sorry to see you here. Didn't you know that no good could come from stolen money? There's a curse on it."

"Well, jedge," replied the prisoner, "I didn't know Mistah Appleton stole dat money. I couldn't tell dat by jest lookin' at it."-Exchange.

A GEORGIA judge (says an exchange) was accosted by an old darkey.

"Mornin', jedge," began old Sam. "Howdy."

"Say, jedge, I'se like tu be on de nex' ticket for justice uv de peace," continued Sam.

"You a judge!" replied my friend. "Why what do you know about the law?"

"Mos' eberythin'."

"Well, now, Sam, if we should elect you and a man was brought before you charged with committing suicide what would your judgment be?"

This caused Sam some deep meditation, and after a considerable wait he replied: "Well, under de circumstances, I guess I'd make him support his wife."

REPRESENTATIVE BOURKE COCKRAN was seated in his law office one day recently when one of the clerks announced a visitor. The orator was very busy, but the man refused to tell his business to a clerk, insisting that it was a personal matter and he must see Mr. Cockran himself.

"Well, show him in," said the lawyer finally, in disgust.

"I want to get some legal advice, Mr. Cockran," said the visitor, "and I came to you because I am a poor man and cannot afford to pay a real lawyer."

"What do you mean?" thundered the representative, indignantly.

"Well, I mean that as a politician you will not be hard on one of your constituents. Besides, I have another claim on you. My aunt does washing for one of your cousins."

"My dear sir," said the lawyer in his most withering tones, as he ushered the visitor

out, "you don't want to see a lawyer; you want to see a nerve specialist."-New York Herald.

A STORY, Said to be true, is related of the late Senator "Matt" Carpenter, of Wisconsin. The Senator was once arguing a case before the State Supreme Court, and before he was half through with his argument, the judges made up their minds that the Senator did not have a case, and informed him that he might as well conclude, as the decision would go against him. Carpenter sat down and as the opposing counsel, who was very deaf arose to speak, the Chief Justice said: "I don't think it will be necessary to hear from you." Seeing that he was being addressed, the lawyer turned to Carpenter. "What did the Chief Justice say, Matt?" he whispered. "He said he would rather give you the case than to listen to you," replied Carpenter, aloud.-Chicago Law Journal.

THE Cross-examiner had kept the witness on the stand for some time, and the witness naturally was getting weary.

"If you would only answer my questions properly," said the cross-examiner, “we would have no trouble. If I could only get you to understand that all I want to know is what you know, we-"

"It would take you a lifetime to acquire that," interrupted the witness.

"What I mean is that I merely want to learn what you know about this affair," the lawyer said, frowning. "I don't care anything about your abstract knowledge of law or your information in regard to theosophy, but what you know about this case."

"Oh, that isn't what you want," said the witness in an off-hand way. "I've been try ing to give you that for some time, and-"

The lawyer got in an objection and the witness had to stop.

"If I don't want to know what you know about this particular case and nothing else," inquired the lawyer later, "what do you think I do want to know?"

That seemed so easy that the witness laughed as he said:

"It isn't what I know that you want to know; it's what you think I know that you're after, and you're trying to make me know it or prove me a liar."

Then it was that every one in the courtroom knew that he had been on the witness stand before.-New York Press.

THE Hon. Elihu Root, who has returned to the practice of law in New York city, has engaged a new office boy. Said Mr. Root: "Who carried off my paper basket?"

"It was Mr. Reilly," said the boy. "Who is Mr. Reilly?" asked Mr. Root. "The janitor, sir."

An hour later Mr. Root asked, “Jimmy, who opened that window?"

"Mr. Lantz, sir."

"And who is Mr. Lantz?" "The window cleaner, sir."

Mr. Root wheeled about and looked at the boy. "See here, James," he said, "we call men by their first names here. We don't 'mister' them in this office. Do you understand?"

In ten minutes the door opened and a small, shrill voice said: "There's a man here as wants to see you, Elihu."-Cleveland Plain-Dealer.

"I-I've bought a farm about ten miles out of town," said the man with the black eye, as he entered a lawyer's office. "Exactly-exactly. You've bought a farm and you've discovered that one of the line fences takes in four or five feet of your land. You attempted to discuss the matter with the farmer, and he resorted to arms." "Yes."

"Well, don't you worry. You can first sue him for assault. Then for battery. Then for personal damages. Then we'll take up the matter of the fence, and I promise you that even if we don't beat him we can keep the case in court for at least 25 years. Meanwhile, he'll probably hamstring your cows, poison your calves and set fire to your barn, and you can begin a

new suit almost every week. My dear man, you've got what they call a pudding and you can have fun from now on to the day you die of old age."-Chicago Law Journal.

