A local rate, which presumably is adopted as covering both initial and final expenses of the haul, is prima facie excessive as part of a through rate over a through line composed of two or more carriers.Board of Trade v. Ala. Mid. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 1.

That with prevailing prices and rates, a complainant cannot conduct his business at a profit, does not demonstrate such rates to be excessive.Buchannan v. No. Pac. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 655, 5 I. S. C. C. R. 7.

An increase of the trolley fare from five cents to ten cents between Watertown and Glen Park held unreasonable.— Watertown Residents v. Black R. Traction Co. Decided by the N. Y. Public Service Commission for the Second District, May 12, 1908.

Charges in excess of those fixed by legislative authority are conclusively unreasonable.- Heiserman v. Burl. C. R. & N. R. Co., 63 Iowa, 732, 18 N. W. 902.

In the absence of special contract, the posted schedules fix the rates of a shipment.- Kellerman v. K. C. St. J. & C. B. R. Co., 136 Mo. 177, 34. S. W. 41.

A state statute provided that no carrier should charge more for transportation than the rate appearing in the printed tariff.- Held, that from the fact that a greater charge is made for transportation in one direction between two points than is charged in the other direction between the same points, it does not necessarily follow that the former rate is an overcharge.- Scull v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 144 N. C. 180, 56 S. E. 876.

A carrier is not entitled to charge as for separate parcels for a hamper containing such parcels, and a charge adjusted on that basis. is unlawful.-Pickford v. Grand J. R. Co., 10 M. & W. (Eng.) 399.

Maximum fare for transportation of passengers on railroads,— see N. Y. R. R. L., § 37.

Provisions as to rate of fare on street surface railroads,- see N. Y. R. R. L., § 101.

Whether an act fixing a maximum rate is a regulation of interstate commerce, see ante, § 25, note [14].

As against the shipper, the carrier cannot recover for the transportation of property more than the maximum fixed by law, by showing that the amount sought to be charged is no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered. As between the company and a shipper, there is a statutory limitation of the charge for transportation actually performed. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179, affg. 8. c. 36 Wis. 252.

The three cents per mile statutory maximum charge does not apply to street railway corporations.- Hoyt v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 1 Daly (N. Y.), 528.

A charge of more than the statutory maximum per mile is permissible on a spur track running from the main line to a race-track, and used only at racing times.- Palm v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 17 N. Y Supp. 471.

An Illinois act gave a state board power to fix maximum rates, and made carriers liable to penalties for extortionate charges, on suit by shippers.- Held, that to sustain recovery it must be shown that the carriers charged more than the rates fixed by the commission, and until such rates are fixed there can be no liability, even though the proof shows the rates charged to be more than fair and reasonable.- Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 77 Ill. 443.

If a carrier is entitled to charge three cents per mile and "the fare shall always be made that multiple of five nearest reached by multiplying the rate by the distance," the charge is properly the multiple of five next above the figure obtained by multiplying the rate by the distance.- Heaton v. C. H. & D. R. Co., 1 Oh. N. P. 188, 2 Oh. Dec. 47.

[39] Advances in rates.

Advances in freight rates to be filed and published,- see post, § 29,

note.

There is no presumption of wrong arising from a change of rate by a carrier- Interstate Com. Commission v. Ch. G. W. R. Co., 209 U. S. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. (U. S.) 493, affg. s. c. 141 Fed. 1003.

That a certain class of express traffic has to be specially delivered, which involves a special terminal expense, does not warrant an increase in the rate more than the amount of the additional expense for the special service.— Society Am. Florists v. U. S. Exp. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 138.

Advances in rates on live stock from the southwest in 1903 were unjust and unreasonable.- Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. Mo. K. & T. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 296.

Large expenditures for reducing grades, adding to equipment, etc., do not justify advances in rates, as they are supposed to decrease the cost of transporting.— Rates from St. L. to Texas Common Points, 11 Inters. Com. R. 238.

Where material advances in reasonable and remunerative rates were made by concerted action of the carriers, justification for the increases must be clearly shown.- Rates from St. L. to Texas Common Points, 11 Inters. Com. R. 238.

Increased volume of traffic should reduce, not advance, rates.- Rates from St. L. to Texas Common Points, 11 Inters. Com. R. 238.

An advance in the price of the article transported does not justify an advance in the rates.- Rates from St. L. to Texas Common Points, 11 Inters. Com. R. 238; Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates, 9 Inters. Com. R. 382.

Carriers have no right to advance a rate which is already reasonably high and which yields an adequate return for the service rendered, solely because additional revenue is needed.- Tift v. So. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 548.

An advance in rates cannot be claimed to be the outcome of competition, as the natural and immediate effect of competition is to lower, rather than advance, rates.-Tift v. So. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 548.

When carriers advance a rate which has been in force for some time, the burden of proof is upon them to show sufficient grounds for such advance.- Central Y. P. Assn. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 505.

A railroad will not be permitted to advance rates already remunerative, merely because competitive conditions have been so far restrained that it can.- Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates, 9 Inters. Com. R. 382.

