to examine the facts upon which they rest and to determine from such examination whether there has been an unconstitutional exercise of power and an illegal interference by the State or its commission with the interstate commerce of the railroad. Whether there has or has not been such an interference is a question of law arising from the facts. In this case there was no important conflict of evidence on the material points, and so the Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, and these facts are clearly and sufficiently set forth in 138 Fed. Rep., supra. The fact that the company has contracts to transport the mails of the United States within a time which requires great speed for the trains carrying them, while not conclusive, may still be considered upon the general question of the propriety of stopping such trains at certain stations within the boundaries of a State. The railroad has been recognized by Congress, and is the recipient of large land grants, and the carrying of the mails is a most important function of such a road. We think that the railroad company has fully performed its duty towards the town in the way of furnishing it proper and adequate and reasonable accommodation, without stopping these interstate trains as ordered, and, therefore, the order of the commission was improper and illegal, and not merely an incidental interference with the interstate commerce of the company. The Circuit Court of Appeals has, in effect, so held, although it did say that the commission and the Circuit Court had made an order that indicated that the trains which already stopped at Magnolia were not sufficient and that the town should have five daily trains going south, and, therefore, the court said it thought it well to examine other questions, which it did. A reading of the whole opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals shows that the court did not concede, in any degree, that the passenger facilities afforded were inadequate, but that the remedy was to compel the company to run more trains and not stop the ones in question. The opinion simply suggests that even if the facilities were inadequate, the appropriate course was to order more trains

instead of stopping those mentioned. In any event, the question is before us upon uncontradicted evidence as to whether there were or were not proper facilities, and we hold there

were.

The order cannot be viewed alone in the light of ordering a stop at one place only, which might require not more than three minutes, as asserted. It is the question whether these trains can be stopped at all at any particular station when proper and adequate facilities are otherwise afforded such station. If the commission can order such a train to be stopped at a particular locality under such circumstances, then it could do so as to other localities, and in that way the usefulness of a through train would be ruined and the train turned from a through to a local one in Mississippi. The legislature of a State could not itself make such an order, and it cannot delegate the power to a commission to do so, in its discretion, when adequate facilities are otherwise furnished.

The transportation of passengers on interstate trains as rapidly as can with safety be done is the inexorable demand of the public who use such trains. Competition between great trunk lines is fierce and at times bitter. Each line must do its best even to obtain its fair share of the transportation between States, both of passengers and freight. A wholly unnecessary, even though a small, obstacle ought not, in fairness, to be placed in the way of an interstate road, which may thus be unable to meet the competition of its rivals. We by no means intend to impair the strength of the previous decisions of this court on the subject, nor to assume that the interstate transportation, either of passengers or freight, is to be regarded as overshadowing the rights of the residents of the State through which the railroad passes to adequate railroad facilities. Both claims are to be considered, and after the wants of the residents within a State or locality through which the road passes have been adequately supplied, regard being had to all the facts bearing upon the subject, they ought not to be permitted to demand more, at the cost of the ability of

the road to successfully compete with its rivals in the transportation of interstate passengers and freight.

We are of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit of Appeals was right, and it is

Affirmed.

ALLEN v. RILEY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 99. Submitted November 6, 1906.-Decided December 3, 1906.

While a State may not pass any law prohibiting the sale of patents for inventions or nullifying the laws of Congress regulating their transfer, it has the power, until Congress legislates on the subject, to make such reasonable regulations in regard to the transfer of patent rights as will protect its citizens from fraud; and a requirement in the laws of Kansas that before sale or barter of patent rights, an authenticated copy of the letters patent and the authority of the vendor to sell the right patented shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county within which the rights are sold is not an unreasonable regulation.

71 Kansas, 378, affirmed.

FRANCES J. RILEY, the defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, recovered a judgment against plaintiffs in error, defendants below, for $1,250, in the District Court of Brown County, in the State of Kansas, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the defendants below have brought the case here by writ of error.

