find the principles here avowed. Inhabitancy, according to this report, means purely and simply "locality of existence"-the mere fact of being in a place. This definition, I venture to say, was never before heard of, and is at war with the spirit of all our free institutions. When I was elected to this House, in September last, I was employed in the Department of State. The question occurred-Shall I resign that employment, and accept a seat in this House? This was an interesting question, to one who depended for his living on his own exertions. In this country nearly all of us are compelled to persue some course of honest industry for our support; and, Mr. Chairman, it is most fortunate for the country that this necessity is so general. To a person thus situated, the question presented for decision was an important one. Doubts I know were entertained of my eligibility. I extended my inquiries to all analogous cases within my reach; and they were all, without exception, in favor of my eligibility. I learnt the opinions of some of our first citizens on this point; and they too went to the same result. I have learnt, accidentally in most cases, the opinions of at least twelve of the very first statesmen and jurists of the nation; and, what is most remarkable, those opinions are perfectly unanimous-not one, of the whole number, is opposed to what appears to me to be the truth of the question. I do not mention this fact, under the impression that such opinions should have a binding force with this House. With this House, and this House alone, the Constitution has left the full control of questions like the present. But the opinions of such persons are entitled to respectful consideration. And it is natural to suppose, that they must have had decided weight with me, when determining in my own mind the question of acceptance. Before examining the principles of the report of the committee, I beg leave to notice several errors in it, in point of fact. The report (p. 6-7) says: "It is contended by Mr. Bailey, that, as he was in the employ of the 'General Government while in this District, and ' had expressed an intention of returning to Massachusetts, that he still remains an inhabitant of that State." I certainly never contended, Mr. Chairman, that I remained an inhabitant of Massachusetts, merely from the two facts here stated. But I did contend for it, from those two facts, supported by another most important fact, that this constant declaration of my intention of returning, was confirmed by my whole course of conduct while I was employed in this Districtby my total disconnection with the civil affairs of this place. We all know the irresistible propensity of freemen, to take part in the civil concerns of those communities, in which they intend to make their permanent abode. My entire abstinence from taking such part in this District, most strongly corroborates my uniform declaration, that I intended it as merely a temporary abode. The report (p. 7) further says: "The fact is 'conceded, that, at the time of the election, and MARCH, 1824. 'for nearly six years before, Mr. Bailey was actually an inhabitant of the City of Washington." The obvious understanding of this remark would be, that this fact had been conceded by me. Such, however, is not the fact. No such concession has ever been made by me. [Here the Chairman of the Committee of Elections, rose to explain. He said that the committee were obliged to state the points of Mr. B.'s defence from recollection merely, as it had never been put into their hands in writing, but merely read to them. Mr. B. replied, that his defence was read to the committee on the 29th of January, from a rough draught—that he was to have given in a correct draught at the next meeting of the committee, on the fourth of February-but that, in the meantime, on the second of February, he learnt from the committee that they had determined on their report. This fact, together with a desire to incorporate some remarks on several points subsequently suggested by the committee, was the reason why the corrected draught was not submitted to the committee.] The report (p. 8) also says, that I assumed" the character of the head of a family." This is entirely incorrect, unless there be some peculiar and technical meaning of the phrase, different from its common meaning. I have been accustomed to consider, that a person, in order to be the head of a family, must either own or rent a house-or must have the government of the domestics of the family-or must regulate its pecuniary expenses, or at least furnish the means. Some one, at least, if not all, of these incidents, I have always supposed necessary to constitute the head of a family. Yet not a single one of these incidents has attached to me, during my residence in this District. These errors in point of fact, in the report before us, I have thought it necessary to notice in the first instance; as they may have had an unfavorable influence on the minds of some members of this House. If they have had such influence with a single member, it is hoped these remarks will correct it. I will now proceed, Mr. Chairman, to notice some of the points and arguments contained in this very extraordinary report; and will show, not only that many of them are founded in error, but that many are wholly inconsistent with each other. In the second paragraph of the report, it is stated, that the subject under consideration is "one of great national consequence." This remark could not certainly be intended to apply merely to the individual seat, which is now contested; but must be meant to refer to the general principle involved in the question under discussion. Is the remark correct, even in this respect? Our present National Government has been in operation for thirty-five years. At the end of thirty-five years, one case has occurred, in which a person residing at the Seat of Government has been elected a member of this House. Perhaps