BOOK IV. is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident CHAP. XVIII. If the Boundaries be not set Faith and no En or Ex travagancy can be contra dicted. What dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as 11. If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this thusiasm crying up of faith in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all in Religion the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above donne jamais que lorsque ce qu'il fait car ils ne peuvent pas se souvenir toujours des raisons de croire. (Nouveaux Essais.) 1 What can be shown to be absolutely unreasonable, or 'contrary to reason,' must be rejected by all who are endowed with reason, as the alternative to a universal doubt. See Stillingfleet's first Answer, pp. 45-47, and Toland's Christianity not Mysterious, passim. brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and BOOK IV. more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by 1. 1 It must be remembered, however, that 'reason,' in Locke's narrow meaning of inferential understanding, judging according to sense, is an inadequate test of possibility in things spiritual, which appeal to the entire constitution СНАР. XVIII. BOOK IV. CHAP. Love of Truth necessary. CHAPTER XIX. [1OF ENTHUSIASM.] [1. HE that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it 2. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it; nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning who does not profess himself a lover of truth: and there is not a rational creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise 1 This chapter was added in the fourth edition. 'What I shall add concerning Enthusiasm,' Locke writes to Molyneux (Oates, April 6, 1695), ‘I guess will very much agree with your thoughts, since yours jump so right with mine about the place where it is to come in; I having designed it for ch. xviii. lib. iv, as a false principle of reasoning, often made use of. But to give an historical account of the various ravings men have embraced for religion, would, I fear, be beside my purpose, and enough to make a huge volume.' The influence of enthusiasm in withdrawing men from the genuine pursuit of truth, by substituting sensuous emotion for genuine spiritual insight, is the subject suggested by this chapter. Truth,' says Bacon,' which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the lovemaking or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it-is the sovereign good of human nature.' (Essay I.) The love of truth was Locke's ruling passion. It finds expression in many parts of his books and correspondence, along with praise of that 'indifferency,' or freedom from bias, which he represents as its characteristic. He sees in the adoption of enthusiastic sentiment for the direction of our judgments, neglect of natural understanding, if not of supernatural reason, as their ultimate criterion; and want of that love of truth which seeks to see things as they really are, because they are what they are, to which this chapter recalls mere enthusiasts. But Locke's exaggerated regard for the empirical understanding of things leads him to disparage imagination, emotion, and reason in that highest meaning which implies philosophical faith-as factors in a human interpretation of the uni verse. СНАР. XIX. of. And yet, for all this, one may truly say, that there are BOOK IV. very few lovers of truth, for truth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth inquiry: and I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain receives not the truth in the love of it; loves not truth for truth's sake, but for some other bye-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth: it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me, that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not, that it is true: which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of selfevidence1, or by the force of demonstration2, the arguments that gain it assent are the vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other than such as they deliver it to our understandings. Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs 5 it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such: which, as it can receive no 3 1 Cf. chh. ii. § 1; xvii. § 14. 3 Cf. chh. xiv-xvii. 46 'to us'. character of probability, as dependent upon the spiritual development and experience of the persons whose 'assent' is given. suggests the relative 5 But we must not limit our available 'principles and proofs,' for determining judgment by 'evidence,' to those supplied by the empirical under- BOOK IV. evidence from our passions or interests1, so it should receive no tincture from them. СНАР. XIX. A For to dictate from 2. The assuming an authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant wardness concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. another's For how almost can it be otherwise, but that he should beliefs, be ready to impose on another's belief, who has already whence. imposed on his own? Who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him in dealing with others, whose understanding is not accustomed to them in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and usurps the prerogative that belongs to truth alone, which is to command assent by only its own authority, i. e. by and in proportion to that evidence which it carries with it. Force of Enthusiasm, in which reason is taken away. 3. Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third ground of assent2, which with some men has the same authority, and is as confidently relied on as either faith or reason; I mean enthusiasm: which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct 3. 16 our passions and interests'-especially our sensuous passions and selfish interests. 2 Locke's other two grounds of 'assent' are reason or inference and faith. 3 Reason, or inferential thought, and faith in a miraculous divine revelation are both to be tested by the objective evidence that evokes a response from the reason that is in us-practical as well as speculative. Faith, while it accepts all the scientific discoveries of the empirical understanding, moves on a higher plane, and interprets them all in harmony with the supremacy of spiritual law and moral purpose. Nothing in 'science,' the product of reason in its narrower meaning, can contradict philosophical or divine faith ; for a lower law cannot contradict a higher, although it may be explained by it. While reasoning and faith must be reasonable, Locke's 'enthusiasm,' determined by sensuous emotion, incited by fancy, supersedes proof and contradicts reason. Genuine faith is reasonable; this sort of enthusiasm is blind. But emotion and imagination are motive forces indispensable to the discoveries of science and the insight of faith, both which imply possession by an ideal. |