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THE CONFEDERATE

MARCH, 1863.

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Dep't of Richmond

....

..........

Total Army of the East....143,000

43 000

73,000 36,000

£3,000

6,00

6,000

168,000

Dep't of Tennessee

50.000

66,000

Dep't of Fast Tennessee........ 11,000

16,000

23 000

Dep't of Mississippi.

49.000

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[blocks in formation]

96,000

252,000

484,000

These figures offer to those curious in such matPresent For duty. Present. & abs't. ters a fruitful theme for speculation. It will be seen Dep't of Northern Virginia..... 60,000 169,000 that "the Confederate army," [quoting from the Dep't of S. Carolina and Ga 32,000 Dep't of Virginia and N. Car. 45,000 73,000 generalizations of the collaborator,]" undoubtedly 7,000 reached its highest point, both in numbers and ef232,000 ficiency, in the early summer of 1863, when the movement into Pennsylvania was commenced. At the close of March, before all preparations had been made, the returns show a nominal force of 484 000, of whom 341,000 were present, and 281,000 present for duty. Probably about 20,000 were added during the next six weeks to the Army of the East: so that we may safely say that at the middle of June there were a little more than 500,000 on the muster rolls, of whom 300,000 were present for duty. The army, especially that under Lee, were in the highest state of efficiency. The recent victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had inspired them with perfect confidence in their own invincibility. The Confederacy was at that time like an athlete in the highest condition of training. Fully one-half of the men of military age were enrolled in the army. If we take into account those exempt by infirmity, those employed in the various civil departments, and those detailed directly to perform labor in the various military work-shops, it is hardly an overstatement to say that every able-bodied man was enrolled; of these seven out of ten were actually present, and six out of ten were present for duty."

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No people could long sustain such a strain. In the first week of July they suffered losses amounting to fully 100,000 men. At the end of the month Lee had only 41,000 for duty out of the 100,000 with which he had set out six weeks before; and in a 430,000 month by every exertion he could get together only 15,000 more, and out of this 56,000 all told, he was forced to send 15,000 of his best troops to the West. If the autumn campaign of 1863 in Virginia had been prosecuted by the Union commander with 221,000 anything approaching vigor, there is no reason to 127.000 doubt that it would have closed the war; for Meade 27.000 had an army fully double that of Lee. When in the 77 000 spring of 1864 Grant opened his campaign, Lee had 9,000 only a little more than 50,000, and in August, when 329,000 the siege of Richmond was fairly opened, he had, 550,000 counting in those present with him, though still nominally belonging to the Department of North 88,000 182,000 Carolina, less than 60,000. From this time the re15,000 21.000 4,000 5,000 turns show how prevalent became desertions from 6,000 7,000 17,000 the Confederate armies of the East and West. In 90,000 114,000 225,000 August, out of a nominal force of 550,000, there 30,000 46.000 96,000 were not 200,000 present for duty in all the armies. 3,000 4.000 7,000 At the close of February, the date of the last report 21.008 ...... 15,00) 38,000 52,000 77,000 in our possession, Lee, out of a nominal force of 160 000 had present but 73,000, and for duty but 1.4, 00 218,0 0 59,000. More than half were absent wholly, and

100,000
265,000

443,000

little more than a third were present for duty. When he finally abandoned Petersburg and Richmond, it is doubtful whether he had 35,000 men, all told."

We here have a confirmation of our statement, repeated in several instances, of the almost uniform numerical preponderance of the National army over that of the Confederates. One reason why this was necessary, and why it did not always result in victory was alluded to by Grant when he said: "The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison; and long lines of river and railway communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies." While this was true, in a general sense, it did not excuse the absence of success on special occasions when our field superiority was unquestionable, as, for instance, during the entire campaign of McClellan, and at Gettysburg and the subsequent pursuit of Lee, when Meade held in hand 70,000 men to Lee's

40 000.

