and unprovoked aggression of the AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, in declaring war upon this country, after all the causes of its original complaint had been removed, does not permit them to reduce the fleet at once to a peace establishment. But as the question now at issue in this war, is, the maintenance of those maritime rights, which are the sure foundation of our naval glory, their lordships look with confidence to that part of the fleet which it may be still necessary to keep in commission, for a continuance of that spirit of discipline and gallantry, which

has raised the British navy to its present pre-eminence. In the reducing the fleet to the establishment necessary for the American war, the seamen and marines will find their lordships attentive to the claims of their respective services. The reduction will be first made in the crews of those ships which it may be found expedient to pay off; and from them the petty officers and seamen will be successively discharged according to the length of their services; begining in the first instance with all those who were in his majesty's service previous to the 7th of March, 1803, and have since continued in it. When the reduction shall have been thus made, as to the ships paid off, their lordships will direct their attention to those which it may be found necessary to keep in commission, and as soon as the circumstnances of the war will admit, will bring home and discharge all persons having the same standing and periods of service, as those discharged from the ships paid off; so that in a few months the situation of individuals will be equalized, all men of a certain period of service will be at liberty to return home to their families; and the number which it may be still necessary to retain, will he composed of those who have been the shortest time in the service. An arrangement in itself so just, cannot in their lordships' opinion fail to give universal satisfaction: and they are induced to make this communication to the fleet, because they think that the exemplary good conduct of all the petty officers, seamen, and marines, entitles them to every confidence, and to this full and candid explanation of their lordships' intentions. Their lordships cannot conclude without expressing their hope, that the valour of his majes ty's fleets and armies will speedily bring the American contest to a conclusion, honourable to the British name, safe for British interests, and conducive to the lasting repose of the civilized world.

"By command of their lordships.

"J. W. CROKER.”

Notwithstanding these symptoms of a near approaching hurricane, a delusion almost universally prevailed through the nation, of which it is hardly possible to produce a parallel. Numbers of our most enlightened citizens, knowing that the restoration of peace had removed all the ostensible causes of war, and placing full reliance upon the magnanimity of Great Britain, predicated all their arrangements on a speedy and honourable peace. Purchases and sales of property to an incalculable amount, were made under this soothing expectation. And we were lulled into a state of the most perfect security, as if all our dangers had utterly subsided-the temple of Janus was about to be closed-and every man was to convert his sword into a plough-share.

To such a degree was this infatuation carried, that authentic information of the sailing of hostile armaments produced no effect to diminish it. We were gravely told, that it was quite in character for nations to assume an energetic and formidable attitude when they were negociating; that the expense to England of sending these armaments was inconsiderable; that they would be recalled as soon as a treaty was signed; and in fine that she was too magnanimous to take advantage of the existing state of things-withan endless variety of arguments and assertions, equally profound. convincing, and cogent.

There were infinite pains taken by the friends of England in this country to foster and extend this delusion. Their efforts were crowned with the most complete success. The nation fell into the snare with a degree of cullibility that afforded a practical commentary on our pretensions to illumination superior to the rest of the world.

These deceits were varied with an address and industry, worthy of a better cause. They assumed every shape from an humble six-penny paragraph, extracted from a London paper, to an important public document. Extracts of letters innumerable, from "eminent merchants" in London, Liverpool, and Glasgow, to merchants of equal eminence in Boston, New-York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, were published with most confident assurances of the immediate appointment of commissioners, to negociate with curs, on terms comporting with the magnanimity of England, and perfectly honourable to the United States. Letters were said likewise to have been received from Mr. Gallatin, full of assurances of peace, which Great Britain would grant on terms more favourable than when she was pressed by the power of Bonaparte. All these tales, how wild or extravagant soever, were greedily caught at and believed by our citizens, as they flattered and coincided with their ardent desire for peace. So justly sings the poet

"What we wish to be true, we are fond to believe."

Several times we were deluded with information that Admiral Cochrane had received despatches announcing an approaching armistice, and his consequent recall from the American station. In a word, no pains were spared to lead us into a most profound sleep; and the opiates operated most powerfully.

During all this deceitful calm, through which every man of discernment might readily and unerringly foresee the approaches of fearful storm-as every indication from England, deserving of credit, portended a long, a desperate, and a vindictive warfare; the government of the United States took no measures to dispel the delusion. In vain the public looked to Washington for information on the prospect of affairs. All was there profoundly silent. Government must have had all the information on the subject that was in this country: and it was their incumbent duty to have disseminated abroad the result of their intelligence, that the public might regulate their proceedings, and predicate their measures on rational and prudential calculations. But this imperious duty was, I venture to assert, utterly neglected. There was not a line of official communication on the subject. And

nothing appeared in the National Intelligencer, that strongly marked either a probability of peace, or of a continuance of the war. As far, however, as conclusions could be drawn, from that semi-official paper, they warranted much more the hope of a restoration of peace, than fear of the contrary.

This conduct, on the part of the administration, was to the last degree culpable. It was a dereliction of duty that exposed our citizens to ruinous consequences. The Philadelphians were among the most deluded portion of the people of the United States. There were no preparations made for defence except the embodying a number of volunteer corps, very inefficient indeed to protect us. As I shudder to think what might have been the consequences, had the enemy assailed us while we were thus napping in a state of stupid and most irrational security.

The crash of the conflagration at Washington, awaked us out of our slumbers, and dispelled the delusion-We were then aroused to a full sense of our dangerous situation, and of the folly and supineness that had caused it. We went manfully to workand in a few weeks made such preparations as renewed public confidence, and promised fair to enable us to repel the enemy, should he make his appearance,

General Wilkinson and General Hampton. Proceedings of Congress. Lamentable torpor, delay, and indecision. Neglect of public opinion.

In military affairs, when combined operations are undertaken,

it is indispensably necessary, in order to insure success, that a good understanding should prevail between the commanders who are to co-operate. A want of due attention to this obvious dictate of prudence and common sense, has caused the failure, among various nations, of expeditions of the utmost importance. It is one of those plain rules, which can hardly escape the discernment of a man of even mediocre capacity.

Nevertheless, the northern campaign of 1813, was intrusted to Gen. Wilkinson, and Gen. Hampton, between whom existed a high degree of hostility, which was sufficiently well known, to have pointed out the absurdity of the proce dure. The issue of the campaign was disastrous. And it is