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SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA

Mr. MONAGAN. Among other Soviet involvements has been the contribution to Cuba of about $400 million a year, as I recall the figure. Is that still being done, and in what form is that done?

Mr. HURWITCH. It takes a variety of forms, some of it in grant military assistance and some of it in subsidy prices for the sugar and some grant economic assistance of various kinds. As we mentioned to Congressman Whalley, the figure that we use generally is about $1 million a day and probably goes up to $1.4 million a day. It has become more costly.

Mr. MONAGAN. However much Castro might like to dally with the Chinese, this really is the fact of life as far as the continuance of his regime is concerned, wouldn't you say so?

Mr. HURWITCH. I would agree with that; yes.

Mr. MONAGAN. You talked about interference with the internal affairs of Latin America. What about any interference with the internal affairs of the United States? Is there any movement in that direction coming out of Cuba that you are familiar with?

Mr. HURWITCH. No; the intelligence that comes to my attention on this matter would not support a contention that there is, if you like, a Cuban plan to subvert the United States, although there may be some attempt to influence radical groups.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF CASTRO'S REGIME

Mr. MONAGAN. I was interested in your description of Cuba as a drab place with most of the trappings of a repressive police state. Certain articles that come out of Cuba and appear in our press would indicate that on the whole, politically speaking, there are enough people who have gained status or improved their positions, even though they may be in the proletariat, that there is majority support for the regime. How would you assess that?

Mr. HURWITCH. Congressman, I think the question is pertinent and it is a very difficult one to answer. I don't think we know the degree of popular support for the Cuban Government. I think it would be perhaps more profitable to look at it from another standpoint. There is no question, I think, in any analyst's mind that Mr. Castro is firmly in power and has created a very efficient and pervasive security apparatus. There is no really known organized threat to his power. He is a man of a certain amount of recklessness in his own personal habits, I am led to believe. I think if there were widespread and organized resistance to him, the fact that he survived for 10 years would have been really remarkable.

On the other hand, the reports that we receive about conditions in Cuba are very much the basis for the statement that I made in my opening statement. I think that there is a general air of discontent among many people but which has not translated itself into political action in an organized sense.

I think it is true that a number of people who felt left out of the society, so to speak, under the Batista type of government have now a greater sense of participation in this government and from that standpoint, economically, probably feel that they have a better deal.

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FUTURE U.S. POLICY

Mr. MONAGAN. As far as the future is concerned, sometimes suggestions have been made that there may be movement back toward some kind of relationship. How do you envisage the future? Can you see any indication at this time of the possibility of renewal of relations under any conditions?

Mr. HURWITCH. It is hard to say. The question was asked earlier. Let me repeat that it is very difficult to foresee under present circumstances that eventuality coming about. It is very difficult.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, we have a lot of other questions. This group of witnesses will be back tomorrow. We want to finish today promptly at 12 and I am sure that other members of the subcommittee will want to ask other questions about this and the airlift. I have a great many questions about that.

I would like to continue now for a few minutes with respect to general policy questions.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CUBA

The Castro government is by every criteria a Russian satellite. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. Well, within the general terms of satellites, yes, sir; I suppose the word is not one we normally use but they certainly have a great deal of control. If by satellite one were to say that the Kremlin can count on Mr. Castro sort of reacting every time they press the button, I think that would be too much to say. They have considerable influence

Mr. FASCELL. They have considerable influence in terms of direct economic and military assistance. In order to buttress their influence, they also sent their Defense Minister there and some of their fleet there, some of their airplanes there, and some of their people?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. While Cuba might not be a political satellite in the technical sense of the word, Castro has certainly accomplished one objective of his revolution, which was to place the Cuban people and Cuba's economy and the Cuban Government within the orbit of Russia? That has been done?

Mr. HURWITCH. I think that has been done. I would not be absolutely

Mr. FASCELL. He is not getting any financial help from anybody else, is he? The Chinese are not giving him any, the Mexicans are not giving him any, the United States is not giving him any, the Brazilians are not giving him any?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is right. Quite a few people are not, Mr. Chairman. I think my only moment of hesitation is that I think what you describe is Soviet policy, that the Soviets have succeeded in doing what you described.

CASTRO'S PROMISES

Mr. FASCELL. Castro announced at the time he took over that this was his objective, to take Cuba out of the orbit of the United States and place it within the orbit of Russia. I would say that 10 years later, in the year 1970, he has accomplished at least that, wouldn't you?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes. All right.

Mr. FASCELL. Castro promised free elections in Cuba, did he not? Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Have there been any elections in the last 10 years? Mr. HURWITCH. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Castro also promised freedom of the press. Is there any freedom of the press in Cuba today?

Mr. HURWITCH. Completely controlled.