in thirty-five years more, another case may occur. Is this an alarming prospect? Is the case one of such "great national consequence?" I will agree with the chairman of the Committee of Elections, that if another case should occur within the next thirty-five years, and we should both have seats on this floor, I will join him in a vote in favor of an amendment of the Constitution, which shall expressly exclude from this House all persons not actually resident in the States in which they are chosen. But I will whisper in the ear of that gentleman, that if he feels alarmed lest the purity of this House should be destroyed, and is anxious for a remedy, there is an amendment which might be made in the Constitution, far more efficacious than the one proposed. Let the Constitution be amended, so as to prohibit Executive appointments from being made from this and the other branch of Congress. If there is real danger of Executive influence in Congress, here is a field more worthy of the gentleman's labor than the one in which he has been industriously engaged. In the same paragraph, we have an attempt to elucidate the meaning of the word inhabitant, by adverting to the supposed state of the parties in the Convention which framed the Constitution of the Union. It is alleged, that in this Convention there were three parties, zealous in support of their respective favorite theories; one in favor of a consolidated Government, a second in favor of a confederation not differing widely from the old, and a third in favor of an intermediate form. No authorities are cited in support of these alleged historical facts. But suppose the statement perfectly correct is not the inference from it precisely the reverse of that drawn by the committee? The committee infer, that, since the second party were zealous in "sustaining the distinctive character of the several States," and in limiting the powers of the General Government, therefore, we are bound to give a rigid interpretation of the word inhabitant. To me, this appears completely a non sequitur. Before this inference can be legitímately drawn, it must be proved that this party prevailed in the Convention, and modelled the Constitution according to their own views. But this is not proved--the fact is known to be the reverse. So far were they from this victory, and so erroneous did they consider the principles of the Constitution, that some of them refused to the last to sign it; and others were strenuous in advocating amendments, which should restrain what they deemed the dangerous latitudinarian powers of the General Government. So true is this, that the report itself admits that "it was with much ' reluctance that they finally agreed to unite, in that spirit of mutual concession and compromise, 'out of which resulted the adoption of the present 'Constitution." To infer that a word used in the Constitution ought to be construed rigidly, because there was, in the Convention which framed it, a party in favor of giving very limited power to the General Government, which party it is confessed did not succeed in establishing their peculiar views, is a species of reasoning, which this House will never adopt. H. OF R. "whose ment would collect a number of persons, The report subsequently alludes to the experience of the British nation, and the supposed intention of the framers of the Constitution to avoid the evils incident to the election of members of the British Parliament. In the remarks which I had the honor to submit to the Committee of Elections previous to their report, and which are printed with it, I have suggested what seems to me the reason why inhabitancy has been for a long period made a qualification for office, by so many of our constitutions and laws. Our ancestors had seen the evils experienced in Great Britain from their system of representation, and aimed at preventing their existence in this country, without weighing fully the difference of conditions between that country and this. Such, I presume, was the motive of the first adoption of this rule; a rule which was continued, and engrafted into the Constitution of the United States, rather from habit, than from any serious fears, at that time, of danger to liberty, from the want of such a rule. So different is the condition of representation in this country from that in Great Britain, that I venture to say, that no injury would be experienced by us, if the clause of the Constitution, requiring inhabitancy as a qualification for a seat in this House, were entirely abolished. The equality of our representation, and the great number and intelligence of our electors, We are further informed, by the report, that render it impossible, even without such a clause, the wise framers of the Constitution must have that the evils of representation, found in the Britforeseen, that the Seat of the General Govern-ish system, should ever exist with us. The vote of one, or two, or five electors, as in England, may be controlled; but those of five thousand, as in the United States, cannot be. For this reason I believe most fully, that if this clause of the Constitution were entirely abolished, no practical evil would result. And, therefore, I believe, that the clause was inserted by the framers, rather from habit, than from a belief in any necessity for that over-rigid adherence to the principle, which this report inculcates. When reading this allusion to the improper influence exercised in elections to the British Parliament, I confess I had one regret. I did regret, that the committee did not add, that not the slightest appearance of such influence existed in the case in question. Since the committee allude to such improper influence in Great Britain, as having a bearing on the present subject of debate, some may be led to infer, that possibly it had real existence in the election now contested. It was shown, apparently to the satisfaction of the committee, that none such existed in the case. I