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or disability resulting from disease and not from personal injury would be without authority of law, and the award would be void because it would be beyond the lawful power and authority of the commission to make it." (2 Comp. Gen. 6, 7, July 5, 1922.)

"The act of September 7, 1916, the Employees' Compensation Act, is in form and purpose somewhat similar to the employers' liability laws enacted by various States for the benefit of employees injured in the course of their employment, and basically the purpose is to provide compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment. Certainly, com

pensation paid under an employer's liability act is not a gratuity, and the payments to employees of the United States injured in the course of their employment authorized to be made by the Employees' Compensation Act, being of the same nature, are no more gratuities than payments under an employer's liability acts. The fact that it was an act of grace for the Congress to su provide or that the sovereign could not be compelled to make such a provision does not change the character of the payment. As so understood, it is clear that a payment under the Employees' Compensation Act, whether to the injured employee or to his dependents in case of death, is not a gratuity within the meaning of that term as used in the statutes hereinbefore quoted but is exactly what the statute terms it, 'compensation' growing out of civil employment under the Government. (18 Comp. Gen. 308, 312, Oct. 3, 1938. See also 18 Comp. Gen. 747, 749, Mar. 25, 1939.)

Furnishing of medical, surgical, and hospital service, "Section 9 of the employees' compensation act, as originally enacted and as amended by the act of June 26, 1926, 44 Stat. 772, clearly requires that the services, appliances, and supplies authorized by the statute shall be furnished by or upon the order of United States medical officers and hospitals whenever practicable. The Employees' Compensation Commission is not authorized, and does not maintain or operate hospitals or institutions under its jurisdiction. I am convinced, therefore, the intent of the statute is that all available facilities of the United States for furnishing medical and hospital services and supplies shall be utilized for the treatment of injured civil employees of the United States who are beneficiaries under the employees' compensation act, without any charge for the costs thereof against the employees' compensation fund. All appropriations made available for maintaining and operating United States hospitals may be considered as available for that purpose. There would appear to be no justification for the conclusion that United States hospitals under certain departments of the Government were intended to be available without cost, while hospitals under certain other departments were intended to be available with cost, for the treatment of beneficiaries under the employees' compensation act." (6 Comp. Gen. 372, 373, Nov. 30, 1926.)

"The authority contained in the employees' compensation act for care and treatment of beneficiarles under the act in United States hospitals makes such treatment a part of the authorized duty of the naval hospital facilities for the performance of which the regular appropriations or funds for maintenance of such facilities are available." (6 Comp. Gen., supra, at 374.)

"You are advised, therefore, that naval hospitals are not entitled to reimbursement from the employees' compensation fund for medical and hospital

services, appliances, and supplies furnished in naval hospitals to beneficiaries under the employees' compensation act." (6 Comp. Gen., supra, at 375.)

"The specific provisions of this law are that for a disability incurred in line of duty an employee of the Federal Government is entitled to 'reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services. The term 'reasonable' as used in this law must be construed with respect to the nature of the injury or malady, (13 Comp. Gen. 432, 434,

June 13, 1934.)

Rights of employee having annual or sick leave to his credit.- "Section 8 of the Employees' Compensation Act of September 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 743, provides:

"That if at the time the disability begins the employee has annual or sick leave to his credit he may, subject to the approval of the head of the department, use such leave until it is exhausted, in which case his compensation shall begin on the fourth day of disability after the annual or sick leave has ceased.

"Under this statutory provision an employee entitled to disability compensation under said act, and who has to his credit either sick or annual leave, may elect, subject to the approval of the head of the department concerned, whether he will take leave without pay from his civilian position and receive disability compensation, or his regular compensation for the period of accrued sick and/or annual leave." (17 Comp. Gen. 500, 502, Dec. 14, 1937.)

