may and should have reference to the peculiar situation and needs of the community. The law under consideration, designed to prevent the clandestine removal of property in which a large number of the people of the Territory are interested, seems to us an obviously rightful exercise of this power. It is true it affects interstate commerce, but we do not think such was its primary purpose, and while it may have an effect to levy a tax upon this class of property, the main purpose evidently was to protect the people against fraud and wrong.

It is further urged that this law is invalid because it imposes an unreasonable fee for the inspection, which goes into the treasury of the sanitary board, and the allegations of the writ tend to show that an inspector might make a considerable sum in excess of day's wages in the work of inspecting hides under the provisions of this act. The law being otherwise valid, the amount of the inspection fee is not a judicial question; it rests with the legislature to fix the amount, and it can only present a valid objection when it is shown that it is so unreasonable and disproportionate to the services rendered as to attack the good faith of the law. Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345.

We are of the opinion that the allegations of the relator as to the cost of inspection, compared with the fees authorized to be charged, and the profit which might accrue to the inspector, in view of other and necessary incidental expense connected with the inspection and registration, do not bring the case within that class which holds that under the guise of inspection other and different purposes are to be subserved, thus rendering the legislation invalid.

Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion that, in the absence of Congressional legislation covering the subject, and making a different provision, the act in controversy is a valid exercise of the police power of the Territory, and not in violation of the Constitution giving exclusive power to Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce.

Affirmed.

Argument for Appellants.

203 U.S.

LANDRAM v. JORDAN.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 179. Argued October 9, 1906. Decided October 22, 1906.

Testator created a trust for his children including therein all of his property except one parcel, the income whereof was to go to a niece for life, the trustees to make such income up to a specified sum from the property in the general trust. The general trust was declared void as creating a perpetuity but not the trust for the niece. The children appealed claiming that the trust for the niece was also void. Held that One not appealing cannot, in this court, go beyond supporting the judgment and opposing every assignment of error, and therefore the niece could not endeavor to sustain the validity of the trust as a whole. The trust for the niece was not illegal, and was not so intimately connected with the failing trust as to fail with it; but the decree was modified so that the income could only be made up to the specified sum from income from property in the jurisdiction.

An objection that a person should have been made a party to a bill of review comes too late when the existence of that person does not appear of record.

25 App. D. C., 291, modified and affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John J. Hemphill, with whom Mr. James Hemphill was on the brief, for appellants:

The testator violated the law of this jurisdiction in placing the title to Washington real estate in the hands of trustees without power to alienate prior to 1928. Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, 312. See also Code of the District, and as to rule in other jurisdictions see Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 381. The rule applies to the possibility of non-vesting. Proprietors v. Grant, 3 Gray, 142, 153; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 380; Sears v. Putnam,

203 U.S.

Argument for Appellants.

102 Massachusetts, 5; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Maryland, 119. It applies to equitable estates and trusts. 1 Perry on Trusts, § 382; Bigelow v. Cady, 171 Illinois, 209; Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Maine, 541. If the suspension be for a fixed period without reference to a life or lives, such period cannot exceed twentyone years flat. Page on Wills, § 632; Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Maine, 541; Kimball v. Crocker, 53 Maine, 263.

Under the New York statute limiting the suspension to two lives in being, as well as under similar statutes of other States, it is held that if a gross or absolute term of years instead of lives is taken as the measure of suspension, the statute is violated however short the term may be. Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 316; Rice v. Barrett, 102 N. Y. 161; Cruikshank v. Home for the Friendless, 113 N. Y. 337. See also Re Walkerley Estate, 108 California, 627; DeWalf v. Lawson, 61 Wisconsin, 473.

The rule is one of law and not of construction. Gray on Perpetuities, § 629; Pearles v. Moseley, 5 App. Cas. (H. of L.) 714, 719; Hasman v. Pearse, L. R., 7 Ch. App. 275, 283.

For cases where provisions similar to those in suit were held bad, see Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 78 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 898; Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Maine, 541; Coleman v. Coleman, 65 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 832; Phillips v. Heldt, 71 N. E. Rep. (Ind.) 320; Speakman v. Speakman, 8 Hare, 180; Kimball v. Crocker, 53 Maine, 263.

