work be done, wherever it needs to be done, and so done that there will, in our day at least, be no occasion for doing it over again.

And this seems to be the view taken by the friends of order and religion in France. The bishops and clergy, as far as we have seen, without a single dissentient voice, have given in their adhesion to the republican order, resolved to give it a fair and honest trial, and to live or die with it. The politicians of all parties seem also to have done the same. The conviction appears to be universal, that if France is ever to find good government, and be restored to domestic tranquillity and peace, it must be as a republic. This requires no sacrifice of principle or consistency. Government is for the public good. When circumstances no longer controllable by human means have disabled an existing government from securing that good, and rendered constitutional changes necessary and inevitable, a new régime the only practicable one, it is the part of wisdom, of all sound politics, as well as of duty, to accept it, and to make the best of it. The wise and consistent statesman, when he cannot control circumstances, conforms to them, for government is an affair of human prudence, and takes care never to ruin himself or his country for the sake of an abstraction.

It is because we judge it the part of wisdom to accept this republican order, and to labor to render it permanent and beneficial, that we have begun our remarks on the recent events in Europe by condemning the causes which have made them necessary and inevitable. If we are not much mistaken, European society can hereafter be settled only on the republican basis. Whether it can be settled even on that may be regarded as problematical; but if not on that, it can on none. Republicanism is now the last hope of Europe. If that fails her, her civilization must go backward, and she become ere long the counterpart of Asia. the reason that, in the fifteenth century, we would have sustained feudalism against the tendency to centralism, and in the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, centralism against the democratic tendency, we would now sustain republicanism against any tendency to overthrow it, whether in favor of socialism or aristocracy. Our principle is, to sustain the existing constitution of the state, whether it conforms to our abstract notions or not; because in polities every thing is to be taken in the concrete, nothing in

the abstract.

For

But if we maintain in principle that the change from feudalism to democracy is a progress, if we say, with the beardless philosophers of the day, that the people, in seeking it, have been obeying a divine instinct, and declare the revolutionary spirit which has been followed throughout, wise and sacred, we cannot with any consistency maintain this new order, or resist the tendencies that may be manifested for additional changes. Moreover, a people filled with the revolutionary spirit, holding, as a sound maxim in politics, that the evils they may have to endure in the social state are to be remedied by the subversion of the existing government, whether by violence or peaceful agitation, and the substitution of some other form, is incapable of sustaining a good and permanent government, whatever its constitution; for no government can prevent or redress all evils, and at best there will be much that can be overcome only by the Christian virtues of resignation and patience. Every government, if government, must sometimes restrain, must make its authority felt, and compel submission; for in every society, as long as the world stands, there will be turbulent and rebellious spirits, whom authority must tame. Men's views, too, of the policy the government should adopt will often conflict, and it will be impossible for the government to satisfy them all. Impossible, therefore, must it always be to maintain a fixed and permanent government, if its subjects feel that it is right and proper for them to overthrow it whenever they choose. The old governments have fallen, not for the want of physical force, but because they no longer had any moral support in their subjects. No matter what is the physical force at the command of the government, it cannot long sustain itself, at least in a condition to perform its proper functions, unless it has the moral force of the nation with it. This is even more true of republican government than of any other. The virtue of loyalty is far more essential to a democracy than to a monarchy, though a democracy is less fitted to inspire it. In vain will you labor to sustain your republic, if the people are disloyal, if they hold themselves under no moral obligation to support it, and free to abolish it whenever they fancy it will be for their interest or their pleasure to do so. It has then no moral support; and the moment the people find, or imagine they find, themselves a little incommoded by it, they will begin to agitate for a change, and force it to take measures of repression or concession, which, sooner or later,

must prove its ruin. The brief history of our own governments, especially of the government of the state of New York, would confirm this conclusion, if it needed confirmation.

It is true, that our popular politicians tell us that mere humanitarian principles will be always a sufficient guaranty against frequent and unnecessary revolutions. The people, they say, will always, from affection and interest, sustain the government of their choice, and we may always rely on their vis inertia and indisposition to change. For, add they, in the words of Mr. Jefferson, "all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer evils, while they are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." But times have altered since 1776. When Mr. Jefferson drew up the declaration of American independence, his appeal to experience was warranted; for up to that time mankind had very generally held the doctrine, that to support the constitution of the state is a sacred duty binding upon all the citizens, and that to labor in any way to subvert or abolish it is a crime, and a high crime. But from the fact, that mankind have shown under this doctrine the disposition asserted, we cannot safely conclude that they will continue to show it under the contrary doctrine. Mr. Jefferson could appeal only to the experience of mankind under the moral operation of the anti-revolutionary doctrine. Since his time, the revolutionary doctrine has been in vogue, and very widely received, and we do not find the people now so indisposed to change as they were then. They have, in fact, become greedy of change, and ready to embrace every novelty that is proposed with a little earnestness and eloquence. Jefferson, perhaps, did not sufficiently reflect that the prevalence of the revolutionary doctrine would very naturally tend to weaken, if not destroy, that indisposition of the people to abolish the forms to which they were accustomed, on which he relied as a protection against its dangerous

ness.

