CH. XXIII.] RADICALS ATTACK THE PRESIDENT 487 have, in my opinion, abandoned."1 July 5 he returned to the subject, making this entry: "Garfield, Schenck, and Wetmore were bitter against the timid and almost slavery course of the President."2 pro July 8 the President, in a public proclamation, gave his reasons for not signing the bill, and went on to say: "Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people."3 The convictions of the extremest radicals found expression in a Protest signed by Wade, who had charge of the Reconstruction bill in the Senate, and Henry Winter Davis, which was published, August 5, in the New York Tribune, and is known as the Wade-Davis manifesto. It is a bitter attack on the President, remarkable as coming from leaders of his own party after he had received a unanimous nomination from a convention that had made no pronouncement on the question at issue.1 66 1 Warden, p. 623. 2 Ibid., p. 625. 3 Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 545. This is printed in full in Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia for 1864, p. 307. It is the right and duty of the supporters of the administration, they said, "to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere." The President's proclamation of July 8 is a "political manifesto" proposing a grave Executive usurpation." Then follows a minute scathing and unreasonable criticism of the proclamation. "The President," they continued, "by preventing this bill from becoming a law holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. . . . He strides headlong toward the anarchy his proclamation of the 8th of December inaugurated. A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated. The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his Administration have so long practised, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash ... ... We left the Army of the Potomac marching from Cold Harbor to the James River. Grant had hoped to destroy or defeat totally Lee's army north of Richmond, and, failing to do either, had decided to transfer his troops to the south side of the James, and from that quarter besiege the Confederates in their capital. This movement, which began June 12 and ended the 16th, was very successfully accomplished. The precision of the march, the skilful work of the engineers in bridging the river, the orderly crossing showed how like a fine machine the Army of the Potomac, even in its crippled state, responded to efficient direction. The strategy of Grant had deceived Lee, who failed to divine the movement, and did nothing, therefore, to impede it. The capture of Petersburg, the possession of which would undoubtedly within a brief period compel the fall of the Confederate capital, was included in the plan of the Union general, and was within his grasp. "The enemy shows no signs yet of having brought troops to the south side of Richmond," is his despatch of June 14 to Halleck. "I will have Petersburg secured, if possible, before they get there in much force. Our movement from Cold Harbor to the James River has been made with great celerity, and so far without loss or accident."8 Sending W. F. Smith with his corps to Bermuda Hundred, Grant despatched at the same time to Butler, there in command of the Army of the James, a conditional order "to seize and hold Petersburg." This he followed up by a personal visit three days later, and an order for its immediate and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes our support he must confine himself to his Executive duties to obey and execute, not make the laws to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress." 1 Grant's despatch of June 5, also report July 22, 1865, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. pp. 11, 22. 2 Humphreys, pp. 202, 209; Walker's Hancock, p. 230. "A plan of campaign should anticipate everything which the enemy can do, and contain within itself the means of baffling him.” — Military Maxims of Napoleon, p. 5. 3 O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 12. 4 June 11, ibid., vol. xxxvi. part iii. p. 754. CH. XXIII.] FAILURE TO TAKE PETERSBURG 489 capture,1 and forthwith returned to the Army of the Potomac to hasten its crossing, and throw it forward by divisions to support this attack. If Butler had been a soldier, he would have led out all his available force and captured Petersburg the next day, knowing, as he did, that its garrison was weak, amounting to about 2500 men.2 By Grant's orders he sent forward Smith, who, by nine o'clock on the evening of June 15, had carried the formidable works to the northeast of Petersburg, gaining, in the opinion of Grant, important advantages; and if everything had been properly ordered and carried out, the city itself might that day have been captured and the Appomattox River reached.3 Beauregard But the golden opportunity was let slip. ordered all the available troops in his department to Petersburg, and on June 16 had the works pretty well manned. He asked reinforcements from Lee, but did not get them, for he was unable to convince his commander that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the James, and was thundering at the gates of the city. Grant and Meade were now on the ground, and on June 16, 17, and 18 ordered successive assaults, which failed to take Petersburg, and resulted in a loss of about 1 June 14, Report, ibid. part i. p. 25. 2 Beauregard, who was in command, says an effective of 2200.- Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 540; see, also, Humphreys, p. 213, note 1; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 409; O. R., vol. xl. part ii. p. 675. See Grant's report, O. R., vol. xxxvi. part i. p. 25; Humphreys, pp. 210, 212, 213; letter of Hancock, June 26, Meade to Grant, June 27, unsigned and unsent letter of Grant to Meade in his handwriting, June 28, O. R., vol. xl. part i. pp. 314, 315; Hancock's report, Sept. 21, 1865, ibid., p. 304; Grant, Personal Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 293 et seq.; W. F. Smith, From Chattanooga to Petersburg, pp. 60-134; Smith's report, June 16, O. R. vol. xl. part i. p. 705; Walker, Life of Hancock, p. 231 et seq., The Second Army Corps, p. 527; Beauregard's article, Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 541; Wilkeson, Rec. of a Private, p. 156 et seq.; Life of Lee, Fitzhugh Lee, pp. 346, 347; Long's Lee, p. 373; Butler's Book, p. 687 et seq. In the Nation of June 9, 1898, p. 445, Gen. J. D. Cox has skilfully analyzed the evidence and thrown new light upon these operations. 4 Beauregard's article, Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 541; Fitzhugh Lee, p. 348; incidentally the Confed. corr., O. R.; see, also, Humphreys, p. 213 et seq. 10,000 men.1 Owing to the much greater number of the Union soldiers, the attempt on the first two days was feasible; but the work, according to one on Grant's staff, was not "equal to our previous fighting, owing to our heavy loss in superior officers."2 If an intelligent private may be believed, the soldiers of the Second Corps were so discouraged that they had not been sent into Petersburg the night of the 15th, that they went forward to the subsequent assaults without heart and without determination to fight stanchly.3 Although not fully convinced that the Army of the Potomac was on the south side of the James, Lee sent a division to Beauregard, which arrived early in the morning of June 18, and Lee himself reached Petersburg before noon of the same day. The severe repulse of the Union troops, which took place afterwards, demonstrated that any further attempt to carry the place by storm would be foolhardy. Dana's remark in his despatch to Stanton of June 19 formulates what the situation required: "General Grant has directed that no more assaults shall be made. He will now manœuvre; "5 also Grant's determination, as announced six days later: "I shall try to give the army a few days' rest, which they now stand much in need of."6 The Army of the Potomac was worn out. The continual fighting for forty-five days at a disadvantage and without success, and the frequent marches by night, had exhausted and disheartened the men. Gallant and skilful officers by the score, brave veterans by the thousands, had fallen. The morale of the troops was distinctly lower than it was even the day after Cold Harbor. Reinforcements were constantly sent 1 Humphreys, p. 224. 2 Dana to Stanton, June 19, O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 24. The staff officer added: "The men fight as well, but are not directed with the same skill and enthusiasm." 3 Wilkeson, Rec. of a Private, p. 160 et seq. 4 Beauregard, Century War Book, vol. iv. p. 543; Humphreys, p. 221. 5 O. R., vol. xl. part i. p. 25. 6 Ibid. On June 22 an unexpected combat had occurred, resulting also disastrously. CH. XXIII.] THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE ARMY 491 to Grant, but they were for the most part mercenaries, many of whom were diseased, immoral, or cowardly. Such men were now in too large a proportion to insure efficient work. They needed months of drill and discipline to make good soldiers. Indeed, a reconstitution and reorganization of the army were necessary: these were made during the many weeks of inaction from June 18 to the spring of 1865, covered by the siege of Petersburg, which now commenced.2 At this time the President paid a visit to the army. With the impression which I have tried to convey of the unsuccess of the costly operations of Grant and of the demoralization of the army, the imagination might conjure up a private interview between Lincoln and Grant, in which the President entreated the general to be more careful of the lives of his soldiers, and warned him that the country could not or would 1 Halleck wrote Grant, June 7: "I inclose a list of the troops forwarded from this department to the Army of the Potomac since the campaign opened - 48,265 men. I shall send you a few regiments more, when all resources will be exhausted till another draft is made."—O. R., vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 602. 2 Humphreys, p. 225; Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. p. 412; Walker, Life of Hancock, p. 246, The Second Army Corps, p. 555; Ropes, Papers of the Milt. Hist. Soc. Mass., vol. x. p. 267; Porter, Century Magazine, April, 1897, p. 830; Wilkeson, Rec. of a Private, p. 185. Wilkeson writes (p. 191): "After the battle of June 18, 1864, the enlisted men frequently discussed the condition of the Army of the Potomac. They sat o' nights in groups behind the intrenchments and talked, talked, talked, of the disintegrating force which Grant commanded. Enormous losses of prisoners were reported, losses that were incurred while charging earthworks, which fact clearly showed that our troops had surrendered after reaching the Confederate intrenchments - surrendered rather than attempt to take them or to return to our line under the deadly accurate fire of the Confederate infantry. Many of the volunteers vehemently asserted that the bounty-paid recruits really deserted during action to seek safety in Confederate prison pens. The enlisted men who had gathered into ranks under McClellan, and who had been forged into soldiers by that admirable drill-master, all said that the Army of the Potomac of 1862 was far superior, man to man, to that which crossed the Rapidan in May of 1864, and immeasurably superior to the army which lay in the trenches before Petersburg in July of 1864. They also asserted, and truthfully, that if the original volunteers, or men as good as they were, were commanded by Grant, he would capture Richmond in twenty-four hours." • June 21. |