between the parties to it, and it has often been held that the Legislature cannot make a contract between two or more persons, which they do not choose to make. Hence, I should say that this statute is unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution, because it infringes the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts, since the State, by the charter which it granted to the corporation, contracts to give it the same rights which are given natural persons in carrying on the same business for which the corporation is chartered to carry on. . One might argue against this that the Legislature, although it has not the power to make contracts for the corporation, might impose duties which can be enforced as if they arose from contract. Even though we may concede this to be true, it cannot be denied but that these duties must be imposed by the Legislature itself, and not by a third person; which, by this statute, would be any other rail road within the State. It is one of the first principles of constitutional law that a Legislature cannot delegate its authority to any other body or to any person. This body, in whom has been entrusted the power of judgment and discretion, cannot relieve itself of the responsibility of this power by choosing other agencies to execute its power; nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom and discretion of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. RECAPITULATION. To conclude, it may be said that unless the Constitution of the United States or of the State ex pressly prohibits the passage of regulative laws, general in character, as applicable to these railroad corporations, the power is necessarily vested in the Legislatures of the several States. All contract rights are subject to State regulation, as are property rights, and although a railroad corporation has a charter not subject to amendment or repeal by the Legislature, it takes it, nevertheless, subject to such changes as may be made in the general laws and Constitution, unless as to the subject-matter involved, the charter constitutes a contract exempting the corporation from the operation of such legislation. The company, in conducting its business under the charter, must conform to such rules and regulations as the State may establish for the safety and protection of those being carried by or having transactions with it. These regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety or welfare of society, and they must not injure the property rights of the corporation, lawfully obtained from or while acting under the charter. The most essential of 1 Cooley's Const. Lim. 137. When France in wrath her giant limbs upreared, And with an oath that shook earth, sky, and sea, Stamped her strong foot and said, "I will be free." But the lurid star of Erle's nativity exercised no malign influence over his life or nature. His life was gentle, and the elements in him most happily and graciously mixed. All the red star of revolution did was to make Erle a mild but consistent liberal, a liberal who sat through one session of parliament silent like Gibbon, and voted steadily with his party. Gibbon used to explain his silence as a senator by saying that "the bad speakers in the house filled him with terror, the good ones with despair." Perhaps Erle had the same feeling. He was not gifted with eloquence - indeed, he had a slight impediment in his speech - nor did he, though a distinguished scholar at Winchester and New College, show any particular brilliancy when he first joined the Western Circuit. He attended, it is said, several assizes and sessions without picking up a stray brief. But he had what was better than brilliancy, thoroughness. He was painstaking, he was tenacious, never declamatory, but strikingly argumentative, plain and homely in his style, thinking, like old Fuller, that "the plainest words are the profitablest oratory in weightiest matters." Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control, These three alone lead life to sovereign power And these Erle had. He conquered the impediment in his speech by a self-imposed habit of distinct enunciation, and the only trace of the defect remaining in after life was a certain deliberateness of delivery, a 'measured emphasis of utterance." He schooled his temper, too, as well as his tongue. Pray, Mr. Kenyon, keep your temper," said Lord Mansfield. Your Lordship," said Mr. Cowper, who sat by, "had better recommend Mr. Kenyon to part with it altogether." Erle parted with his. It is no secret that naturally his feelings were strong, but he for a long course of years kept them under stern restraint, and so effectually that no one can remember any outbreak. He rightly considered that nothing could be more unforensic or more unjudicial than ill-temper. The result of all was that he became a very acute and able advocate; indeed, the late Lord Chief Justice once stated that, in his opinion, the finest advocate of his time was Sir William Erle. Serjeant Davy used to say that the more he went the Western Circuit the more he understood how the wise men came from the East, but in Erle's time this jibe would have fallen flat, for Follett and Crowder and Wilde were among the leaders of the circuit, and among these, able and brilliant as they were, Erle gradually came to the front, though his rise was anything but meteoric. and his dealing with it illustrated what I have said He had a quiet sense of humor, and much rel- "The He was sixteen years before he obtained a silk gown from Lord Brougham, and it was ten years more before he was appointed a judge of the Common Pleas. It is significant how