examinations of the different courses have been passed, the undergraduate goes up for the final ordeal called Esame di Laurea. Three (and in some universities five) essays on subjects chosen by himself are submitted to a board of eleven examiners, and, like the student of the Middle Ages who used to nail his thesis to the college gate and challenge whomsoever to dispute it, he has in a subsequent viva voce examination to make good his propositions. If successful, he is proclaimed Dottore in Legge.

As in France, the legal profession in Italy is divided into two branches, the Procuratori (avoués) and the Avvocati (avocats). The Procuratore (who is somewhat akin to the English solicitor) need not have taken a degree; his term at the university is limited to two years; he cannot plead outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of the district in which his domicile is registered, and never in criminal cases before the Court of Appeal. He must be an Italian subject, and is sworn on his assumption of office. His fees are determined by law.

The Avvocato must have taken his degree; he can, with the assistance of a local Procuratore, plead before any Court of the kingdom (at the Supreme Courts of Cassation only after five years' practice). No oath is required of him, and he may be an alien. In some parts of Italy the two professions used to be distinct... At the present day the distinction may be said to have almost ceased to exist, especially after the passing of the law providing that every Procuratore afterfive years' practice becomes de jure a barrister, and every barrister, after two years' practice, may enter his name on the rolls of Procuratori..

Few faults can be found with this system of legal training in Italy, which strives not only to equip the student with an ample knowledge of the laws and institutions of his country, but also to broaden his mind by a sound and comprehensive general education. . .

A sweeping reform is . . . to be desired with regard to the expounding of the Civil

Code. This monumental work, an enlarged and corrected edition of the Code Napoléon, consists of three books and 2147 paragraphs. The period of two years allotted to its study is entirely insufficient. The teaching of the Code practically resolves itself either into a hurried and perfunctory review of the law, or else into a monographical study of a single part, with the inevitable result of confusion in the first instance and deplorable blanks in the second.

It is an everyday occurrence that students leave the University in entire ignorance of such important matters as the law of Contracts, the law of Inheritance, or the law of Real and Personal Property.

A complete knowledge of Civil law is essential, and this object is only to be attained by distributing the study of the Code throughout the four years of the academic curriculum, with yearly or biennial examinations.

IN an article in The Canadian Law Review for May is given much interesting information about "An English Judge's Dress." For example:

The earliest representation we have of the official costume of the Bench is the seal of Robert Grimbald, a justice of the time of Henry II. He is depicted in a long tunic and mantle, with a round cap on his head and a sword in each hand. There is little doubt that these robes were already scarlet, although the exact period when the Bench had adopted scarlet in its official dress is not known to us. It has, it is true, been suggested that they wore green in the reign of Edward III., but this was only in virtue of their being likewise knights, green being the badge of knighthood. Even at that early period the robes seem to have consisted of a long tunic or colobrium reaching to the ankles, surmounted by a cope. . . . Gradually the closed cope came to be the distinctive dress of the judges.

The earliest notice of the robes of the judges occurs in a Close roll dated 1292. . . . In an illumination of the time of Henry

VI. we see the parti-colored gowns and clothing of the sergeants, officers of the Court of Chancery, and others represented with great exactness. There are two judgės in scarlet robes trimmed with white badger or lambskin, one of whom is uncovered and tonsured, as becomes a priest, the other, the Lord Chancellor and a layman-perhaps the first layman who held that office-wearing on his head a kind of brown cap. This suggests the very natural query, when did judges and lawyers first think it necessary to cover up their heads during professional hours? probably coincided with the evolution of the lawyer from priest or deacon to layman, and was originally designed to conceal his character, which would have been revealed by the tonsured scalp, from the litigants and spectators. The general head-covering before the days of wigs was the coif, which, like the periwig of later times, enjoyed a Vogue amongst laymen in the thirteenth century. When they abandoned it, it was continued by the priests and lawyers. It was originally of white linen, and tied under the chin like a child's night-cap. In the fifteenth century . . . its resemblance to a modern wig on the heads of the three sergeants at the bar is very striking. . . . The coif appears to have undergone little alteration until the advent of wigs at the Restoration. Then, as we shall see, it suddenly dwindled in size until today it is represented by an absurd black patch on the crown of the wig..

There is still another indispensable and attractive adjunct to the costume of our higher judicial personages, which we have not yet adverted to. It is fully as ancient as the textile portion of the "C.J.'s" official attire. No one has yet correctly ascertained the origin of the collar of the SS. or Esses, but it probably appeared first in the reign of Henry IV. The earliest description we have is in a warrobe account of 1391, in which there is an entry of one collar of gold with seventeen letters "S" made in the shape of feathers with inscriptions on them. . . . The collar, which is now bestowed by the sovereign, was anciently described as "the collar of SS. in

England, wherewith esquires may be made." The letters S are, as will be seen by the portrait of Sir Edward Coke, linked together by knots and terminate with two portcullises and a pendent rose. It may be added that this identical order of Coke's was in the possession of and worn by the late Lord Coleridge on the bench.

