OUR COAST DEFENSES.

BY HON. Jos. R. HAWLEY, U. S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT.

THE United States is a nation of more than 60,000,000 of people, worth more than $40,000,000,000, and is defenseless against the weakest of the civilized powers of the earth. No enemy would ever undertake to invade our territory. We have a little regular army of 25,000 men, of whom perhaps 15,000 could be spared to be collected in case of emergency. We have between 150,000 and 200,000 of organized militia or National Guard, who could be immediately assembled, tolerably well equipped and disciplined, and we have a reserve of small arms on hand to arm a few hundred thousand more. It is true that we have only twenty-five or thirty steel breechloading, rifled field-pieces fit for a modern light battery, and a few obsolete light guns, but doubtless we could give a good account of ourselves in a short time against an enemy on land. Nobody, I say, will invade us with land forces.

While we remain in our present condition the Congress of the United States will never declare war for any imaginable outrage. Against such we are compelled to negotiate and procrastinate. But it is possible to suppose that demands may be made upon us with uplifted hand which from very shame we should be obliged to deny. In what condition should we find ourselves?

To quote from Captain Griffin's excellent pamphlet: "A complete system of sea-coast defenses consists of three lines. The outer line is composed of war-ships; the second or skir mish line, of torpedo-boats; and the third or inner line, of land fortifications and channel obstructions, the latter usually fixed electrical torpedoes. Besides these there should be a reserve of war-ships, torpedo boats and launches, gunboats, floating batteries, etc."

And first, as to the outer line. The total of our navy is 98

182

vessels. Of these there are 12 tugs at navy yards, 12 old sailing vessels used as receiving and school-ships, and 6, classed unserviceable, used as receiving ships, or condemned and waiting to be sold. This reduces the number to 68. Seven are classed

as fourth-rate. Two of these are weak old propellers; one is the barkentine we are allowed by treaty to keep in the northern lakes; one is a dispatch-boat; one is the ram Alarm; one, a small four-gun cruiser building at Baltimore; and one, the experimental dynamite-gun vessel.

Among the 43 third-rates are 5 old double-turret monitors that have been "awaiting completion" since the war; 13 are single-turret monitors with only four inches of plating, each carrying two old smooth-bore guns; and 25 unarmored vessels, ranging from 900 to 1700 tons. Two have iron hulls, four steel, and the rest are wooden. The best are four steel vessels, three of which are building. They are cruisers and commercedestroyers, and could not fight modern forts or armored vessels.

Of second-rates there are 13. Five of these are steel, one of which is to be a battle-ship of 6300 tons, and three of which are protected or partially protected cruisers. Three of these five are still in the builder's hands. The others are also wooden ships of honorable record-the Hartford, Richmond, etc. The Trenton is the best-3900 tons and ten guns. The modern 8-inch steel gun would send a shot through two such vessels from stem to stern.

Of the first-rates there are five steel vessels,—or will be, as four of them are protected cruisers still in the contractor's hands.

The vessels worth counting are those of the first, second, and third rates-61 in all. Ten are building. Eighteen are monitors, twelve of which are not worth fitting up, even for harbor defense. The remaining 33 are chiefly innocent old wooden propellers, armed with smooth-bores and a few Parrott rifles of the class that kill more friends than enemies. Only four of them are modern steel vessels, and they are of the lighter order. Of those building, but one aims to be a battleship, and she will rank far below the first-rates of other nations.

The navy has the start of the land forces in reconstruction under modern ideas. Sixteen or seventeen vessels have been ordered by Congress since August 4, 1882, four of which have been finished, but only one is to be heavily armored. Nevertheless, as the acts ordering ships likewise ordered armor and guns, the latter, when massed, made a quantity sufficient (considering also the confident hope of further building) to justify a steel company in making the necessary costly plant and contracting for our first American heavy forging for armor and guns. Previously 34 forged-steel built-up guns, ranging from 5-inch caliber to 10-inch, were nearly finished, the tubes of the heaviest having been purchased in England. These were for the Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and Dolphin. For the ships since authorized contracts have been made for 108 similar guns, of which 24 are of 10-inch caliber and 2 of 12-inch. Two or three years at least must elapse before the latter can be finished. And at the rate at which we have been progressing for the last six years, it is not safe to prophesy when the United States would be ready to cope with even the third-rate navies of other nations.

Excepting the four new cruisers, how are our ships armed? The following is a correct table of the serviceable heavy guns of the navy, afloat and on shore:

Dahlgren muzzle-loading rifles, converted from 11 inch to 8 inch...

50

-1,040

There is not a gun in this list that any other naval power would think of putting on shipboard. The Parrott rifles were a temporary resort. They are dangerous, and should be sold as old metal. Some of the smooth-bores in their day and time, before 1860, put our then first-class ships among the best armed in the world. They, too, would be condemned to the waste-heap when compared with modern ordnance.

To these must be added 10, 8, 6, and 5 inch breech-loading, built-up, forged-steel rifles of the latest type (already referred to) for the monitors and new cruisers, as follows:

The duty of the navy would be to watch for the enemy at sea, fight him there if possible, give notice of his position and probable intentions, and, in cases of necessity, to concentrate between him and our seaports.

What of this can our existing navy do? We have no ships that can overtake any known enemy; none that could fight him if it did catch him; none that could escape him in a race for home; and no harbor defenses that could protect our ship when it got home.

Technically, the second line of defense should be torpedoboats. We have just bought the little yacht Stiletto to make a beginning with, and are contracting for another!

As an essential part of the third or inner line of land fortifications and channel obstructions, fixed electrical torpedoes are usually adopted. We have on hand a considerable number

of "cases" (hollow wrought-iron globes), but we have no electrical apparatus, no long lines of cable, no protected shelters or torpedo galleries along the shores of our harbors whence the groups of fixed torpedoes may be operated.

Of course we have no minor batteries established to cover the fields of the torpedoes or mines. All these things require time and money, quite contrary to the popular idea that torpedoes can be arranged in a few days.

We come now to the main inner line of coast-defense fortifications, our forts and other permanent works. Between 1816 and 1826 a general system of coast fortifications was adopted. Under it we built some granite and brick forts; some with walls eight feet thick, thinning to five feet around the embrasures, and good against guns of those days. The system was excellent, and for the numbers and wealth of the people they were costly. Not one of these fortifications, formerly a matter of just national pride, is anything more than a death-trap to-day when faced by the best modern weapons. Since 1875 not one penny has been appropriated for the construction of sea-coast defenses.

General Duane, Chief of Engineers, writes me under date of May 19. 1888, as follows:

"The construction, preservation, and repair of all the permanent works of the country, including collateral works, and the lands and buildings connected therewith, are in the charge of the Corps of Engineers. The Ordnance Department has the responsibility of the care and preservation of the armament only, such as the guns, carriages, and ammunition.

"The act of February 10, 1875, gave the last appropriation for the construction of fortifications. With the exhaustion of that appropriation all constructive work ceased.

"The acts of 1876, 1877, 1878, 1879, and 1880 appropriated each year for the protection, preservation, and repair of fortifications and other works of defense $100,000; the acts of 1881, 1882, 1883, and 1884 gave annually $175,000, and the act of 1885 $100,000. This last was the final appropriation, and was practically exhausted by the end of the fiscal year for which it was appropriated. The estimates of this office for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1887, 1888, and 1889 were $175,000 each.