supra, held that such articles should be held dutiable under the second duty provision of the paragraph. The imported articles being found to be lace window curtains, and, as such, eo nomine designated in the first duty provision of said paragraph, exactly the same method of reasoning required that they, if embroidered, be relegated to the second duty provision, as obtained in the proper classification of embroidered flouncings. In the case at bar the articles imported are collars made of netting, embroidered. Collars not being eo nomine designated in the first duty provision of the paragraph, the case is not parallel to United States v. Field, supra, and the goods were properly classified by the collector under the 90 per centum provision of the paragraph. Considerable argument is offered to demonstrate that the goods in question are not articles made of "nets and nettings, embroidered." The theory advanced is that the imported collars were manufactured of several component materials, among which was netting, unembroidered; that the embroidery was placed upon the netting concurrently with the making of the collars and, hence, the netting never was embroidered. But as we view the case this is immaterial. If the collars were made, in part, of plain netting, this answers every requirement of the statute which specifies "embroidered or otherwise," that is, embroidered or not, as we have held in United States v. Vandegrift, 4 Ct. Cust. Appls. 226, T. D. 33438, and United States v. Chesterton,. 15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 175, T. D. 42232. The judgment of the court below is reversed. UNITED STATES v. T. E. ASH AND MARKLE STEEL Co. (No. 3089)1 DEFORMED STEEL BARS-DUTIABILITY. Following United States v. Henry L. Exstein Co., Inc., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls.. 328, T. D. 43079, and United States v. B. R. Anderson & Co., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. T. D. 43093, both decided concurrently herewith, deformed, re-inforced steel bars are dutiable as structural shapes of steel under paragraph 312, Tariff Act of 1922, rather than as steel bars under paragraph 304 of the same act. United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 19, 1928 APPEAL from United States Customs Court, Abstract 4947 [Affirmed.] Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth G. Osborn, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States. R. C. Patterson and De Vries & Davis (Jesse P. Crawford of counsel) for appellees. 1T. D. 43088. [Oral argument October 10, 1928, by Mr. Osborn and Mr. Crawford] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND and HATFIELD, Associate Judges BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The collector at the port of Houston, Tex., classified deformed, reinforced, steel bars as steel bars at 1 cent and not above 12 cents per pound under paragraph 304 of the Tariff Act of 1922. Importers protested the classification, claiming the merchandise dutiable at one-fifth of 1 cent per pound under that portion of paragraph 312 of said act providing for "all other structural shapes of iron or steel.” Paragraphs 304 and 312 are as follows: PAR. 304. Steel ingots, cogged ingots, blooms and slabs, by whatever process made; die blocks or blanks; billets and bars, whether solid or hollow; shafting; pressed, sheared, or stamped shapes, not advanced in value or condition by any process or operation subsequent to the process of stamping; hammer molds or swaged steel; gun-barrel molds not in bars; alloys not specially provided for used as substitutes for steel in the manufacture of tools; all descriptions and shapes of dry sand, loam, or iron molded steel castings; sheets and plates and steel not specially provided for; all of the foregoing valued at not over 1 cent per pound, two-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 1 cent and not above 11⁄2 cents per pound, three-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 11⁄2 and not above 22 cents per pound, five-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 21⁄2 and not above 31⁄2 cents per pound, eight-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 31⁄2 and not above 5 cents per pound, 1 cent per pound; valued above 5 and not above 8 cents per pound, 1% cents per pound; valued above 8 and not above 12 cents per pound, 21⁄2 cents per pound; valued above 12 and not above 16 cents per pound, 31⁄2 cents per pound; valued above 16 cents per pound, 20 per centum ad valorem: Provided, That on steel circular saw plates there shall be levied, collected, and paid an additional duty of one-fourth of 1 cent per pound. PAR. 312. Beams, girders, joists, angles, channels, car-truck channels, tees, columns and posts, or parts or sections of columns and posts, deck and bulb beams, and building forms, together with all other structural shapes of iron or steel, not assembled, manufactured or advanced beyond hammering, rolling, or casting, one-fifth of 1 cent per pound; any of the foregoing machined, drilled, punched, assembled, fitted, fabricated for use, or otherwise advanced beyond hammering, rolling, or casting, 20 per centum ad valorem; sashes, frames, and building forms of iron or steel, 25 per centum ad valorem. The court below sustained the claim of importers, and the Government has appealed to this court, and here it is conceded that the same issue is involved as was involved in the decision of United States v. Henry L. Exstein Co., Inc., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 328, T. D. 43079, Suit No. 3086, and United States v. B. R. Anderson & Co., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. -, T. D. 43093, Suit No. 3088), both of which are decided concurrently herewith. In each of the above cited cases it was held that merchandise like that in controversy here was dutiable under paragraph 312 as structural shapes of steel. The reasons for such action are fully set out in the Exstein Co., case, supra, which we regard as fully controlling in the case at bar. Upon the authority of the decision of the court in that case, we hold that the merchandise involved herein is properly dutiable as other structural forms of steel under paragraph 312 and, therefore, the judgment of the United States Customs Court is affirmed. SCHARF BROS. Co. (INC.) v. UNITED STATES (No. 3095)1 1. SIMILAR MERCHANDISE-IDENTITY IN COMPOSITION-FINDING OF COURT BELOW. A finding that the merchandise "in chemical composition is similar to the rock candy sold or freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland * * *” is not sufficient, within itself, to be regarded as a finding that the imported merchandise was similar to the merchandise sold for home consumption. A thing may be similar chemically and yet not similar within the meaning of that word as used in section 402 (b), Tariff Act of 1922. 