do regret that the committee, when alluding to such influence, did not explicitly state their belief, that such was the fact. The report proceeds to state that "the true theory of representative government" requires that the representative be "selected from the bosom of that society which is composed of his constituents;" and that he should possess a knowledge of their character and political views, and for that purpose should "mingle in their company and join in their conversations ;" and that he should especially have "that reciprocity of feeling and identity of interest which exist only among members of the same community." This is a beautiful theory, but happens to make no part of our Constitution, and, therefore, has no application to the case in question. We are all prone to fancy to ourselves what ought to be a rule of action, and thence to infer that such is in fact the established rule. This is an error. Our inquiry now is, what is the Constitution?-not, what ought it to be? That the above picture is ideal, and unsupported by the Constitution, is easily shown. Suppose, when I came to this city, I had, instead of this, gone to the State of Ohio, and settled there, with full and evident intention of making it my permanent abode. And suppose, in one month after this, a district of that State had been as infatuated as a district in Massachusetts seems to have been, and had in its weakness selected me to a seat in this House. This would unquestionably have been a valid and Constitutional election. What, then, becomes of the above beautiful theory of representative government? Where is the representative coming from the bosom of the society of his constituents? Where his mingling in their company-his joining in their conversations and his intimate knowledge of their character and political views? It is plain that nothing of this is found. Yet a provision securing these advantages, the report asserts, is "absolutely necessary" for "every well regulated government." Either, therefore, our Government is not a well regulated one, or the MARCH, 1824. report under consideration is incorrect. We shall be safe in continuing to believe that our Government is a good one, and that the people may still be trusted with selecting their own representatives without a danger that they will select persons wholly unacquainted with their interests and views. The report, in illustration of its doctrine, quotes the Journal of the Convention of 1787, which framed the Constitution of the United States. I feel greatly indebted to that journal; for it proves, conclusively, that the rigid doctrine of the report is unsound. By recurring to the journal, we find that the earlier draughts of the Constitution, when speaking of the qualifications for a seat in this House, use the word "resident;" requiring that the person elected should be a resident of the State in which he should be chosen. But toward the close of the Convention, the word "resident" was changed to the word "inhabitant;" which plainly shows that the framers of the Constitution considered that a person might be an inhabitant of a State though not actually resident in it. We further find that the qualification for the office of President was, in the first draught, twenty-one years an inhabitant of the United States; but this was afterwards changed to fourteen years a resident. This two-fold change proves clearly that the two terms, "inhabitant" and "resident," were understood by the Convention to have distinct and separate meanings. So evident is this fact, that the report itself admits that the word "inhabitant" was inserted in place of "resident," "as a stronger term." This admission completely overthrows the main principle of the report: which is, that, according to the Constitution of the United States, a person is an inhabitant of that place in which he actually resides. If the stronger term "inhabitant" mean mere "locality of existence"-mere residence in a place what less than this can the weaker term "resident" mean? This one fact, as admitted by the committee themselves, proves that the fundamental principle of their report is unsound, and, therefore, ought not to be sustained by the House. The report cites Vattel, and Jacob's Law Dictionary, in support of its definition of inhabitancy: but it does it hesitatingly, as in doubt of the applicability of these foreign authorities to an American question. I agree with the committee in their doubts: I do not believe these authors would be conclusive authority, even if they were most explicit and full. But they are the reverse of this. Vattel says: "Inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers, who are permitted to settle and stay in the country." Even according to Vattel, it is only those who settle in a place, that are inhabitants of it. As I never settled in the District of Columbia, and never intended to settle there, the quotation does not apply. Besides, according to Vattel, inhabitants are strangers. What becomes of the delightful theory of representative government laid down in this report? If inhabitants are strangers, where is the representative coming from the bosom of the society, with his knowledge of its character and views? The quotation from Jacob is still more vague. These authorities prove nothing. The constitution of Massachusetts is quoted in the report, as declaring, that a person shall be considered as an inhabitant "where he dwelleth or hath his home." This the committee consider as "settling conclusively" the meaning of the word. Persons acquainted with the civil concerns of the State well know, that that definition is held as leaving the question as doubtful as it found it. So far is it from settling the question conclusively in favor of the rigid doctrine of the report, that the whole practice of that State proves the reverse. The decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of the State, as well as its legislative proceedings, prove