141 CHAP. II. two languages. But in this men stand not usually to ex- BOOK III. amine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name. to the 5. Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk Secondly, barely of their own imagination1, but of things as really they Reality of are; therefore they often suppose the words to stand also Things. for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds. Words by Use com- excite Ideas of 6. Concerning words, also, it is further to be considered: First, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, readily and by that means the instruments whereby men municate their conceptions, and express to one another those their thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts; objects. there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us. 7. Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signi- Words are fication of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, without 1 Locke's 'simple ideas'-always assumed by him to be other than 'bare imaginations,' or subjective fancies. 2 Which Hobbes denies. It is manifest, he says, that words ' are not the signs of the things themselves; for that the sound of the word stone often used 144 CHAP. II. why. BOOK III. because by familiar use from our cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them Significa readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly1; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand therefore some, not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise. Their not the conse quence of connexion. 8. Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come tion to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily, that perfectly they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. arbitrary, But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect arbitrary imposition2, is evident, in that they a natural often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, 1 This is what Leibniz called 'symbolical,' in contrast to intuitive' thought; in which the verbal symbol is substituted for the sensuous image. Cf. Hume's Treatise, pt. i. sect. 7; Stewart's Elements, ch. iv. sect. 2, on the analogy of ordinary language, so substituted, to signs in Algebra. 2 Hence by analogy Bacon's naturae interpretatio; and Berkeley's metaphor of a 'language' of sense, in virtue of which nature is interpretable — the orderliness of its sequences being an expression of the supreme rational Will, which the terms of the sequence signify as words signify their meanings by the arbitrary appointment of men. CHAP. II. in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is BOOK III. true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else1. 1 'Let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes; yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So that it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom CHAPTER III. OF GENERAL TERMS. BOOK III. 1441 CHAP. III. The greatest 1. ALL things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too,-I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest Words are part of words that make all languages are general terms: general which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity. Part of terms. That every particular should 2. First, It is impossible that every particular thing should Thing have a distinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind Name for makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of itself is im- them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, have a possible. that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name1. 1 Locke, here and elsewhere, speaks of 'general terms' as needed only to save excessive multiplication of proper names. 'Now it is so far from being 141 CHAP. III. And Men would be it were 3. Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; BOOK III. because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that useless, if they may be understood: which is then only done when, possible. by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things; whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice 1. name for every thing, not 4. Thirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I A distinct think is not,) yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of know- particular ledge: which, though founded in particular things, enlarges fitted for itself by general views 2; to which things reduced into sorts, enlargeunder general names, are properly subservient. These, with knowthe names belonging to them, come within some compass, ledge. true that general names are only makeshifts for an infinite number of proper names, that even the possession of an infinite store of such names would not enable us to think one jot, or to frame a single sentence. Each object being a mere particular, no occasion for predication could arise. . . . The infinite number of proper names would be like so many unmeaning numerical marks put upon absolutely non-resembling objects. We cannot say of five that it is six, or of any one number that it is another number.' (Prof. Seth's Scottish Philosophy, p. 169.) Thus, as Plato shows in his Theætetus, philo. sophical nominalism refutes itself. From the moment of its first imposition for a reason upon any one object, a name is potentially the name of a class. It is from the first a general term, a universal, though it may chance to be applied to only one individual. It is from the beginning capable of 1 The unintelligibility, for the pur- 2 That generality, and ultimately universality, is of the essence of knowledge, explains why most terms are general; not the impossibility of sufficient economy of language if proper names exclusively were used. Moreover capacity for being thus subjects of predication is implied in things being even perceivable in sense. ment of |