to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.

[Section 1 of article I of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]

A law affecting any rights of an individual can only be questioned as to constitutionality by the individual affected. (Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 578; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345.) "Law of the land does not mean the act of legislature which deprives the citizen of his rights, privileges or property. (Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 393, et seq., which is a leading case as to the meaning of "law of the land," and "due process of law." See also, Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474; People v. Toynbee, 20 id. 168, 198; Green v. Shumway, 39 N. Y. 426; Bowe v. U. S. Reflector Co., 36 Hun, 410.)

Statute providing for courts-martial not in conflict with this section. (People, ex rel. v. Daniell, 50 N. Y. 274, 280.)

The provisions of this section do not take away the legislature's power of taxation. (Town of Guilford v. Supervisors, 13 N. Y. 143; People v. Supervisors of Ulster Co., 36 Hun, 491, 496)

Section 383 of the Penal Code prohibiting the exclusion of colored persons from places of amusement not in conflict with this section. (People v. King, 42 Hun, 186; affd., 110 N. Y. 418.)

The sovereign power may regulate the use of one's property with reference to the public welfare. (Id.)

The right to liberty secured to the citizen by constitutional prohibitions includes the right to adopt and follow such lawful individual pursuits, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit. Principle applied to statute prohibiting manufacture of oleomargarine, etc. (People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377.)

Section 292 of the Penal Code prohibiting emplayment or exhibition of child under fourteen years as a dancer, is

not contrary to this section. (People v. Ewes, 47 St. Rep. 501; S. C., 141 N. Y. 129; as to § 713 of Penal Code, see People, ex rel. Zeese v. Maston, 79 Hun, 580.)

The provision permitting the formation of a state commission from one political party is not in violation of the constitution. (Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173, 181.)

Rights of citizens are not abridged by law providing for eight hours labor as in Laws 1891, chapter 105, title 24, section 504. (People v. Warren, 77 Hun, 120.)

As to constitutionality of section 873 of Code of Civil Procedure providing for examination of person of plaintiff in personal injury cases. (Lyon v. Man. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 298.)

Ticket brokerage act, held unconstitutional as violative of the constitutional guarantees of civil rights and privileges and of liberty. (People, ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden, 157 N. Y. 116.) (1898.)

Trial by jury.- § 2. The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law.

[Section 2 of article I of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]

The expression "in all cases in which it has been heretofore used" is generic. It does not limit the right to the mere instances in which it has been used, but extends it to such new and like cases as might afterward arise. (Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 426.) The word "heretofore" in this clause means before 1846, and cannot be carried back to 1777 and confined to cases which at that early period were triable by a jury. (Id. 427. See also Riggs Such jury must be a jury

V. Shannon, 27 Abb. N. C. 456.)

of twelve men. Y. 406.).

(Id. 427; People ex rel. v. Justices, 74 N.

Act creating special session for trial of petit larceny without a jury is constitutional. (Murphy v. People, 2

Cow. 815.)

Constitutional provision does not apply to the petty offenses triable before a court of special sessions. (People ex rel. v. Justices, 74 N. Y. 406.)

Right to trial by jury has no reference to proceedings intended merely to prevent the commission of offenses. (Duffy v. People, 1 Hill, 355; S. C., 6 id. 75.)

Nor does it apply to special proceedings for removal of tenants. (Roberts v. Cone, 3 Alb. L. J. 151.) Nor to a proceeding for determining whether a license should not be revoked for violation of law. (People ex rel. v. Commissioners of Police of Brooklyn, 59 N. Y. 92.) Nor to imprisoning for non-payment of costs. (Standacher V. Webb, 16 Hun, 42.) Nor to a summary proceeding for judgment on a recognizance. (People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83.)

Legislature cannot take the right away by classing among disorderly persons those who are entitled to a jury trial. (People ex rel. v. Baird, 4 Weekly Dig. 576.)

Act of legislature not unconstitutional because it allows title to land to be tried in an action of partition; party desiring jury trial may have it by issues sent to circuit for trial. (Ward v. Ward, 23 Hun, 431.)

The provision of the constitution relative to trial by jury relates to the trial of issues of fact, in civil and criminal proceedings, and has no relation to assessments for damages for property taken for a public purpose. (Livingston v. Mayor of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Matter of Newell Smith, 10 id. 449; People, ex rel. Herrick v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Astor v. Mayor, 62 id. 580.)

The trial by jury is preserved by the constitution in all cases in which it had been used prior to its adoption. But in controversies cognizable in courts of equity a jury trial was never, in general, resorted to. (Matter of the Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 199, 210; Sands v. Kimbark, 27, id, 147; Hudson v. Caryl, 44 id. 553, 555.)

The lien law of 1862, relating to liens upon vessels, is not unconstitutional as infringing upon the right of trial by jury. (Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52.) As to constitutionality of mechanics' lien law, see Schillinger Fire Proof Cement Co. v. Arnott, 14 N. Y. Supp. 326.

In an action to abate a nuisance, a jury trial is a matter or right. (Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553.)

The circumstance of the question involved being one of facts does not of itself give a right to a trial by jury. (McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y. 300.) If request for jury be not founded on tenable ground, even if right existed, the court would not err in refusing request. (Id.)

Waiver of trial by jury may be adjudged upon any evidence which would be sufficient to constitute a waiver of rights in other cases. (Baird v. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 382; Powell v. Waldron, 89 id. 328; Hund v. Kennedy, 83 id. 149.)

Act providing summary trial and punishment of public intoxication by magistrate is not repugnant to this section. (People v. Burleigh, 1 Crim. R. 522.)

In an equitable action a trial by jury is not a matter of right; it rests in the discretion of the court. (Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 8 Hun, 21; Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Co., 76 N. Y. 365.)

Defendant cannot be deprived of constitutional right to trial by jury because plaintiff demands equitable relief. (Libman v. Manhattan El. R. R. Co., 26 Abb. N. C. 423; S. C., 59 Hun, 428.)

For recent decisions as to the right of trial by jury, see Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188 (1897); Buttling v. Hatton, 18 App. Div. 128 (1897); Schillinger v. Arnott, 152 N. Y. 584 (1897.)

An act which merely regulates the mode of securing a common-law jury is not violative of the right of trial by jury. (People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528.) (1898.)

Act of 1896, chap. 378, providing for a special jury in criminal cases upheld. (People v. Dunn, 57 N. Y. 528.) (1898.)

Freedom of worship; religious liberty.- § 3. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of consience hereby 1 secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.

[Section 3 of article I of the constitution of 1846, without change.]

This section does not shield a witness from cross-examination as to his religious belief. (Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265.)

A statute which prevents theatrical entertainments on Sunday is valid. (Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548; Neundorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557; People v. Hoynn, 20 How. Pr. 76.)

Habeas corpus.- § 4. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension.

[Section 4 of article I of the amended constitution of 1846, without change.]

The legislature cannot commit a person for contempt and then forbid all inquiry into the rightful exercise of that power, for this would take away the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus. (People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 32 Hun, 563; S. C., 99 N. Y. 463.)