Decisions on questions arising under statute."It is the commission which must determine whether the claimant has or has not been injured while in the performance of his duty or as a result of his own willful misconduct or intoxication; whether his disability is total or partial in character; whether upon review the amount awarded shall be increased or diminished; how it shall be apportioned among the beneficiaries; and when it may be commuted for cash, etc. But before any of these questions can come on for disposal it must first of all appear that the claimant is an employee of the United States, and this basic fact the commission must decide at the very threshold.". (31 Op. Atty. Gen. 252, 254, Mar. 21, 1918. See also: 23 Comp. Dec. 567, 568-569, Apr. 12, 1917; 25 Comp. Dec. 197, 198-199, Aug. 30, 1918; 25 Comp. Dec. 222, 225, Sept 11, 1918; 2 Comp. Gen. 224, 225, Sept. 23, 1922.)

"I am of the opinion that the Federal Employees' Compensation Commission is endowed with the power under the Act of September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. 742), finally to determine questions arising under said Act, and that the interpretation of the words 'personal injury' to include injuries arising from occupational diseases is justified under the law and the intent of Congress." (33 Op. Atty. Gen. 476, 485, May 16, 1923. See also 2 Comp. Gen. 784, May 29, 1923.)

Meaning of "United States medical officer.""It is believed that the proper definition of 'United States medical officer' as used in this statute is that of those whose professional services are mainly to the Government under regular appointment or contract of employment in any branch of the service." (4 Comp. Gen. 85, 86, July 19, 1924.)

/1916, Sept. 8. Prevention of unfair methods of competition.

Sec. 806. That whenever, during the existence of a war in which the United States is not engaged, the President shall be satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that any vessel, American or foreign, is, on account of the laws, regulations, or practices of a belligerent Government, making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage in any respect whatsoever to any particular person, company, firm, or corporation, or any particular description of traffic in the United States or its possessions or to any citizens of the United States residing in neutral countries abroad, or is subjecting any particular person, company, firm, or corporation or any particular description of traffic in the United States or its possessions, or any citizens of the United States residing in neutral countries abroad to any undue or unreasonable prejudice, disadvantage, injury, or discrimination in regard to accepting, receiving, transporting, or delivering, or refusing to accept, receive, transfer, or deliver any cargo, freight or passengers, or in any other respect whatsoever, he is hereby authorized and empowered to direct the detention of such vessels by withholding clearance or by formal notice forbidding departure, and to revoke, modify, or renew any such direction.

That whenever, during the existence of a war in which the United States is not engaged, the President shall be satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that under the laws, regulations, or practices of any belligerent country or Government, American ships or American citizens are not accorded any of the facilities of commerce which the vessels or citizens of that belligerent country enjoy in the United States or its possessions, or are not accorded by such belligerent equal privileges or facilities of trade with vessels or citizens of any nationality other than that of such belligerent, the President is hereby authorized and empowered to withhold clearance from one or more vessels of such belligerent country until such belligerent shall restore to such American vessels and American citizens reciprocal liberty of commerce and equal facilities of trade; or the President may direct that similar privileges and facilities, if any, enjoyed by vessels or citizens of such belligerent in the United States or its possessions be refused to vessels or citizens of such belligerent; and in such case he shall make proclamation of his direction, stating the facilities and privileges which shall be refused, and the belligerent to whose vessels or citizens they are to be refused, and thereafter the furnishing of such prohibited privileges and facilities to any vessel or citizen of the belligerent named in such proclamation shall be unlawful; and he may change, modify, revoke, or renew such proclamation; and any person or persons who shall furnish or attempt or conspire to furnish or be concerned in furnishing or in the concealment of furnishing facilities or privileges to ships or persons contrary to the prohibition in such proclamation shall be liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 nor more than $50,000 or to imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. In case any vessel which is detained by virtue of this Act shall depart or attempt to depart from the jurisdiction of the United States without clearance or other lawful authority, the owner or master or person or persons having charge or command of such vessel shall be severally liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 nor more than $10,000, or to imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both, and in addition such vessel shall be forfeited to the United States.

That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and empowered to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as shall be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.-(39 Stat. 799-800, ch. 463.)


