admit what they allege as a proof, or to assign a better. And BOOK IV. this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam1. СНАР. 21. III. Thirdly, A third way is to press a man with con- XVII. sequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. Thirdly, This is already known under the name of argumentum ad Argumenhominem2. tum ad hominem. The advances 22. IV. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any Fourthly, Argumen of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call tum ad argumentum ad judicium. This alone, of all the four, brings judicium. true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to know- Fourth ledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, alone because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that us in of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another knowledge and man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same judgment. with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arising from 1 We are not bound in reason to accept our adversary's conclusion as proved, because we cannot offer better proof of another conclusion. For the question may be one which transcends man's experience and intelligence, intermediate between mere sense and Omniscience. 'Malebranche having enumerated and showed the difficulties of the other ways whereby he thinks human understanding may be attempted to be explained, and how insufficient they are to give a satisfactory account of the ideas we have, treats this of "seeing all things in God" on that account as the true, because it is impossible to find a better. Which argument, so far being only argumentum ad ignorantiam, loses all its force as soon as we consider the weakness of our minds, and the narrowness of our capacities, and 2 This argument is legitimate when BOOK IV. the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error 1. 144 CHAP. XVII. Above, 23. By what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things, into those that contrary, are according to, above, and contrary to reason2. 1. According and to reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover by to Reason. examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation according and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles3. 3. Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. 1 The argumentum ad judicium suggests the reference to the limits and ultimate foundations of reason in man contained in the following section. 2 See Leibniz. The distinction of things according to above' and 'contrary to' reason is characteristic of that incomplete knowledge and experience, or merely finite intelligence of the universe, which all reasoning implies. It is inconsistent with Omniscience. As Locke elsewhere remarks, ‘I think we cannot say God reasons at all; for He has at once a view of all things. But reason [reasoning] is very far from such an intuition; it is a laborious and gradual progress in the knowledge of things, by comparing one idea with a second, and a second with a third, and that with a fourth, to find the relation between the first and last in this train; and in search for such intermediate ideas as may show us the relation we desire to know, which sometimes we find, and sometimes not. This way therefore of finding truth, so painful, uncertain, and limited, is proper only to men of finite understandings, but can by no means be supposed in God.' (Exam. of Malebranche, § 52.) 'Dieu seul,' says Leibniz, 'a l'avantage de n'avoir que des connaissances intuitives.' (Nouveaux Essais.) Thus 3 Il me semble que de la manière que cette définition est couchée, elle va trop loin d'un côte et pas assez loin de l'autre; et si nous la suivons, tout ce que nous ignorons et que nous ne sommes pas en pouvoir de connaître dans notre présent état serait au-dessus de la raison par exemple, qu'une telle étoile fixe est plus ou moins grande que le soleil; item que le Vésuve jettera du feu dans une telle année ce sont des faits dont la connaissance nous surpasse, non pas parce qu'ils sont au-dessus des sens, car nous pourrions fort bien juger de cela, si nous avions des organes plus parfaits, et plus d'information des circonstances. Il y a aussi des difficultés qui sont au-dessus de notre présente faculté, mais non pas au-dessus de toute la raison; par exemple, il n'y a point d'astronome ici-bas qui puisse calculer le détail d'une éclipse dans l'espace d'un Pater, et sans mettre la plume à la main, cependant il y a peut-être des génies à qui cela ne serait qu'un jeu.' (Nouveaux Essais.) And when it is suggested that 'above reason' may mean not only above our reason, conditioned by sensation and reflection but above reason in any finite intelligence, this, he argues, only shifts the difficulty. 1441 CHAP. XVII. the existence of one God is according to reason; the existence BOOK IV. of more than one God, contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. Above reason also may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signifying above probability 1, or above certainty 2: and in that large sense also, contrary to reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken. and Faith for Faith by Reason. 24. There is another use of the word reason, wherein it is Reason opposed to faith: which, though it be in itself a very improper not way of speaking, yet common use has so authorized it, that it opposite, would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only must bet I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however faith regulated be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it3. He that believes without having any reason* for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and places it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason 1 'above probability.' Probable propositions are those the truth or falsehood of which cannot be determined (by man) except by presumptions, founded on the analogies of experience, in ourselves or in others. 2 'above certainty,' i. e. propositions which, while men can determine them, as more or less probable, on relative grounds of probability, transcend the 'reason,' i.e. without seeing the CHAP. XVII. BOOK IV. directs him. He that doth otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability1. But since reason and faith are by some men opposed2, we will so consider them in the following chapter. All the certainty and evidence of knowledge depends at last, according to the Essay, on the light of rational intuition; and the rational measure of probability is conformity to the analogies of experience, in that wide sense which includes spiritual as well as sensuous experience, and the experience of others as well as our own. 2 Reason and blind submission to authority are opposed; but not reason (either discursive or intuitive) and faith reason, in a human consciousness, presupposes faith, which Omniscience alone can dispense with. CHAPTER XVIII. OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES. 1. IT has been above1 shown, I. That we are of necessity BOOK IV. ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want CHAP. ideas2. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, XVIII. where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge Necessary and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific their ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in boundmatters where we have neither knowledge3 of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon. 4 From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion. aries. what, as 2. I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make Faith and use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is Reason, matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how contradis they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer 1 Cf. chh. iii. xvii. §§ 9-11; also Locke's Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman. 2 all sorts,' i. e. intuitive, demonstrative or rational, and sensitive. 36 'knowledge' seems here to be taken widely, so as to include judg ments of probability, as well as the absolute certainties to which Locke's own definition limits 'knowledge.' ♦ Cf. Conduct of the Understanding, § 44. What Locke calls 'bottoming' is seeking for ultimate truths, a process in which he habitually stops short, through his aversion to forsake the concrete, or to draw off from individual substances. tinguished. |