The History, Civil, Political and Military, of the Southern Rebellion

position on a ridge to the west of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. After driving back Wharton's division, he had not advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders were given for concentrating all our guns on him. In the meantime, a force of cavalry was advancing along the pike, and through the fields to the right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great danger, and Wharton was ordered to form his division at once, and take position to hold the enemy's cavalry in check. Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division, which had become separated from the other brigades, was ordered up for the same purpose. Discovering that the 6th Corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the approach in that direction was through an open flat and across a boggy stream with steep banks, I directed Captain Powell, serving on General Gordon's staff, who rode up to me while the artillery was being placed in position, to tell the general to advance against the enemy's right flank, and attack it in conjunction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery was opened from our right; but as Captain Powell said he did not know where General Gordon was, and expressed some doubt about finding him, immediately after he had started I sent Lieutenant Page, of my own staff, with or ders for both Generals Gordon and Kershaw to make the attack. In a short time Colonel Carter concentrated eighteen or twenty guns on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram advanced at once to the position from which the enemy was driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right, and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north of Middletown, and take position across the pike against the cavalry. Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he delivered my order to General Kershaw, but the latter informed him that his division was not in a condition to make the attack, as it was very much scattered, and there was a cavalry force threatening him in front. Lieutenant Page also stated that he had seen Gordon's division in Kershaw's rear reforming, and that it was also much scattered, and that he had not delivered the order to General Gordon, because he saw that neither his division nor Kershaw's was in a condition to execute it. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his place. I then rode to Middletown to make provision against the enemy's cavalry, and discovered a large body of it seriously threatening that flank, which was very much exposed. Wharton's division and Wofford's brigade were put in position on Pegram's right, and several charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I had no cavalry on that flank ex

cept Payne's very small brigade, which had accompanied Gordon and made some captures of prisoners and wagons. Lomax had not arrived, but I received a message from him, informing me that he had crossed the river, after some delay from a cavalry force guarding it, and I sent a message to him requiring him to move to Middletown as quick as possible, but, as I subsequently ascertained, he did not receive that message. Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but he had not been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to the attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th. There was now one division of cavalry threatening my right flank. and two were on the left, near the Back road, held in check by Rosser. The force of the latter was too weak to make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and all we could do was to watch it. As I passed across Cedar creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the camps and drive the men to their commands. It was reported to me subsequently that a great number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the division commanders to send for their men.

After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had taken a new position about two miles north of Middletown, and, as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to prevent his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the left, for the purpose of ordering an advance. I found Ramseur and Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not come up. In a short time, however, I found him coming up from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's left, and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his new position-Kershaw and Ramseur being or dered to advance at the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous, and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gordon's skirmishers came back reporting a line of battle in front behind breastworks, and General Gordon did not make the attack. It was now apparent that it would not do to press my troops further. They had been up all night and were much jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning, their own 1anks had been much dis ordered, and the men scattered, and it had re

EARLY'S VERSION

OF THE BATTLE OF CEDAR GROVE. 555

Every effort to rally the men in the rear having
failed, I had now nothing left for me but to order
these troops to retire also. When they commenced
to move, the disorder soon extended to them, but
General Pegram succeeded in bringing back a por-
tion of his command across Cedar creek in an or-
ganized condition, holding the enemy in check, but
this small force soon dissolved. A part of Evans'
brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a ford
above the bridge for a short time, but. it followed
the example of the rest. I tried to rally the men
immediately after crossing Cedar creek, and at
Hupps' Hill, but without success. Could five hun-
dred men have been rallied, at either of these places
who would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all
my artillery and wagons, and the greater part of
the captured artillery, could have been saved, as
the enemy's pursuit was very feeble.
As it was, a
bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the
road between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, just above
Strasburg where there was no other passway, there-
by blocking up all the artillery, ordnance and med-
ical wagons and ambulances which had not passed
that point, and, as there was no force to defend
them, they were lost, a very small body of the ene-
my's cavalry capturing them.

quired time to reform them. Their ranks, moreo- | alry, which would have destroyed all hope at once. ver, were much thinned by the absence of the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps. The delay which had unavoidably occurred had enabled the enemy to rally a portion of his troops, and his immense force of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance extremely hazardous. I determined, therefore, to try and hold what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off the captured and abandoned artillery, small arms and wagons. A number of bold at tempts were made during the subsequent part of the day by the enemy's cavalry to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in the afternoon the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men, and led them back against the enemy, but without avail. The information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry. observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear, without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disorder. Ramseur, however, succeeded in retaining with bim two or three hundred men of his division, and Major Goggin, of Kershaw's staff who was in command of Conner's brigade, about the same number from that brigade; and these men, aided by several pieces of artillery, held the enemy's whole force on our left in check for one hour and a half, until Ramsear was shot down mortally wounded, and the ammunition of those pieces of artillery was exhausted. While the latter were being replaced by other guns, the force that had remained with Ramseur and Goggin gave way, also. Pegram's and Wharton's divisions and Wofford's brave brigade had remained steadfast on the right, and resisted all efforts of the enemy's My loss in the battle at Cedar creek was twentycavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved three pieces of artillery, some ordnance and medito the left without leaving the pike open to the cav-cal wagons and ambulances, which had been carried

The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the Back road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The infantry moved back toward Newmarket at three o'clock next morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were beyond pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that place while he was there. He then fell back without molestation to his former position, and established his line on Stony creek, across from Columbia furnace to Edinburg, seven miles below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at Newmarket, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and there was an entirely open country between the two places, they being very nearly in sight of each other.

Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the Front Royal road toward Winchester, under the impression that the enemy was being forced back toward that place, and he did not reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had taken place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the Luray Valley to his former position at Millford, without molestation.

to the front for the use of the troops on the field; about 1860 in killed and wounded, and something over 1000 prisoners. Major-General Ramseur fell into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him, not only my command bnt the country sus tained a heavy loss. He was a most gallant and energetic officer whom no disaster appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new strength in the midst of confusion and disorder. He fell at his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native State has reason to be proud of his memory. Brig adier-General Battle was wounded at the beginning

of the fight, and other valuable officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and wounded in this action was very heavy.

This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for, on the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men undertook to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. Had they but waited, the mischief on the left would have been remedied.