This section, which is part of an act relating to the prevention of unfair methods of competition, is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 77 of title 15.

/1917, Feb. 14. Threats against the President.

That any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both.--(39 Stat. 919, ch. 64.)


This act is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 89 of title 18.

The first section of an act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593-594, as amended, provides that any alien convicted of violating this act shall be deported and excluded from readmission to the United States.


Scope and operation of statute.- "It is the threat which is 'knowingly and willfully' made that is condemned by the statute. 'Knowingly' means 'with knowledge.' 'Willfully' is defined by Webster to mean: 'In a willful manner; obstinately; by design; with a set purpose. Doing a thing knowingly and willfully implies, not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it. The words 'knowingly and willfully' are used in the statute in substantially the same


sense as in section 201 of the Criminal Code
As used in the statute and indictment, they are in-
tended to signify that the defendant, at the time of
making the threat charged against him, must have
known what he was doing, and, with such knowledge,
proceeded in violation of law to make it. They are
used in contradistinction to 'ignorantly' and 'unin-
tentionally. The offense denounced by the statute
is completed at the instant the unlawful threat is
knowingly and willfully made. It is not the execu-
tion of such threat, or (as claimed by defendant) a
continuing intent to execute it, that constitutes
the offense, but the making of it knowingly and
willfully. If it be thus made, the subsequent aban-
donment of the bad intent with which it was made
does not obliterate the crime. The probabilities
that there will be at once set in motion the evil
consequences resulting to the public from i pro-
mulgation (aside from those attendant on its actual
execution) are vastly greater than the probabilities

that the threat will be carried out." (United
States v. Stickrath, 242 F. 151, 154, June 22, 1917.
See also: Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643,
645, Aug. 13, 1918; Reid v. United States, 136 F.2d
476, June 17, 1943, cert. den., 320 U.S. 775, Oct.
25, 1943.)

"If the defendant knowingly and willfully threatened to take the life of the President, the motive by which he was actuated will constitute no defense; nor is it necessary that the threat, even if communicated to the President, should have been of such a nature and extent as to disturb or unsettle his mind to any degree, or to take away from his acts in any measure that free, voluntary action which alone constitutes consent." (United States v. Stickrath, supra, at 155. Compare: United States v. French, 243 F. 785, 786-787, July 30, 1917.)

"Whatever prior to the passage of the act may have been the essential nature of a criminally punishable threat or its technical significance or description, that act recognizes as punishable an oral as well as a written threat, though not communicated or intended to be communicated to the President. The question whether the threat has a tendency to cause action or non-action on his part is wholly foreign to any proper consideration of a given case. The vital inquiry under the act is whether the threat is of such a nature as to create or tend to create sedition or disloyalty, or' to stir up violence toward or resistance to the lawful authority of the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, or as chief executive of the nation. (United States v. Stobo, 251, F. 689, 692, May 18, 1918. See also: United States v. Jasick, 252 F. 931, 933, Aug. 3, 1918; United States v. Apel, 44 F. Supp. 592, 593, Apr. 29, 1942.)

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"An oral threat against the President, unheard by any one, cannot constitute the threat denounced by the statute. In an oral threat contemplated by the statute there are two essential elements: First, the utterance of the words, and, secondly, the hearing of the words by some person or persons other than the utterer. The use of the threatening words in an unheard soliloquy, whatever may be the intent or purpose with which they are uttered, is not an offense punishable under the act. Its manifest purpose was to punish the use by one of the threatening words calculated to inflame or have a sinister influence upon the minds of others, and in the case of an oral threat the offense is not complete unless the words are uttered in the hearing of some other person or persons. (United States v. Stobo, supra, at 695. See also Pierre v. United States, 275 F. 352, 354, July 22, 1921.)