Railways should share in the general prosperity and recuperate losses of the past in an era of good times. But this does not necessarily mean that they are entitled to advance former rates, certainly not in those cases where the rate was not reduced owing to the financial depression.Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates, 9 Inters. Com. R. 382.

An increase in rates which results simply from the withdrawal of a lower export rate, or from the maintenance of any tariff rate, cannot be condemned solely for that reason as an unwarranted advance.- Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates, 9 Inters. Com. R. 382.

Where by concerted action and under circumstances not warranting an increase, carriers have advanced rates, they cannot, when the lawfulness of the increase is questioned as to a single commodity, plead their need for more revenue.- National Hay Assn. v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 9 Inters Com. R. 264.

Carriers making an advance in rates should be able to present a satisfactory justification of such advance, particularly when the old rates have been of many years' standing, and the advance is great, and the traffic affected is of large volume and vital importance.-Railroad Commission of Florida v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 414, 688, 5 I. C. C. R. 13.

An increase of one-sixth in the charge for the same service, through the device of charging for the gross instead of the net weight, is unreasonable.- Proctor v. C. H. & D. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 614, 3 Inters. Com. R. 131, 4 I. C. C. R. 87.

Where an existing classification and rate have not been shown to operate injuriously to the carrier, or to give undue advantage to shippers, a change that materially injures an important industry and a class of shippers at a particular point, who have there built up the industry in reliance upon the continuation of a previous classification and rate first established, and long maintained without complaint from any quarter, will be held unlawful by the Interstate Commerce Commission.- Bates v. Pa. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 608, 732, 734, 714, 3 I. C. C. R. 435.

[40] What constitutes a reduction in rates.

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The Constitution of California provided that "whenever a railroad shall lower its rates such reduced rates shall not be again raised or increased from such standard without the consent of the governmental authority in which shall be vested the power to regulate fares and freights." Limited passenger tickets were issued which did not give all the privileges of full fare tickets, but it was shown that these privileges were of little or no value to the average traveller over such line.- Held, that there was a reduction in rates within the meaning of the constitutional provision.- Edson v. So. Pac. R. Co., 144 Cal. 182, 77 Pac. 894.

[41] Whether statements of agents as to rates bind carrier.

Shipper must be guided by published tariffs rather than statements of carriers' agents,- see post, § 33, note [9].

A carrier is bound by the acts of its depot agent in giving rates.Southern R. Co. v. Anniston, F. & M. Co., 135 Ala. 315, 33 So. 274.

The receipt of goods marked for a particular destination beyond the terminus of the receiving carrier's line, without an express undertaking to do more than transport to that terminus and deliver to a connecting carrier, does not make such initial carrier bound by the statement of its local station agent as to the rates to be charged over the connecting lines.- McLagan v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 116 Iowa, 183, 89 N. W. 233.

[42] Refund of overcharge.

An overcharge made in good faith, through misapprehension or mis understanding between the passenger and the agents, may lawfully and properly be corrected by a refund of the excess.- Sanger v. So. Pac. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 548, 3 I. S. C. C. R. 134.

[43] Effect of long continuance of rates.

The existence of rates for a considerable period gives no right by prescription either to the carrier or shipper to their continuance.— Quimby v. Clyde Ss. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 459.

[44] Extent of interest of shippers or public in rates.

Where the service of a common carrier between two points is rendered for just and reasonable rates, the public have no interest in the question whether one corporation or many are engaged in it, or whether it is under a monopoly control.- Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271, 38 N. E. 292, 25 L. R. A. 674, affg. s. c. 68 Hun (N. Y.), 486, 22 N. Y. Supp. 976.

The amount of the compensation or allowance which a carrier pays to an elevator owner for elevation is not a matter of concern either to shippers or to other carriers, unless in some way it enters into the rates charged on the grain traffic, and thus makes the rate excessive, or unless by some device a portion of the allowance is returned to the shippers and thus becomes a rebate.-Allowances to Elevators by U. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

[45] Carload and less than carload rates.

Power of Commission to prescribe minimum carload weights,- see post, § 49, note [14].

A distinction should be drawn between the legal obligation of carriers and the discretion that may properly exercise. It would be lawful for carriers to establish carload and less than carload rates on cotton, with a reasonable difference between them and a reasonable minimum which would secure to shippers the lower carload rates; but it does not follow that they are bound to do so, much less that they can be required to establish a differential based upon an unusual carload minimum, especially when such differential is sought to favor the use of a particular machine for compressing cotton.-Planters' Compress Co. v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 382.

A vendee, who has purchased carriages of different manufacturers to the amount of a carload, should be permitted to procure the carload rate thereon by having them brought together at the warehouse of some one of his vendors and by that vendor loaded into the car and shipped. -Buckeye Buggy Co. v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 620.

[46] Prohibition of rates unreasonably low.

A provision that all rates shall be reasonable and just does not render rates unreasonably low unlawful to such an extent as to enable the Interstate Commerce Commission to prohibit their being made. In re Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 55, 137, 2 I. C. C.; R. 231.