that the word inhabitant, in that State, does not mean, as this report contends, barely residence in a place, but refers to a person as a member of the political community. The qualification of a voter for Governor and Senators is inhabitancy, without using at all the word citizen or citizenship. And yet (see Mass. Reports, vol. 2, p. 245, 263, and vol. 7, p. 523) the question respecting a right to vote, is invariably considered as involving the question of citizenship. Numerous cases also in its legislative history show, that inhabitancy is retained, without actual residence. Besides, the terms citizen and inhabitant are used in the constitution of the State without any apparent distinction. If, therefore, we take the use of the term inhabitancy in Massachusetts, as the test of the legality of the election in question, it is most unquestionably legal. Every authority is in its favor. And this use, probably, ought to be the test. When the Constitution of the United States says, that a member of this House must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen, it probably leaves to each State to determine what shall be its own terms of inhabitancy. If, however, we take the other ground, and consider the question as one to be determined solely by the Constitution of the United States, without reference to the State authorities, it has already been shown, that the framers of the Constitution, as admitted by the committee themselves, had a different understanding of the meaning of the word inhabitant from that contended for in this report. H. OF R. ginia, in her general election law, adds also her example to the list. Instead of inferring from these facts, as this report infers, that mere absence destroys inhabitancy, I infer, and confidently infer, the very reverse. This general concurrence of the voice of the nation, in favor of persons in public employment, proves that the principle is founded deeply in the common sense of mankind. It proves that it is an essential principle in our free institutions, that absence on public employment shall not diminish the rights of the person so employed. The report cites the act of March, 1790, for taking the first census, as proof of the correctness of its own definition of the word inhabitant. We know very well, that laws are often passed, without much regard to critical verbal accuracy. In most cases, the language is such as happens to be reported by a committee; and I am not at all inclined to support the infallibility of committees. But suppose the word inhabitant is used in this law with entire accuracy; even this proves nothing. It does not prove that the first Congress meant to exclude from the enumeration persons who were temporarily absent from their original permanent homes. It therefore proves nothing. Nor does the judiciary law of 1789, cited in the report, prove any thing. In the whole of that long act, the word inhabitant appears to be used but twice; in the 11th and in the 27th sections. And in neither case does the use of the word give the slightest sanction to the doctrine advanced in this report. In reply to the almost irresistible argument in my favor drawn from the numerous instances in which persons have enjoyed the privilege of inhabitants, while absent in public employment, the report contends, that such instances cannot be properly adduced as precedents, where the question was not formally agitated and decided. This doctrine I venture to say is unsound. Whatever may be its correctness as applied, in the strict practice of courts of law, to principles, it cannot be true as applied to the meaning of a word. Language, we all know, is perfectly arbitrary. The meaning of a word is determined wholly by its use. If the people of a country, by common consent, consider a person as an inhabitant of a State, though he is temporarily absent in public employment, this must be received as the true meaning of the word, even if there were not a single formal decision on the point. Such general practice shows what is the common-sense interpretation of the word; and is conclusive of the question. It is also stated in the report, that the constitutions of Delaware, Georgia, and Ohio, have a saving clause in favor of persons absent from those States; and this saving clause is given as proof, that absence destroys inhabitancy. It might have We might go further than this. Even if it been stated, that not only these three States, but were proved that the framers of the Constitution nearly all the States in the Union, acknowledge understood the word in the same sense as is conthe same principle in favor of their citizens, when tended for in the report, (though we have seen absent in the service of their State, or of the Uni- distinctly that they did not,) yet, if it were also ted States. The constitution of Kentucky, for proved, that, for thirty years past, the uniform instance, has the following provision: "Absence understanding of the people of this country has on the business of this State, or the United States, been different, and their uniform practice different, shall not forfeit a residence once obtained." The it would be wrong to reject this uniform undersame principle, to a greater or less extent, is re-standing and practice, and revive the obsolete use cognised by the constitutions of twelve out of the of the word. Language is ever fluctuating. The eighteen States, whose constitutions have been title of one of the most ingenious treatises on formed since that of the United States. And Vir-philology ever presented to the world, very aptly H. OF R. Massachusetts Contested Election. expresses this character of language "Winged Words." Words are indeed winged; they are constantly changing their meanings, and assuming new uses. If the constitution of a country, by the lapse of time, have a different construction from that originally given it, and any supposed evil ensue, the proper remedy is to amend the constitution, and not to