Another thing will impress the student as one of the strange features of the war-that, considering the weakness of the Richmond garrison and defenses, during 1861-2-3, no serions attempt should have been made to seize and hold the Confederate capital. A history of the secret influences which controlled the operations of commanders on the Lower James, would reveal the fact that personal jealousies had quite as much influence in suppressing operations against the rebel capital as 'military considera

tions.'

THE NORTH CAROLINA PLEA FOR PEACE. The document referred to on page 203 is as follows, italicised as printed in the Raleigh Standard for July 31st, 1863:

MR. EDITOR: There is so far as I remember, no war to be met with in history entirely analagous to the one now raging between the North and the South. That produced by an attempt on the part of three of the Swiss Cantons to separate themselves from the Confederation, a few years since, in some respects, resembles it most nearly. That attempt, it will be remembered, was arrested, and the rebellious Cantons speedily reduced to submission by the arms of the Coufederacy. It is frequently compared to our old Revolutionary struggle with the mother country, but there is scarcely an analogy between the two cases. The thirteen Colonies were not like the Southern States, equal in political rights with the other States of the British Empire. They possessed no sovereign rights whatever. They were

not, as we were, entitled to representation in the common Parliament of the British Union. but were mere Colonies-mere dependencies upon the mother country. In an evil hour the administration of GEORGE GRENVILLE, and afterwards that of Lord NORTH, attempted to impose a tax upon the Colonies. This oppression was resisted, and the resistance was made the pretext for other oppressions more unjust still. The Colonies continued the old resistance in a constitutional way for nearly ten years, by represesentations, remonstrances, and petitions for the redress of grievances; but all in vain. At length they took up arms, with the avowed object of enforcing such redress. They solemuly disclaimed all intention of separation from the parent State, for they were as loyal in their feelings of attachment to the British Constitution as were the inhabitants of Surry or Cornwall. This resolute step they confidently expected would procure the desired redress; but the advice of all the ablest statesmen at that age-of CHATHAM, of CAMDEN, of BURKE, of Fox, of ROCKINGH&M, and others, were thrown away upon the narrow-minded monarch and the bigoted ministry which then swayed the destinies of the British Empire. Still in hope, they continued the struggle for one whole year. At length

the British Parliament declared the Colonies out of

the protection of the parent State. And then, at last, no other course was left them but to proclaim their independence, and defend it, if need be, with their life's blood. The battle of Lexington was fought on the 19th of April, 1775, and on the 12th of April, 1776, the Provincial Congress of North Carolina "empowered their delegates in Congress to concur with the delegates of the other Colonies in declaring independence and forming foreign alliances," and on the 15th of the following month Virginia, through her Convention, instructed her delegates in the Continental Congress "to propose to that body to declare the United Colonies free and independent States, absolved from all allegiance to, or dependence on, the Crown or Parliament of Great Britain," and on the 4th of July following the ever memorable Declaration was made.

But how different has been the course of the Secessionists. They seem to have resolved years ago that the Union should be destroyed, and then to have set themselves to work to forge such griev ances as would seem to give them a decent pretext for the accomplishment of their premeditated schemes. The first effort was made in the days of nullification by the Secessionists of South Carolina. The grievance then complained of was the tariff, although the State of South Carolina, herself, had been from the foundation of the Government nearly up to that period as strong an advocate of a high tariff as any State in New England. That question

THE NORTH CAROLINA PLEA FOR PEACE.

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and Free States. It is said, however, that the Compromise of 1820 was unconstitucional; but what is that to the purpose? It was a most solemn compact between the two sections of the country, made for the settlement of a most perplexing question, and without any reference to its constitutionality, should have been regarded as an organic law, and observed as sacredly as the Constitution itself.