Mr.

Affection and interest are great words. But affection, when not founded in principle, and sustained by a sense of duty, is mere steam from the marsh; and what is or is not interest is a matter not always easy to determine. If it be a duty to sustain the existing constitution, there is no difficulty in determining the questions of duty which may come up. But interests are the hardest things in the world to

settle. Men often mistake their own interests, and after it is too late find out that they have blundered. Their views of what is or is not their interest vary, too, with their age, with their pursuits, or their social position. The Haves and the Have-nots are far from agreeing as to their respective interests. No man will believe his interest is consulted, when he finds himself thwarted, or his neighbour succeeding, and his own plans miscarrying. Interests themselves do often really conflict, and it is impossible for the government to harmonize all so as to satisfy each. The wise statesman, therefore, can never rely on the mere sense of interest; but must, while he seeks as far as possible to promote all interests, make his appeal to the sense of duty,—to loyalty.

But no people, holding themselves free to abolish their existing form of government whenever they think proper, can regard themselves as under a moral obligation to sustain it. An obligation from which we may absolve ourselves whenever we choose is no moral obligation, and, indeed, no obligation at all. The obligation to support the government and the right to abolish it are not compatible, the one with the other, and no sophistry can make them so. The revolutionary spirit and doctrine to which we owe the recent events in Europe are, then, incompatible with the existence of government itself, and therefore as incompatible with the existence of republican government as of monarchical government. This is wherefore we have opposed them, and venture, even in the moment of their victory, to denounce them. We accept the victory as un fait accompli, and wish the people to reap from it the fruits of real social and political well-being. But to applaud the forces which have won it, to sanction the spirit and doctrine which made it necessary, although they have gained it, would be to render the victory barren of good fruits,nay, worse, prolific in new disorders. The work of demolition must cease, and that of construction must begin, and the principles which must govern the builders cannot be those which governed the destroyers. If you knock away the foundation as you raise your superstructure, you raise— a castle in the air.

But we have dwelt long enough on general considerations. What is likely to be the result of the recent events in Europe? France is now decidedly a republic. Will she be able to establish and maintain the authority of the state and

the freedom of the subject? This is a matter about which we do not wish to speculate. We have found nothing in our historical reading which leads us to augur her success. The historical precedents are all against her. But we cannot pretend to fathom the designs of Almighty God, to whom belong the ordering of all events and the determination of their issues. Whether he has designed the revolution in mercy or in judgment to the nation, we can know only as he himself is pleased to make it manifest; but whichever it be, it is ours to be silent and adore, for his judgments are as adorable as his mercies. That the French people will find it an easy task to reconstitute the state, which the revolution of February dissolved, and reëstablish and maintain order, the indispensable condition of liberty, we presume nobody with a grain of political philosophy or experience will pretend. The ideas and passions, the schemes and wishes, which have destroyed the old government, and reduced French society to its original elements are opposed to all governinent, and if not abandoned, must be as fatal to the republic as they have been to the monarchy. The revolutionary party are in pursuit of Utopia, and have no stopping-place within the limits of practicable government. They must be arrested, or they will subvert the new institutions before they get fairly into operation. But to attempt to arrest them by physical force, by measures of repression, will only renew between them and the new government the very relations which rendered the old government impotent for good, and its longer existence impracticable. Under Providence, then, the solution of the problem must turn on the fact, whether the radicals, represented by such men as Ledru-Rollin, that second edition of Danton, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, Albert, and company, are a large, or only a small, minority of the French nation, and on the courage, firmness, and energy of the party opposed to them. If they are only a small minority, confined principally to a few localities, and the friends of order show them from the outset that their opposition is disregarded, and their advice. will not be asked, they may be held in subjection till the new government is so firmly established as to render their attempts to subvert it impotent and ridiculous. But if they are a large minority,-absolutely so, by their numbers, or effectually so, by their organization and concentration, or by the uncertainty, hesitation, fears, and anxieties of their opponents,--they will have little difficulty in defeating all