Cuba's help." Castro also continues to encourage local guerrilla leaders to acquire funds and arms through robbery, kidnapping and other violent means.

Castro has moderated his former propaganda campaign against his Latin American neighbors but has intensified the volume and virulence of anti-U.S. propaganda. Havana Radio broadcasts programs in eight languages and two Indian dialects. "Yankee imperialism," the Alliance for Progress, the Nixon administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency are prime targets of these abusive attacks. Havana Radio International broadcasts anti-U.S. speeches and interviews by disgruntled U.S. citizens. It reiterates the theme that there is only one approach to the solution of Latin America's problems: "the path of genuine revolution capable of destroying the present structure and putting an end to imperialist exploitation." The official Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Granma, maintains a steady anti-U.S. campaign denouncing racism in the United States and "the brutal aggression of U.S. imperialism" in Vietnam. Castro also supports the Afro-Asian Latin American Solidarity Organization, its propaganda organ, Tricontinental, and the Continental Organization of Latin American Students.

In sum, Castro has shown through his actions and words that he will continue to support subversion and revolution throughout the Americas.

SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Soviet military activities in the Caribbean consist of military assistance to Cuba and Soviet air and naval operations that some times include visits to Cuba.

[Security Deletion.]

Soviet assistance has given Cuba the best equipped forces in Latin America, but these forces do not have the air or sealift to mount operations outside of Cuba. There are a substantial number of military advisers, technicians, and instructors in Cuba who oversee and protect the Soviet investment and sustain and enhance Castro's defensive posture. There are also advisers in the civil sector where, for example, the Soviets are assisting the Cubans at their experimental nuclear reactor. This reactor has no apparent military application.

The exchange of extended visits by Defense Ministers of the two countries within the past 8 months and Castro's speech of April 22 are indications of continued military cooperation between the two countries. In his speech, Castro explicitly stated that "Cuba would never sever its political and military relations with the U.S.S.R. On the contrary, we shall always be ready to have closer military ties with the Soviet Union."

In the last 12 months, we have observed new forms of Soviet military activity in the Caribbean that may challenge our security interests. In July of last year, Soviet naval combatants entered the Caribbean and visited Cuba for the first time. [Security deletion.] The purpose of this first Soviet naval visit may well have included familiarization with Caribbean waters. In May of this year, a more significant Soviet naval force, made up of three submarines (two conventionally powered, the other nuclear powered), a submarine tender and guided missile cruiser, a missile equipped destroyer, and an oil

tanker, visited Cuba for 2 weeks after a cruise in the Caribbean. [Security deletion.] Further incursions of Soviet naval power into the Caribbean Sea are likely, just as they have increased in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

In April and May of this year, three flights of two Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flew non-stop from the U.S.S.R. to Havana. [Security deletion.]

We can expect that Soviet naval vessels [security deletion] and long-range reconnaissance aircraft will continue to visit Cuba. [Security deletion.] In this fashion, the Soviets will probably want to demonstrate that the Soviet Navy is a global force-one that is able to operate in the Caribbean, traditionally an area of immediate U.S. security, just as they do in the world's oceans.

U.S. SECURITY POSTURE

In order to protect our interests in the Caribbean, the United States maintains a variety of forces, installations, and programs. Let me summarize them briefly.

There are three major U.S. bases in the area: the Canal Zone, which protects the canal and dominates travel and communications within the hemisphere; Guantanamo, which provides major training facilities and helps to protect the eastern Caribbean and the approaches to the canal; and Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico [security deletion]. In addition to these three major bases outside the continental United States, the various Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army bases in the Southeastern United States support our Caribbean security posture.

Our military forces in the area are small, the minimum needed for the immediate security of U.S. facilities. Briefly, we have an Army brigade in Panama, a Marine battalion and supporting fighter aircraft at Guantanamo, and a naval amphibious ready force normally on station in the Caribbean. There are larger forces available in the Southeastern United States to reinforce these small forces if required, primarily the Marine and Army divisions in North Carolina, with appropriate air and naval support.