2. ROCK CANDY SIMILAR MERCHANDISE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING FINDING. The finding of the court below that the imported rock candy, composed of crystals of sucrose united together, and formed on strings in the process of manufacture, "is similar to the rock candy sold or freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland," is supported by the evidence which shows that both the imported candy and that sold for home consumption are made in the same kind of vats, by the same process, and out of the same material; that they are of approximately the same value, identical in composition, taste, color, and use, differing only in the sizes of the crystals and in the fact that for the home market the crystals are separated and the strings broken before sale. Their qualities of identity and similarity render them commercially interchangeable. 3 "SIMILAR"-COMMERCIAL INTERCHANGEABILITY-LEGISLATIVE INTENT. In providing that the price or value of a "similar" article should be taken for the value of the imported article, the Congress did not contemplate that an article would or would not be regarded as 'similar" solely because of the whims, petty prejudices, or other like considerations of the trade, in reference to the commercial interchangeability of merchandise. 66 United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 19, 1928 APPEAL from United States Customs Court, Circular Reappraisement 997 2 {Affirmed.] Barnes, McKenna & Halstead (Samuel M. Richardson of counsel) for appellants. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Hugo P. Geisler and Oscar Igstaedter, special attorneys, of counsel), for the United States. 1T. D. 43089. 2 Decision on application for review (Circ. Reap. 730). [Oral argument October 11, 1298, by Mr. Richardson and Mr. Igstaedter] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND and HATFIELD, Associate Judges BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The importation from Holland, rock-candy sticks or sugar sticks, entered at its United States value, was appraised at its foreign value by the local appraiser at the port of New York. Appeal was taken to the United States Customs Court, where the cause was tried by a single justice who affirmed the values found by the local appraiser. Appellant appealed to the second division of the Customs Court from the decision of the single appraising justice, which appeal resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of the Government and which judgment affirmed the appraisement made by the single appraising justice. Appellants have appealed to this court from the decision of the court below and here present but one question for the decision of this court. Did the court below properly find from the record that there was a foreign market value for such or similar merchandise? It is conceded that there was no export value for the merchandise, and the controversy between the parties was as to whether there was a foreign value, both sides admitting that if there was no foreign value shown in the record, the merchandise was properly appraised at its United States value, as invoiced and entered. The definition of foreign value is found in section 402 (b) of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, and is as follows: The foreign value of imported merchandise shall be the market value or the price at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States. (Italics ours.) In reappraisement cases the statute requires the court below to state its action in a written decision and to set forth the facts upon which the findings are based and the reasons therefor. From the decision of the court below, evidently made in attempted compliance with the mandate of the statute to set "forth the facts upon which the finding is based and the reasons therefor," we quote the following: First. That the importer is the shipper's sole and exclusive agent in the United States for this merchandise. Second. That the importation consists of white and brown crystallized rock candy on strings. Third. That in chemical composition it is similar to the rock candy sold or freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland, the exported candy and that sold in Holland being made at the same time in the same vat and from the same material. Fourth. That the market values of such or similar merchandise on the date of exportation were those returned by the appraiser, to wit: Fifty-one florins for the white and fifty florins for the brown rock candy. Both sides to the controversy agree that to support the judgment of the court below it should have found as a fact that there was, at the time of exportation, a foreign value for the merchandise in dispute as defined by subdivision (b) of section 402, supra, and that one of the essential facts necessary to be found in finding foreign value was that "such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade," etc. The trial of the cause in the court below narrowed down to but one issue: Was there, at the time of exportation, merchandise "similar" to the imported merchandise freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland, it being conceded that there was no merchandise identical with the imported merchandise sold or offered for sale for such home consumption at the time of exportation. The law is too well settled to require citation that in reviewing a reappraisement judgment of the United States Customs Court it is the duty of this court, whose review is limited to questions of law only, to ascertain if there is any substantial evidence in the record supporting the essential facts found by it. If the court below did not find that there was such or similar merchandise sold or freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland at the time of exportation, one of the essential facts to support its judgment would be absent from the record and under our decision in Downing & Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 235, T. D. 42243, we would be compelled to remand the cause for a proper finding of facts. The findings are not clear, but we think, from the view we take of them, that they indicate that the court found that there was such or similar merchandise sold or freely offered for sale for home consumption in Holland at the time of exportation. True enough, the third finding, unless coupled with other findings in the decision, would not be sufficient to be regarded as a finding that the imported merchandise was similar to merchandise sold for home consumption. It will be noted that the third finding states "that in chemical composition it is similar to the rock candy sold or freely offered for sale for home. consumption in Holland, the exported candy and that sold in Holland being made at the same time, in the same vat, and from the same material." If these were the only reasons why the court below determined that the merchandise sold in Holland for home consumption was similar to the imported merchandise, we would be compelled to disagree with it. It seems clear to us that a thing may be similar chemically and yet not similar within the meaning of the word as |