and Jellachich, so completely is each identified with the cause he defends. The one, Kossuth, is an eloquent rhetorician, able to stir up the masses as the tempest stirs up the waves of the ocean; the other, Jellachich, a soldier, loyal and intrepid, electrifies an entire people, rude indeed, but brave and devout. The one fascinates by his discourses, the other by his example; the one is nourished by the discourses of the old French convention, which he admires, the other by the history of his country, which he loves; the one glorifies revolutions, the other glorifies liberty."-pp. 21-24.

We commend this parallel between Kossuth and Jellachich to the admirers of the former. No one questions that Kossuth is a distinguished revolutionary orator, and in that sort of eloquence the lowest in the scale and the easiest to be attained to which is adapted to rouse up the evil passions, and stimulate the natural insubordination of an unreasoning and unscrupulous multitude, he stands preeminent. But of the lofty character of a true patriot, of a real lover of liberty, or of a wise and prudent statesman, he has as yet given us no indication. His speeches in this country tire by their repetitions, and disgust by their egotism. His credit is every day diminishing, and if he ever leaves this country it will be as a small man in comparison with what he was esteemed when he first set his foot on our shores. He is far inferior, in all the qualities that fit him to be a leader of a revolutionary movement, to Joseph Mazzini, and can fill only a subordinate place under him. Our people have shown their usual bad taste in attempting to make him the object of their hero-worship. They love liberty, and delight to honor it in its representative, and for this we honor them. But in Kossuth they have selected a second-rate revolutionist, a sort of Camille Desmoulins, or rather a Robespierre without Robespierre's incorruptibility in money matters,not the representative either of liberty or of a noble struggle in behalf of national independence. The Magyars were the oppressors, not the oppressed, and while they were seeking to render themselves independent of the empire, they were fighting to keep eight millions of Hungarians of other races in subjection to themselves. It was the Croats who were fighting for liberty, and who were the real champions of freedom. He who deserves our sympathies and honors is not Kossuth, but their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich. He loved his country and liberty, and knew how to defend both, and he deserves to have his name placed high on the list headed by our own Washington.

What we have cited was written in the month of June, 1848, after the revolution in Vienna, and before the outbreak of hostilities between Hungary and Austria, but by one who saw clearly what was to be expected, and fully comprehended the causes which were at work to ruin the Austrian empire. Since then, Austria, who appeared to us at that time utterly prostrate, whose empire we thought must be dissolved, and the German provinces be united to a new German empire embracing all Germany, the Italian be absorbed in an independent federative Italy, and the Sclavonic be in part merged in a new and independent kingdom of Poland, and in part incorporated with the Magyars, forming an independent and powerful kingdom of Hungary, -since then, we say, Austria has suppressed the revolt in Italy, put down the revolution in her hereditary states, and reduced the Magyars to submission. This has disappointed and enraged the revolutionists, for Austria was the key-stone of the old European edifice, and it was only by her destruction that it could be demolished.

Threatened with red-republicanism within, with continued revolt in her provinces, and having to oppose, not only her own rebellious subjects, but the combined power of the whole revolutionsry party of the continent, Great Britain, and the United States, Austria called upon Russia to assist her in putting down the rebellion in Hungary. Russia complied with her request, and the Magyars were finally defeated and reduced by the combined forces of Austria and Russia.

This assistance granted by Russia to Austria has been represented by the defeated revolutionists, Great Britain, and the United States, as an unauthorized and criminal intervention in the domestic affairs of independent nations, and the revolutionary ex-Governor Kossuth, liberated from a Turkish prison through the intervention of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Webster, calls upon us to give him material aid in reviving the suppressed revolution, and to unite with Great Britain and intervene so far as to prevent Russia from again intervening. He made the same demand of England, and found many of the English people ready to respond to it in their toasts. This demand is the burden of all his speeches here, and their name is legion. Our government, if we may judge from the president's late message, was at first inclined to favor his revolutionary projects, and even to comply with his demand. Many of our citizens have

been quite enthusiastic on the subject, and, having declared Kossuth the champion of liberty, the apostle of humanity, a second Messiah, come to break the power of tyrants, and to redeem the human race from bondage, have been ready to respond to his appeal, and to force their government into a war with both Austria and Russia in his behalf.

Kossuth, in all his speeches that we have read, in all his reasonings, quietly assumes as the basis of his arguments what he knows perfectly well is false, and the mass of his American sympathizers take his statements as true, without having any clear or just conception of the real merits. of the question. Four years ago Hungary, to the great body of our people, even our educated people, was as much a terra incognita as the interior of Africa. Very few of them had any knowledge of its inhabitants, its domestic institutions, or its relations to the Austrian empire. Italian refugees and French liberals had prejudiced them against Austria, and prepared them to believe that any party opposed to her must be in the right. When, therefore, they heard Hungary had revolted and taken up arms against her, they took it for granted that the Hungarian cause was a good cause, and deserving the sympathy of every American citizen, and every friend of liberty throughout the world.