entirely he owed his advancement to his professional merits, and not to his political pretensions, that he received his ap-curred in court which must have been not a little pointment from a Tory Chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst. It was one of those excellent appointments which Campbell jestingly told Lord Lyndhurst at a dinner at Mr. Justice Patterson's would "cover the multitude of his sins." conducive to hilarity, but whether it was hilarity which the chief justice shared may be doubted. It was in a case tried at Bodmin, in 1855. There was a deaf juryman. He said nothing about his infirmity, and it was only when the judge had finished his summing up that it was discovered that the juryman had not heard a word of the recapitulation of the evidence. The result was that Erle had to repeat the whole of his summing up for the benefit of the exasperating juryman. Needless to say he was then discharged. Apropos of juries, some of his opinions given before a parliamentary committee on our jury system are worth noting. Imprimis, he thought that jurors ought to be paid by the day, on a scale which would at least pay their expenses, and afford some indemnity for loss of time. He also thought that nine or seven jurors should be sworn instead of twelve. Hear him on the "hardships" of jurymen: "When I have heard great complaints by jurors I have said: By the unanimous suffrage of the whole legal profession a better judge than Sir William Erle never sat on the bench - combining in the highest degree learning, diligence, patience, and courtesy. His impartiality and his single-eyed desire for justice inspired in the bar and in the public a confidence which many judges of more striking and original talents have failed to secure. A writer in one of the quarterlies described Erle, J., as the best of our judges on the common law bench "bating a little obstinacy." This so-called obstinacy was the one flaw in Erle's judicial characier; it generally is, of a strong judge like Erle-it goes along with masculine sense and decision. Such men are not given to nicely balancing opposite views like philosophers or casuists, nor was Chief Justice Erle. He was emi-If it is so repulsive to you I will discharge you at nently practical. He never delivered a judgment or charge in which he did not allude to practical experience or rest on practical views. Serjeant Ballantine says that he put too much faith in outside respectability, and was almost as weak as some juries in cases where injuries were alleged to have been inflicted upon women. If he did it was a failing which leaned to virtue's side. "I was counsel," says the serjeant, "in the last cause he tried, once, and tell the sheriff never to allow you to On 66 The chief justice was one of those who "do good by stealth and blush to find it fame." 'He was," says Ballantine, a man of great benevolence, and I have heard many anecdotes illustrative of his kindness of heart, and one example happened to come within my own knowledge. He was presiding in the civil court at Northampton, and was obliged to direct a jury against some poor people who had been scandalously but legally swindled. To them the result was absolute ruin. On the following morning an elderly gentleman on horseback made his appearance in the alley where the sufferers resided. This was Sir William Erle. He gave them some very good advice, and with it a sum of money that replaced them in their old position." not depend on the soundness of the roof over his profession. Our homage," he went on to say, "is head." due, and is paid not only to the dignity of the judge, but the worth of the man," his simplicity and elevation of character, his private and social virtues, his kindness and his courtesy. It was, indeed-to use the words of one who was present on the occasion—a touching scepe to see the hero of a hundred forensic pitched battles, the tried and tested athlete of the legal arena, the judge who had presided over so many a well-fought contest, who had so gently, yet so strictly, kept counsel, witnesses and public in order for twenty years; who had known so well how to maintain judicial dignity, yet who had ever been ready to enliven the tedium of protracted inquiries and long-drawn disputations with the sallies of a dry and quiet humor, now when he came to bid farewell to his colleagues and to those who had practised before him, as nervous and almost as overcome as if he were a junior holding a maiden brief before a court of quarter "When Sergeant Robinson adds his testimony: I applied," he says, "to the Chief Justice Erle to recommend me to the chancellor he wrote me a very kind letter, stating that his relations with the chancellor were so strained, that he had come to the resolution not to make any further applications to him of any kind. He said he was very sorry to refuse me, but he could not submit to the rebuffs he had received from Lord Westbury on more than one occasion. However, in less than a fortnight, I received from him another note saying that he had thought over my application, and did not think I ought to suffer on account of any private grievances of his own, and that he would, at all events, make an exception in my favor. Anyone acquainted with the chief justice would recognize this plea as thoroughly illustrative of his character. The recommendation was given, and I shortly afterwards obtained the coif." No finer tribute could be paid to any judge than that which was paid to the chief justice, on his retirement in 1866, by Sir John Rolt, the then attorney-general: "My Lord," he said, "we all feel and desire to acknowledge that under your presidency