towards the West Coast, and before it arrives at the West Coast, this through freight train has used 20 crews. And the hours on duty for these crews, not the hours on the train, the hours on duty from the moment of report to the monent of release vary from two hours and 10 minutes to five hours and 25 minutes, and average three hours and 23 minutes. That is a day's work?

The average for engineers and firemen in through freight service is only four hours a day. a

In passenger service it is four, and 5.6, I think, in through freight. Now, it seems to me, gentlemen, that not only do

these absolute figures present a condition which needs correction, but think of the inequity of such a structure, where employees working for the same employer, having the same general skill, are so arranged that one group works on the average only 30 hours a week, and the other 50 hours a week for the same pay.

Now, of course, if you try to deal with a

structure of that kind and try to rationalize it, to twist it around, so that those who work too long shall work less and those who work too little shall work more, naturally those who have to work a little more are going to squawk. I have heard that squawk.

Next, we found an overtime system which unlike overtime arrangements in every other industry of which I have

any knowledge, did not in fact penalize management for excessively long tours of duty. As you know, in every other industry if you work overtime, you pay a penalty rate. That serves as a brake opon the management's discretion in using its men for excessively long tours of duty.

industry.

Not so, really, not so effectively in the railroad Under this system which prevails in the railroad industry, a 15 hour run -- a 15 hour run pays no overtime if the train covers at least 200 miles. "In the freight service, the rule is that as long as the train averages 12-1/2 miles an hour or more, the crew gets no overtime. Such a system, it seems to me, does not encourage the management to reduce excessively long runs.

Next, the pay structure for road service, the

so-called dual system of pay, produces bizarre and irrational results. Let me give you some illustrations of why I call it bizarre and irrational.

An engineman runs a fast freight train on Monday,

and he covers 160 miles in four hours. He gets paid $39.95 for that day's run. On Tuesday the same engineer, or another, on a slow freight does 100 miles in 11 hours, as against the other man's four. He gets $39.02.

Now, you might say, well, but he did 60 miles less.

So let us see whether that is the thing that makes the

difference.

An engineer doing 100 miles in 12 hours gets

$43.70. But if in this same length of time he does 160 miles, he gets less pay, only $39.95. Now, whoever invented that belongs in the Rube Goldberg Club. Why should he get less money for doing more miles in the same amount of time? An engineer who does 120 miles in 14 hours gets $50.56. he does 180 miles in the same 14 hours, he gets $6 less. Figure that one out.

But if

Here is a neat one. If the engineer does 60 miles in ten hours, he gets $34 in change. If he does twice as much in ten hours, he gets $3 less. And so on.

I can multiply instances by the gross, and that is why I subscribe to the words which appear in the report which say the conclusion that we draw is that the present disparity in hours on duty, some unduly short and others excessively long, is unconscionable.

The speed basis of overtime is an anachronism involving inconsistence among types of runs. The dual basis of pay contains widespread anomalies, and inequities. wage differentials among classes of service and occupation

contain serious inequities, and so on.

The

The pay rules are complex, with many components and

as such they contribute to disputes. In short, the word which best describes the compensation structure is that it

is a mess.

it, it follows

Now, when you try to introduce some rationality into it follows, gentlemen, that those who are the adventitious beneficiaries of those anomalies will complain.

One of the sacred institutions of railroading is the seniority system, and there is no question that the seniority system does afford the long service employees many choices and many protections. But the seniority system is based upon or is founded upon a base so small that actually it doesn't give the protection that it ought to give. By that I mean this: The seniority system is based upon the division or the terminal or the yard or some other facility. So you might have

a divison of 100 miles in length and an old man engineer or conductor is the senior man there, but if that division should shrink or should disappear entirely, because it may be discontinued, or the terminal may be discontinued, or if

the yard be discontinued, he loses his seniority and may be let out. While a 25 year old youngster may be hired that very day in the adjacent yard in the adjacent terminal

or on the adjacent stretch of track. Why? Because 100 years ago, a hundred miles of road meant something. And the

same archaic division points are responsible for the 20 crew changes that I spoke to you about a moment ago. We had a problem of manning the train. How to man these trains. And there were two services which have to be manned, and you should keep distinct, because the railroad people keep them distinct.

There is engine service and there is train service.

The engine service consists of the men who serve

the engine, the engineer and his fireman. The train service consists of the men who serve the train in road service, the conductor and brakemen. In yard service the foreman and his helpers.

Now let us look at the engine situation.

Every freight

diesel engine today carries a complement of three men, a driver, called an engineer, a fireman, called a fireman-helper,

and a head brakeman. And of this I am certain, because we
saw it with our own eyes, and we heard the evidence with our
own ears, and we studied it until we knew that we had reached
a correct result.

The fireman on board that engine does not serve a useful enough purpose to warrant his retention there. In short, the national diesel rule which was adopted in 1937 was a mistake. Had that mistake not been made in 1937, then in the slowprocess of dieselization, the problem would have been solved, and we would not have that problem today. But because that mistake was made, we have something like 40,000 firemen on bur hard s, today, who are condemned to a life of doing something which doesn't have to be done, and that does not contribute to the human personality.

In the train service, you find these extraordinary conditions. You find a train running along, and it is served

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