The late Senator Vest was a clever lawyer as well as an orator and statesman. In his younger days, it fell to his lot to defend a man indicted for murder. There were circumstances, not strictly legal, that made the crime less heinous in fact than in name. Vest was sorely puzzled to find a defense for his client, but at length told him that his only hope was that the jury would find him insane, and he instructed his client not to speak from that time forth to the end of the trial. The case proceeded, the State presented its evidence and rested. Vest made little defense, and waited for the summing up of the State's attorney. Then he started in with an address to the jury in which he demonstrated that his client was an utter imbecile, entirely incapable of planning and carrying out the crime for which he was indicted. He made his client out worse than a degenerate-a pitable human wreck mentally, the veriest imbecile. The jury was convinced and acquitted the prisoner. Not so the prisoner. With ill-concealed rage he sought out his lawyer, and calling him to one side gave him to understand that if ever again in trouble and Vest should employ that kind of defense to free him, the lawyer would hear from him in an emphatic way.The Law Register.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of THE GREEN BAG:

The custom of a belligerent nation prohibiting all trade with its enemy is of very ancient date. We have records of such a practice as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century. It seems to have been usual in that and the next following century for belligerent nations on the outbreak of war to issue proclamations warning all men not to attempt to import food or any merchandise whatever into the enemy's territory, and, thereupon, to arrest and confiscate the vessels and goods of any persons

who might contravene such warning, as the property of individuals who were in reality in league with the enemy. The States General of Holland appear to have maintained this practice without any serious dispute on the part of the other nations as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century; but it came to be questioned towards the end of that century as an immoderate exercise of belligerent right, since which time it has been generally disclaimed, and may now be regarded as obsolete. Upon the other hand, the practice of intercepting all merchant vessels trading with the enemy's coast is as old as war itself.

It has been observed that the usage of belligerents to forbid by proclamation all trade with the enemy, and to confiscate the property of parties contravening their proclamation was successfully impugned in the seventeenth century, as an unreasonable exercise of belligerent force, and may now be regarded as having no sanction from the modern practice of nations of the first rank. We may trace back to the same century the first systematic attempt to regulate the belligerent right of blockade, which originated with the Dutch. "On the question of blockade," says Lord Stowell, "three things must be proved-(1) the existence of an actual blockade; (2) the knowledge of the party; (3) some act of violation either by going in or coming out with a cargo laden after the commencement of the blockade." The point, therefore, which must be considered is, what constitutes an actual blockade? It was one of the objects of the Armed Neutrality-a confederacy against England, formed by Russia, Sweden and Denmark in 1780-to establish a more precise rule than had previously prevailed for determining when a port was actually in a state of blockade, in order that an obligation to abstain from trading with such a port might be imposed upon the merchants of neutral countries. In pursuance of that object, Russia communicated to the various European powers a declaration of the principles of the Armed Neutrality comprised in four prop

ositions, the fourth of which was to the effect that in order to determine what characterised a blockaded port, that term shall only be applied to a port where, from the arrangement made by the attacking force, there is evident danger in entering the port. Great Britain acceded to this definition of a blockaded port at her convention with Russia in 1801, and the principles generally affirmed by the great nations of the world may be said to be in harmony with it. At the beginning of the Crimean war (in 1854), France and England may be considered to have affirmed the same principle when they declared their intention "to maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's ports, harbors or coasts." Upon the conclusion of peaceit will be remembered that both England and France were supporting Turkey against Russia-the subject of belligerent blockade came under the consideration of the Powers assembled at Paris in the Congress of 1856, when it was agreed to remove all uncertainty among themselves by declaring their view of the maritime law on the subject. and by inviting all other nations to accede to a common declaration. The proposition which was adopted by the Congress was as follows: "Blockades, in order to be binding. must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

A knowledge of a blockade, however acquired, will preclude the captain of a neutral ship from any claim to receive a direct warning from the blockading squadron. even if the ship should have sailed from the port where she had shipped her cargo without a knowledge of the blockade. The general notoriety of a blockade will be presumed after it has been publicly notified and de facto maintained for any considerable period.

Yours very truly,

LAWRENCE IRWELL. Buffalo, New York, September 3, 1904.

NEW LAW BOOKS.

It is the intention of The Green Bag to have its book reviews written by competent reviewers. The usual custom of magazines is to confine book notices to books sent in for review. At the request of subscribers, however, The Green Bag will be glad to review or notice any recently published law book whether received for review or not.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By Theophilus Parsons. Ninth edition, edited by John M. Gould. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1904. Three volumes. (cccvii +646+xx+974+ix+749 pp.)

As the original edition appeared in 1853, the present edition celebrates approximately the fiftieth anniversary of this popular work. That this edition is the ninth indicates clearly the estimation in which the work is held by the profession. It is hardly conceivable that there is an American law office of any consequence which does not contain at least one edition, for Parsons on Contracts is probably the only rival of Greenleaf on Evidence for the highest place in the estimation of the American bar as a work of practical value.