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"The first part of the statute contemplates (1) a written threat (2) deposited with the postal service for conveyance or delivery. The threat is made, when the writing is so deposited. Hence, the offender is the depositor, and not the writer. The second part of the statute applies to him who 'otherwise makes any such threat,' importing a threat to kill or to inflict bodily harm, made orally, or in writing exhibited. A threat is an avowed present determination or intent to injure presently or in the future. In threats to influence, existence of intent to execute is not essential; in the threats denounced by the second part of the statute, it is otherwise. That the threat is conditioned upon a contingency subject to the maker's control does not deprive it of the quality of a threat, if the contingency be a possible one. Every threat unexecuted involves some contingency, if none other than that the maker's purpose be not abandoned, or that execution by him be not prevented." (United States v. Metzdorf, 252 F. 933, 937-938, Aug. 8, 1918.

1917, Mar. 2. Relations with civil government of Puerto Rico.

Geographical application of act. That the provisions of this Act shall apply to the island of Porto Rico and to the adjacent islands belonging to the United States, and waters of those islands; and the name Porto Rico as used in this Act shall be held to include not only the island of that name but all the adjacent islands as aforesaid.--(39 Stat. 951, ch. 145.)

Sec. 7. Conveyance of lands, buildings, etc., to people of Puerto Rico; acceptance of lands, buildings, etc., from people of Puerto Rico. That the President may from time to time, in his discretion, convey to the people of Porto Rico such lands, buildings, or interests in lands or other property now owned by the United States and within the territorial limits of Porto Rico as in his opinion are no longer needed for purposes of the United States. And he may from time to time accept by legislative grant from Porto Rico any lands, buildings, or other interests or property which may be needed for public purposes by the United States.--(39 Stat. 954, ch. 145.)

Sec. 11. Supervision of government of Puerto Rico. That all reports required by law to be made by the governor or heads of departments to any official of the United States shall hereafter be made to an executive department of the Government of the United States to be designated by the President, and the President is hereby authorized to place all matters pertaining to the government of Porto Rico in the jurisdiction of such department.--(39 Stat. 955, ch. 145.)

Sec. 12. Authority and duties of the Governor of Puerto Rico. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer, whose official title shall be "The Governor of Porto Rico. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and hold his office at the pleasure of the President and until his successor is chosen and qualified. The governor shall reside in Porto Rico during his official incumbency and maintain his office at the seat of government. He shall have general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in Porto Rico, so far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and shall be commander in chief of the militia. He may grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses against the laws of Porto Rico, and respites for all offenses against the laws of the United States until the decision of the President can be ascertained, and may veto any legislation enacted as hereinafter provided. He shall commission all officers that he may be authorized to appoint. He shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Porto Rico and of the United States applicable in Porto Rico, and whenever it becomes necessary he may call upon the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States in the island, or summon the posse comitatus, or call out the militia to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, and he may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety

requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the island, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and the President's decision therein made known. He shall annually, and at such other times as he may be required, make official report of the transactions of the government of Porto Rico to the executive department of the Government of the United States to be designated by the President as herein provided, and his said annual report shall be transmitted to Congress, and he shall perform such additional duties and functions as may in pursuance of law be delegated to him by the President.--(39 Stat. 955, ch. 145.)


The name "Porto Rico" was changed to "Puerto Rico" by joint resolution of May 17, 1932, ch. 190, 47 Stat. 158-159.

The first section of this act, as amended, is embodied in the U.S. Code as sec. 731 of title 48. Sec. 7, as amended, is embodied in the Code as sec. 748 of title 48. Sec. 11, as amended, is embodied in the Code as sec. 791 of title 48. Sec. 12, as amended, is embodied in the Code as sec. 771 of title 48.

By Article VIII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, signed at Paris on Dec. 10, 1898 (30 Stat. 1754, 1758), Spain ceded, in Puerto Rico "all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain." This article was considered by the Attorney General in the following opinions: 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 544, July 26, 1899; and 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 8, Mar. 19, 1902.