But Kossuth knows perfectly well that Hungary had no ground of complaint against the Austrian government. That Hungary had not developed her resources, that she had not kept pace with the industrial progress of the age. that she had to suffer very serious evils, very many things that needed reforming, is most true and undeniable; but all this was due, not to the Austrian government, but to the obstinacy and folly of her own diet, or local parliament. The imperial government labored constantly to persuade the local parliament to introduce the reforms which in the process of time and change of circumstances had become necessary, but always without success, and there was not a grievance complained of, not a reform needed, that the Hungarian parliament was not competent to redress or to introduce, if it had been so disposed. This fact should never be overlooked or forgotten, for it renders the opposition to Austria wholly unjustifiable.

Moreover, the immediate causes of the war with the imperial government were not the grievances that required redress, but desire for national independence on the one

hand, and on the other the determination of the Magyars to subject to Magyar rule the non-Magyar races of Hungary, or rather of Croatia, Selavonia, Transylvania, &c., in a general way reckoned as parts of Hungary, but not within the limits of Hungary proper, civil or geographical. The pretext for hostilities was, that the imperial government would not aid the Magyars in reducing these non-Magyar races, that is, would not aid in stripping the empire of a number of her provinces, and give them to the Magyars, to render the kingdom they proposed to declare independent powerful enough to defend itself. If the imperial government consented to let Hungary separate herself from the empire, and become independent, it could not be expected to add to her proper dominions other provinces, or to refrain from efforts to confine the independent kingdom within the limits of Hungary proper. The demand of the Magyars was itself unreasonable, and they had no right to feel aggrieved that it was not complied with, or that the imperial government aided Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania to maintain their independence of Hungary, and their loyalty to the empire. Even assuming Hungary, which, however was not the case, to have been recognized as independent of the empire, this would have been no cause of war on the part of Hungary. A state has a right to defend its loyal provinces, and in fact the war of the Magyars on the Croats, who adhered to the empire, was itself a war on the empire, and of itself justified the imperial government, and would have done so even assuming Hungary to have been independent, in making war on Hungary. The revolt of the Magyars had no justification, and their war upon the empire was aggressive, and in all respects unjustifiable. Under any point of view, then, from which we choose to consider the Magyar cause, it is essentially a bad cause, with which no friend of freedom or of justice could, understanding it, sympathize.*

*We are not sure that this is sufficiently clear to all our readers. Hungary is sometimes spoken of as including Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania, and sometimes as excluding them. Geographically it includes them, politically it in some respects did, and in some respects did not, include them. These states inhabited chiefly by Sclavonians and Roumans, were distinct from the Hungarian state, but were for certain purposes of administration joined to the kingdom of Hungary, and dependent on the Hungarian crown. Yet they had a civil organization of their own, and diets of their own, at least Croatia had a diet, distinct from the

But Kossuth and his friends misrepresent the relation which subsisted between Hungary and the empire. Certainly Hungary was distinct from and independent of the duchy of Austria, but to assert it to have been independent of the Austrian empire or state, and connected with it only by the accidental union of the crown of each in the same person, is to assert a palpable falsehood. Hungary was an integral part of the Austrian state, as much so as the duchy of Austria itself. Austria aside from Hungary, Bohemia, Galicia, Croatia, Selavonia, Transylvania, Dalmatia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, &c., is not an empire, but a dukedom, and these kingdoms and provinces, in forming in union with the duchy of Austria the Austrian empire,

Magyar diet, which is meant whenever mention is made of the Hungarian diet.

While Magyar Hungary, or Hungary in its restricted political sense, remained united to the empire, those provinces in some sense held from the empire, if we understand it, through the Hungarian crown. In consequence of this fact, when the Magyar kingdom obtained, in March, 1848, from the concessions of the good, but weak and terrified, Emperor Ferdinand, an independent ministry, the Magyar government claimed these provinces as a part of the Hungarian state, and demanded their submission to the new independent ministry. As the concession of that independent ministry was a virtual separation of Hungary from the empire, and threatened to be soon even a formal one, and to render Magyar Hungary in all respects an independent kingdom, the effect of this demand would have been, if complied with, to sever Croatia, Sclavonia, and Transylvania from the Austrian empire, and to make them provinces of the independent Magyar kingdom, and to subject the Sclavonians and Roumans to the Magyars, their bitter enemies and hereditary oppressors. The Croats, who were impatient of their quasi-dependence, on Hungary even while Hungary was united to the empire, could not entertain the thought of being dependent on her as an independent kingdom. They preferred being united to Austria, and holding immediately from the emperor, to being subjected to the Magyars, no longer united to Austria. They consequently, under the lead of their noble chief, the Ban Jellachich, refused to submit to the Magyar ministry. The ministry took up arms to compel them to submit but were defeated by Jellachich. They then applied to the imperial government to use its authority to compel them to submit, and to put down what Kossuth calls "the Servian insurrection.' The imperial government, if its action has not been misrepresented, counting on the loyalty of the Magyars, and trusting that they would still remain united to the Austrian state, appears to have been at first disposed to listen to their request; but as soon as it was clearly manifest that the Magyars were to be satisfied with nothing but absolute independence of the empire, it refused, and approved the Ban Jellachich.

Here we get at once at the immediate causes of the war of the Hun garian ministry under Kossuth against the empire. The Magyar diet had so alienated the affections of the non-Magyar provinces of the geographical kingdom of Hungary, that they would not consent to belong fo the political kingdom of Hungary, if independent of Austria, and