attempt to revive obsolete interpretations, to the prejudice of the rights of persons who have acted on the faith of long and uniform practice. In the present case, however, there is no necessity for this. We have seen that the framers of the Constitution did not understand the word inhabitant as it is defined in this report. There is one argument, Mr. Chairman, entitled to great consideration; it is the peculiar condition of the District of Columbia and its government. The Committee on Elections, however, in their report, confess themselves unable to discover any thing in this circumstance applicable to the present case. To my view, the circumstance is a most important one-so important that perhaps the question might be rested safely on this point alone, without even naming any other. The District of Columbia is a district erected expressly for the accommodation of the States of this Union, as the seat of their common Government. This common Government exercises exclusive legislation over it. Every State, therefore, partakes of its jurisdiction; and every person residing in the District is under the participant jurisdiction of his own State. To say, then, that a person, coming from one of the States to this District, has left entirely the jurisdiction of his own State, is incorrect; he has left its peculiar and separate, but not its participant jurisdiction. Let us suppose a district of ten miles square in the centre of Maryland, divided into four equal parts, and owned by four individual persons. Suppose these persons should convert one square mile, in the centre of this District, into a joint property, for the purpose of a park. And suppose Maryland should pass a game law, prohibiting every person from hunting on any grounds not his own. Can we believe that this law would prohibit those four proprietors from hunting in their joint park? No. Yet in the same sense in which this park is the property of these four persons, is the District of Columbia the territory of each State in the Union. Who will deny that each State participates in the legislation of this House? In the same degree it participates in the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia. The report says that the same rule will apply to all the territory purchased by the United States, as to this District. The correctness of this position is distinctly denied. The power of Congress over this District, and that over such Territories, are powers derived from two entirely distinct clauses of the Constitution; and clauses having a marked distinction of phraseology. To say that what applies to one power, must apply to the other also, is therefore plainly erroneous. But even if correct, it would not prove the correctness of the report. If any one can by an effort prove, that what MARCH, 1824. applies to the one applies also to the other, he shall be welcome to the full benefit of his effort. The doctrine will still be true and unshaken, that each State participates in the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia. It may also be truly said, that a person employed in the business of the United States, is employed in the business of each State. The agent of a commercial house is the agent of each individual associated in the firm. So, the business of the United States is the business of each State so united. A person, therefore, who leaves his own State to discharge any executive duties at Washington, is employed in the business of that State, and continues under its modified jurisdiction. That the Committee of Elections should confess themselves unable to discover a distinction between such a residence at Washington, and an ordinary "settlement in one of the States of the Union," is indeed remarkable. In the seventh page of the report, we have a statement of the views of the committee respecting ambassadors and other foreign agents, which, taken in connexion with other parts of the report, has indeed surprised me. It is stated that no analogy exists between the cases of such foreign agents, and the case in question; inasmuch as an ambassador cannot become a "citizen" of the country in which he resides, nor can "lose his allegiance" to his own country. Here the committee have fallen into the very error (if error it be) against which, in a former part of their report, they hold out a pointed caution. In page 4 they say that " many of the misconceptions" which prevail respecting inhabitancy, have arisen from confounding the terms inhabitant and citizen. "The word inhabitant," they say, "comprehends a simple fact, locality of existence; that of citizen, a combination of civil privileges." Yet, in page 7, when speaking of ambassadors, they commit the very error against which they had just protested: and speak of citizenship and allegiance, saying nothing of inhabitancy, and the ambassador's local existence. If the main doctrine of the report be correct, that "civil privileges" relate exclusively to citizenship, and not at all to inhabitancy, and that inhabitancy comprehends barely the fact of local existence, then an ambassador is most plainly and indisputably an inhabitant of the country in which he resides. The doctrine, therefore, in relation to ambassadors, is utterly inconsistent with the fundamental principle of this report. Equally inconsistent with it is the report of the same Committee of Elections, made on the 3d instant, in the case of the member from Georgia, (Mr. FORSYTH.) "The capacity in which he acted," says this second report, "excludes the idea that, by the performance of his duty abroad, he ceased to be an inhabitant of the United States." How the capacity in which a person acts, can change the "fact" of his local existence, is perfectly incomprehensible. If the doctrine of the first report be true, that inhabitancy means barely the fact of local existence; and if a Minister of the United States actually reside in Spain, it follows by irresistible necessity that he is an inhab |