The first section of an act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1383, 32 Stat. 731-732, provided as follows:

"That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to make, within one year after the approval of this Act, such reservation of public land and buildings belonging to the United States in the island of Porto Rico, for military, naval, lighthouse, marine-hospital, post-offices, customhouses, United States courts, and other public purposes, as he may deem necessary, and all the public lands and buildings, not including harbor areas and navigable streams and bodies of water and the submerged lands underlying the same, owned by the United States in said island and not so reserved be, and the same are hereby granted to the government of Porto Rico, to be held or disposed of for the use and benefit of the people of said island: Provided, That said grant is upon the express condition that the government of Porto Rico, by proper authority, release to the United States any interest or claim it may have in or upon the lands or buildings reserved by the President under the provisions of this Act: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to affect any legal or equitable rights acquired by the government of Porto Rico or by any other party, under any contract, lease, or license made by the United States authorities prior to the first day of May, nineteen hundred."

The act of July 1, 1902, supra, was cited in Proc. No. 502, June 26, 1903, 33 Stat. 2311-2315, which reserved certain public lands in Puerto Rico for naval purposes. Proc. No. 502 superseded the following: Proc. No. 135, Mar. 29, 1899, 31 Stat. 1947; Exec. Order dated Aug. 20, 1901; and Exec. Order dated Dec. 17, 1901. Proc. No. 502 was supplemented by Exec. Order No. 219, June 30, 1903, and was modified by Exec. Order No. 220, June 30, 1903. Proc. No. 502 was further modified by Exec. Order No. 1042, Feb. 27, 1909. The act of July 1, 1902, supra, and Proc. No. 502 were considered by the Attorney General in an opinion dated Nov. 3, 1901, (25 Op. Atty. Gen. 269).

An act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2929, 34 Stat. 1410-1411, authorized the President to transfer to the People of Puerto Rico certain lands not required for naval purposes, in exchange for other lands. Proc. No. 819, Aug. 4, 1908, 35 Stat. 2197-2199, was issued pursuant to the act of Mar. 4, 1907, supra. In this connection, see opinion of the Attorney General dated July 17, 1911 (29 Op. Atty. Gen. 205).

An act of June 14, 1910, ch. 290, 36 Stat. 467, provided as follows: "That the President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to convey to the people of Porto Rico such lands and buildings, or interests therein, adjacent to the city of San Juan, reserved for public uses under the authority conferred by the Act approved July first, nineteen hundred and two (thirty-second Statutes at Large, page seven hundred and thirty-one), as in his opinion are no longer needed for purposes of the United States." The above-quoted enactment was con sidered by the Attorney General in an opinion dated July 17, 1911 (29 Op. Atty. Gen. 205).

By Proc. No. 1177, Jan. 26, 1912, 37 Stat. 1725-1726, certain public lands located in the vicinity of San Juan, Puerto Rico, which had been reserved for naval purposes by Proc. No. 502, were transferred to other departments of the Government. Some of the lands transferred to other departments of the Government by Proc. No. 1177 were later transferred to the People of Puerto Rico by Proc. No. 1211, July 13, 1912, 37 Stat. 1751-1758, which was issued under authority of the act of June 14, 1910, supra.

By Exec. Order No. 2322, Feb. 21, 1916, certain public lands in Puerto Rico which had been reserved and placed under the control of the War Department under authority of the act of July 1, 1902, supra, were transferred from the control of the War Department and placed under the control of the Navy Department for use as a naval radio station and for other naval purposes. The above-mentioned lands were transferred to the People of Puerto Rico by Exec. Order No. 3310, July 17, 1920, which was issued under authority of sec. 7 of this act.

By a provision of an act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 417, 39 Stat. 556, 568, a tract which constituted part of the military reservation of Henry Barracks, at Cayey, Puerto Rico, was transferred to and placed under the control and jurisdiction of the Navy Department for use for naval purposes. The abovementioned tract was subsequently transferred to the People of Puerto Rico by Exec. Order No. 3806, Mar. 5, 1923, which was issued under authority of sec. 7 of this act.