Through military assistance and foreign military sales, the United States is able to assist most of the countries of the area in developing military forces capable of maintaining the internal security required for orderly social and economic development.

There are military assistance programs in the Central American countries, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. In earlier years, these programs emphasized materiel, as we assisted these countries (except Venezuela) by providing the transportation and communications equipment and light weapons their armed forces needed to accomplish their internal security mission. As the programs began to fulfill at least the minimum equipment needs, the materiel part of the program has decreased toward eventual phaseout, and the emphasis has increasingly been placed on training.

The military assistance program furnishes three types of training in Latin America. The Southern Command maintains excellent Army and Air Force schools in the Canal Zone that present their instruction in Spanish. These schools primarily train enlisted men and lower rank

ing officers. Latin American students also attend U.S. service schools for courses not available in the Canal Zone. The third part of the training program consists in mobile training teams which visit the receiving country to present practical instruction to larger numbers of people.

As the materiel requirements of the Latin American countries have become more manageable, the foreign military sales program has increased in importance. By making reasonable amounts of credit available, we can help these countries to help themselves in purchasing their military equipment needs without unacceptable strain on their limited resources.

SUMMARY

The United States faces many challenges in the Caribbean. The historic economic and social problems of the area are still far from solved. When the ferment of newly independent countries, the stirring of potentially divisive racial frictions, Castro's continuing disruptive efforts, and the increasing Soviet military activities in the area are added to the equation, it is obvious that our "third border" will continue to require our vigilant attention.

Mr. NUTTER. Thank you very much for your kind attention. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral Holmes.

(A biographical sketch of Admiral Holmes follows:)

ADMIRAL E. P. HOLMES

Adm. Ephraim Paul Holmes was born in Downsville, New York, 1908. Following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1930 he served aboard the U.S.S. Milwaukee, the heavy cruiser Augusta, the U.S.S. Houston, the U.S.S. Peary, the U.S.S. Brazos and the U.S.S. Maryland. In January 1941 he joined the staff of the Commander Battleships, Battle Force and was present during the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Holmes subsequently took part in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. In 1942 he transferred to the staff of Commander Battleship Division Four. Vessels of that Division participated in actions off Guadalcanal and Santa Cruz Islands. In 1944 he assumed command of the destroyer U.S.S. Stockham which saw heavy action in the Philippines and Saipan, against other Japanese held islands, and in the second battle of the Philippine Sea. For outstanding services while in command of the Stockham he was awarded the Silver Star Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and the Gold Star in lieu of the Second Bronze Star Medal, also with Combat "V". In February 1945 he reported as Officer in Charge of General Line and Applied Communications Curricula at the Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland remaining there until July 1947 when he joined the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In 1950-51 he was a student at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. after which he was a faculty member at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. In 1952 he assumed command of the U.S.S. Sanborn and in 1953 was detached to serve on the staff of Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He became Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Northhampton in October 1955 and in early 1957 reported as Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) Navy Department. Again ordered to sea, he became Commander Cruiser Division FOUR in April 1959. In March 1960 he returned to the Navy Department as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (General Planning) and Director, General Planning Group. In March 1963 he assumed command of the Amphibious Force, Pacific, and in January 1964 became Commander, FIRST fleet. He then served as Director of Navy Program Planning, and Scientific Officer to the Center for Naval Analyses in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In the latter capacity "for exceptionally meritorious service" he received the Distinguished Service Medal. On June 17, 1967 he assumed

his present post as Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Holmes' home is in Palo Alto, California.

STATEMENT OF ADM. E. P. HOLMES, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,

ATLANTIC

Admiral HOLMES. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, it is a pleasure to appear before this committee to give you my views on the U.S. security posture in the Caribbean. As the Commander whose area of responsibility includes our national defense interests in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, I have a deep concern about our posture in these areas.