was compromised - South Carolina obtained all that she ostensibly demanded. A revenue tariff, with incidental protection, became the settled policy of the Government, and, except for a short period, under the tariff of 1842, was never departed from. But still they were not satisfied. Immediately after the passage of Mr. CLAY'S Compromise bill, the newspaper organ of the Secessionists at Washington declared that the South could never be united on the tar ff The effect of this measure was great and rapid, question, and that the slave question was the only one and there can be but little doubt that it was such as that could unite them." And Mr. CALHOUN, if I 2 majority of its authors contemplated. The result mistake not, said the same thing in a speech at Ab- was the formation of a great party at the North opbeville, in South Carolina, about the same time; posed to the further extension of Slavery, and which and, of course, was followed by all the lesser lights party very nearly succeeded in electing their canamong his adherents. Then commenced that vio didate for the Presidency, Mr. FREMONT, in 1856. lent agitation of the Slavery question which had After the election, this party seemed to be on the nearly culminated upon the admission of California, wane, until the Anti-Slavery spirit of the whole in 1850. Again, by the efforts of those immortal North was aroused to madness, by an attempt on statesmen of the last age, Messrs. WEBSTER, CLAY, the part of Mr. BUCHANAN'S Administration to force and others, was the matter compromised. The the Lecompton Constitution, with Slavery, upon the whole country at first appeared to be satisfied with people of Kansas, in opposition fo the known and the settlement, but it soon appeared that there expressed wish of three-fourths of them. But for this were a number of restless spirits among the extre most unjustifiable measure the Republican party mists of the South that would be satisfied with noth- would undoubtedly have dwindled down to modeing short of a dissolution of the Union. Of this rate proportions; and, even after this, it is doubtful class of politicians W. L. YANCEY may be fitly se- if they could have succeeded in the Presidential lected as representative man. He immediately be- election of 1860. if the Secessionists with YANCEY gan to agitate the question again. He went to the at their head, had not determined that they should Democratic National Convention at Baltimore, in succeed. After Mr. YANCEY and his party had, 1852, as a delegate from the State of Alabama, and against their wishes, succeeded in getting their ultithere proposed as the ultimatum on which he could matum of non-intervention incorporated into the continue to act with the Democratic party, and Cincinnati platform, they went to work to conjure upon which, in his opinion, the Slave States could up another to present to the Charleston Convention. consent to remain in the Union, that the doctrine of Abandoning their doctrine of non-intervention, they non-intervention by Congress in regard to Slavery went to the opposite extreme and demanded that in the Territories should be incorporated in the the intervention of Congress for the protection of Democratic platform. In this he failed, and there- Slavery in the territories should constitute a part of fore did not support the nominee of the Convention, the Charleston platform. This demand they well Mr. PIERCE. He could not, however, at that time, knew would not be complied with, nor did they desucceed in creating a great schism in the Demo- sire that it should be. Their object was to procure cratic party, so great had been the calm which the the secession of the delegates of the Cotton States Compromise measures of 1850 had produced. In from the Convention, and thus, by defeating the 1856 he again went as a delegate from the State of nomination of Mr. DoUGLAS, and rending asunder Alabama to the Cincinnati Convention, with his old the Democratic party, to ensure the election of Mr. ultimatum in his pocket. Contrary to his wishes and LINCOLN, and thereby forge for themselves a griev expectations it was incorporated into the Cincinnati ance which would seem to justify them in the exeplatform, and being thus left without an excuse, hecution of the long meditated designs of destroying supported Mr. BUCHANAN for the Presidency, in the fall of that year. In the meantime, however, that fatal measure, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, had been consummated. It was brought about by the extremists of the South, aided by a few partizan Democrats at the North. The avowed object of its author was to open to Slavery the territories north of the Missouri Compromise line, notwithstanding the agreement of 1820, that said line should forever divide the territories between the Slave

the Union. All of this they accomplished, and the election of Mr. LINCOLN was perhaps harted with greater joy at Charleston than at New York. I will do them the justice to state that they also claimed to have some other grievances; among them, that some of the Northern States, by their statutes, obstructed the execution of the Fugitive Slave law, but the only States that could complain much on that score were willing to remain in the Union, while South Carolina, the State which

they should not be disposed to assist us, Cotton was King, and would soon bring all the crowned heads of Europe on their knees in supplication to us; would compel them to raise the blockade- should one be established-in thirty days, in sixty days, in ninety days, in one hundred and twenty days, in six months, in nine months, in one year at furthest.

set the ball in motion, perhaps never lost a slave. | perpetuity in the Southern States; that if, after all But it must be borne in mind that no act of the National Government constituted any part of their grievances. They did not pretend that any act of Congress infringed their rights, and the decisions of the Supreme Court were mainly such as they would themselves have made. Nay, even at the very time of Mr. LINCOLN's inauguration, if the Cotton States had allowed their Senators and Representatives to remain, they would have had a decided majority in both houses of Congress in favor of the extension of Slavery, and in opposition to the policy of the party which elected him.