The suit was commenced by the filing of a petition by defendant in error, plaintiff below, in a District Court of Kansas, March 17, 1902, to recover the value of certain lands alleged to have been transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant Erasmus W. Allen, in part payment for the transfer to plaintiff of rights for the State of Kentucky under a patent dated January 30, 1901, for a washing machine. The right to recover is based upon the failure of the defendants to comply with the Kansas statute, which failure defendants do not

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

203 U.S.

deny, but they insist that the statute is void as being in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress referred to in the opinion. The Kansas statute is chapter 182 of the Laws of 1889. A copy of the act is set out in the margin.1

Mr. N. H. Loomis, Mr. R. W. Blair and Mr. H. A. Scandrett for plaintiffs in error:

The Constitution gives Congress power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries, and Congress has exer

1 Chapter 182, Laws of 1889 (paragraphs 4356, 4357 and 4358, General Statutes of Kansas, 1901), reads as follows:

"SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or barter or offer to sell or barter any patent right, or any right which such person shall allege to be a patent right, in any county within this State, without first filing with the clerk of the District Court of such County copies of the letters patent duly authenticated, and at the same time swearing or affirming to an affidavit before such clerk that such letters patent are genuine, and have not been revoked or annulled, and that he has full authority to sell or barter the right so patented; which affidavit shall also set forth his name, age, occupation and residence; and if an agent, the name, occupation and residence of his principal. A copy of this affidavit shall be filed in the office of said clerk, and said clerk shall give a copy of said affidavit to the applicant, who shall exhibit the same to any person on demand.

"SEC. 2. Any person who may take any obligation in writing for which any patent right, or right claimed by him or her to be a patent right, shall form a whole or any part of the consideration, shall, before it is signed by the maker or makers, insert in the body of said written obligation, above the signature of said maker or makers, in legible writing or print, the words, 'Given for a patent right.'

"SEC. 3. Any person who shall sell or barter or offer to sell or barter within this State, or shall take any obligation or promise in writing for a patent right, or for what he may call a patent right, without complying with the requirements of this act, or shall refuse to exhibit the certificate when demanded, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, or be imprisoned in the jail of the proper county not more than six months, at the discretion of the court or jury trying the same, and shall be liable to the party injured in a civil action for any damages sustained."

203 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

cised that power by appropriate legislation regulating the issue of letters patent and providing for their assignment. 3 U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, § 4898, as amended by act of March 3, 1897. Congress has attempted to take exclusive charge of the issuing and assignment of patents.

It has prescribed the manner of making application, the proof required, the time for which granted, and finally, that every patent shall be assignable by an instrument in writing, which shall be recorded in the Patent Office within three months from its date.

That the assignment shall be in writing and be recorded in the Patent Office are the only restrictions prescribed by Congress, and are the only ones contemplated.

The question is squarely presented whether or not the state statute placing additional restrictions on the assignment of a patent is in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The state court has held it was not. Mason v. McLeod, 57 Kansas, 105. The decisions of the state courts are not harmonious. Those taking a contrary view to the Kansas court include Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Illinois, 109; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Michigan, 309; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minnesota, 24; Ex parte Robinson, 2 Biss. 309; Helm v. National Bank, 43 Indiana, 167, but see Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501. See also Brechbill v. Randall, 102 Indiana, 528; Hankey v. Downey, 116 Indiana, 118; Wilch v. Phelps, 14 Nebraska, 134; Commonwealth v. Petty, 29 S. W. Rep. 291; Woolen v. Banker, 2 Flipp. 33; Castle v. Hutchinson, 25 Fed. Rep. 394; Pegram v. Am. Alkali Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 1000; Brown v. Pegram, 125 Fed. Rep. 577. Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. Rep. 787; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, distinguished.

This court has decided that a State in the exercise of its police powers may regulate the handling of a product manufactured under a patent, such as illuminating oil as in Patterson's case and sewing-machines in Webber's case, but it has never decided that a State can in any way interfere with an