My concern arises from a conviction that the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and what goes on in these areas are vitally important to U.S. security. First, as you are well aware, we have extensive commercial interests there involved with such valuable and strategically significant items as oil, bauxite, and iron ore. There are many other items. All require U.S. personnel, installations, and capital outlays in order to succeed to the benefit not only of U.S. interests but of local institutions under friendly governments. They require, as well, an environment of stability and comparative good order. Anyone contemplating difficulty for the United States or the established governments in the area will certainly try among other things to disrupt this stability and to create disorder. The activities spreading from Cuba are examples of this tactic.

You might say that these are economic considerations, not military, and I would have to agree. But if protection of these interests and of the people pursuing them becomes involved, or the shipping of these items is imperiled, the situation immediately takes on military implications.

Next I would shift your attention to another facet of my concern and that is the attractiveness of this area to Russian penetration and to their extension of Communist influence. The Russians recognize the U.S. strategic requirements and commitments which are fulfilled in this area, such as from the bases there where we operate in defense of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, for the defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal, and for the conduct of maritime surveillance and antisubmarine warfare. The Soviets would like to disrupt the fabric of this structure.

Additionally, I am quite sure that they view some of the small, new, and underdeveloped nations of the area as fertile grounds in which their doctrines and policies of economic and political penetration might readily be exploited. A sympathetic U.S. presence is the best means to promote the counterdevelopment of free, independent, and democratic principles and institutions. The opportunity which the Russians seized upon in Cuba and the efforts which they and their Cuban converts have made elsewhere bear out this concern, as Secretary Nutter has explained.

Here again, one might say that these are political or economic problems-not military. I would like to point out, however, what an established Russian presence in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico might mean from the military viewpoint. The southern flank of the United States is exposed in this direction. Missile-capable naval units,

either of surface or submarine type, operating from bases directly and closely to the south of this flank is a practical situation that cannot be contemplated with equanimity. The possibility that the Panama Canal might be closed or that it would be difficult and dangerous for friendly shipping even to proceed to or from it is also disconcerting.

Twice within a recent 10-month period we have seen Russian missilecapable submarines and surface ships in Cuba whence in the latest instant they sortied first to within about 35 miles of our gulf coast and later transmitted at about the same distance along the east coast of Florida before they departed to the eastward. To consider that anyone might suggest a withdrawal from our base at Guantanamo or a reduction of military capability in this whole area in the face of these facts, strikes me as folly.

So then what does this mean to me in relation to my responsibilities for security of U.S. interests in the area? What military capabilities are required to discharge these responsibilities against the challenge we already see there? There are several.

Quite logically, we should have the ability to protect or evacuate our nationals, to provide such stabilizing factors as we might be required by established governments to do, or to support adjacent U.S. commanders in similar operations on a joint basis as might be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These are tasks for which amphibious units are ideally suited, as has been demonstrated on numerous occasions. It is to perform these tasks that the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the naval component of the Atlantic Command, has maintained a group of amphibious ships in the area with Marines embarked. Until recently such an amphibious ready group has been maintained in the Caribbean on a continuous basis. With recent reductions in ships, however, this posture of readiness has had to be change to an intermittent basis.

We should have the capability, moreover, to protect the shipping which will transit through this area from South America, the Panama Canal, and the South Atlantic. We know from World War II how critical such protection can be. This is a task for antisubmarine warfare forces, especially surface escorts for convoys and patrol aircraft to surveil, locate, and destroy enemy submarines. If such submarines are already in the area and can operate from bases or havens in the area, the task becomes that much more intense.

There will be requirements for ASW forces in many places in the event of a war. The fulfilling of requirements for the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico will have to take its place in priority with all other requirements. There may not be enough because it comes down simply to a case of numbers and our numbers have been reduced.

Closely alined with the protection of shipping is another ASW task the detection, location, and destruction of missile-capable submarines which might be in position in this area to fire missiles up from the south into the United States. The Russian nuclear-powered missile firing submarines such as their new type, the Yankee class, have the endurance to reach the caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico and to remain on station there for extended periods. Once located, it would take numbers of ASW units of all types to hold contact with them and to thwart them from their objective.