Webster defines "author" as "one who composes or writes a book, a composer as distinguished from an editor, translator, or compiler," and defines “authorship" as "the quality or state of being an author." There are other meanings given to these words, but we think the foregoing is the sense in which the word "authorship" is used in paragraph 1310. A mere mechanical production, such as the importations here, is not, we think, susceptible of authorship as that word is used in the paragraph. Subdivision (2) is elliptical. The board filled the ellipsis by inserting the word "books" after "all other," and found the merchandise here to be books. We are of opinion that Congress intended that the ellipsis might only be filled by inserting therein the articles named in subdivision (1) which, though susceptible of authorship, were not, in fact, of bona fide foreign authorship and that no articles not susceptible of authorship should be classified under either subdivision (1) or (2). If such had not been the congressional intent, it was unnecessary to provide eo nomine for blank books and slate books in subdivision (3), because if subdivision (2) included all books, regardless of whether or not they were susceptible of authorship, blank books and slate books would have fallen within subdivision (2), the rate of duty thereunder being the same. We see no reason to depart from the reasoning thus lucidly expressed. In the case at bar similar reasoning is applicable. There is nothing about these telephone notebooks which indicates authorship. Such lettering as appears thereon is merely such as might appear upon any blank book or similar article. The collector has found that they are in chief value of paper, and hence they were properly classified as manufactures of paper. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed and the cause remanded. FRYE & Co. v. UNITED STATES (No. 3084) 1 REMISSION OF ADDITIONAL DUTIES-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. Wheat screenings imported from Vancouver, B. C., were entered at the port of Seattle on four different dates, from December 16, 1924, to January 9, 1925. The market value at the times of the importations was fluctuating greatly, sometimes as much as $3 or $4 a ton a day. Three of the entries (two on pro forma invoices, one on consular invoice) were made by a clerk of the importer, whose duty it was to make customs entries and who was working under the direct supervision of the office manager. The other entry (on pro forma invoice) was made by the manager of a subsidiary, whose duty it was to make such entries in the absence of the clerk. Both the clerk and the manager of the subsidiary had general instructions to enter all goods at market value on date of exportation. Accordingly, the clerk, in each instance before making entry, applied to a customs official for information as to market value, and being informed there was no information available, called the seller by telephone at Vancouver and inquired of him the market value on date of exportation. He then entered the goods at the values thus given, which in each instance was an advance over invoice price. Likewise, the manager of 1 T. D. 43078. the subsidiary consulted the seller in person, who happened to be in Seattle at the time, and from the information received made the entry at an advance over the purchase price. Held, that the prayer of the petition should have been granted. Wolf & Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 589, T. D. 41453. United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 19, 1928 APPEAL from United States Customs Court, Abstract 4806 [Reversed and remanded.] Donworth, Todd & Holman, and Wise, Whitney & Parker (Byrd D. Wise of counsel) for appellee. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Philip Stein and Oscar Igstaedter, special attorneys, of counsel), for the United States. [Oral argument October 5, 1928, by Mr. Wise and Mr. Igstaedter] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND and HATFIELD, Associate Judges The Customs Court, after a hearing, denied the same, and the appellant brings the matter here, alleging that the court erred in not granting the prayer of the petition and in failing to make a finding of fact such as is contended to be necessary under United States v. Fish, 268 U. S. 607. The facts as shown by the record are, briefly, as follows: Appellant imported four shipments of wheat screenings from Vancouver, B. C., at the port of Seattle, Wash., which were entered separately on December 16, 1924, and January 22, February 4, and January 9, 1925, the entries being numbered respectively 3107, 3677, 3824, and 3463. Entries numbered 3677, 3824, and 3463 were made by H. L. Parsons, a clerk in the employ of appellant, whose duty it was to make customs entries and who worked under the direct supervision of Thomas Henry Cliff Harding, office manager of appellant. The remaining entry was made by George J. Gagnon, manager of the Union Stock Yards, a subsidiary of appellant, and who performed the duties of Parsons when the latter was absent. The final appraised values for the respective entries were $17, $23, $22, and $19.50 a ton. The testimony further shows that at the times of these importations these screenings are gathered in small quantities from various localities and shipped to a central point, and that the market value thereof, at Vancouver, was fluctuating greatly, sometimes as much as $3 or $4 a ton a day, due to supply and demand. It appears that Parsons was generally instructed by Harding to disregard, in all cases, the purchase price, and to enter goods at their market value at the time of exportation. Parsons made entries 3463 and 3677 upon pro forma invoices, not having the consular invoices at the time. Entry 3824 seems to have been made upon a consular invoice. At the respective times these entries were made, Parsons applied to an official in the customhouse, by the name of Jarrett, for information as to the market values of the goods. He was informed there was no information available, but that the goods should be entered at the market value. Parsons thereupon, in each instance, called by telephone W. T. Miller at Vancouver, the person from whom such screenings had been purchased, and inquired the market value of the same on the date of export. On this information being received, the goods were entered according to the values thus given, the importer voluntarily advancing his values from $17 to $18.50 a ton, in entry No. 3824, and $552.39 in entry No. 3463. Gagnon also made entry No. 3107 on a pro forma, invoice. He had been instructed by Harding to enter all goods at their market value on the date of export. Before making the entry in question, he consulted the said Miller, who happened to be in the Seattle office at the time, and from the information thus received made the entry, adding $1 a ton, to make market value, to the purchase price of $15 a ton. This is the substance of the record. An attempt was made to show knowledge by Parsons of certain marginal notations of value upon the invoices in entries Nos. 3677 and 3463. It was clearly developed, however, that these invoices had not been in the hands of Parsons before said entries were made, but