From the point of view of theoretical science, the author is extremely easy to criticise. At the very outset he claims for his favorite subject a jurisdiction over very nearly the whole field of law, and thus raises the question whether he is not too careless of legal distinctions. Here are his words: "The Law of Contracts, in its widest sense, may be regarded as including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of contracts express or implied, declared or understood, grow all rights, all duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure of human life implies, or rather, is, the continual fulfilment of contracts. Even those duties, or those acts of kindness and affection, which may seem most remote from contract or compulsion of any kind, are nevertheless within the scope of the

obligation of contracts. The parental love which provides for the infant when, in the beginning of its life, it can do nothing for itself, nor care for itself, would seem to be so pure an offering of affection that the idea of a contract could in no way belong to it. But even here, although these duties are generally discharged from a feeling which borrows no strength from a sense of obligation, there is still such an obligation. It is implied by the cares of the past, which have perpetuated society from generation to generation; by that absolute necessity which makes the performance of these duties the condition of the preservation of human life; and by the implied obligation on the part of the unconscious objects of this care, that when by its means they shall have grown into strength, and age has brought weakness upon those to whom they are thus indebted, they will acknowledge and repay the debt. Indeed, the law recognizes and enforces this obligation, to a certain degree, on both sides, as will be shown hereafter. Further, in all the relations of social life, its good order and prosperity depend upon the due fulfilment of the contracts which bind all to all. Sometimes these contracts are deliberately expressed with all the precision of law, and are armed with all its sanctions. More frequently they are, though still expressed, simpler in form and more general in language, and leave more to the intelligence, the justice, and honesty of the parties. Far more frequently they are not expressed at all: and for their definition and extent we must look to the common principles which all are supposed to understand and acknowledge. In this sense, contract is coördinate and commensurate with duty; and it is a familiar principle of the law, of which we shall have much to say hereafter, and which has a wide, though far from a universal application, that whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the law supposes him to have promised to do.”

From this rhetorical prelude, one might well infer that the author would extend the subject of Contracts in such a way as to in

clude Torts and Crimes.

Yet, in truth, the author immediately and wisely forgot his rhapsody, for though the study of legal history had had not yet possibly progressed so far as to make common the knowledge that the law of Crimes and of Torts is older than the law of Contracts, the author, as a practical lawyer, knew—to quote again his own words-that "a contract, in legal contemplation, is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or the not doing of some particular thing," and further that among "the essentials of a legal contract" is "the Assent of the Parties, without which there is in law no contract."

Without serious departure from scientific ideals, and with the result of making his work extremely useful in practice, the author has included almost every topic that is even remotely connected with the narrow subject of Contracts. Among the topics thus treated, sometimes at considerable length, are Agency, Trusts, Guardianship, Corporations, Partnership, Bills and Notes, Infancy, Coverture, Landlord and Tenant, Sales, Suretyship, Bailments, Patents, Copyright, Trade-marks, Shipping, Insurance, Conflict of Laws, Estoppel, Damages, Liens, Bankruptcy, and Constitutional Law. From this long list—which might easily be made longer by naming the topics found in all books on Contracts, it is clear that the work might appropriately be termed an Encyclopædia of Commercial Law. This encyclopædic quality has done much towards making the book indispensable, and has also caused the task of each editor to be unusually difficult. The editor of the eighth edition, Professor Williston, besides bringing the citations down to date, added elaborate comments which caused the work to represent the present state of the law of Contracts, from both the scholarly and the practical point of view, as nearly as such a result can be accomplished upon the basis of an old-fashioned text. In the present edition, the effort of the editor

has apparently not extended beyond adding citations of recent cases.

Vast as the work is, and wide as was the author's initial conception of the scope of Contracts, there is no considerable treatment of those obligations implied by law and enforced in contractual forms of action, which are now discussed by scientific authors under the head of Quasi-Contracts. It is strange that Parsons did not deal with this topic; but the successive editors have done well not to supply the omission, for in truth nothing but harm can come from overlooking the essential distinction between obligations founded on mutual assent and those founded otherwise.

CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES. By

Frederick Van Dyne. Rochester, New York: The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company. 1904. (xxvii+385 pp.) The citizenship of which Mr. Van Dyne treats is Federal citizenship, State citizenship being outside the province of this book. The subject is dealt with under four general heads-Citizenship by Birth, Citizenship by Naturalization, Passports, and Expatriation. Mr. Van Dyne's long experience as Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, in which position he has had to deal with many questions relating to citizenship, has been a fitting preparation for his present work.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters are those on Naturalization by Treaty, and on the Attitude of Foreign Governments toward their citizens who have become naturalized in the United States. In the former chapter are to be found the provisions bearing on naturalization in the treaties with Great Britain in 1794, with France in 1803, with Spain in 1819, with Mexico in 1848 and 1853, with Russia in 1867, and again with Spain in 1898. In the latter chapter is given the summary, compiled by the Department of State, of laws and regulation of the principal European countries, and of Persia, concerning the status of their citizens who have become naturalized here. Of special interest are the questions of the denial by