mainders will be equal. Though these are unquestionable Truths, many propositions may be found in numbers, equally if not more clear; as that one and one are equal to two.

4thly, As to real existence, that idea having no connexion with any others than those of self and a first being, we have not even demonstrative, much less intuitive knowledge.

The Rules established in the schools, that all reasonings are er præcognitis et præconcessis, seem to make these maxims the foundation of all knowledge. I suppose they mean that these truths are the first known to the mind, and are the basis of all the other parts of knowledge.

We have shewn in Chap. 2. Book 1. that these are not the truths first known to the mind. A child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother, long before it knows that 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. It is evident that our first ideas are those of particular things; and that abstract ideas are only rendered obvious by constant and familiar use, being fictions of the mind. Does it not require some pains to form the general idea of a triangle? for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In short, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist, an idea comprising some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas :-yet

the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of these ideas for the communication and enlargement of knowledge.

From what has been said it follows that these Maxims are not the foundation of all our knowledge. Cannot we know that one and two are equal to three, without knowing that the whole is equal to all its parts taken together? indeed if there be any odds, the ideas whole and parts are more obscure than those of one, two, three. Scholastic men talk much of the maxims on which the sciences are built: but it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such sciences. Axioms may serve to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. When we find out an idea, by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others, this is a revelation from God to us, by the voice of reason. When God declares any truth to us, this is a revelatian by the voice of his spirit. But in neither of these do we receive our knowledge from maxims; which are of no use in the discovery of unknown truths.

Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths and advances in Mathematical knowledge; but was not assisted by any such general maxims.

When schools were erected, and Professors taught what others had discovered, Axioms were laid down

to be settled in the minds of their scholars, in order to convince them of truths in particular instances, which were not so familiar to them as the Axioms they had learnt: though these particular truths, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident than the axioms themselves. The schools making disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, adjudged the victory to him that kept the field: but as skilful combatants could always run out into an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions, mostly self-evident, were introduced into the schools; and these, being allowed by all, directed and limited the excursions of the disputants. Though it was accounted a glory in the schools obstinately to maintain any side of a question, even after conviction, I think the rational part of mankind will scarcely believe that such a practice could be admitted among the lovers of Truth and students of Religion or Nature: a practice likely to turn men's minds from the sincere search and love of Truth, and to make them doubt whether there be any such thing, at least, that is worth adhering to.

It is one thing to shew a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in possession of truth: but what truths can these maxims teach us, which are only about identical predications? Our knowledge begins with particulars, and gradually rises to generals: but we take afterwards the quite contrary course,

draw our knowledge into general propositions, and have recourse to them as the standards of truth and falsehood. Hence we get a habit of supposing that particular propositions derive their truth and evidence from their conformity with general ones.

Unless we have correct and settled notions of things, general maxims will confirm us in mistakes, and serve to prove contradictions. He who with Des Cartes shall consider Body to be nothing but Extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum and he who considers Body as possessing both extension and solidity, may as easily demonstrate that there is a vacuum. A child making whiteness one of the constant simple ideas in his complex one of man, may demonstrate by the maxim "it is impossible for the same to be and not to be," that a negro is not a man.

CHAP. VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

ALL purely Identical Propositions contain no instruction in them: though they may sometimes serve to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circumlocution or equivocal terms he denies the same thing of itself; because no one will affirm visible contradictions in plain words. By identical

propositions I mean such only, where the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of itself.

Another sort of trifling is when a part of a complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole,a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. What information does the proposition "Lead is a metal," convey to a man who knows the complex idea signified by the word Lead? since all the simple ideas comprised in the term metal were comprehended in the name Lead. To one indeed who knew the meaning of the word metal and not of the word lead, such a proposition is a shorter explanation than the enumeration of its simple ideas heaviness, fusibility, malleability.

To predicate any part of the definition of the term defined, one of its simple ideas of the complex one, is also trifling: as, "all gold is fusible;" for fusibility is a simple idea comprehended in the name gold, and the signification of that name is supposed to be understood. Such propositions may serve to remind a disingenuous reasoner of the definition of his own terms; and are necessary in those cases where the hearer is not supposed to understand the terms used by the speaker.

Those propositions contain instructive truth, where something is affirmed of another, which is