The trust covering the Washington realty being void, the provision for the appellee falls within it. Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 393, 398; Pitsel v. Schneider, 216 Illinois, 17; Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Illinois, 149; Harris v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 242, 257; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Maryland, 19; Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 265; Re Christie, 133 N. Y. 473; Amory v. Lord, 9 N. Y. 403; 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 866.

The trust created by the testator is not merely a part of the machinery for accomplishing a subsequent intention towards any objects of his bounty, but was primarily created and intended for the purpose of conserving this property and holding it together for a fixed period without reference to

Argument for Appellants.

203 U. 8.

consequences. The disposition of the income was not a necessary element of the trust. It was an incident and an outgrowth, and of course, dependent upon it.

As the attempted trust embodies the general scheme or plan of the testator as to his Washington real estate, the direction to his trustees to pay appellee forty dollars per month-being a part of the monthly income of the trust property-rests upon the void trust, so that it cannot be established without reliance upon the void trust.

The cases cited by the court below, and in the appellee's brief can be distinguished.

Mary B. Kearney who is a necessary party has not been brought into court.

Any person, not a party to the original suit, who becomes interested in the subject-matter in controversy by operation of law, or under a distinct claim not derived from one of the parties, must be made a party to the bill of review, and is not bound by the proceedings under it, unless he be made a party. Debell v. Foxworthy's Heirs, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 228, 231. All whose interests are to be affected by a decree should be made parties to a bill of review to reverse it. Turner v. Berry, 3 Gilman (Ill.), 541, 543, citing Bank of U. S. v. White, 8 Peters, 262, 268; Story's Eq. Pleading, 420; Daniel Chan. Pl. and Pr., 6th ed., § 1580; Singleton v. Singleton, 8 B. Mon. 349.

Mrs. Kearney became entitled to dower in an undivided one-half of the real estate in the District of Columbia upon the filing of the decree of June 27, 1900, declaring the will invalid as to the real estate in the District, and was a necessary party to the proceeding in the lower court. 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1st ed., 264; Story's Equity Pl. § 240; Turner v. Berry, supra; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1.

Appellee's contention that the court below was without jurisdiction to entertain the original suit can not be raised by a bill of review. 16 Cyc. 529; Friley v. Hendricks, 27 Mississippi, 412, 418; Donaldson v. Nellis, 108 Tennessee, 638; Berdanatti v. Sexton, 22 Tenn. Chan. 699, 703.

203 U. S.

Argument for Petitioner.

Mr. Charles F. Wilson, with whom Mr. Frank W. Hackett was on the brief, for appellee:

As to the validity of the annuity for Miss Jordan, the trust is valid; it is separate from the other trusts and can be upheld even if they are invalid; it is not essential to the general scheme. Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 307; Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 349; Harrison v. Harrison, 36 N. Y. 54; Tiers v. Tiers, 98 N. Y. 568; Van Schuyer v. Mulford, 59 N. Y. 432. The trust itself is valid; there was no intention to create a perpetuity. A will need not in express terms provide that the particular trust for each beneficiary shall cease upon his or her death. It is enough that a necessary implication exists that such was the testator's intention. Montignani v. Blade, 145 N. Y. 111; Estate of Hendy, 118 California, 659; Gray on Perpetuities, 201.

Mr. Frank Sprigg Perry on behalf of Mary B. Kearney, petitioner:

On a bill of review all parties interested should be made parties defendant. Friley v. Hendricks, 27 Mississippi, 412; Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. Rep. 714; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 140; Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193, 198; Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. 591; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563.

Affirmance of decree in this case would reduce petitioner's dower interest in the property in the District of Columbia, and, therefore, she is an indispensable party. Shepard v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 117 N. Y. 446; Sykes v. Chadwick, 18 Wall. 145; Rogers v. Potter, 32 N. J. L. 78.

Under the laws of Maryland in force in this District at testator's death, the trust was a perpetuity and void. 2 Kilty's Laws of Maryland, Ch. 101, subch. 1; Abert's Digest Dist. of Col. Laws, Ch. 70, 82; see § 1023 D. C. Code; Ould v. Hospital, 95 U. S. 304, 312; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 355; Barnitz, lessee, v. Casey, 7 Cr. 456,