The following proclamations affecting the Navy Department were issued under authority of sec. 7 of this act: Proc. No. 1585, Feb. 14, 1921, 11 Stat. 1813-1815; Proc. No. 1807, June 11, 1927, 45 Stat. 2912-2915; Proc. No. 1889, Aug. 26, 1929, 46 Stat. 3001-3005; and Proc. No. 1970, Sept. 15, 1931, 47 Stat. 2482--2183.

An act of July 12, 1921, ch. 41, sec. 5, 12 Stat. 139-140, provided as follows: "That as consideration for a suitable site and requisite rights,

privileges, and easements for a receiving and distant-control radio station in Porto Rico the Secretary of the Navy be, and he hereby is, authorized to exchange or lease for such period as he may deem proper any land under naval control in Porto Rico not otherwise required for naval purposes: Provided, That in time of war or national emergency, if necessary, the Navy Department shall have without cost free and unlimited use of any land so exchanged or leased.". The lease which was executed pursuant to the above-quoted provision was considered in Baker v. United States, 27 F.2d 863, July 30, 1928, cert. den., 278 U.S. 656.

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Status of Puerto Rico.- "The Constitution of the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that government is exerted. This has not only been admitted but emphasized by this court in all its authoritative expressions upon the issues arising in the Insular Cases, especially in the Downes v. Bidwell and the Dorr Cases. The Constitution, however, contains grants of power and limitations which in the nature of things are not always and everywhere applicable, and the real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we went there, but which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new conditions and requirements. The guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application in the Philippines and Porto Rico, and, as this guaranty is one of the most fruitful in causing litigation in our own country, provision was naturally made for similar controversy in Porto Rico. Indeed provision is made for the consideration of constitutional questions coming on appeal and writ of error from the

Supreme Court of the Philippines, which are certainly not incorporated in the Union." (Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-313, Apr. 10, 1922.)

"Porto Rico and the Philippines, since their cession by Spain, have not been foreign countries within the meaning of statutes imposing duties upon goods 'imported from foreign countries' (De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176), but they are not a part of the United Stares within the meaning of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution providing that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. So Congress can impose duties upon articles brought here from the islands and taken into the islands from this country. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, They are territories 'appurtenant and belonging to the United States but not a part of the United States.' Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151." (35 Op. Atty. Gen. 273, 276, July 25, 1927.)

"In Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304305, Apr. 10, 19227 it was held that, although the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution with respect to the right of trial by jury applied to the territories of the United States, it did not apply to territory belonging to the United States which had not been incorporated into the Union; and that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory which had been so incorporated or had become a part of the United States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it. But it is evident, from a consideration of the pertinent acts of Congress and the decisions of this court with respect to these acts, that whether Puerto Rico comes within a given congressional act applicable in terms to a 'territory,' depends upon the character and aim of the act. Words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by consideration of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed." (Puerto Rico v. Shell Company, 302 U.S. 253, 257-258, Dec. 6, 1937.)

Disposal of public lands in Puerto Rico.- "The power to dispose permanently of the public lands and public property in Porto Rico rests in Congress, and in the absence of a statute conferring such power, can not be exercised by the Executive department of the Government." 11. (22 Op.Atty. Gen. 544, 545, July 26, 1899. See also 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 205, 207-208, July 17, 1911.)

Transfer of control of public lands in Puerto Rico. Any part or parts of the naval stations in Puerto Rico no longer needed for naval purposes may be transferred to the control of the War Department or of any other department, either by formal Executive order or by arrangement between the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the other department, since this would be in effect the act of the President. (29 Op. Atty. Gen. 205, July 17, 1911, citing 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 269, Nov. 3, 1904.)

"In the matter of local regulations and the exercise of police power Porto Rico possesses all the sovereign powers of a state, and any exercise of this power which is reasonable and is exercised for the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public is not in contravention of the Organic Act nor of any provision of the Federal Constitution.". Armstrong v. Goyco, 29 F.2d 900, 902, Dec. 18, 1928.)

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