defendant by publishing a notice in a newspaper published in said county. Afterwards, the defendant moved to set aside this service upon the grounds that no proper affidavit had been filed, and that the case was not one in which service by publication could be had. This motion the court overruled, and the defendant excepted, and now brings the case to this court. No The plaintiff in error, defendant below, says in its brief that "the point for decision is whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction of plaintiff in error by publication or by notice in a newspaper." We think, however, that the first question which can properly be presented to the supreme court for consideration is whether the supreme court has jurisdiction to determine any question involved in the case. judgment has yet been rendered in the case nor any final order made, but the case is still pending, undisposed of, in the district court. The case does not come within any of the provisions of the statute authorizing appeals or petitions in error to the supreme court. Civil Code, § 542; Potter v. Payne, 31 Kan. 218; S. C. 1 PAC. REP. 617; Dolbee v. Hoover, 8 Kan. 124; Brown v. Kimble, 5 Kan. 80; Edenfield v. Barnhart, 5 Kan. 225. See, also, Hockett v. Turner, 19 Kan. 527. We do not think that the plaintiff in error, defendant below, has any authority to bring the case in its present condition to this court, nor has this court any jurisdiction to hear or determine any of the questions involved therein; therefore the case will be dismissed from this court. (All the justices concurring.) (33 Kan. 716) STATE V. CARLYLE. Filed July 9, 1885. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PARTY FOUND GUILTY ON SEVERAL COUNTS-PUNISH MENT. Where an information contains several counts, each charging the defendant with a sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of the prohibitory liquor law of 1881, and the defendant is found guilty under each count, the court may, under each count, sentence the defendant to the full amount of the punishment prescribed by statute for each offense; and, where imprisonment is imposed, may adjudge the imprisonment under one count to commence at the termination of the imprisonment under another count. Crim. Code, § 250. Appeal from Allen county. S. B. Bradford, Atty. Gen., and G. A. Amos, for appellee.. VALENTINE, J. Many of the facts of this case are similar to those of the case of State v. Brooks, ante, 591, and the same decision must follow. But in this case there is one question that was not involved in the Brooks Case. In this case, as in that, the defendant was charged upon information in four separate counts with four separate violations of the prohibitory liquor law of 1881; but in this case he was convicted and sentenced under each count, and under each of the first three counts he was sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for the term of 90 days, as follows: Under the first count the imprisonment was to commence at the date of the sentence; under the second count the imprisonment was to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment under the first count; and under the third count the imprisonment was to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment under the second count,-making in all 270 days' imprisonment; and under the fourth count he was sentenced to pay a fine of $500, and he was also sentenced to pay the costs of the prosecution. The defendant claims that such a cumulative sentence cannot be imposed upon him; that as each of these offenses is charged as a first offense, and as the limit of punishment for a single first offense is imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed 90 days or a fine not to exceed $500, he could not be imprisoned under the information for more than 90 days, and could not be required to pay a fine under the information of more than $500, and only one of such punishments could be imposed upon him under a single information, however many counts might be contained in the information, and of however many offenses under such information he might be found guilty. We think, however, that the sentence of the court below in this respect is correct. The court had the right, and it was its duty, to sentence the defendant separately under each count; and it had the right to impose the maximum punishment under each count, and under each count could sentence the defendant to pay a fine of $500 or to be imprisoned in the county jail for 90 days. Prohib. Liquor Law 1881, § 7. And the court also had the right, in sentencing the defendant under the several counts, to adjudge that the imprisonment under one count should begin at the termination of the imprisonment under another count. Crim. Code, § 250. Technically, we suppose, the costs incurred under each count should be taxed separately under such count; but it is wholly immaterial in this case whether the costs were taxed separately under each count or in the aggregate under all the counts. The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. (All the justices concurring.) (34 Kan. 16) SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. CITY OF CHEROKEE v. Fox. 1. PEDDLER'S LICENSE-CITY ORDINANCE. An ordinance of a city of the third class, requiring a "professional hawker or peddler of any article of merchandise or traffic usually kept for sale by any merchant or manufacturer of the city," to pay a license of $2.50 per day for selling, or offering for sale, "any such article of merchandise or traffic at retail," is not void for the reason that it is class legislation, or that it makes unjust discriminations, or is partial and oppressive in its operation, or is inconsistent with public policy. 2. SAME TITLE OF ORDINANCE. Nor is such an ordinance void for the reason that it has no title, when in fact its title corresponds precisely with the requirements of the statute. Thirdclass City Act, § 17, Comp. Laws, 1879, p. 189. 3. SAME-COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE. Where a person is prosecuted before the police judge of the city for a violation of such ordinance, the complaint is not void for the reason that the letters "J. P." instead of the letters "P. J.," or the words "police judge," are attached to the name of the police judge where he signs the jurat attached to the complaint. 