Mr. FASCELL. Castro also promised freedom of religion. Is there any freedom of religion in Cuba today?

Mr. HURWITCH. Not in the sense we mean it, no.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any freedom of education in Cuba?

Mr. HURWITCH. They regard it as free but whether it is freedom is a different question.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any individual proprietorship in Cuba today in the sense of an individual owning either a business or a property? Mr. HURWITCH. There may be vestiges but it is not worth talking about.

Mr. FASCELL. Are these the trappings of a nondemocratic society? Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, I would say so.

CUBA A STATE CONTROLLED BY CASTRO

Mr. FASCELL. Notwithstanding the pontifications of Mr. Castro early in his takeover, the fact is that Cuba today is a controlled statecontrolled by him and whoever he selects; is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Changes in the Cabinet are made by Castro at will? Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Changes in his military leadership are made by him at will?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Do they have provincial governors in Cuba?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, they have provincial leaders in each of the provinces.

Mr. FASCELL. Are they appointed by Mr. Castro?

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, sir. In many instances these are military officers and his brother is, of course, the Defense Minister. It is a rather close relationship. To all intents and purposes you can say Fidel Castro does that.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, being as objective as one ought to be after 10 years of the government of Castro in Cuba, whatever he has done, whether the people support him personally or not, the fact is that there are none of the institutions of economic or social or political participation in a democratic sense. Is that correct?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct. I think that you have aptly described it as a one-man Communist dictatorship.

CONSIDERATIONS IN U.S. POLICY FORMULATION

Mr. FASCELL. Whether Castro lives up to his promises or not is a problem for him and the Cuban people. But it does present, it seems

to me, a very serious question with respect to U.S. policy. If we are to take into consideration the character, and the nature of the governments in this hemisphere, it would be very important for us certainly to take into consideration the nature and the character of that particular government. Don't you agree?

Mr. HURWITCH. I agree.

Mr. FASCELL. We have on occasion formulated our policy by taking into account the nature of a particular government in Latin America. This is still our general method of international diplomacy, is it not? Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. What you are saying, then, is that we have found nothing that would give us any basis on which to change our policy with respect to the Castro Government?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is entirely correct.

Mr. FASCELL. It has nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs or the United States. The fact is that all of these actions and attitudes are Mr. Castro's?

Mr. HURWITCH. That is correct.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, on that one point, isn't there a policy established through the processes of osmosis really?

Mr. FASCELL. Whose, Mr. Castro's?

Mr. ROYBAL. Our own policy with regard to Cuba. We are still not talking directly to anybody but to a third or fourth person.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not advocating talking to third or fourth persons. I am trying to lay down the basis, as I understand it, for the way we conduct our diplomatic international business, the basis upon which we would do business with another government; that is all.

In carrying that one step further, unless-and this is certainly farfetched-Mr. Castro took his government out of the orbit of Russia in terms of his military, economic and political dependence on that country, and unless he established some democratic institutions allowing the Cuban people to participate in shaping their destiny, what possible benefit could flow from a change in U.S. policy?

I am asking this objectively: What possible benefit could there be in the United States unilaterally changing its position with respect to Cuba?

Mr. HURWITCH. This is a question we ask ourselves. One further element to that, Mr. Chairman. That is, that unless he were to foreswear his public policy attempting to subvert other governments. It seems to us that when you have a man that is going to try to subvert other governments, when he brings a major military power such as the Soviet Union into our back yard you have to treat that situation by putting it, if you can, in an isolation ward and making sure it does not become contagious more than anything else.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON CUBA

Mr. FASCELL. You have another factor still pending. You have a congressional resolution which is still in effect. I think for the purposes of underlining our present situation, we ought to have that resolution at this point in the record.

(The text of the resolution referred to follows:)

TEXT OF PUBLIC LAW 87-733 [S.J. RES. 230], 76 STAT. 697, APPROVED OCTOBER 3, 1962 JOINT RESOLUTION Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedomloving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for selfdetermination.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to hear your views on that situation. Does this resolution provide a basis for policy? Can the State Department really take any action which would be contrary to the terms of that resolution? It reads, in part―

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(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedomloving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Mr. HURWITCH. Is that the resolution of 1962?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; there is also a 1965 resolution. Without objection, we will put the text of that one also in the record at this point. (The text of House Resolution 560, agreed to Sept. 20, 1965, follows:)

TEXT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 560, AGREED TO SEPTEMBER 20, 1965

RESOLUTION To express the sense of the House of Representatives declaring the policy of the United States relative to the intervention of the international communistic movement in the Western Hemisphere

Whereas the subversive forces known as international communism, operating secretly and openly, directly and indirectly, threaten the sovereignty and political independence of all the Western Hemisphere nations; and

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