were in the possession of the customs officers, and that the entries thereon were made by said customs officers. Upon this record we are of opinion remission should have been granted. It would be a work of supererogation to again cite or dwell upon the various authorities on this subject. We have, on numerous occasions, been called upon to announce our views upon this statute. Many of these authorities were summed up and expressed in Wolf & Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 589, T. D. 41453, as follows: Summarized, these adjudged cases announce certain fundamental facts which the petitioner must establish if he is to obtain relief: First, he must show that in undervaluing his goods he was acting in entire good faith; second, that there were no facts or circumstances known to the petitioner when he made his entry which would cause a prudent and reasonable person to question the correctness of the values given by him; third, that he has made to the collector in making his entry, a full and candid disclosure of all the material facts in his possession bearing upon the value of the merchandise imported. Testing the facts in the case at bar by the rule thus stated, no reason appears why importer has not brought itself within the rule. The facts all affirmatively show that the importer was trying to fully disclose to the customs officials the truth about the values of his importation, and that no fraud or deceit was intended. In such a case remission should have been granted, and it was error to refuse it. Randall Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 540, T. D. 41427; Syndicate Trading Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 409, T. D. 41339. For this reason, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. UNITED STATES v. HENRY L. EXSTEIN CO., INC. (No. 3086)1 1. DEFORMED STEEL BARS-REINFORCEMENT FOR CONCRETE-STRUCTURAL SHAPES. So-called steel bars, in part approximately 1% inches square and 60 feet in length, in part round, 40 feet in length, and three-eighths and one-half inch in diameter, completely manufactured, and not advanced beyond hammering, rolling, or casting, with surfaces so ridged and shaped as to make them suitable for holding when embedded in concrete construction, and used chiefly for reinforcement for concrete, are "structural shapes * * * of steel" within the meaning of paragraph 312, Tariff Act of 1922. 2. STEEL BARS NOT FABRICATED FOR USE-CLASSIFICATION. The fact that steel bars used precisely as other structural shapes of steel, when used in buildings where concrete work is needed, require certain manipulations in the progress of construction, by the bending of the ends in such form that they can be anchored by means of stirrups, or otherwise, to the wall columns or laterals of the building, will not remove them from the classification of "structural shapes" into that of "material," though bought and sold in bulk as other building materials. 3. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 312, TARIFF ACT OF 1922-"FABRICATED FOR USE." The expression "fabricated for use as contained in paragraph 312, Tariff Act of 1922, is construed to mean that there may be products of steel included within the paragraph which are not fabricated for use. If a steel product is used as a structural shape of steel, it is not removed from that classification because it requires fitting and fabricating, to a degree, before it is used. 4. COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. Evidence that the bars were bought and sold and known in the trade as "deformed bars," "reinforced bars," or "concrete bars" is not sufficient to remove them from the classification of "structural shapes" into that of "bars." 5. STEEL AS PART OF STRUCTURE-CLASSIFICATION. Whether or not steel that goes into a structure and becomes a part thereof is to be classified as "structural shapes" or "material" will depend, in each case, upon its character, designation, and use. 1T. D. 43079. United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 19, 1928 APPEAL from United States Customs Court, T. D. 42677 [Affirmed.] Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth G. Osborn, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States. Colladay, Clifford & Pettus (Henry B. Morrow, Edward F. Colladay, Edward Clifford, J. P. Crawford and Frank L. Lawrence of counsel) for appellee. Lamb & Lerch (John G. Lerch of counsel) amici curiæ. [Oral argument October 10, 1928, by Mr. Osborn, Mr. Morrow, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Lawrence, and Mr. Lerch] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND and HATFIELD, Associate Judges GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: William H. Masson entered certain so-called deformed steel bars at the port of Baltimore, which were duly classified by the collector there as steel bars, under paragraph 304 of the Tariff Act of 1922. The appellee protested, claiming the same to be dutiable as structural shapes of steel, under paragraph 312 of the same act. The matter was duly heard by the United States Customs Court, and judgment was entered there sustaining the protest and directing a reclassification accordingly. From that judgment the Government has appealed, alleging that the original classification by the collector was correct and that the court below erred in not so holding. The competing paragraphs are as follows: PAR. 304. Steel ingots, cogged ingots, blooms and slabs, by whatever process made; die blocks or blanks; billets and bars, whether solid or hollow; shafting; pressed, sheared, or stamped shapes, not advanced in value or condition by any process or operation subsequent to the process of stamping; hammer molds or swaged steel; gun-barrel molds not in bars; alloys not specially provided for used as substitutes for steel in the manufacture of tools; all descriptions and shapes of dry sand, loam, or iron molded steel castings; sheets and plates and steel not specially provided for; all of the foregoing valued at not over 1 cent per pound, two-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 1 cent and not above 11⁄2 cents per pound, three-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 11⁄2 and not above 22 cents per pound, five-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 21⁄2 and not above 32 cents per pound, eight-tenths of 1 cent per pound; valued above 31⁄2 and not above 5 cents per pound, 1 cent per pound; valued above 5 and not above 8 cents per pound, 110 cents per pound; valued above 8 and not above 12 cents per pound, 21⁄2 cents per pound; valued above 12 and not above 16 cents per pound, 32 cents per pound; valued above 16 cents per pound, 20 per centum ad valorem: Provided, That on steel circular saw plates there shall be levied, collected and paid an additional duty of one-fourth of 1 cent per pound. PAR. 312. Beams, girders, joists, angles, channels, car-truck channels, tees, columns and posts, or parts or sections of columns and posts, deck and bulb beams, and building forms, together with all other structural shapes of iron or steel, not assembled, manufactured or advanced beyond hammering, rolling, or casting, one-fifth of 1 cent per pound; any of the foregoing machined, drilled, |