in this court the great judicial duty of reconciling, as far as may be, positive law with moral justice has been satisfied. The letter of the law which kills, and the mere discretion of the judge, which has been well said to be the law of the tyrant, have been alike kept in proper and due respect. Learning, great experience of affairs, wise administration, have been so combined that, with the assistance of the eminent judges associated with you on that bench, the laws of England have been exhibited in their true aspect as the exponents of the rights and duties of our citizens and the guardians of their liberties. The Court of Common Pleas, under your presidency, my lord, has obtained the highest confidence of the suitor, the public, and the sessions. Cincinnatus laid aside the fasces to till his farm. From and after his retirement, Sir William Erle passed his time chiefly in the country, following the life of a country gentleman, fond of his tenantry, his horses, his dogs and his cattle, and dispensing with a peculiar charm the hospitalities and charities of a Hampshire squire, at Bramshott, near Lip"Senesco non segnesco" hook and Haslemere. was his motto, and, like Dyer, he would say: Seek her on the marble floor. In vain you search, she is not there. On the meads and mountain heads. He sometimes, however, attended the sittings of the Privy Council. Westbury, says Serjeant Robinson, once remarked to Chief Justice Erle, after the latter's retirement, "I wish, Erle, you would sometimes come into the Privy Council and relieve me from my onerous duties there, for we can't get on without three, and there is no one else I can apply to." Erle said he would willingly come, but he was getting a little deaf, and was afraid that might interfere with his power of doing full justice. "Not at all, my dear fellow," said Westbury. "Of my two usual colleagues, is as deaf as a post and hears nothing, is so stupid that he can understand nothing he hears, and yet we three together make an admirable court." "Human life," he says, in his admirable little treatise on Trade Unions, "is a progress between two sets of physical and moral agencies perpetually striving against each other; one on the side of falsehood, malice, and destruction; the other on the side of truth, kindness, and health; and the law, if wisely made and properly administered, maintains truth and kindness and health." Erle's own life was all on the side of truth, kindness and health. His decisions will be found reported in the later volumes of Adolphus and Ellis, in Ellis and Blackburn, Common Bench Reports, Cox Criminal Reports and Law Reports Common Pleas, vols. 1 and 2. | It is very old law that adultery does not bar a wife's right to dower. Needham v. Bremner (14 L. T. Rep. 437; L. Rep. 1 C. P. 583) is based on the same principle. It decides that a verdict finding a wife guilty of adultry does not constitute a defense to an action against the husband for necessaries supplied to the wife. It does not, like a decree for dissolution, alter the status of the parties. The woman still continues the wife of the defendant. The verdict is binding as between the parties to the suit, but not as against other parties who came to litigate the same question. Our law has always rigorously enforced the safety of the King's highway to his liege subjects. Hadley v. Taylor (13 | L. T. Rep. 368; L. Rep. 1 C. P. 53) decides that occupiers of premises, warehousemen for instance, who leave a hoist hole unfenced, say a cellar flap, within a foot of the highway, are liable if a man fall down it. A hole in such close proximity to the highway is a public nuisance, because, though you cannot recover if you wander into danger from the highway, you ought to be able to step a foot off the highway without danger. The ravages of rats at sea have much exercised the minds of our judges. Kay v. Wheeler (16 L. T. Rep. 66; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 302) is one of the earlier cases, and it decided that the shipowner is liable for injury done by these "busy mischievous vermin" letting in sea water to the goods, though shipped under a bill of lading containing exceptions of "the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all other dangers and accidents of the sea, rivers, and navigation, of what kind and nature soever.” Innkeepers are rather hardly pressed by the com mon law of England, but there is such a thing as contributory negligence on the part of the guest which will exonerate the innkeeper from liability. Armstead v. Wilde (17 Ad. & Ell. 261) is an instance. There a traveler for a firm ostentatiously showed a large sum of money in the presence of several persons, and then openly put it in an illsecured box, which he left in the travellers' room, and the innkeeper was held not responsible for a loss. It is not even necessary, semble, that the negligence should be gross. Ex parte Death (18 Ad. & El. 647) decided an important point of University discipline, viz., that the governing body of a university may lawfully issue a decree that every tradesman with whom a person in statu pupillari within the university contracts a debt of £5 shall make the same known to the tutor of such person's college on pain of being discommuned if he omits doing so; and in case of disobedience they may enforce such decree by ordering that no person in statu pupillari shall deal with the tradesman for a given period. The law would indeed have been deplorably meddlesome if it had interfered with this wholesome provision against undergraduate extravagance in Cambridge. Only why does not Oxford follow her sister university's example? Other