The great cause of complaint was, that a man opposed to the extension of Slavery in the Territories had been elected President of the United States, according to the terms of the Constitution which he was sworn to defend and protect, and who disclaimed any other than constitutional means in the accomplishment of his objects. Under such circumstances it seems that if they had labored under any real grievance, their course was plain. They should have taken the course of our Revolutionary fathers When the States assembled in convention, instead of proceeding at once to declare their independence for the idea of secession, peaceable of right, seems, as Publius says, to have exploded and given up the ghost-should clearly and concisely have stated what their grievances were, and demanded redress in respectful, yet firm and decided terms. They should have exhausted every constitutional means of obtaining guarantees-if any were needed-by representation by remonstrance, by petition; and failing in all these, they should have done as our Revolutionary sires did, i. e., fight in the Union for their rights until they were driven out of it. Such a course would have procured for us, as it did for our fathers, the respect, the sympathy, and the assistance of other nations. Instead of that, we have not a friend in Europe. But such was not the course which these-in their own estimationwise statesmen chose to pursue. When such a course was suggested or recommended to them, they evaded it by a long list of magnificent promises, which looked so splendid as almost to dazzle the mind with their brilliancy.

First and foremost, they promised that secession should be peaceable.

Secondly They promised that if perchance war should ensue, it would be a very short war; that it would not last six months; that the Yankees would not fight; that one Southerner could whip from ten to one hundred of them; that England and France would speedily recognize us, and render us every assistance we might desire; that whatever might be their abstract opinions of the subject of Slavery, their interests would impel them to promote its

Thirdly: They promised us that all the Slave States, except Delaware, would join the Southern Confederacy; that Slavery should not only be perpetuated in the States, but that it should be extended into all the Territories in which the negro could live; that all the grievances occasioned by the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave law should be speedily redressed; that slave property should be established upon a basis as safe as that of landed property.

Fourthly: They promised us that the new Govern ment should be a mere Confederacy of States, of absolute sovereignty and equal rights; that the States should be tyrannized over by no such ** central despotism" as the old Government at Washington; that the glorious doctrine of State rights and nullification, as taught by Mr. JEFFERSON and Mr. CALHOUN, should prevail in the new Confederacy; that the sovereignty of the States and their judicial decisions should be sacredly respected.

Fifthly: They promised us the early and permanent establishment of the wealthiest and best Government on the earth, whose credit should be better than that of any other nation; whose prosperity and happiness should be the envy of the civilized world.

And lastly, they promised us that if war should ensue, they would go to the battle-field and spill, if necessary, the last drop of their blood in the cause of their beloved South.

While such have been their promises, what have been their performances? Instead of secession being peaceable as they promised it would, it has given rise to such a war as has never before desolated any country since the barbarians of the North overran the Roman Empire.

So far from the war's ending in six months, as they said it would, should it ensue, it has already lasted more than two years; and if their policy is to be pursued, it will last more than two years longer; and, notwithstanding their predictions, the Yankees have fought on many occasions with a spirit and determination worthy of their ancestors of the Revolution-worthy of the descendants of those austere old Puritans whose heroic spirit and religious zeal made OLIVER CROMWELL'S army the terror of the civilized world-or of those French Huguenots"who, thrice in the sixteenth century, contended with heroic spirit and varying for tunes against all the genius of the house of Lo

THE NORTH CAROLINA PLEA FOR PEACE.