4. SAME EVIDENCE. There was some evidence introduced on the trial tending to prove every material allegation of the complaint, and whether it proved the same or not is a question of fact and not one of law, and the supreme court cannot say that the complaint was not proved. Appeal from Crawford county. John T. Voss, for appellant. E. A. Perry and C. Dana Sayrs, for appellee. VALENTINE, J. The defendant, J. F. Fox, was tried before E. M. Bogle, police judge of the city of Cherokee, on a complaint for violating a certain city ordinance. After conviction he appealed to the district court, where he was tried before the court without a jury, and was again convicted, and was sentenced to pay a fine of five dollars, and the costs of the prosecution. He now appeals to this court. The defendant claims that both the ordinance and the complaint under which he was convicted are void, and that the evidence introduced on the trial does not prove the complaint nor any violation of any ordinance or law. He claims that the ordinance is void, for the reason that it is class legislation, that it makes unjust discriminations, is partial and oppressive in its operation, is inconsistent with public policy, and has no title. The ordinance reads as follows: "Be it ordained by the mayor and councilmen of the city of Cherokee, Kansas: Section 1. That no professional hawker or peddler of any article of merchandise or traffic usually kept for sale by any merchant or manufacturer of this city shall be permitted to sell any such article of merchandise or traf fic at retail, or offer the same for sale, within the limits of the city, without first having a license therefor, as hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. That all proprietors or transient auctioneers shall pay into the city treasury a license tax, as hereinafter provided. Sec. 3. The license tax under the provisions of this ordinance shall be at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents per day: prov.7p.no.11-40 vided, that no license shall be issued for less than two days. Sec. 4. Any person or persons violating the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not less than five nor more than twentyfive dollars for each and every offense thereof, each day's violation being considered a separate offense.' We do not think that the ordinance is void for any reason. The evidence tended to show that the defendant was a hawker, a peddler, and an auctioneer, but we would think that it was not intended in the complaint filed against him to charge him with being anything more than a hawker, or with offering his goods for sale or selling them in any other character than as a hawker, within the meaning of section 1 of the ordinance. Under that section he was not prohibited from offering his goods for sale or selling them. Under that section he could offer his goods for sale and sell them as a merchant or manufacturer without having any license therefor; or he could procure a license and then offer his goods for sale and sell them under such license as a hawker or peddler; or, if his goods were not such as are usually kept for sale by any merchant or manufacturer of the city of Cherokee, he could offer them for sale and sell them as a hawker or peddler without having any license therefor. There are some good reasons for all these distinctions and discriminations, and we cannot hold that the ordinance is invalid because thereof. Class legislation is sometimes permissible, and under some circumstances is valid. City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 434-436; S. C. 4 PAC. REP. 800. And this very kind of class legislation has already been held to be valid in Kansas. City of Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151; S. C. 1 PAC. REP. 288; Tulloss v. City of Sedan, 31 Kan. 165; S. C. 1 PAC. REP. 285. The next question is with reference to the title to the ordinance. We think the title is sufficient; it seems to correspond precisely with the requirements of the statute. Third-class City Act, § 17; Comp. Laws 1879, p. 189. The next question is with regard to the complaint. It is claimed by the defendant that the complaint is insufficient, for the reason that it seems to have been sworn to before "E. M. Bogle, J. P.;" in other words, it is claimed that the complaint is void for the reason that Bogle, in signing his name to the jurat attached to the complaint, attached the letters "J. P." to his name, meaning justice of the peace, instead of the letters "P. J.," meaning police judge. We do not think this renders the complaint void. The title to the complaint shows that the proceedings were had before E. M. Bogle, police judge of the city of Cherokee, and there is nothing in the case that would tend to show that Bogle was a justice of the peace. But what difference could it make even if the complaint had been sworn to before Bogle as justice of the peace, when all the other proceedings were had before him as police judge? Besides, if Bogle had been a justice of the peace, and if the proceedings had been instituted before him in that character, and then the whole of the pro ceedings carried on before him in that character, the defendant would probably not have taken an appeal to the district court, and gone through with all the trouble and expense of a trial in that court; but would have commenced proceedings to enjoin the judgment of the justice of the peace, for the reason that the justice could not have any jurisdiction in such cases. Besides, as the appeal was taken from Bogle to the district court, the district court could take judicial notice of the official character of Bogle, and, of course, knew from what tribunal the proceedings came. And, further, it is indorsed on the copy of the complaint used in the district court that it was agreed by the parties that it was only a copy of the original, and that the original was duly signed and sworn to by the complaining witness "before E. M. Bogle, police judge," etc., and no objection was taken in that court to this copy or to the agreement thereon, and no pretense was made that the complaint had not been regularly and properly sworn to before the police judge and filed in his court. This is a weak point, and probably we should not have taken any notice of it. It is also claimed that the evidence introduced on the trial does not prove the complaint. This is a question of fact, and not one of law; and as there was some evidence introduced tending to prove every material allegation of the complaint it would seem as though there was really nothing for us to consider, as we do not retry the case upon the evidence. We might state, however, that the evidence showed, among other things, that on or about March 12, 1884, the defendant, within the corporate limits of the city of Cherokee, erected a platform on a corner lot, near the street; had a stand on the platform, with bottles of medicine on the stand; also a woman on the platform, and an organ, and a violin, and had music and singing, drawing large crowds around him, distributed bills, offered his medicines for sale by loud talk and outery, and sold some of the medicines. It was also shown that he had previously been in Texas and other states selling his medicines. If there was any failure in proving the complaint, it was in not proving that the medicines which the defendant offered for sale and sold were medicines usually kept for sale by some one or more of the merchants or manufacturers of the city of Cherokee. One of the medicines which the defendant offered for sale and sold he called a nervine, or "Star Nervine." also sold medicines which he recommended for various diseases. It was also shown that nervines were sold in the drug stores of the city of Cherokee, and also that medicines were sold in such drug stores for all the various diseases for which defendant recommended his medicines; but no witness testified that the defendant's medicines were identical with any of those sold in the drug stores, nor do we think that it was necessary. All that we think was necessary was to show that he sold medicines which were substantially the same as those sold in the drug stores. For instance, if the principal ingredient of the medicine which he sold as a nervine, and the ingredient which made it a nerv |