decisions of Erle's are: That the servant of a horsedealer has an implied authority to bind his master by a warranty (Howard v. Sheward, 15 L. T. Rep. 183); that a landlord cannot break open the outer door of a stable, though not within the curtilage, to levy an ordinary distress for rent (Brown v. Glenn, 16 Ad. & Ell. 254); that the solicitor of a vendor receiving the deposit on a sale is not a stakeholder (Edgell v. Day, 13 L. T. Rep. 328; L. Rep. 1 C. P. 80; cf. Ellis v. Gaulton, 68 L. T. Rep. 144; (1893) 1 Q. B. 853); that it is not competent to a company incorporated in the usual way for the formation and working of a railway to draw, accept, or indorse bills of exchange (Bateman v. Mid Wales Railway Company, L. Rep. 1 C. P. 499); that a pew in a parish church does not entitle the owner to a county vote as a 40s. freeholder (Hinde v. Chorleton, 15 L. T. Rep. 472; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 104); and that a ballot divertissement is not an "entertainment of the stage " (Wigan v. Strange, 13 L. T. Rep. 371). The notorious Jackson case stirred society to its depths. It was stigmatized as subversive of marriage and domestic life, and the press poured forth "cataracts of nonsense," but in truth all that the Jackson case laid down had already been laid down long before in Reg. v. Legget (18 Ad. & Ell. 781), one of Erle decisions, viz., that where a wife is, by her own desire, living apart from her husband, and is under no restraint, the court will not grant a habeas corpus on the application of the husband for ADMIRALTY-MARITIME SERVICE-WATCHMAN.— The service rendered by a watchman, employed to care for and clean the machinery and maintain a general care and supervision of a vessel lying at her home port, out of commission, and with no voyage in contemplation, is not maritime. (Williams v. The Sirius [U. S. D. C., Cal.], 65' Fed. Rep. 226.) CARRIERS-INJURIES TO GOODS AFTER REACHING DESTINATION.—Where the seller contracts to deliver goods "f. o. b." at the place to which they are to be shipped, and pays the freight to such place, on the arrival of the boat by which the goods are transported at such place the carrier ceases to be the agent of the seller, and becomes the agent of the purchaser, and the seller cannot maintain an action against the carrier for injuries to the goods after such arrival, and before they were unloaded. (Capehart v. Furman Farm Imp. Co. [Ala.], 16 South. Rep. 627.) CONTRACT-ACTION-THIRD PERSONS.-Where a contract for sale of land recites that part of the price "is going to " one not a party to the contract, and for whose benefit the contract is not entered into, he has no right to sue for a breach of such contract. (Crandall v. Payne [Ill.], 39 N. E. Rep. 601.) CONTRACT WITH PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION.— The fact that, upon the dissolution of a partnership, one member assigns to the other his interest in a partnership contract, does not release the other party to the contract from the performance thereof. (Campbellsville Lumber Co. v. Bradlee [Ky.], 29 S. W. Rep. 313.) CORPORATION-TREASURER OF CORPORATION. The treasurer of a manufacturing corporation has no implied authority to bind a company as an accommodation indorser. (Usher v. Raymond Skate Co. [Mass.], 39 N. E. Rep. 416.) CUSTOM-EFFECT ON CONTRACT.-A guarantor of the payment of freight bills which may become due to a railroad company from a certain shipper is not relieved from any part of his liability because the company failed to enforce against such shipper its custom of collecting its bills weekly. (Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Snowden [Penn. ], 30 Atl. Rep. 1129.) DEED-RESERVATION-RIGHT OF WAY. -A deed of land which reserves to the grantor a right of way over part of the land described, conveys to the grantee the fee to the whole of the land, including that part over which the right of way is reserved, subject to the use of such part for the purpose for which it was reserved. (Moffitt v. Lytle [Penn.], 30 Atl. Rep. 922.) EASEMENT-CONVEYANCE OF DWELLING.----A water pipe leading from a driven well in a yard to a sink in the kitchen of a dwelling, there ending in a pump, by which water can be and is habitually drawn from the well to the kitchen for domestic purposes, the well and the water pipe being completely hidden from view, form an apparent and continuous easement, which will pass with a conveyance of the dwelling alone by the owner of both yard and house, the owner retaining the yard. (Larsen v. Peterson [N. J.], 30 Atl. Rep. 1095.) EVIDENCE- -DECLARATIONS AS TO OWNERSHIP.Declarations of a deceased person, claiming ownership of specific property, are not competent evidence in favor of his administrators, or others claiming title under him, whether such declarations of ownership were made before or after the title of the adverse claimant commenced. (Crothers' Adm'rs v. Crothers [W. Va.], 20 S. E. Rep. 927.) FIXTURES-BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.-An innocent purchaser of a building in which machinery had been placed so as to become a part of the realty, is not affected by an agreement between his vendor and the seller of the machinery, by the terms of which the latter was to retain the title to the machinery until it was paid for. (Wentworth v. S. A. Woods Machine Co. [Mass.], 39 N. E. Rep. 414.) GARNISHMENT MONEY DEPOSITED.-A treasurer of a school district deposited in a bank a draft and enough cash to make the amount he owed the district, stating he left it for the treasurer of the school district, his successor. The draft was in part the proceeds of stock of a third person, re |