OF "Malicious Cartoons" Case and Comment for May says:

Great latitude may well be allowed in the use of cartoons, as well as in the discussion of all public questions. On all public matters every point of view may properly be presented. Something may be allowed for overstatement and unfairness of presentation during the heat of a contest. But absolute misrepresentation, deliberate, dishonest, and malignant, ought to be regarded, not as a wrong to the individual victim simply, but as a greater wrong to the public. If a public man subjected to such misrepresentation cannot wisely take notice of it, or has no adequate remedy, the wrong to the public is of sufficient importance to require the public officials, without any private complaint or suggestion, to prosecute and punish the offender. A public prosecutor might render great service if, without any political motive or bias, he would impartially prosecute every conspicuous and aggravated case of criminal libel.

A VIGOROUS plea for "Reform in Criminal Procedure" is made by Everett P. Wheeler in the Columbia Law Review for Mav. He

says:

In this country, as well as in England, the old severity of penal legislation has been altogether reformed. But the old traditions of criminal procedure remain. They are totally inapplicable to existing conditions and require revision as much as the sanguinary penal code of a century ago....

The first rule which should be changed is that which requires the jury to be satisfied of the guilt of a prisoner beyond a reasonable doubt. This has enabled myriads

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of criminals to escape just punishment. It may possibly in a few instances have saved an innocent man from undeserved punishment, but the impunity that it has given to actual criminals has undoubtedly caused the death or injury of many times the number of those whom it has judiciously shielded. . . . It is in the interest of justice that if the jury before whom he is tried are satisfied of his guilt by the fair preponderance of evidence he should be convicted.

2. Another rule which grew up during the Draconic legislation of the past was that it was better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be convicted. This maxim overlooked entirely the duty of the State to give protection to the innocent men, who were likely to suffer from the escape of the ten guilty culprits, who, emboldened by impunity, would feel free to prey upon the community. These two maxims may be justly said to have caused the death of manifold more innocent persons than they have protected. . . .

3. One cause of delay in the trials of criminals and of punishment of crime was recently stated by Mr. Justice Woodward, of the Supreme Court of New York:

"It is impracticable in most communities to assemble a grand jury oftener than three or four times a year. If the crime is committed immediately after the sitting of one Grand Jury, the criminal, if apprehended, usually has from three to four months before another assembles and before he can be indicted. Until this time he cannot be lawfully tried. Then, for the first time he is formally charged with the crime, and he is then entitled to a reasonable opportunity to procure counsel. If he is unable to do so, the court assigns counsel. In such a case the counsel may be entirely unprepared to deal with the defense, and a decent regard for the rights of his client compels the granting of sufficient time to enable counsel to look into the case and determine upon a line of defense. In the meantime the court adjourns and the case of necessity goes over until the court reconvenes, which may be three or four months hence."

4. Another provision of law which has enabled many guilty persons to escape is that which gives to persons jointly indicted for a particular crime the right to separate trials.

5. "The gross abuses that exist owing to the readiness of appellate courts to grant new trials in criminal cases" should be ended.]

6. There is another technical rule in criminal pleading which should be repealed. It is thus stated by the Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Stedeker:

"An exception in a statute must be negatived in pleading, while a proviso need not."

In this particular case the application of this technical rule discharged the criminal. What possible reason in the nature of the case can be given for the distinction thus stated by the court? In all cases it should be enough that the indictment state the crime with clearness sufficient to enable the defendant to understand the charge. All matters of defense or exception should be left for the proof.

"THE Need of Creating Advocates or Defenders for the Accused" is strongly urged in the Canadian Law Journal for April, by W. D. Sutherland, who says:

At present, while there remain greatly preponderating advantages on the side of the Crown, no one can tell how any trial might result if only the Crown stood on something like the same footing in the contest and possessed only a parity, or as nearly as possible a parity, of advantages with the prisoner.

That such an officer as suggested is required cannot be doubted by any who give the question the least consideration. Those learned in the criminal law and skilled in all the ways and arts of the accomplished pleader should be selected and set apart solely for the work, whose duty it should be to assume the responsibility of the defence of prisoners ab initio; i. c., as soon as they should be apprehended. No consideration of what it will cost the country should be allowed for a moment to enter into the question.

AMERICAN FLAG. (DESECRATION-USE FOR AD

VERTISING PURPOSES - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTE-POLICE POWER.)

NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.

In People v. Van De Carr, 86 New York Supplement 644, the constitutionality of Penal Code, Sec. 640, subd. 16, prohibiting the use of the United States flag for advertising purposes is determined.

