3. Election of city officers, when to be held; extension and abridgment of terms. ARTICLE XIII. 1. Oath of office. 2. Official bribery and corruption. 3. Offer or promise to bribe: 4. Person bribed or offering a bribe may be a witness. 5. Free passes, franking privileges, etc., not to be received by a public officer; penalty. 6. Removal of district attorney for failure to prosecute; expenses of prosecutions for bribery. ARTICLE XIV. 1. Amendments to constitution, how proposed, upon and ratified. voted 2. Future constitutional conventions; how called; election of delegates; compensation; quorum, submission of amendments; officers; rules; vacancies; taking effect. 3. Amendments of convention and legislature submitted coincidentally. ARTICLE XV. 1. Time of taking effect. Preamble. We, the people of the State of New York, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessing, do establish this Constitution. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. A constitution is an instrument of government made and adopted by the people for practical purposes connected with the common business and wants of human life. (People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 485; McKoan v. Deveries, 3 Barb. 196.) The meaning of the words in a constitutional provision is to be reached in two ways: first, by ascertaining what the framers desired to guard against by the provision; and, second, by ascertaining the meaning of the words when applied to a statute by writers and courts. (People v. Supervisors of Chautauqua, 43 N. Y. 10, 14.) A constitution should be so construed as best to promote the great objects for which it was made; avoiding the two extremes of a liberal or strict construction. (North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 750.) In construing a constitutional provision, its history and the conditions and circumstances attending its adoption must be considered. (Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316.) The rule of statutory interference with vested rights has but little, if any, application to the construction of the constitution. (Matter of Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9.) The same rules of construction which are applicable to statutes govern in constitutional interpretation. (Matter of New York District Railway, 42 Hun, 621; affd., 107 N. Y. 42.) In construing the language of a constitution the courts have nothing to do with the arguments ab inconvenienti. (People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 109.) A constitutional provision should not be so construed as to work a public mischief, unless its language is such that no other course is open to the court. (People, ex rel. v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285, citing Smith v. People, 47 id. 330; People, ex rel. v. Potter, id. 375; People, ex rel. v. Angle, 109 id. 564.) The terms of a written constitution if plain, clear and unambiguous, conveying a distinct meaning, will not be extended by implication. (Settle v. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y. 280.) In giving construction to a constitutional provision the whole provision is to be considered, and the real intent should prevail over the strict letter, but that intent must be gathered from the language, unless this would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction or obsurdity. (Adams v. East River Savings Inst., 136 N. Y. 52; aff'g 47 State Ren. 175.) Constitutions should be so construed as to give effect to every part thereof and leave each part some office to perform; to deprive any part of effect and meaning when it is susceptible of a different interpretation is unauthorized. (People, ex rel. v. Angle, 109 N. Y. 564; Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 72.) In construing a constitutional provision the intent of the enactment must prevail over the letter thereof. (People, ex rel. v. Lorillard, 135 N. Y. 285; People, ex rel. v. Potter, 47 id. 375.) Greater care and caution should be used in adding words to or striking them from the constitution than if the provisions were contained in a statute. (People ex rel. v. Wemple, 125 N. Y. 485.) The constant and uniform construction of a constitutional provision by every department of the state government will have great, if not controlling weight, upon its interpretatlon, and almost the force of a judicial exposition. (People v. Home Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 328, 337; People, ex rel. v. Williams, 55 id. 367; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 id. 235.) It must be assumed that the legislature and all other public bodies intrusted with the functions of government will use the power conferred by the constitution or the law fairly and in the public interests. (Clark v. State, 142 N. Y. 101.) Statutes are presumed constitutional, only declare them void in a clear case. dard, 52 Barb. 533; People, ex rel. v. 569; Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 id. v. Rice, 135 id. 484.) and a court will (Roosevelt v. GodDurston, 119 N. Y. 316; People, ex rel. A statute evading the terms, or the necessary implied purposes of a constitution is as clearly void as if forbidden in express terms. (People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50.) A statute cannot be declared unconstitutional or defective where it may be completely executed. (People, ex rel. v. City of Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525.) The constitutionality of a statute is to be tested not by what has been done under it, but by what may by its authority be done. (Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Matter of South Market Street, 67 Hun, 594.) Actual and material injury must exist to warrant a court in declaring a statute unconstitutional. (People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390.) The question of constitutionality should be determined by the language and general scope of the statute, and not by independent inquiries as to facts outside of the provisions of the statute itself. (Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345.) And if it cannot be made to appear by argument deduced from the language of the law itself or from matters of which the court can take, judicial notice that the act is unconstitutional, it must stand. (People, ex rel. v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569.) A court should not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless necessary to a decision in a cause. (Frees v. Ford, 6 N. Y. 176; People v. Crissey, 91 id. 616; People v. Brooklyn, 89 id. 75.) Nor should a court declare a statute unconstitutional un-, less required by the most cogent reasons, or compelled by unanswerable grounds. (People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 13.) The language of the statute must comply with the constitution in substance and form. (People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404.) The general rule is that where a part of a statute is in conflict with the constitution, and that part is entirely separable from the residue, so that the other portion of it can be enforced without any reference to the former, the unconstitutional part only will be condemned. (Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 441; Matter of De Vaucne, 31 How. Pr. 289.) Before a statute can be declared unconstitutional, it must be shown to be in direct conflict with the constitution. (Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 331; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232.) The courts should not imply a conflict between a statute and the constitution. (Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 383; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 109.) When a statute and the constitution can be so construed as to enable both to stand, it is the duty of the court to give them that construction. (Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316; People, ex rel. v. Terry, 108 id. 1.) Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. (Fort v. Cummings, 90 Hun, 481.) (1895.) A statute must be viewed with reference to what could be done under it, and not what actually was done. (Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396.) (1895.) The constitutionality of an act is not to be determined by what has been done under it in any particular instance, but what may be done under it by virtue of its authority. (Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188.) (1897.) Where a portion of a statute may be carried into effect without the aid of the remainder, it may be upheld, although the remainder is unconstitutional. (Matter of Oneida Street, 37 App. Div. 266.) (1899.) The rule of construction that a law is not retroactive, unless clearly expressed or intended by the enacting power, applies to constitutional provisions. (O'Reilly v. Utah, Nevada, etc., Stage Co., 87 Hun, 406.) (1895.) The proceedings of the convention in which the constitution was framed may be examined in considering the purpose of a given article or section. (Goedel v. Palmer, 15 App. Div. 86.) (1897.) Where in a new constitution, an article relating to the same subject-matter embraced in a provision of the former constitution which has received judicial construction, is phrased in different language or qualified, it is presumed that the effect of the construction placed upon the former provision is intended to be avoided. (Matter of Smith, 90 Hun, 568.) (1895.) ARTICLE I. Persons not to be disfranchised. Section 1. No member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights and privileges secured |