rainne, and all the power of the house of Valois." England and France have not recognized us-have not raised the blockade-have not shown us any sympathy, nor is there any probability that they ever will, and that Cotton is not King is now universally acknowledged. And Maryland has not joined the Confederacy, nor has Kentucky nor Missouri ever really been with us. Slavery has not only not been perpetuated in the States, nor extended into the Territories, but Missouri has passed an act of emancipation, and Maryland is ready to do so rather than give up her place in the Union, and the last hope of obtaining one foot of the Territories for the purpose of extending Slavery has departed from the Confederacy forever. The grievances caused by the failure of some of the Northern States to execute the Fugitive Slave law have not only not been remedied, but more slaves have been lost to the South forever, since secession was inaugurated, than would have escaped from their masters in the Union in five centuries. And how have they kept their promise that they would respect the sovereignty and rights of the States? Whatever the Government may be in theory, in fact we have a grand military consolidation, which almost entirely ignores the existence of the States, and disregards the decisions of their highest judicial tribunals. The great central despotism at Washington, as they were pleased to call it, was at any time previous to the commencement of the secession movement, and even for some time after it had commenced, a most mild and beneficent Government, compared with the central despotism at Richmond, under which we are now living.

Instead of an early and permanent establishment of the "wealthiest and best Government in the world, with unbounded credit," what have we got? In spite of all the victories which they profess to have obtained over the Yankees, they have lost the States of Missouri, Kentucky, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, and, in my humble opinion, have lost them forever; and, in all probability, Alabama will soon be added to the number. This will leave to the Confederacy but five States out of the original thirteen, and of these five the Yankees have possession of many of the most important points, and one-third of their territory. So far the Yankees have never failed to hold every place of importance which they have taken, and present indications are that Charleston will soon be added to the number. The campaign of General LEE in Pennsylvania has undoubtedly proved a failure, and with is the last hope of conquering a peace by a successful invasion of the enemy's country. Our army has certainly been very much weakened and dispirited by this failure and the fall of Vicksburgh, and how long even Richmond will be safe no

533

one can tell. As the Richmond Enquirer said some time ago, "They are slowly but surely gaining upon us acre by acre, mile by mile," and, unless Providence interposes in our behalf-of which I see no indications-we will, at no great distance of time, be a subjugated people.

As to our unbounded credit, based upon the security of King Cotton, it is unnecessary to speak. When we see one of the most influential States in the Confederacy discrediting a very large part of the Confederate currency and the Confederate Government itself repudiating, to some extent, its most solemn obligations, we cannot but suppose that the confidence of other nations in the good faith and credit of this Government is small indeed. As regards their promise "to go to the war and spill the last drop of their blood in the cause of their beloved South," I will say nothing. Everybody knows how the Secessionists of North Carolina have kept that promise. Everybody knows that the leaders, with a few honorable exceptions, will neither fight nor negotiate.

What a deplorable spectacle does the foregoing history present to our view! To what a desperate pass have they brought us and for what? They say that they did it because the North would give us no guarantee in the Slavery question. I have before stated that not one of the conventions of the seven Cotton States ever demanded any guarantees whatever. Nay, they even refused to accept of any, if their friends of the Border States would procure it for them.

The Legislature of North Carolina, at its regular session in January 1861, adopted resolutions appointing commissioners to the Peace Congress, at Washington City, and also to the convention which assembled at Montgomery, Alabama, in February, 1861, for the purpose of adopting a Constitution, and establishing a Provisional Government for the Confederate States of America. On the motion of the writer of this, the resolution appointing commissioners to Montgomery was amended so as to instruct them "to act only as mediators, and use every effort possible to restore the Union upon the basis of the Crittenden propositions as modified by the Legislature of Virginia." The commissioners, under these instructions, were the Hon. D. L. SWAN, Gen. M. W. RANSOM, and JOHN L. BRIDGERS, Esq., who, upon their return, submitted a report to his Excellency Governor ELLIS, which was by him laid before the Legislature, and was printed among the legisla tive documents of that year, where it may be consulted. In this report they say that they had the most ample opportunities of ascertaining public opinion in the Cotton States, and then add: "We regret to be constrained to state, as the result of our inquiries, made under such circumstances, that

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