The statute not only prohibits the use of the flag as a trade mark or label or for the advertisement of merchandise, but also prohibits its mutilation, defacement or defilement, and the displaying of any word, figure, mark or advertisement of any nature upon the emblem itself. In these latter particulars the statute is held constitutional, the court saying, "It was competent for the Legislature to make it a misdemeanor to publicly mutilate, deface, defile, trample on, or cast contempt, either by words or act, upon the national or State flag, and the mutilation of the flag may mean the printing of an advertisement on the ensign itself. Such legislation is within the police power of the State, for it relates to the preservation of the peace." But while this is true and that part of the statute may be separated from the other provisions, the court is led to the conclusion that such other provisions are unconstitutional. All parts of this statute must be upheld, if at all, on the ground that the legislation is within the police power of the State. It is elementary that to be within the police power the legislation must relate in some way to the public health, morals, safety, comfort and general welfare.

The prohibition of the use of the flag as a trade-mark or in connection with an advertisement of merchandise, it is said, in no way relates to any one of the legitimate subjects to which the police power extends.

The Federal government has not prohibited the use of the flag in connection with advertisements. Trade labels, of which it forms a part, are accepted at the patent office. Not being within the police power, this part of the statute is an unauthorized interference with the liberty of the citizen, which includes the right to engage in any lawful pursuit, and to use all customary and lawful agencies in the prosecution of such business, and it is not legitimate legislation to declare that one of those agencies shall become unlawful, unless its use in some way affects the public health, etc.

The statute made an exception in favor of the reproduction of the flag in newspapers, books, circulars, ornamental pictures, articles of jewelry or stationery, etc., where it was not connected with an advertisement. This exception, the court holds, renders the statute class legislation, and obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment.

A number of cases are cited on general and collateral propositions, but no case is referred to which is directly in point.

ARREST. (HOMICIDE IN ATTEMPTING-RESPONSI-
BILITY OF OFFICER.)

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA.

In re Laing, 127 Federal Reporter 213, was a proceeding in habeas corpus to secure the relator's release from confinement on an indictment for murder.

Relator was a member of a posse organized by the United States marshal, to effect the arrest of a striker charged with resisting an officer during the West Virginia coal strike in 1903. The striker had stated that he did not intend to be taken alive, and never intended to be arrested. The officers and posse, amounting in all to four persons, ap

proached the striker's house, one officer taking a position in front and placing the others in the rear, to cut off all possible escape. The striker was given warning, and armed with a pistol ran from the rear of the house. The members of the posse called upon him to halt. He disregarded the call and continue l to run, changing his course towards a tree, which the officers anticipated he intended to reach, in order to open fire upon them. They fired twice and killed him.

They were indicted in the State court. After holding that habeas corpus is a proper proceeding, the court proceeds to a discussion of the merits of the case, holding that there was an absence of malice, that the relator was attempting to execute the process of the court, and that the killing was in selfdefense.

First Hawkins, P. C., p. 81, Sec. 11, is quoted to the effect that if a person having committed a felony will not suffer himself to be arrested, but stands on his own defense, or flies so that he can not possibly be apprehended alive, he may be lawfully slain by those who pursue him. This principle, the court says, has been held to be law in this country, citing State . Garrett, 60 N. C. 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359. The conclusions reached are also said to be sustained by United States in Allison v. United States, 160 U. S. 203216, 16 Supreme Court Reporter 252, 257, 40 L. Ed. 395, and Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 493, 17 Supreme Court Reporter 154, 156, 41 L. Ed. 528.

ATTORNEYS. (DISBARMENT FOR ADVERTISING.) COLORADO SUPREME COURT.

In People v. Taylor, 75 Pacific Reporter 914, the court makes absolute a rule to show cause why the defendant should not be disbarred for unprofessional conduct. The proceedings were brought on the relation of the Colorado Bar Association against an attorney of that State, who advertised, through the public press and otherwise, to secure divorces. The court states that such advertisements as were published are reprehensi

ble, mischievous and detrimental to good morals, and libelous upon the courts of justice throughout the State. The court refers particularly to the case of People v. Maccabe, 32 Pac. 280, 18 Colo. 186, and states that the reasons which are fully set forth in that case govern the present one. In the case referred to, the attorney advertised to obtain divorces quietly which would be good everywhere. It is held that the ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney shall advertise his talent or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. An attorney may properly accept a retainer for the prosecution or defense of an action for divorce when convinced that his client has a good cause, but for anyone to invite or encourage such litigation is reprehensible. An advertisement stating that divorce could be obtained quietly which would be good everywhere is against good morals, public and private. It is a false representation and a libel upon the courts of justice. Divorces cannot be legally obtained very quietly which shall be good anywhere. To say that divorces can be obtained quietly is equivalent to saying that they can be obtained without publicity. The statutes require certain public proceedings, such as the filing of the complaint, the summons, service of process, either personal or by publication in a newspaper; and to indicate that such public proceedings can or will be dispensed with by the courts having jurisdiction of such cases is a libel upon the integrity of the judiciary which cannot be overlooked.