ing decided that the District of Alaska was not "Indian country,” and that the act of June 30, 1834,1 regulating the trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, was not in force therein, Congress, in the general appropriation act of March 3, 1873,2 amended section 1 of the Alaska act of June 27, 1868,3 so as to extend over that country sections 20 and 21 of said act of June 30, 1834, as well as the acts relating "to customs, commerce, and navigation.' The first of these sections provides, among other things, that, if any person shall introduce, or attempt to introduce, any spirituous liquors or wine into the Indian country, except supplies for the army, under the direction of the war department, he "shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $300." By the act of March 3, 1847, said section 20 was amended so that upon a conviction before the District Court of such act or attempt, the party should be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year. The section was again amended by the acts of February 13, 1862,4 and March 15, 1864.5 By these latter amendments, the maximum punishment for a violation of the section was fixed at two years' imprisonment and $300 fine, and jurisdiction was given to the Circuit Court as well as the District. By section 2 of the Alaska act, the President was given "power to restrict and regulate, or to prohibit the importation and use of fire-arms, ammunition and distilled spirits into and within the territory of Alaska." It is a question whether this provision, so far as distilled spirits are concerned, was not superseded and repealed by the extension of said section 20 over Alaska by the act of March 3, 1873.7 This section, as has been stated, absolutely prohibits the introduction of spirituous liquors, which, of course, includes distilled spirits, into Alaska, except for the use of the army, by permission of the war department. Without doubt, as to the executive power to restrict or prohibit, the latter act supersedes the earlier one. A statute power in the President to restrict or prohibit, is certainly rendered nugatory by a subsequent act which absolutely prohibits. But as to the power "to regulate," which naturally implies the power to permit, the case is not so clear. Probably the better conclusion is, that the acts should be construed as in pari materia, and both have effect, so far as possible. Upon this construction of the statutes, the law concerning the introduction of spirituous liquors and wine into Alaska is, that such introduction is absolutely prohibited, subject to the power of the war department to permit the same for the use of the army, and the power 1 4 Stat. 729. 2 17 Stat. 530. a 15 Stat. 240, sec. 1954, Rev. Stat. 4 12 Stat. 339. 513 Stat. 29; Rev. Stat., sec. 2139. 1 Supra. of the President to permit the introduction of distilled spirits, but not wine, for any purpose. It is doubtful if any attempt to commit an offense of this character is indictable at common law; and this is probably the reason why it was made so specially by the act defining the crime.1 It is said that the subject of attempt to commit crime is "less understood by the courts," and "more obscure in the text-books," than any other branch of the criminal law. And certainly there is none, in some respects, more intricate and difficult of comprehension. It is almost impossible to comprehend all cases of attempt, in a definition that does not necessarily run into a mere enumeration of instances. It is easy to say that there must be a combination of intent and act- an intent to commit a crime, and an act done in pursuance of such intent, which falls short of the thing intended. There are a class of acts which may be fairly said to be done in pursuance of or in combination with an intent to commit a crime, but are not, in a legal sense, a part of it, and therefore do not, with such intent, constitute an indictable attempt. For instance, the purchase of a gun with a design to commit murder, or the purchase of poison with the same intent. - These are considered in the nature of preliminary preparations conditions, not causes and although co-existent with a guilty intent, are indifferent in their character, and do not advance the conduct of the party beyond the sphere of mere intent. They are, it is true, the necessary conditions without which the shooting or poisoning could not take place, but they are not, in the eye of the law, the cause of either.3 Dr. Wharton says, "to make the act an indictable attempt, it must be a cause as distinguished from a condition. And it must go so far that it would result in the crime unless frustrated by extraneous circumstances." Bishop says,5 "It is plain that if a man who has a wicked purpose in his heart does something entirely foreign in its nature from that purpose, he does not commit a criminal attempt to do the thing proposed. On the other hand, if he does what is exactly adapted to accomplish the evil meant, yet proceeds not far enough in the doing for the cognizance of the law, he still escapes punishment. Again, if he does a thing not completely, as the result discloses, adapted to accomplish the wrong, he may under some circumstances be punishable, while under other circumstances he may escape. And the difficulty is not a small one, to lay down rules readily applied, which shall 1 1 Whart. Cr. L., sec. 177; 1 Bish. Cr. L., secs. 684, 687. 21 Bish. Cr. L., sec. 657. 1 Whart. Cr. L., secs. 178, 181; 1 Bish. Cr. L., sec. 668, et seq.; People v. Murray, 14 4 Supra, sec. 181. guide the practitioner in respect to the circumstances in which the criminal attempt is sufficient." In People v. Murray,1 the defendant was indicted for an attempt to contract an incestuous marriage and was found guilty. From the evidence it appeared that he intended to contract such marriage; that he eloped with his niece for that purpose, and requested a third person to get a magistrate to perform the ceremony. Upon an appeal, the judgment was reversed. Chief Justice FIELD, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It (the evidence) shows very clearly the intention of the defendant, but something more than mere intention is necessary to constitute the offense charged. Between preparation for the attempt, and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference. The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense; the attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after the preparations are made; but until the officer was engaged, and the parties stood before him, ready to take the vows appropriate to the contract of marriage, it can not be said, in strictness, that the attempt was made. The attempt contemplated by the statute must be manifested by acts which would end in the consummation of the particular offense, but for the intervention of circumstances independent of the will of the party." In the case under consideration, to constitute the attempt charged in the information, there must have been an intent to commit the crime of introducing spirituous liquors into Alaska, combined with an act done in pursuance of such intention that apparently, in the usual course of events, would have resulted in such introduction, unless interrupted by extraneous circumstances, but which actually fell short of such result. But it does not appear that anything was done by the defendant towards the commission of the intended crime of introducing spirituous liquors into Alaska but to offer or attempt to purchase the same in San Francisco. The written order sent there by the defendant was in effect nothing more or less than an offer by him to purchase the one hundred gallons of whisky; and it will simplify the case to regard him as being present at the house of the San Francisco firm, at the time his order reached them, seeking to purchase the liquor with the intent of committing the crime of introducing the same into Alaska. But the case made by the information stops here. It does not show that he bought any liquor. Whether he changed his mind and countermanded the order before the delivery of the goods, or whether the firm refused to deal with him, does not appear. Now, an offer to purchase whisky with the intent to ship it to Alaska, is, in any view of the matter, a mere act of preparation, of 1 Supra. which the law takes no cognizance. As the matter then stood, it was impossible for the defendant to attempt to introduce this liquor into Alaska, because he did not own or control it. It was simply an attempt to purchase an act harmless and indifferent in itself, whatever the purpose with which it was done. But suppose the defendant had gone farther, and actually succeeded in purchasing the liquor, wherein would the case differ from that of the person who bought the gun or poison with intent to commit murder, but did not subsequently act in execution of such purpose? In all essentials, they are the same. - A purchase of spirituous liquor at San Francisco or Portland, either in person or by written order or application, with intent to commit a crime with the same as to dispose of it at retail without a license or to a minor, or to introduce it into Alaska-is merely a preparatory act, indifferent in its character, of which the law, lacking the omniscience of Deity, can not take cognizance. At what period of the transaction the shipper of liquor to Alaska is guilty of an attempt to introduce the same there is not very easily determined. Certainly the liquor must first be purchased - obtained in some way—and started for its illegal destination. But it is doubtful whether the attempt or the act necessary to constitute it can be committed until the liquor is taken so near to some point or place of "the mainland, islands or waters" of Alaska as to render it convenient to introduce it from there or to make it manifest that such was the present purpose of the parties concerned. But this is a mere suggestion; and each case must be determined upon its own circumstances. The demurrer is sustained to the second count, and overruled as to the first. ATTEMPT TO MURDER-DELIVERING POISON TO THIRD PERSON. STABLER V. COMMONWEALTH. [95 Pa. St. 318.] In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1880. The Mere Delivery of Poison to a Person, and soliciting him to place it in the spring of a certain party, is not an attempt to administer poison or punishable as such. ERROR to the Court of Quarter Sessions of Alleghany County. Indictment of Alois Stabler for an attempt to administer poison, and solicitation to commit felony. The first count charged that the defendant feloniously did attempt to administer a certain poison, commonly called Paris green one Richard F. Waring * to with the intent to commit the crime of murder, and to feloniously kill and murder the said Richard F. Waring, etc. The sixth count charged that defendant did falsely and wickedly solicit and invite one John Neyer, a servant of the said Richard T. Waring, to administer a certain poison and noxious and dangerous substance commonly called Paris green, to the said Richard F. Waring, and divers other persons whose names are to said inquest unknown, of the family of the said Richard F. Waring, etc. There having been no official notes of testimony taken on the trial of the case in the court below, it was agreed that this court shall treat the following as being all the testimony bearing on the first count of the indictment: "The only witness sworn was John Neyer, who testified that he had a conversation with Alois Stabler over a year before the information was made against him, in which Stabler stated his grievance against Waring, and stated his (Stabler's) determination to be revenged, and then solicited Neyer to put poison in Waring's spring, so that he and his family would be poisoned, and offered the witness a reward therefor, and gave him directions how to administer the poison, and gave him the poison to so administer. That the witness refused to administer the poison, and said he would not have anything to do with it, and handed the poison back to Stabler. That the witness had his coat off when the two were talking together. Three or four days after this conversation, the witness, upon putting on his coat, found a package in his coat pocket which he believed was the same package that Stabler had handed him. That the witness shortly after left the city of Pittsburg and went to Toledo, Ohio, where he remained several months. That he again returned to Pittsburg, about a year after the conversation with Stabler, and then, for the first time, told a party about what had taken place, and handed this party the package of poison. "That the witness never had any intention of administering the poison, and never did anything toward it, and never had any other conversation with Stabler about the matter except the one stated." The court, EWING, P. J., charged the jury: "That if they believed the testimony of John Neyer, and found that the defendant, Stabler, in a conference with him had stated his grievance against Waring, and his determination to be revenged, and solicited Neyer to put poison in Waring's spring or well, so that he and his family would be poisoned thereby, and offered him a reward therefor, giving him directions how to administer the poison, and gave him the poison to |